Research › Browse › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

1985 DIGILAW 135 (ORI)

DOMA ROUT v. SAMAL PRASAD CHANDUKA

1985-03-29

G.B.PATNAIK

body1985
JUDGMENT : G.B. Pattnaik, J. - This is an appeal u/s 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act?) against the order of the Commissioner under the Act, rejecting the prayer of the Appellants who had claimed compensation for the death of Bihari Rout. 2. According to the Appellants' case, the deceased Bihari Rout had been employed as a skilled labourer under Respondent No. 1 and had been engaged in the work of demolition of a portion of his shop room of Roopak Cloth House in Puri town. While he was thus engaged, he met with an accident and later he died in the hospital and thereafter the Appellants filed a claim petition u/s 22 of the Act claiming compensation. It was averred in the claim petition that the deceased was engaged on a daily wage of Rs. 8/- and it was further mentioned that the deceased while being engaged to demolish a portion of the shop room of the Roopak Cloth House on 20.9.1975 met with an accident and died at 11.45 a.m. Respondent No. 1 contested before the Commissioner alleging that the deceased ' had never been employed by him and he was not a 'workman' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act and therefore, no compensation can be awarded in his favour under the Act. Respond-dent No. 2 which was the Puri Municipality contended that the Municipality had never engaged the deceased for demolition of the shop of Respondent No. 1 and therefore, they are not liable. 3. During the course of trial before the Commissioner, the records of the Puri Hospital were called for on the application of the Appellants and these records indicated that the deceased was admitted in the hospital on 24.7.1975 and expired on 19.9.1975. The documents, produced from the hospital thus completely belied the case of the Appellants as made out in the claim petition. The Appellants, therefore, filed an application for amendment. The proposed amendment was to the effect that the deceased met with an accident on 24.7.1975 at 11.45 a.m. and was admitted as an indoor patient in the Puri Government Hospital and ultimately died on 19.9.1975 due to the injuries. This amendment application was ordered to be considered at the time of final hearing. The learned Commissioner in the final order rejected the amendment sought for by the Appellants. This amendment application was ordered to be considered at the time of final hearing. The learned Commissioner in the final order rejected the amendment sought for by the Appellants. On the question whether the deceased was a 'workman' within the ambit of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act or not, the learned Commissioner also came to the conclusion that the deceased was a casual labourer and therefore, does not come within the definition of 'workman' under the Act. It was further found that it has not been established beyond doubt as to whether the deceased was at all employed by Respondent Nos. 1 and/or 2. On these findings the learned Commissioner rejected the claim for compensation. 4. Mr. B.P. Ray, the learned Counsel for the Appellants, submits that the conclusion of the Commissioner on each of the points is erroneous in law and is contrary to the evidence on record and he further submits that the proposed amendment should have been allowed in the interest of justice. The learned Counsel for the Respondents, on the other hand, submits that the Commissioner has scrutinised the evidence in great detail and his conclusion is unassailable. 5. So far as the amendment sought for by the Appellants is concerned, in the original petition, it was averred: That one Bihari Rout s/o Doma Rout of village Batagaon, Puri Sadar, Puri was employed as a skilled labourer under opposite party No. 1 Samal Prasad Chanduka, was engaged to demolish a portion of shop room of Roopak Cloth House on 20.9.1975. That while so working he died in accident at 11.45 a.m. The proposed amendment was only for alteration of the date of accident and date of death to the effect that the 'accident took place on 24.7.1975 and the death occurred on 19.9.1975.' No doubt, the dates given in the claim petition were incorrect in view of the papers produced from the Hospital in connection with the death of the deceased Bihari Rout. But in my opinion, the nature of the case has not been altered in any manner nor does it work out any prejudice to the Respondents. The essence of the allegations both in the original claim petition as well as in the proposed amendment is that the deceased while being employed by Respondent No. 1 sustained the injuries which ultimately caused his death. The essence of the allegations both in the original claim petition as well as in the proposed amendment is that the deceased while being employed by Respondent No. 1 sustained the injuries which ultimately caused his death. In my opinion the proposed amendment should have been allowed in the interest of justice particularly when no prejudice is being caused to the Respondents. The learned Commissioner committed an error in not allowing the amendment on the ground that it was made at a belated stage. I do not think that it would be a justifiable ground in the facts and circumstances of the present case to reject an amendment and accordingly I hold that the amendment sought for by the claimant Appellants by their application dated 7.8.1978 must be allowed. 6. The next question which comes up for consideration is whether, on the evidence adduced in this case, the deceased can be said to be a 'workman' within the ambit of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act which reads as follows: ?Workman' means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business) who is (i) a railway servant as defined in Section 3 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (9 of 1890), not permanently employed in any administrative, district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, or (ii) employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, Whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union; and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead include a reference to his dependants or any of them. In order to show that a person is not a 'workman' within the definition of the section, two things must be proved; (1) his employment was of a casual nature; and (2) his employment was otherwise than for the purposes of employer's trade or business. In order to show that a person is not a 'workman' within the definition of the section, two things must be proved; (1) his employment was of a casual nature; and (2) his employment was otherwise than for the purposes of employer's trade or business. Unless both these things are established the person concerned would not be taken out of the purview of the definition of 'workman' u/s 2(1)(n) of the Act. Let me now examine as to whether the employment of the deceased was of a casual nature or not. This phrase though has not been defined in the Act but has been defined by judicial pronouncements of different courts of law. Whether employment of a particular workman is of a casual nature or otherwise depends upon the nature of employment and the onus in such cases is