B. N. KIRPAL ( 1 ) THIS is a revision petition against, the order of the Additional District Judge- Delhi dismissing the suit of the petitioner filed under S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated the case of the petitioner was that it was in possession of the premises situate at 2nd floor of House No. 4/ 2. Roop Nagar. Delhi. The monthly rent was stated to be Rs. 300 - According to the petitioner, the respondent-landlords had earlier taken proceedings to evict the tenant but without success. The case of the petitioner was that some time between 4th and 26th Feb. 1978. in the absence of the employees, agents and officers of the petitioner-company, the respondents broke open the locks and took illegal and forcible possession of the tenanted premises. A complaint was lodged with the Police on 26th Feb. . 1978. The prayer of the petitioner was that the respondents had dispossessed the petitioner without its consent and a decree for possession of the entire second floor premises of the said house should be passed in favour of the petitioner. ( 3 ) THE defence of the respondents was that the petitioner voluntarily had handed over vacant possession of the premises in question on 31st Jan. 1978. White it was admitted that there was litigation between the parties with regard to the said premises, in the written statement it was alleged that a eompromise was reached between the. parties through the good offices of one Shri Sat Narain and it was, in pursuance thereto that vacant possession of the premises was handed over on 31st Jan. 1978. ( 4 ) ON the pleadings of the parties, two issues were framed by the trial court. They were as under : 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession of the premises in dispute on the allegations made in the plaint? OPP 2. Relief. ( 5 ) IT appears that the petitioner filed an application, inter alia, contending that the onus of issue No. 1 had been wrongly placed. The submission of the petitioner was that the onus of this issue should have been on the respondents. Vide order dated 24th April, 1979 this application was dismissed. The matter rested there. No revision was filed against the said order. ( 6 ) BOTH the parties led evidence, both oral and documentary. The submission of the petitioner was that the onus of this issue should have been on the respondents. Vide order dated 24th April, 1979 this application was dismissed. The matter rested there. No revision was filed against the said order. ( 6 ) BOTH the parties led evidence, both oral and documentary. The Additional District Judge, vide his order dated 3rd Feb. 1982, came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not entitled to any portion of the premises. The Additional District Judge accepted the defence of the respondents. The present revision petition has been Filed against the aforesaid decision. ( 7 ) THE first contention of Shri Marwaha, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the Additional District Judge erred in referring to and relying on the testimony of D. W. 7 A. S. P. Sri Ram. It was submitted by the learned counsel that his cross-examination had not been completed and, therefore, his evidence should not have been referred to. 1 find there is no merit in this contention. The evidence of D. W. 7 was first recorded on 30th Oct. 1980. During the course of his cross-examination he was directed to bring the file concerning the case which had been investigated by him. It may here be noted that D. W. 7 had carried out the investigation pursuant to the First Information Report which had been lodged with the police station by the petitioner on 26th Feb. 1978 alleging illegal dispossession of the petitioner by the respondents. D. W. 7 then entered the witness box on 9th Mar. 1981. His cross-examination was concluded on that day. There is nothing to indicate that any right was reserved to cross-examine the said witness at a later date. The evidence of the said witness was recorded in toto and the counsel for the petitioner had full opportunity to cross-examine him. His evidence could, therefore, not be excluded by the learned Additional District Judge. ( 8 ) WHILE relying upon S. 109 of the Evidence Act, the next contention of Shri Marwaha was that onus of proof of issue No. 1 had been wrongly placed on the petitioner. It was submitted that as admittedly there had been a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the onus of proving that the said relationship had come to an end ought to have been on the respondents. It was submitted that as admittedly there had been a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the onus of proving that the said relationship had come to an end ought to have been on the respondents. In this connection the learned counsel referred to Harish Chander v. Ghisa Ram AIR 1981 SC 695 . ( 9 ) FOR the view that 1 am taking, it is not necessary for me to go into the question whether the onus was rightly fixed or not I will proceed on the assumption that the onus of issue No. 1 ought to have been on the respondents. Shri