JUDGMENT : B.K. Behera, J. - The Court of Session has held the prosecution case established, on the basis of the evidence of three witnesses to the occurrence (P.Ws. 1 to 3) and an extrajudicial confession made by the appellant before his father (P.W. 10) who, in turn, had informed P.W. 9 about it and production of the axe (M.O.I) suspected to be the weapon of attack at the police station, that the appellant had killed his cousin Hiradhar Kollar (to be referred to hereinafter as the 'deceased') by dealing a blow on the backside of his head while the deceased was coming back from the Mathili market in the evening on August 8, 1980, in the company of P.Ws. 1 to 3. The appellant has been convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. 2. Mr. K.C. Mohanty, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has taken us through the evidence and contended that the evidence was highly unsatisfactory and could not sustain the charge. It admits of no doubt from the medical evidence that the deceased had died a homicidal death. P.Ws. 1 to 3 had not definitely stated that M.O.I was in the hands of the appellant with which he had assaulted the deceased. There was no material on record to show that the axe had any stains of blood in it. The seizure of M.O.I on production by the appellant at the police station cannot be of any avail to the prosecution. 3. No doubt, no other person than the father of the appellant had testified that the appellant had admitted before him to have killed the deceased and there was no evidence of any strained relationship between the appellant and his father. This witness (P.W. 10) had, however, stated that this confessional statement had been made by the appellant before the Panchayatdars and Chaukidar, meaning evidently, as has rightly been submitted at the Bar, the Grama Rakshi. It has been laid down in Madan @ Undu Barik v. The State (1977) 43 C.L.T. 512 that an extrajudicial confession made in the presence of a Grama Rakshi who is a police officer is not admissible in evidence. None of the Panchayatdars had supported the evidence of P.W. 10 in this regard. It has been laid down in Madan @ Undu Barik v. The State (1977) 43 C.L.T. 512 that an extrajudicial confession made in the presence of a Grama Rakshi who is a police officer is not admissible in evidence. None of the Panchayatdars had supported the evidence of P.W. 10 in this regard. If the appellant had made any confessional statement before P.W. 10, it was highly unlikely that he would have informed an outsider like P.W. 9 who had spoken about such information having been given by P.W. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, no reliance can be placed on the evidence relating to the extra-judicial confession said to have been made by the appellant. 4. There remains for consideration the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 who, on their own showing, had been coming together with the deceased. According to them, while they were coming together from the Mathili market and on the way, the deceased halted for urination while they proceeded ahead, they heard a sound and on looking back, saw the appellant dealing an axe-blow with its blunt side on the back side of the head of the deceased who had fallen on the ground with the chest down-wards and on being challenged by them, the appellant gave out that he had hit and killed his enemy. None of those three witnesses had made a statement in the course of investigation about any such statement having been made by the appellant. P.W. 2 had not informed any one in the village about what he had claimed to have seen. According to P.Ws. 1 and 3, they had informed P.W. 4, the son of the deceased, about it. It was not in the evidence of P.W. 4 that he had received any information from P.W. 3. According to him, P.W. 1 informed him that the appellant had assaulted his father and that his father was lying dead. This could not be the true state of affairs as the evidence indicated that P.W. 4 and some others went to the spot and brought the deceased in an injured state and he had died in the village at about midnight. Thus the deceased had not died on the spot. 5. This could not be the true state of affairs as the evidence indicated that P.W. 4 and some others went to the spot and brought the deceased in an injured state and he had died in the village at about midnight. Thus the deceased had not died on the spot. 5. P.W. 1 had stated in his cross-examination that the spot was not visible from the place where they heard the sound and on hearing it, they ran back and witnessed the occurrence. It was not in the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 that after they heard the sound, they ran back and saw the assault. This discrepancy becomes material as those three witnesses had been coming together and the evidence of P.W. 1 was that P.Ws. 2 and 3 were then with him. It had been stated by P.W. 1 that they had searched for the deceased finding that he was not with them and apprehending that he might have been waylaid by the robbers. According to P.W. 3, during the night, they went and searched for the deceased and found him lying on the road side and the deceased was carried to his house. As has rightly been submitted on behalf of the appellant, this statement of P.W. 3 would show that none of the villagers had seen the assault for which they went in search for the deceased and found him lying on the road side. P.W. 3 had not stated to the Investigating Officer that he had seen the appellant striking the head of the deceased by the blunt side of the axe from behind. 6. Regard being had to the aforesaid features in the evidence, it would not be safe and proper to accept the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 and hold that the appellant was the author of the crime. The learned Standing Counsel has fairly submitted that in this state of the evidence, it would be reasonable to hold that the charge had not been brought home to the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. He has taken a fair stand and this concession is well-founded. 7. In the result, we would allow the appeal and set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant who shall be set at liberty forthwith. K.P. Mohapatra, J. - I agree. Final Result : Allowed