on the employer to prove the conditions necessary for excluding a person from the category of workmen. In the case of Gorelal v. Dropadibai 1958 65 ACJ 248 (MP), the learned Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held: A man employed in construction work of a building at a rate of wages whether determined by the hour, by the week or by the day is in an employment which is not of casual nature. The meaning of the word 'casual' as given in Chambers Dictionary is 'accidental, unforeseen, occasional, off-hand.' 7. It is the nature of the relationship between the employer and employee which would ultimately decide whether the employment was of a casual nature or not. If a man is paid his wages on a daily basis but is engaged by an employer to work in his house not occasionally or accidentally but more or less in routine manner then such employment will not be of a casual nature, but the employment in question must not be an accidental or unforeseen one or on a purely occasional basis. I will now examine the evidence on record from the aforesaid stand point to find out whether the employment of the deceased was of a casual nature or not. Witness No. 1 for the Appellants in his evidence stated: In August, 1975 my brother Bihari Rout worked as a labourer under Samal Prasad Chanduka, opposite party No. 1. After working for 8 days this accident took place. He was getting a wage of Rs. 8/- per day. Witness No. 1 for the Appellants in his evidence stated: In August, 1975 my brother Bihari Rout worked as a labourer under Samal Prasad Chanduka, opposite party No. 1. After working for 8 days this accident took place. He was getting a wage of Rs. 8/- per day. Witness No. 2 for the Appellants who was also working as a labourer for Respondent No. 1 in his evidence deposed: Both of us were working for 2 days for dismantling the wall and for one month prior to that we were also working for him as labourers. In cross-examination he further stated: We were working for about a month as labourers in the garden of Samal Prasad Chanduka. The aforesaid evidence does not establish that the employment of the deceased Bihari Rout was of a casual nature so as to take it out of the purview of the definition of 'workman' u/s 2(1)(n) of the Act. The onus of proving that the employment is of a casual nature is on the employer. Respondent No. 1 has not discharged that onus by leading any evidence. In my view, the evidence as led rather establishes the employment to be a continued one and not an occasional or accidental one and hence is not of a casual nature. Since to take a workman out of the purview of the definition of 'workman' under the Act both the ingredients must be satisfied namely (1) that the employment must be of a casual nature and (2) the employment was otherwise than for the purposes of employer's trade or business and as I have already found that the employment was not of a casual nature the deceased would be a 'workman' within the ambit of definition of 'workman' u/s 2(1)(n) of the Act. 8. Since the learned Commissioner has discussed the materials and has come to a conclusion that the employment in question was not for the purposes of trade or business of the employer, it is also necessary for me to go into that question. Whether a particular employment is for the purposes of the employer's trade or business depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The emphasis is on the words, "employer's trade or business". Whether a particular employment is for the purposes of the employer's trade or business depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The emphasis is on the words, "employer's trade or business". If the person concerned had been engaged in a job which has some co-ielationship with the employer's trade or business then it must be held that he would come within the ambit of the definition of 'workman' u/s 2(1)(n) of the Act. A landlord whose business is not to give the house on rent if engages somebody for painting his house then the employment in question will not be in course of trade or business of the employer But where a person is engaged in the business of purchasing houses, reconstructing them and letting them out, the employment of any person in any act of renovation of these houses would be for the purpose of employer's trade or business. The evidence in the present case is that the building in question was under the occupation of Respondent No. 1 and he was doing his business of selling cloth in a portion of the shop. A portion of the said shop having been projected out and the municipality giving a direction for the demolition of the said projection, Respondent No. 1 had engaged the deceased Bihari Rout in demolishing that portion. The employment of the deceased in the act of demolition was in for the cause of the Respondent No. 1 continuing his business in the said shop and in that view of the matter the employment of the deceased must be held to be for the purposes of trade or business of Respondent No. 1. The act of demolition of the projection is in fact in connection with the occupation of Respondent No. 1 in the premises in question for the purposes of continuing his trade or business. In my opinion, the conclusion of the learned Commissioner on this score is wholly erroneous and must be set aside. I would, therefore, hold that the deceased had been employed for the purposes of employer's trade or business. Consequently it must be held that the deceased Bihari Rout was a workman within the definition of the 'workman' as defined in Section 2(l)(n) of the Act. 9. I would, therefore, hold that the deceased had been employed for the purposes of employer's trade or business. Consequently it must be held that the deceased Bihari Rout was a workman within the definition of the 'workman' as defined in Section 2(l)(n) of the Act. 9. Having scrutinised the evidence on record I am also of the opinion that the conclusion of the Commissioner that the deceased had not been employed by Respondent No. 1 is not correct. The evidence of the witness Nos. 1 and 2 for the claimants in this regard has not been shaken in any manner. They have categorically stated that Bihari had been engaged by Respondent No. 1 for about a month prior to the date of accident and had also been engaged on the date of accident. No material had been brought out by Respondent No. 1 to discredit their version. I would accordingly hold, disagreeing with the learned Commissioner, that Respondent No. 1 had employed the deceased Bihari Rout. In the result, therefore, the employer Respondent No. 1 would be liable to pay compensatidn u/s 3 of the Act. The amount of compensation has to be calculated u/s 4 of the Act. The quantification of the amount may be done by the Commissioner on the existing materials. 10. In the ultimate result therefore the order of the Commissioner is set aside and this appeal is allowed on a finding that Respondent No. 1 Samal Prasad Chanduka is liable to pay compensation to the claimants for the death of the deceased Bihari Rout in accordance with Sections 3 and 4 of the Act and the matter is remitted to the Commissioner for the limited purpose of quantifying the amount of compensation on the existing materials. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100/- Final Result : Allowed