JUDGMENT K.K. Narendran, J. 1. The short but important question that arises in this case is whether a direction issued by this Court can be nullified and thereby the parties can be deprived of their rights by the State making a retrospective amendment to the rules. The writ appeal is filed by the State of Kerala and the Inspector General of Prisons who were respondents in the original petition. Pending the original petition, a Deputy Jailor got himself impleaded as additional 3rd respondent. The petitioners respondents have filed a memorandum of cross objections in the writ appeal. 2. The petitioners in the original petition are District Probation Officers. They originally formed part of the Kerala Jail Service. They aspired to become Jailors in Central Jails. As per the Special Rules for the Kerala Jail Service, Probation Officers were also in the feeder category for the post of Jailors along with Deputy Jailors. After the petitioners became qualified for the post of jailor, as many as 10 vacancies arose from 23rd April 1969 to 26th March 1974. These vacancies were provisionally filled up by promoting persons belonging to the Jail wing of the department. The petitioners who belong to the probation wing of the department made representations pointing out their legitimate claims for promotions. By a communication dated 2nd January 1975 the Inspector General of Prisons asked for willingness for appointment as Jailors in the Central Prison. By another circular dated 17th June 1975 persons willing for appointment as Jailors were asked to furnish details regarding their qualification. The petitioners complied with the above directions 3. Then, by a Government Order, dated 9th September 1975 the Social Welfare Department was formed and the probation wing of the Jail Department was transferred to the newly formed department. In 1977, by notification, dated 24th June 1977 the Special Rules for the Kerala Jail Service were amended and Probation Officers were taken out of the feeder category for appointment to the post of Jailors. The above amendment was not having any retrospective effect and hence, according to the petitioners, their rights for appointment as Jailors in the vacancies which arose before the Social Welfare Department was formed, were not affected by the amendment. The above amendment was not having any retrospective effect and hence, according to the petitioners, their rights for appointment as Jailors in the vacancies which arose before the Social Welfare Department was formed, were not affected by the amendment. The petitioners again made representations and the State Government instructed the Inspector General of Prisons to take appropriate steps to fill up the vacancies in the post of Jailors which arose prior to 1975. The requisite particulars of the petitioners were duly furnished to the Inspector General of Prisons by the Director of Social Welfare. 4. As no effective steps were taken for filling up the vacancies in question, the petitioners approached this Court with O. P. 4014 of 1978 seeking a relief by way of direction to the State Government and the Inspector General of Prisons to perform their statutory duty of making appointments by recruitment by transfer to the post of Jailors as per the provisions contained in the Special Rules for the Kerala Jail service as it stood at the time of occurrence of the vacancies. The 1st respondent State filed a counter affidavit in the original petition narrating the difficulties which resulted in the delay in making the appointments. This Court by Ext. P-5 judgment, dated 30th January 1980 directed the State to effect regular promotions in accordance with the rules within a period of three months. 5. No steps were taken as directed by this Court in the above judgment. On the other hand, the 1st respondent State issued Ext. P-7 notification, dated 30th April 1980 amending the Special Rules for the Kerala Jail Service with retrospective effect from 23rd May 1968 deleting Probation Officers from the feeder category for appointment to the post of Jailors. It was under the above circumstances that the petitioners again approached this Court with this original petition seeking to quash Ext. P-7 amendments and to declare the claims of the petitioners for being considered for the post of jailors against vacancies which occurred prior to 1975. 6. Pending the original petition, the Departmental Promotion Committee met and drew up a select list of officers for promotion as Jailors. The petitioners amended the original petition to quash the above proceedings Ext. P-8 also. 7. 6. Pending the original petition, the Departmental Promotion Committee met and drew up a select list of officers for promotion as Jailors. The petitioners amended the original petition to quash the above proceedings Ext. P-8 also. 7. A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the 1st respondent State justifying the action taken and pointing out that before making regular appointments to the post of Jailor, the probation wing of the Jail Department was transferred to the Social Welfare Department with effect from 9th September 1975. It has also been pointed out in the counter affidavit that the 1st respondent State took steps for making regular appointments in the cadre of Jailor as per the direction of this Court in its judgment in O.P. 4014 of 1978, but before the Departmental Promotion Committee could meet and prepare the list, Ext. P-7 notification was issued amending the Special Rules with retrospective effect and the petitioners could not be considered for selection as Probation Officers ceased to be in the feeder category with effect from 23rd May 1968. It is also averred in the counter affidavit that the petitioners are ineligible for selection as Jailors and the retrospective amendment to the Special Rules effected by Ext. P-7 notification is not in any way mala fide. The learned Judge who disposed of the original petition rejected the contention of the State that the petitioners could not claim higher post in the jail wing from 1968 and that Ext. P-5 judgment became ineffective. The last proviso in Ext. P-7 notification was struck down as discriminatory. The learned Judge also held that the amendment has to be read down as operative from 24th June 1977. Accordingly, it was held that the Government is bound to comply with Ext. P-5 judgment of this Court and consider the petitioners' case for promotion in the jail wing in accordance with the rules in force till 9th September 1975. 