Marwaha contended that because the onus was wrongly fixed, therefore the decision of the Additional District Judge stands vitiated. He first referred to Ramesh Chandra v. H. D. Jain College, Arrah, AIR 1957 Pat 145 . This decision can be of little assistance to the learned counsel. It is no doubt true that in this case the court had interfered while exercising revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 Civil Procedure Code In Ramesh Chandra s case the Patna High Court was dealing with a revision which had been filed against the order of the Additional Subordinate Judge holding that the onus of proving two of the issues was on the plaintiff. The revision was not directed against the final judgment, but was directed against an interim order. This is not the case here. In the present case the revision has been filed against the final decision in the suit The question which arises for consideration is whether the decision on merits has to be set aside if the onus has been wrongly placed. In this connection, reference was made by Shri Marwaha to V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar AIR 1963 SC 302 . Strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the following observations : "on the other hand, if in dealing with a question of fact the lower appellate court has placed the onus on a wrong party and its finding of fact is the result, substantially, of this wrong approach, that may be regarded as a defect in procedure. Strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the following observations : "on the other hand, if in dealing with a question of fact the lower appellate court has placed the onus on a wrong party and its finding of fact is the result, substantially, of this wrong approach, that may be regarded as a defect in procedure. " ( 10 ) AT the outset, it may be pointed out that in Ramachandra s case ( AIR 1957 Pat 145 ), the High Court had exercisedjurisdiction as a second appellate court under S. 100 Civil Procedure Code The Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal against the judgment of the appellate court. In any case, assuming that the aforesaid principles apply to a case even where jurisdiction is being exercised under S. 115 Civil Procedure Code, it is to be seen whether the finding of fact of the trnal court is the result of the wrong approach, namely, by wrongly placing the onus on the petitioner. ( 11 ) THERE can be no doubt that if the onus has been wrongly fixed and the suit is decided on the basis that the petitioner had failed to discharge the onus then even in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction this Court would be justified in setting-aside the judgment of the trial court. In the present case, however, I do hot find that the decision of the trial court is in any way influenced by the onus which had been placed on the petitioner with regard to issue No 1. It is no doubt true that in the narration of facts it has been stated that the onus of proof was placed on the petitioner, but while discussing issue No. 1 the Additional District Judge nowhere states that the petitioner has failed to discharge the onus and that is why the said issue has to be decided against the petitioner. ( 12 ) AS already noted, both the parties had led evidence before the trial court. The trial court has referred to the evidence of the petitioner as well as the respondents. The trial court has accepted and believed the evidence led by the respondents and has accordingly come to the conclusion that the petitioner had voluntarily handed over vacant physical possession of the premises in question to the respondents. The trial court has referred to the evidence of the petitioner as well as the respondents. The trial court has accepted and believed the evidence led by the respondents and has accordingly come to the conclusion that the petitioner had voluntarily handed over vacant physical possession of the premises in question to the respondents. Where the entire evidence is discussed and the case decided on merits, without regard to the question as to on whom the onus of proof had been placed, the question of onus becomes immaterial. See Manaka v. Madharao, AIR 1950 PC 25, Ramji Dayawala and Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest Import, AIR 1981 SC 2085 and Smt Prem Lata v. Arhant Kumar Jain, AIR 1973 SC 626 . ( 13 ) SHRI Marwaha then contended that material documents had not been referred to by the trial court and, therefore, the said order was liable to be set aside. In this connection it was stated that the trial court had not referred to a suit filed in Feb. 1978 by the respondents and another suit filed by the respondents in Mar. 1978. According to the learned counsel if reference had been made to these two plaints it would have shown that the respondents had never contended that a compromise between the parties had been arrived at through the intervention of Shri Sat Narain. In my opinion, none of these two documents was relevant As regards the filing of the suit in Mar. 1978, the same is referred to in the impugned