R. DAYAL, J. ( 1 ) JUDGMENT :- This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 11th July, 1985 of the learned District Judge dismissing the suit brought by the appellants for a declaration that appellant No. 1 is the owner of plot No. 2003 Rakdong Block, East District, measuring 1. 4780 hectares, for a direction to the authorities concerned to correct the relevant entry in column No. 2 of the Dhadia Khatian by inserting the name of appellant No. 1 in place of the name of Leda Lepcha and also for perpetual injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with their possession in respect of that land. ( 2 ) APPELLANT No. 1 is the son of appellant No. 2 and respondent No. 1 is the son of respondent No. 2. Admittedly the land in question was originally government land under the landlord Gaden Kazi who could pass on the land to any one. Both the parties claim to have taken grant from the said landlord. According to the appellants, appellant No. 2 got the grant in the year 1946 whereas, according to the respondents, the father of respondent No. 2, Leda Lama Lepcha took the grant in the year 1945. The appellants have pleaded that in the year 1962, appellant No. 2 handed over possession of the land to appellant No. 1 and since then the latter has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the same; but during the recent survey operation the land was wrongly recorded in the name of late Leda Lepcha, the father of respondent No. 2 whereafter, at the instance of appellant No. 1, respondent No. 2 made an application addressed to the settlement authorities on 21st June, 1982 requesting them for correcting the entry into the name of appellant No. 1. Appellants have further pleaded that appellant No. 1 submitted a written application with a copy of the application prepared by respondent No. 2 to the settlement authorities but the same was not attended to; and suddenly in November, 1984 respondent No. 1 came to the land with police and claimed a share in the produce stating that appellant No. 1 was only a adhiadar and coerced and forced that appellant to sign an agreement dated 11-11-84 (Ex. D-8) in the form of a compromise addressed to the District Magistrate, East Sikkim to the effect that during enquiry on the complaint made by respondent No. 1,the matter was discussed by the elders of the village and it was found that respondent No. 2 had given the land to appellant No. 1 for cultivation and enjoyment and thereafter the land was given by appellant No. 1 to respondent No. 1 after enjoying the produce of the land for the year 1984, being the compensation for improvement of the land. On the other hand, the case of the respondents is that after getting the grant of the land from the landlord Gaden Kazi in the year 1945, Leda Lama Lepcha, the father of respondent No. 2, allowed his father late Ingib Lepcha to enjoy the produce of the land, during his lifetime as "jewney" and on the death of Ingib Lepcha he himself took over the land and continued to enjoy it until his death in the year 1981. It is pleaded that the responsibility for performing the death rites of Leda Lama Lepcha fell on respondent No. 2 who was in financial distress at that time and so he obtained a loan of Rs. 5,475/- from respondent No. 1, under an agreement that the produce of the land would be received by appellant No. 1 as interest but since the agreement was not in writing, the transaction was treated as of adhiadar. Further it is stated that in the year 1979 Survey operations, the land was wrongly recorded in the name of the paternal uncle of respondent No. 2, Chyabuk Lepcha and on representation made to the department of Survey and Settlement, the record was corrected and the name of Leda Lama Lepcha was recorded without there being any objection from any quarter. It is further alleged that respondent No. 1 asked the appellants to hand over the possession of the land and on their refusal to do so, respondent No. 1 complained to the District Magistrate, East Sikkim who ordered a police enquiry and during the police enquiry facts about financial transaction came to light and on the same day that is 11-11-84 respondent No. 2 repaid a sum of Rs. 4,050. 00 to appellant No. 1 with an undertaking that the remaining amount of Rs. 1,425. 4,050. 00 to appellant No. 1 with an undertaking that the remaining amount of Rs. 1,425. 00 would be repaid on 21-11-84 and accordingly the remaining amount was also paid to appellant No. 1 on the latter date. Regarding the compromise, the respondents have alleged that the same had been drawn up through the intervention of the block Mondal, the local Panchayat and in the presence of a large number of witnesses making a request for dismissal of the complaint filed by respondent No. 1 as withdrawn and after the compromise, possession of the land reverted to the respondents. Regarding the appellants' allegation about wrong entry during the last survey, the respondents have pleaded that the entry in the name of Leda Lepcha was not wrong and appellant No. 1 never approached respondent No. 2 for correcting the record and that the respondents are not aware of appellant No. 1 having made any application to the authorities. ( 3 ) THE learned District Judge framed eight issues. Issues Nos. 3, 4 and 5 upon which the decision has turned are to the effect whether the appellants had any right, title and interest in respect of the land in question and whether they are in possession and whether the record of rights in respect of the