8. The State of Kerala and the Inspector General of Prisons, the respondents in the original petition, have challenged the above judgment in this writ appeal. As already mentioned at the outset, the petitioners respondents have filed a memorandum of cross objections contending that the learned Judge ought to have quashed Ext. P-8 proceedings of the Departmental Promotion Committee drawing up a list of officers for promotion to the post of jailor. 9. As already mentioned at the outset, the petitioners respondents have filed a memorandum of cross objections contending that the learned Judge ought to have quashed Ext. P-8 proceedings of the Departmental Promotion Committee drawing up a list of officers for promotion to the post of jailor. 9. A citizen whose rights are adversely affected by a decision taken by the State or other authorities amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution approaches the Court for a writ or direction to redress his grievance. If he is aggrieved by the non performance of a statutory obligation then also he can approach this Court. In all cases where the rights claimed are justiciable under Art.226 of the Constitution and the party has a real and legal grievance, this Court will grant the relief by the issue of an appropriate writ or direction as the case may be. When this Court issues the writ or direction, the rights claimed by the citizen get transformed into the writ or direction embodied in the judgment. The State or any other party, if aggrieved, will have to go in appeal against the judgment and get it set aside or modified. The State cannot bring legislation with retrospective effect to nullify the effect of the writ or direction issued by this Court and deprive the citizen of his rights already recognised by a judgment of this Court. The legislation or at least its retrospectivity will have to be ignored and the citizen will not be deprived of his rights recognised by the judgment. The position will be different if the judgment is only a declaratory one, for example, holding a tax levied as invalid. In such a case, by amending the law with retrospective effect, the defect pointed out can be rectified and tax levied can be validated. In this case, the petitioners approached this Court on an earlier occasion with an original petition to get their rights for appointment as jailors established. As per the rules, as they stood at the time when the vacancies arose and when the petitioners approached this Court, the petitioners could not be denied the posts. This Court disposed of the original petition with a direction to the State to effect regular promotions in accordance with the rules governing the same. As per the rules, as they stood at the time when the vacancies arose and when the petitioners approached this Court, the petitioners could not be denied the posts. This Court disposed of the original petition with a direction to the State to effect regular promotions in accordance with the rules governing the same. Instead of doing that, the State amended the rules with retrospective effect and deprived the petitioners of their rights for promotion. The net result was that the direction issued by this Court which became final, became a nullity. The rights of the petitioners recognised by this Court and embodied in the direction given by the judgment of this Court cannot be given the go by like this. The direction this Court gave was for the enforcement of the rights of the petitioners. When this Court gives a direction, it cannot but be implemented. There is no escape from it. 10. In coming to the above conclusions we are fortified by the decision of the Supreme Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 1126 . Two settlements were reached in 1974 between the Life Insurance Corporation and its Class III and Class IV employees. The settlements were under S.18 read with S.2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and they covered a number of claims including bonus. Payment of bonus for the year 1975-76 to the employees of the Corporation was stopped under instructions from the Central Government. On a writ petition filed by the employees, a Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court issued a writ of mandamus directing the Corporation to act in accordance with the terms of the settlement. Then, the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976 was passed. The constitutional validity of the above amendment Act was challenged by the employees before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court struck down the Amendment Act and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Union of India and the Life Insurance Corporation to forbear from implementing or enforcing the provisions of the Act and to pay annual cash bonus in accordance with the terms of the settlements. Thereupon, the Corporation issued a notice under S.19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act declaring its intention to terminate the settlements. Thereupon, the Corporation issued a notice under S.19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act declaring its intention to terminate the settlements. A notice was also issued under S.9A of the Industrial Disputes Act proposing to effect a change in the conditions of service applicable to the workmen. This was followed by a notification under S.49 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act substituting a new regulation for the existing regulation No. 58 of the Staff Regulations. Clause (9) of the Standardisation Order concerning bonus also was sought to be amended. The workmen challenged the validity of the notices and the notification in a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court, which was allowed. The Corporation preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court. Another writ petition filed before the Calcutta