judgment It is true that the trial court has not gone into the contention now raised, namely, that name of Sat Narain does not figure in the said suit The said documents may have been relevant if the trial court had found that it is Sat Narain who had brought about a compromise. The trial court has not given any such finding. The trial court has only observed that a compromise was arrived at between the parties and the conclusion of the trial court has primarily been influenced by the testimony of D. W. 7. D. W. 7 had stated that he had carried out investigation pursuant to F. I. R. having been filed by the petitioner. The trial court has only observed that a compromise was arrived at between the parties and the conclusion of the trial court has primarily been influenced by the testimony of D. W. 7. D. W. 7 had stated that he had carried out investigation pursuant to F. I. R. having been filed by the petitioner. He further stated that the conclusion which was arrived at by him on the conclusion of the investigation, was that there was no truth in the complaint and the same was ultimately filed as untraced because none of the offences had been established. Another document to which, it is alleged, reliance has not been placed is a letter dated 6th Feb. 1978 whereby a cheque was sent for rent for the months of Nov. 1977 to Feb. 1978. I, however, find that in para 15 of the judgment there is a reference to this document It is also contended that there is no reference in the judgment to Ex. Public witness 1/8 which is a challan for depositing rent up to 31st Oct 1977. To my mind, the deposit of rent till Oct. 1977 was wholly immaterial for the point in controversy before the Additional District Judge. What had to be determined was whether on 31st Jan. 1978 vacant physical possession had been handed over to the respondents or not The fact that till Oct. 1977 rent had been paid is hot in dispute. In my view, therefore, there is no force in the contention that the judgment should be set aside because of some documents allegedly not to have been referred to. ( 14 ) THE learned counsel also sought to take me through the evidence in order to contend that the judgment is perverse. Inmy opinion, the jurisdiction under S. 115 C. P C is a limited jurisdiction. This jurisdiction is not a jurisdiction of an appellate court. What inference is to be drawn from the evidence on record is for the trnal court or the appellate court The learned counsel wanted me to hold that the story put forth by the respondents was incredible In order to come to this conclusion, it may be necessary to see the evidence and give such a finding. What inference is to be drawn from the evidence on record is for the trnal court or the appellate court The learned counsel wanted me to hold that the story put forth by the respondents was incredible In order to come to this conclusion, it may be necessary to see the evidence and give such a finding. Apart from the fact that as already noted, the jurisdiction under S. 115 is very limited, 1 find that it is not right to say that the story put forth by the respondents is wholly incredible Both sides produced their own witnesses. The only witness which could not have been said to be under the influence of the other party was D. W 7 He is the person who conducted the investigation after the F. I. R. had been filed. From his testimony it is clear that he found that the offence of breaking open the lock and taking illegal Possession of the premises had not been made out against the respondents. It is not for this Court to decide whether the testimony of D. W 7 should have been believed or not The veracity of the testimony was for the trial court to decide. The trial court has. accepted that testimony and having done so. the only conclusion which was possible was the conclusion which the trial court has arrived at, namely that the possession had been voluntarily handed over to the respondents. Having accepted the testimony of D. W 7 it naturally must follow that the story put forth by the respondents had also to be accepted. ( 15 ) IT was lastly contended that this revision petition should be treated as a suit. I am not inclined to do so. Apart from the fact that this Court would have no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit if this petition is treated as a suit no instance has been brought to my notice where a revisional court has treated a revision. petition to be a plaint and proceeded with the case as if it was a suit The decision in the case of Nair Service Society Ltd. v K. C. Alexander AIR 1968 SC 1165 is of no assistance because that case arose from a regular suit where the Supreme Court, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, had allowed the amendment of the written statement. ( 16 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the revision petition is dismissed. The petitioner shall be liable to pay Rs. 2. 000 as costs. Rs. 1,000. will be paid to the respondents and Rs. 1000 - will be paid to the Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board.