JUDGMENT : N.D. Ojha, J. The case of the Petitioner in brief as stated in the writ petition is this that he is the owner of house No. 2/400 Mohalla Vishnupuri, Aligarh. The annual value of this house for purposes of assessment of tax was determined at Rs. 1040/- and shown as such in the assessment list prepared in the year 1975 u/s 145(1) of the U.P. Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Petitioner was, however, subsequently served with a notice dated 24-2-1978 u/s 147(2) of the Act stating that the annual value of his house had been determined at Rs. 14400/- and requiring the Petitioner to file objection, if any, by 23-3-1978. In compliance with this notice the Petitioner filed an objection dated 22-3-1978 on 23-3-1978 True copies of the notice and the objection have been attached as annexure 1 and 2 respectively to the writ petition. 2. In this objection the Petitioner admitted that after the preparation of the assessment list of 1975 he had let out a portion of the said house to the District Cane Officer for his office as well as residence and this tenancy had commenced on 10-1-1977 and that at the instance of the said District Cane Officer he had after obtaining the permission of the Municipal Board constructed a temporary car shed. Thereafter Respondent No. 2, namely the Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Aligarh, exercising the powers of Sanshodhan Adhikari (Revisional Officer) determined the annual value of the house at Rs. 12780/- by his order dated 30-3-1978. 3. Aggrieved by that order the Petitioner preferred an appeal before the Respondent No. 1, namely the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh, acting as Prescribed Authority u/s 160 of the Act. A true copy of the memorandum of appeal has been filed as annexure 4 to the writ petition. Ground No. 7 taken in this memorandum of appeal reads as follows: 7. Because portions of the house in question has been let out to different tenants in the following manner: (a) Smt. Ganga Devi Rs. 40/- P. M. (b) office of the Distt. Cane Officer, Aligarh. Rs. 700/- P.M. (C) Residence of the Distt. Cane Officer, Aligarh. Rs. 200/- P.M. Note: Both (b) and (c) are inclusive of all taxes and maintenance. Hence rent for (b) and (c), as such, considering even house tax only, comes to Rs. 800/- P.M. only. 40/- P. M. (b) office of the Distt. Cane Officer, Aligarh. Rs. 700/- P.M. (C) Residence of the Distt. Cane Officer, Aligarh. Rs. 200/- P.M. Note: Both (b) and (c) are inclusive of all taxes and maintenance. Hence rent for (b) and (c), as such, considering even house tax only, comes to Rs. 800/- P.M. only. (d) Rest of the portion of the house in question is in the occupation of the Appellant himself. (Note:--Accommodation in occupation of the Appellant is less than what it was previously during quinquinnial assessment of 1975. The rent according to assessment of 1975 comes to less than Rs. 47/- per month.) 4. The appeal filed by the Petitioner was, however, dismissed by Respondent No. 1 by his order dated 4-12-1978, a copy whereof has been filed as annexure 5 to the writ petition. It has been stated by Respondent No. 1 in this order that it was admitted to the Petitioner that a major portion of his house had been let out on an annual rent of Rs. 11780/- and that a portion of the house was also in his personal occupation. 5. The Petitioner filed an application for review before Respondent No. 1 and as is apparent from its copy filed as annexure 6 to the writ petition it was inter alia asserted by him that the rent of the house was as stated by him in his memorandum of appeal and he had never made any admission to the contrary. He further asserted that different portions of the building being with different tenants at different rents these portions should be assessed separately. Respondents No. 1 accepted this last stated plea of the Petitioner and modified his order accordingly by order dated 20-2-1979 a copy whereof has been filed as annexure 7 to the writ petition. He, however, has not stated anything in his order in regard to the assertion of the Petitioner that he had never admitted the amount of rent of the house to be different from that was stated in his memorandum of appeal. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders dated 30-3-1978, 4-10-1978 and 20-2-1979 the Petitioner has filed this writ petition with a prayer for quashing them. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders dated 30-3-1978, 4-10-1978 and 20-2-1979 the Petitioner has filed this writ petition with a prayer for quashing them. It has been urged by counsel for the Petitioner that the notice dated 24-2-1978 apart from stating that it was u/s 147(2) of the Act did not state any reason as to why the annual value of the house had been determined at Rs. 14400/- and as such it was invalid. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. Since it is apparent from the Petitioner’s own admission mentioned above that there had come into existence certain events subsequent to the preparation of the assessment list of 1975 namely letting out of the major portion of the house with effect from 10-1-1977 to the District Cane Officer and adding a car shed to the existing building having the effect of increasing the annual value of the house and the Petitioner was given full opportunity to substantiate his objection it cannot be said that any prejudice was caused to the Petitioner because the reason for enhancing the annual value was not stated in the notice. In A.M. Allison Vs. B.L. Sen, AIR 1957 SC 227 , it was held that proceedings by way of certiorari under Article 226 are "not of course". The High Court has the power to refuse the writ if it is satisfied that there was no failure of justice. 