JUDGMENT Kamat, J. - The petitioners in this case have alleged that the respondent have committed wilful disobedience of an order made on 22nd November, 1984 in Writ Petition No. 100 of 1984 which had been filed by them and disposed of finally by this Court and, therefore, liable to be dealt with for contempt. 2. It is mentioned that in that writ petition the Division Bench had made the Rule absolute in terms of prayer 2 of the petition: Coming to prayer 2 of that petition, it reads as under: "The Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of Mandamus or any other writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction and direct the respondents to permit the import of the forest produce from Bhimgad Karnataka State into the Territory of Goa duly covered by a pass issued by the Karnataka officials." 3. It must be, however, seen that in paragraph 1 of the prayer clauses in that petition the petitioners had sought a declaration that the provision of section 41 of the Indian Forest Act whereby the declaration of prescribed routes have been made is not applicable for import of timber or movement into the Territory of Goa from the village Bhimgad of Khanapur Taluka, Karnataka State as that village is inaccessible from the Karnataka side. In this contempt petition the petitioners have now alleged that after the order was made by the Division Bench, the petitioners by their letter dated 20th February, 1985 approached the first respondent bringing to his attention the passing of that judgment and that the petitioners desire to transport the forest produce cut and lying at Bhimgad via Bhimgad-Valpoi Road. In that letter the petitioners indicated that they are ready to deposit Rs. 5000/- towards the charges for use of Bhimgad-Valpoi road for one month. It appears that the Deputy Conservator of Forests, balled on that letter of the petitioners, wrote to the Range Forest Officer, Valpoi, forwarding to him a copy of the judgment of the Court and directed him to allow the petitioners to transport their timber from village Bhimgador Khanapur Taluka, Karnataka State to their factory at Betim, Goa, on payment of Rs. 5000/- for the use of the road and Rs. 300/- for services of the Forest Guard for a period of one month. 5000/- for the use of the road and Rs. 300/- for services of the Forest Guard for a period of one month. In turn the petitioners approached the Range Forest Officer and it is, however, alleged that for one reason or the other there is evasion on the part of the Range Forest Officer to accept the money for the use of the road and for services of the Forest Guard with the result that the petitioners are not able to transport their timber from Bhimgad-Valpoi road. Relying upon the order made in that writ petition, the petitioners now allege that the respondents have committed contempt by their wilful inaction of not allowing the petitioners to transport timber from Bhimgad by the Bhimgad-Valpoi Road thereby wilfully flouting the road made by the Division Court. 4. On behalf of the respondents, Shri O. N. Kaul, Conservator of Forest, has filed an affidavit dated 12th June, 1985 in which, inter alia, he states that there is no contempt committed by him, that he has acted on the basis of the order of the Court and considering what is mentioned in prayer 2 in respect of which the rule was made absolute, the petitioners have been permitted to transport whatever timber from Bhimgad Karnataka State into the Territory of Goa. This affidavit also mentions that based on the order of the Division Court itself the petitioners have been importing into the Territory of Goa from Bhimgad a large quantity of timber and detailed particulars are given in Ex. R-I, -which is an annexure of that affidavit. Ex. R-I gives all details of the timber transported by the petitioners from Bhimgad into Goa via Mollem-Anmod Road. This exhibit mentions the dates on which, the quantity of timber and the transport pass against which the timber is transported into this Territory from Bhimgad and from the chart it is clear to us that between 21st February, 1985 till 11th June, 1985 the petitioners have transported against 23 passes a total of 134.390 cubic meters. It is common ground that in the matter of transport of forest produce from Karnataka State to Goa Territory the specified route for transport of forest produce is Anmod-Mollem Road. 5. It is common ground that in the matter of transport of forest produce from Karnataka State to Goa Territory the specified route for transport of forest produce is Anmod-Mollem Road. 5. It is, however, now the case of the petitioners that whatever the reasons that prompted them to transport their forest produce by Anmod-Mollem road, by virtue of the order made by the Division Court they are entitled to transport the forest produce by Bhimgad-Valpoi Road and that is the most economical route as far as they are concerned. In fact it has been suggested that the petitioners were perforced to use the specified route Anmod-Mollem only because the respondents used dilatory tactics and did not accede to the reasonable requests of the petitioners to permit them to transport the, timber from Bhimgad-Valpoi Road. 6. Slid M. P. Shinkre, learned counsel for the petitioners, relying on the operative part of the order made in writ petition contends that at though in prayer 2 of that petition the petitioners did not specifically mention that they should be permitted to bring forest goods from Bhimgad-Valpoi Road the fact that the Division Court in its order said that the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer 2 of the petition on the petitioners paying the requisite amount to the Government for the use of the road and the services' of the Forest Guard makes in abundantly clear that the petitioners' prayers in the writ petition were in fact granted in toto and all that the said judgment meant was that the petitioners were/are entitled to transport the timber from Bhimgad only by the Bhimgad-Valpoi Road. For this purpose he has also relied upon several averments made in the petition leading finally to prayer 1 and prayer 2 in that petition. It is, therefore, urged by Shri Shinkre that considering the averments in the petition and the prayers and the order finally made by the Division Court, the only meaning that could be given is that the petitioners are entitled to bring their timber by Bhimgad-Valpoi Road though not a specified road for transport of forest produce. 