High Court was transferred to the Supreme Court and the appeal and the writ petition were heard together. The Supreme Court in its judgment D. J. Bahadur's case AIR 1980 SC 2181 directed the Life Insurance Corporation to give effect to the terms of the settlements of 1974 relating to bonus until superseded by a fresh settlement, an industrial award or relevant legislation. The above decision was rendered by the Supreme Court on 10th November 1980. On 31st January 1981 Life Insurance Corporation, (Amendment) Ordinance, 1981 was issued inserting sub clause (cc) in S.48(2) of the Principal Act with retrospective effect from 20th June 1979. By the above ordinance other changes were also effected in the Life Insurance Corporation Act giving power to amend regulations and rules regarding service conditions with retrospective effect. By notification dated 2nd February 1981, Life Insurance Corporation of India Class III and Class IV Employees (Bonus and Dearness Allowance) Rules, 1981 were issued and R.3 of the above rules was given retrospective operation from 1st July 1979. The Amendment Ordinance and the Rules framed thereunder were challenged before the Supreme Court by the petitioner A. V. Nachane and others. Pending the writ petitions, the Ordinance was replaced by an Amendment Act which was also challenged by amending the writ petitions. The Amendment Ordinance and the Rules framed thereunder were challenged before the Supreme Court by the petitioner A. V. Nachane and others. Pending the writ petitions, the Ordinance was replaced by an Amendment Act which was also challenged by amending the writ petitions. One of the contentions taken was that in any event S.48(2C) of the Act was invalid as it permitted retrospective operation to R.3 to override the order of the Supreme Court ia D. J. Bahadur's case AIR 1980 SC 2181 Rejecting the contentions of the Union of India, the Supreme Court held: "We therefore hold that R.3 operating retrospectively cannot nullify the effect of the writ issued in D. J. Bahadur's case (AIR 1980 SC 2381) which directed the Life Insurance Corporation to give effect to the terms of the 1974 settlements relating to bonus until superseded by a fresh settlement, an industrial award or relevant legislation. The Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 and the Life Insurance Corporation of India Class III and Class IV employees (Bonus and Dearness Allowance) Rules, 1981 are relevant legislations. However in view of the decision in Madan Mohan Pathak's case, these rules, in so far as they seek to abrogate the terms of the 1974 settlements relating to bonus, can operate only prospectively, that is, from February 2, 1981, the date of publication of the rules." (para 13) In the above case, the Supreme Court has relied on its earlier decision in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 803 . In Madan Mohan Pathak's case AIR 1978 SC 803 , the contention was that since the Calcutta High Court by its judgment, dated 21st May 1976 issued a writ of mandamus directing the Life Insurance Corporation to pay annual cash bonus to Class III and Class IV employees for the year April 1, 1975 to March 31, 1976 as provided by the 1974 settlements and as this judgment had become final, the Life Insurance Corporation was bound to obey the writ of mandamus and pay as ordered by the High Court. The Court was dealing with S.3 of the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976 which provided that the terms of the settlements in so far as they related to the payment of annual cash bonus to Class III and Class IV employees would not have any force or effect and be deemed not to have had any force or effect from April, 1975. Bhagawati, J., delivering the majority judgment of the Court, held: "Here, the judgment given by the Calcutta High Court, which is relied upon by the petitioners, is not a mere declaratory judgment holding an impost or tax to be invalid, so that a validation statute can remove the defect pointed out by the judgment amending the law with retrospective effect and validate such impost or tax. But it is a judgment giving effect to the right of the petitioners to annual cash bonus under the Settlement by issuing a writ of Mandamus directing the Life Insurance Corporation to pay the amount of such bonus. If by reason of retrospective alteration of the factual or legal situation, the judgment is rendered erroneous, the remedy may be by way of appeal or review, but so long as the judgment stands, it cannot be disregarded or ignored and it must be obeyed by the Life Insurance Corporation. We are, therefore, of the view that, in any event, irrespective of whether the impugned Act is constitutionally valid or not, the Life Insurance Corporation is bound to obey the writ of Mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court...." (page 817) 11. It goes without saying that no interference whatsoever is called for in the writ appeal. It is only proper that the claims of the petitioners in the original petition for promotion are considered and a decision taken without further delay. This is all the more necessary as the matter is already pending for a considerable time. 12. The main grievance in the memorandum of cross objections filed by the respondents is that the learned Judge did not quash Ext. P-8 select list. Nobody included in the select list was made a party in the original petition. They are not parties in this writ appeal also. For this simple reason, it goes without saying that Ext. P-8 select list cannot be interfered within these proceedings. P-8 select list. Nobody included in the select list was made a party in the original petition. They are not parties in this writ appeal also. For this simple reason, it goes without saying that Ext. P-8 select list cannot be interfered within these proceedings. But, it is made clear that this will not affect the rights of petitioners respondents to get promotion as Jailors as per the Special Rules as it stood before the probation wing of the Jail Department was transferred to the newly formed Social Welfare Department. 13. In the result, the writ appeal and the memorandum of cross objections are dismissed. No Costs.