land in question was wrong. All these issues were decided by the learned District Judge against the appellants, which resulted in dismissal of the suit. ( 4 ) IN proof of their respective cases, the parties produced the documents of grant Exhibit P-1 being the grant in favour of appellant No. 2 and Exhibit D-1 in favour of Leda Lama Lepcha. No person entered the witness box to prove the hand-writing or the signature of the grantor of these grants but since both the documents same from proper custody and were more than 30 years old, they were marked Exhibits. To give proper evidentiary weight to these grants, the learned District Judge kept in view the decisions in Ramaswami Goundan v. Subbaraya Goundan, AIR 1948 Mad 388 and Ram Baran v. Bahadur Khan, AIR 1942 All 425. To give proper evidentiary weight to these grants, the learned District Judge kept in view the decisions in Ramaswami Goundan v. Subbaraya Goundan, AIR 1948 Mad 388 and Ram Baran v. Bahadur Khan, AIR 1942 All 425. It was pointed out in the former case that it would be most dangerous to draw the presumption that a document was genuine merely because it was thirty years old according to the recitals in the document and having come from proper custody and, therefore, the proper course is to mark the document as exhibit without requiring formal proof and then consider, having regard to the evidence and surrounding circumstances whether it is genuine or not. The latter case laid down that in order to decide the genuineness of old documents, the important consideration should be whether they were acted upon or not or whether they were supported by possession or not. While judging the genuineness of the grant Exhibit P-1 in favour of appellant No. 2, the learned trial Court correctly observed that appellant No. 2 who was the most competent witness to prove the grant in his favour and his possession since the year 1946, had not entered the witness box and there was no explanation for this. He also observed that the entries in the record of rights made during the last settlement operations in 1980-81 in favour of the father of respondent No. 2 had the presumption of correctness and, therefore, supported the case of the respondents. He also relied upon the fact that the appellants did not produce any proper evidence in proof of their possession. No evidence was produced to show that appellant No. 2 had got the possession from the landlord in the year 1946. Only evidence on this point, on behalf of the appellants, is the testimony of appellant No. 1 who was aged only about 5 or 6 years when the grant was allegedly given to appellant No. 2 and naturally, as pointed out by the learned District Judge, it was not possible for him to know who was in possession during 1945-46. The learned District Judge also correctly took note of the fact that no objection had been filed by appellant No. 1 to the recording of the name of the father of respondent No. 2 in the record of rights in the year 1981. The learned District Judge also correctly took note of the fact that no objection had been filed by appellant No. 1 to the recording of the name of the father of respondent No. 2 in the record of rights in the year 1981. Man Bahadur Dahal (PW-2) who is the only other witness produced on behalf of the appellants, stated that about two years back he had plucked cardamom as labourer engaged by appellant No. 1. As observed by the learned District Judge, this evidence is of no avail for the reason that for the last 3-4 years, admittedly, appellant No. 1 has been in possession, point of difference being as to capacity. Against this evidence, the respondents produced six witnesses including themselves, and from their evidence the learned District Judge was satisfied that at first Leda Lama possessed the land and thereafter respondent No. 2, and I have no reason to differ from him. ( 5 ) AN important circumstance relied upon by the learned District Judge in proof of the case of the respondents is that after Leda Lama Lepcha died in the year 1981, respondent No. 2 took a loan of Rs. 5,475/- from appellant No. 1 and gave the land to appellant No. 1 on adhia and a part of this loan was repaid by him to appellant No. 1 on 11-11-84 when the compromise document (Ex. D-8) was prepared and the remaining part on 26th November, 1984 as had been agreed on 11-11-84, as shown in the document Exhibit D-5. The case of the appellants that no loan had been advanced is not at all convincing in view of the document exhibit D-5. The compromise (Ex. D-8) which shows that the land had been given by respondent No. 2 to appellant No. 1 for cultivation and enjoyment and the same was re-delivered to respondent No. 2, further supports the case of the respondents. The fact that this compromise became the basis for the dismissal of the complaint which had earlier been filed against him by respondent No. 1 and during the enquiry of which, in fact, this compromise had taken place through the intervention of several respectable persons of the locality, nullifies the case of the appellants that appellant No. 1 had been made to sign it under some sort of pressure and renders the whole case of the appellants improbable. ( 6 ) ON behalf of the appellants only two points have been urged in support of the appeal. One is that the learned District Judge was not justified in drawing an adverse inference against the appellants from the fact that appellant No. 2 had not entered the witness box. According to the learned counsel, adverse