7. It is, therefore, urged by Shri Shinkre that considering the averments in the petition and the prayers and the order finally made by the Division Court, the only meaning that could be given is that the petitioners are entitled to bring their timber by Bhimgad-Valpoi Road though not a specified road for transport of forest produce. 7. As against these contentions Shri Nadkarni, learned counsel for the Government, has pointed that in the petition the petitioners had based their challenge for the use of Bhimgad-Valpoi Road that being a public road and being in existence for the last so many years and further that the petitioners have a right to use it and the rofusal on the part of the Forest Authorities is infringement of the rights of the petitioners. Based on this the petitioners had sought the relief in prayer I for a declaration that provision of section 41 of the Forest Act in the matter of declaration of prescribed route for the transport of timber is inapplicable for the transport and movement of timber from the village of Bhimgad on the ground or inaccessibility. It is urged by Shri Nadkarni that this challenge of the petitioners failed and was negatived by the Division Court and what was granted was merely prayer 2 of the petition. It is then pointed out that the whole basis in that petition was the inaccessibility of the village Bhimgad from Karnataka side as there is no that matter even accepting that the transport is costly, the fact remains that Bhimgad is accessible. The further fact remains that prayer 2 of that petition was only restricted to have a direction to the respondents to per in it the import of forest goods from Bhimgad Karnataka State into the Territory of Goa duly covered by pass issued by Karnataka Officials. But, however, "it is true that even while making the rule absolute, the Division Court had mentioned about the payment for the use of the road and service charges of the Forest Guards. Mr. Shinkre, therefore, wants us to give a meaning or interpretation to that judgment relying upon the averments made in that petition that the respondents were directed to allow the petitioners to transport forest produce only by the use of Bhimgad-Valpoi Road that being the irresistible conclusion. Mr. Shinkre, therefore, wants us to give a meaning or interpretation to that judgment relying upon the averments made in that petition that the respondents were directed to allow the petitioners to transport forest produce only by the use of Bhimgad-Valpoi Road that being the irresistible conclusion. We, however, decided not to give any meaning in the present proceedings and suffice for us to say that now it is clear that Bhimgad village is accessible from Karnataka side and the petitioners are allowed to transport their forest produce from the specified route Anmod-Mollem. 10. Mr. Shinkre, however, next submitted that this is a fit case for giving the benefit of the order to the party and for that matter the Court should assist the petitioners and, therefore make an appropriate order or direction to the respondents. Even if the Court comes to hold that some benefit of doubt is required to be given to the respondents, yet we should say that the petitioners are entitled to use Bhimgad Valpoi Road and carry Forest produce therefrom; Reliance has been placed on the authority of Dulal Chandra Bhar and others v. Sukumar Ballerjee and others1, and also on Baibal Kumar Gupta and others v. B.K. Sen2. We do not think that these decisions help the petitioners in any manner. In the circumstances of this case it is not possible to hold that the petitioners are prejudiced and in our opinion on action is necessary for the purpose of protecting the petitioners. This case does not permit us to exercise the special jurisdiction of the Court in contempt proceedings and we propose therefore to close the matter. 11. A passage in paragraph 10 of the judgment approved by the Supreme Court in Bis-wan-UI-Hasan and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh3, can be useful referred to which is as under: "Jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice and that the purpose of the Court's action is a practical purpose and it is reasonably clear on the authorities that the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety." 12. However, before we part with this case we may make this observation that whenever writ or orders are issued by this Court the concerned Officials must always have due regard and act with due circumspection and not to try to get away on this or that ground. If there is any doubt in the minds of the officials they can certainly approach the Court for getting the matter clarified and that would be a fit course. 13. Rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs. 14. Shri Shinkre, learned counsel for the petitioners, at this stage, sought leave of this Court to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave rejected. Rule discharged. 1. A.I.R. 1968 Cal. 474. 2. A.I.R. 1959 Cal. 106. 3. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 186.