7. It was then urged by counsel for the Petitioner that in view of Section 145(2) of the Act no change in the assessment list prepared u/s 145(1) in 1975 could be made till the first day of April next following the completion of a new list except on one of the grounds stated in Clauses (a) to (g) of Section 147(1) and to the result of any appeal u/s 160 of the Act and since letting out of a building or a portion thereof after the preparation of the assessment list u/s 145(1) was not included in any of the Clauses (a) to (g) of Section 147(1) of the Act the alteration made in the assessment list by the impugned orders was without jurisdiction. 8. 8. Counsel for the Municipal Board in this connection urged that since a car shed had admittedly been added in his house by the Petitioner after the preparation of the assessment list in 1975 which had increased the value of the property, Clause (d) of Section 147(1) was attracted and the alteration in the assessment list made by the impugned orders was justified. In reply it was urged by counsel for the Petitioner that since the impugned orders did not make any reference to Clause (d) of Section 147(1) of the Act it was not open to counsel for the Municipal Board to invoke the said clause to support the impugned orders. In the alternative it was urged that even if Clause (d) aforesaid was attracted the value of the newly added car shed could alone be added to the annual value of the house as shown in the assessment list of 1975. 9. Having given our anxious consideration we find it difficult to agree with these submissions also of the Petitioner’s counsel. As regards the plea that no reference was made to Clause (d) of Section 147(1) of the Act in the impugned orders suffice it to say that if Clause (d) was attracted to the facts of the instant case the mere fact that the impugned orders did not refer to this clause will not render them invalid. In Lekhraj Satramdas, Lalvani Vs. Deputy Custodian-cum-managing Officer and Others, AIR 1966 SC 334 , it was held: It is well-established that when an authority passes an order which is within its competence it cannot fail merely because it purports to be made under a wrong provision if it can be shown to be within its power under any other rule, and the validity of the impugned order should be judged on a consideration of its substance and not of its form. The principle is that we must scribe the act of a public servant to an actual existing authority under which it would have validity rather than to one under which it would be void--See P. Balakotaiah Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1958 SC 232 . The same view was reiterated in J.K. Steel Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI), AIR 1970 SC 1173 , and N.B. Sanjana, Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bombay and Others Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1958 SC 232 . The same view was reiterated in J.K. Steel Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI), AIR 1970 SC 1173 , and N.B. Sanjana, Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bombay and Others Vs. The Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Ltd., (1971) 1 SCC 337 . 10. As regards the alternative argument made by counsel for the Petitioner it may be pointed out that Section 140 of the Act defines "Annual value". It reads: 140. (1) "Annual value" means, (a) in the case of railway stations, hotels, colleges, schools, hospitals, factories and other such buildings, a proportion not exceeding five per centum to be fixed by rule made in this behalf of the sum obtained by adding the estimated present cost of erecting the building to the estimated value of the land appurtenant thereto; and (b) in the case of a building or land not falling within the provisions of Clause (a), the gross annual rent for which such building, exclusive of furniture or machinery therein, or such land is actually let, or where the building or land is not let or in the opinion of the board is let for a sum less than its fair letting value, might reasonably be expected to let from year to year. (C) Provided that where the annual value of any building would, by reason or exceptional circumstances, in the opinion of the board, be excessive if calculated in the aforesaid manner, the board may fix the annul value at any less amount which appears to it equitable. As such whenever "Annual value" is to be determined under the Act it has to be so done in accordance with Section 140. Section 145(1) contemplates preparation of assessment list in the manner prescribed by Sections 141 to 144 ordinarily once in every five years. Sub-section (2) of Section 145 provides: (2) Subject to any alteration or amendment made u/s 147 and to the result of any appeal u/s 160, every valuation and assessment entered in a valuation list shall be valid from the date on which the list takes effect in the municipality and until the first day of April next following the completion of a new list. As such it would be of no consequence whether "Annual value" is being determined at the stage of preparation of the assessment list contemplated by Section 145 or u/s 147. Unless the case falls under any of the Clauses (a) to (g) of Section 147(1) there would be no jurisdiction to alter or amend the assessment list u/s 147 whether the alteration or amendment is in regard to determination of "Annual value" or otherwise. If the matter relates to making alteration or amendment of the "Annual value" as shown in the assessment list prepared u/s 145(1) and the case falls under any of the clauses of Section 147(1) the bar of making alteration or amendment in such list created by Section 145(2) stand removed and the authority concerned gets jurisdiction to alter or amend the "annual value" as shown in the assessment list. Take for instance a case which falls under Clause (d) of Section 147(1) namely of a property the revaluing or reassessing the value of which has been necessitated by additions or alterations