inference could be drawn only if there was absolutely no evidence on record on behalf of the appellants and, in support of his argument, he referred to Pandurang Jivaji Apte v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Ashtekar, (1981) 4 SCC 569, where in paragraph 11, adverse inference was not drawn from the absence of two witnesses for the reason that there was other evidence on record including admission of the opposite side. There can be no doubt that if a fact is satisfactorily proved from evidence on record, it cannot be held to be disproved merely because some other witnesses could also be produced. But when there is no other satisfactory evidence on record, the fact that the most important witness has been withheld for no valid reason, has to be taken due note of. The questions whether the grant in favour of appellant No. 2 was genuine and was entitled to be preferred to the earlier grant in favour of the father of respondent No. 2 and whether appellant No. 2 came into possession of the land immediately after the grant were the most important, and in the facts of the case, appellant No. 2 who allegedly got the grant was the most important witness to prove those facts. The fact that he did not appear to prove the genuineness of the grant and to depose that he came into possession when the grant was given in the year 1946 shows that even appellant No. 2 was not prepared to support the appellants' case. Furthermore, there is no evidence on record to prove the genuineness of the grant and also about the possession since the year 1946. Therefore, the contention that there is other evidence on record and, therefore, it was not necessary for that witness to appear is without any substance. ( 7 ) THE other point urged on behalf of the appellants is that the appellants were entitled to succeed on the strength of the application (Ex. Therefore, the contention that there is other evidence on record and, therefore, it was not necessary for that witness to appear is without any substance. ( 7 ) THE other point urged on behalf of the appellants is that the appellants were entitled to succeed on the strength of the application (Ex. P-2) signed by respondent No. 2 on 21st June, 1982 to the effect that the name of his father had been incorrectly recorded in the last survey and that the name of appellant No. 1 should be put in the records. This, the learned counsel says, was an admission made by respondent No. 2 against his own interest and so could be the sole basis for decision in favour of the appellants. But, as the learned District Judge has pointed out, this document was never acted upon and it appears that it was signed by appellant No. 2 without knowing the contents thereof. The document was scribed by Purna Bahadur Chettri (DW6) who was the Panchayat Secretary at the relevant time and who admitted in evidence that the draft of the application had been prepared by him at the instance of appellant No. 1, and the same had not been read over to respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2 has also deposed that the draft of the document (Ex. P-2) was prepared without his knowledge and he did not know its contents. Then admittedly this application was not presented to the settlement authorities by respondent No. 2. Curiously enough, the draft application inter alia states that respondent No. 2 would bear the expenses according to the government rules for the amin. This is very strange. Respondent No. 2 could not have been responsible for the mistake, if there was any, and he was not to be benefited by the correction in any manner. The mention that respondent No. 2 would bear the expenses for the correction, is unnatural and contains intrinsic evidence about its suspiciousness. Then the original application was never submitted before the settlement authorities. The case of the appellants is that its copy was submitted. On the face of it, is very unnatural. No action could be expected from the Settlement Authorities on the basis of a copy of the application and no purpose could be expected to be served by appellant No. 1 by keeping the original with him. The case of the appellants is that its copy was submitted. On the face of it, is very unnatural. No action could be expected from the Settlement Authorities on the basis of a copy of the application and no purpose could be expected to be served by appellant No. 1 by keeping the original with him. Even in the plaint, the appellants have admitted that no action was taken. When no action was taken it would have been natural for the appellants to take proper steps, if in fact, there had been no foul game. The fact, that the appellants did not pursue the matter for the correction, militates against the genuineness of the application. If the case of the appellants had been true, the natural course would have been that the application had been submitted in original to the Settlement authorities, that the matter would have been pursued for the correction and that the application along with the records would have been got summoned from the settlement authorities to the Court. The fact that the original application came from the custody of the appellants is unnatural. The learned District Judge was right in not relying upon this document in face of weighty evidence produced by the respondents to the contrary. ( 8 ) IN the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs in both the Courts. Counsel fee is assessed at Rs. 400/- in each Court. Appeal dismissed. --- *** ---