JUDGMENT : Hari Lal Agrawal, J. - This application is directed against the ORDER :of the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Saharsa, respondent no. 2, dated 11.6.1980. The petitioners are the Bataidars. 2. A proceeding under section 48E of the Bihar Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was started at the instance of the petitioners before the Bataidari Deputy Collector, Saharsa, who proceeded with the case in accordance with the rules framed under the said provision and referred the parties to the Bataidari Board. The Bataidari Board, however, having failed to transmit the records to the Deputy Collector, in accordance with the scheme laid down under sub-section (10) of section 48E of the Act withdrew the proceeding from the Board and by its ORDER :dated 2.7.1977 (Annexure-1) decided the case in favour of the petitioners. 3. An appeal was taken before the Additional Collector, as already said earlier, who by the impugned ORDER :, Annexure 2, has interfered with the ORDER :of the Deputy Collector. 4. Shri Girindra Mohan Thakur, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has submitted that since no appeal lay against the ORDER :(Annexure-1) the ORDER :of the Additional Collector must be quashed. Section 48F of the Act specifically lays down that an appeal shall lie from an ORDER :referred to in sub-section (8) of section 48-E of the Act. Sub-section (8) of section 48E of the Act In its term reads as follows:- xx xx xx "(8). In case of disagreement with the report or the findings of the Board, the Collector shall, after recording his reason, for such disagreement and after giving the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard, make such enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary and on being satisfied that: (i) x x x (ii) x x x (iii) x x x From the above provision it is obvious that the appellate remedy provided to an aggrieved person is limited, only in cases of disagreement between the Board and the Collector under the Act. (See - Jai Ram Das Bhatia and another v. State of Bihar and others : A. I. R. 1977 Patna, 315). 5. This position could not be disputed on behalf of the landlords. It was, however, contended by Mr. Gorakh Nath Singh, that although an appeal did not lie within the straight jacket of section 48F of the Act before respondent no. 5. This position could not be disputed on behalf of the landlords. It was, however, contended by Mr. Gorakh Nath Singh, that although an appeal did not lie within the straight jacket of section 48F of the Act before respondent no. 2, since by the, impugned ORDER :a wrong has been set aside, this Court sitting in writ jurisdiction would not interfere. Reference was made to the case of Devendra Pd. Gupta v. The State of Bihar and ors. (1977 B.B.C.J., 543) as well as the case of Abdul Majid and, others v. The State Transport Appellate Authority, Bihar and others (A.I.R. 1960 Patna, 333). The first case referred to by Mr. Singh was a case under section 103-A of the Bihar Tenancy Act. In this case the High Court set aside both the ORDER :s i.e. the illegal ORDER :passed by the higher authority as well as the original authority. No doubt, in this case there is an observation that resort for quashing one illegal ORDER :resulting into revival of another illegal ORDER :should not be taken and for this observation reliance was placed upon the second case, which is a case under the Motor Vehicles Act where the ORDER :of the Regional Transport Authority granting renewal of permits was manifestly without jurisdiction and the ORDER :of the Appellate Authority setting aside that ORDER :was also erroneous and illegal but did not work injustice to any party in that event the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 was refused to be invoked to annul the said ORDER :. 6. I am afraid, the principle of neither of the cases relied upon by Mr. Singh is of any application to this case, although there is a direct Bench decision of this Court on this point in Hari Prasad Mandal & ors. v. Additional Collector & ors. ( 1978 BBCJ 575 : 1978 PLJR 636 ). Here the only illegality pointed out in the ORDER :, Annexure-1, on behalf of the landlords is that the vendees were not added in the proceeding. That may be so, but nonetheless the original landlords had participated in the proceeding and have been heard. I fail to understand as to how on account of absence of the transferees of the landlords with respect to some of the lands, the ORDER :would become without jurisdiction. That may be so, but nonetheless the original landlords had participated in the proceeding and have been heard. I fail to understand as to how on account of absence of the transferees of the landlords with respect to some of the lands, the ORDER :would become without jurisdiction. The landlords had contested the matter and the claim of the Bataidars had been examined in along considered ORDER :of the Deputy Collector, Annexure-1. 7. Examining the language of sub-section (8) of section 48E it is manifest that right of appeal has been conferred only when there is disagreement between the Board and the Collector under the Act. In a situation where the Collector passes an ORDER :under sub-section (10) of section 48E there is no occasion for disagreement and the ORDER :is not better than an ORDER :, which is passed in agreement with the recommendation of the Board. It is, therefore, plain that the legislature did not intend to provide any remedy of appeal to an ORDER :passed by the Collector in exercise of a situation contemplated under sub-section (10) of sectin1 48E. The respondents, therefore, had no right to go in appeal against the ORDER :of the Deputy Collector, Annexure-1, and the interference in the purported exercise of appellate forum by the Additional Collector is wholly without jurisdiction. 6. I would, accordingly, allow this application and quash the ORDER :, Anncxure-2. In the circumstances, however, I shall leave the parties to bear their own costs.