to buildings. Once making of additions or alterations to buildings having the effect of increasing the value of property is established the finality of the assessment list contemplated by Section 145(2) comes to an end and jurisdiction arises to make alteration or amendment in the assessment list on this score. Then for making this alteration or amendment in the assessment list the "Annual value" of the property will have to be re-determined. For making this re-determination the Act provides no criteria other than that contained in Section 140. As such this re-determination of "annual value" will have to be made in accordance with Section 140. For this the nature of the property as on the date of re-determination of its "annual value" will obviously constitute the guiding factor. The value of the addition or alteration alone in the building will on the face of it not constitute the only criterion. Take for instance a building having its opening in a con-jested narrow lane and having a large tract of open land behind it but having no door or window on that side. The building is let out at a rent of Rs. 600/- per annum exclusive of furniture or machine therein and the assessment list contemplated by Section 145(1) is prepared on the basis that the annual value of the building is Rs. The building is let out at a rent of Rs. 600/- per annum exclusive of furniture or machine therein and the assessment list contemplated by Section 145(1) is prepared on the basis that the annual value of the building is Rs. 600/- namely the amount representing "the gross annual rent" for which the building is "actually let" as contemplated by Section 140(1)(b). Before the preparation of subsequent list contemplated by Section 145(1) the large tract of land behind the house is converted into a posh market and a wide road is taken out adjacent! to the house on its back side. The tenant makes an offer to enhance the rent of the house from Rs. 600/- to Rs. 6000/- per annum in case the landlord makes an opening in the wall of a big room on the back portion of the house and fixes a shutter therein so that the room gets converted into a shop facing the newly constructed road and the posh market and the landlord accepts the offer and makes the necessary alteration and the total cost in making an opening in the wall and fixing a shutter comes to Rs. 1000/-. As a result of the alteration made in the building the value of the property has increased and a case for making an alteration or amendment in the assessment list under Clause (d) of Section 147(1) is made out. The question is whether while re-determining the annual value u/s 147(1) only Rs. 1000/- the costs of making the alteration in the building is to be added to its existing "annual value" of Rs. 600/- or the "annual value" is to be fixed at Rs. 6000/- that being the amount representing the gross rent of the building on the date of re-determination of the annual value as contemplated by Section 149(1)(b). In our opinion there seems to be no doubt that the "annual value" will have to be fixed at Rs. 6000/'- because that is the only course contemplated by Section 140(1) (b). That provision does not permit the mere adding of Rs. 1000/- to the existing "annual value" of Rs. 600/-. In our opinion there seems to be no doubt that the "annual value" will have to be fixed at Rs. 6000/'- because that is the only course contemplated by Section 140(1) (b). That provision does not permit the mere adding of Rs. 1000/- to the existing "annual value" of Rs. 600/-. In this view of the matter in the instant case also the re-determination of the annual value of the Petitioner’s house under Clause (d) of Section 147(1) will have to be done in the light of Section 140 of the Act and not by merely adding the value of the car-shed to the value of the house as shown in the assessment list prepared in 1975. 11. Lastly it was urged by counsel for the Petitioner that since the appellate order passed by Respondent No. 1 proceeds on a mis-conception that it stood admitted to the Petitioner that a major portion of the house had been let out after the preparation of the assessment list of 1975 on an annual rent of Rs. 11780/- it deserved to be quashed and it deserved to be quashed also on the ground that the portion of the house in the Petitioner’s personal occupation had not been specifically valued in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 140 of the Act. In our opinion there is substance in this submission. The only admission which had been made by the Petitioner in regard to the amount of rent which his house was fetching is contained in ground No. 7 of the memorandum of appeal filed before Respondent No. 1 which has already been quoted above. In his review application the Petitioner had pointedly raised this plea and the same has not been repelled by Respondent No. 1. Likewise it is also apparent from the appellate order dated 4-12-1978 of Respondent No. 1 that he has not fixed any specific amount as the value of the portion of the house in the personal occupation of the Petitioner. As such the said appellate order dated 4-12-1978 passed by Respondent No. 1 deserves to be quashed with a direction to the said Respondent to decide the appeal afresh. As such the said appellate order dated 4-12-1978 passed by Respondent No. 1 deserves to be quashed with a direction to the said Respondent to decide the appeal afresh. The order dated 20-2-1979 passed by Respondent No. 1 on the Petitioner’s review application has not been challenged by the Municipal Board and has become final and will have to be kept in mind by Respondent No. 1 while deciding the appeal afresh in so far as the said order directs separate assessment in respect of each tenancy. 12. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed to this extent that the appellate order dated 4-12-1978 passed by Respondent No. 1 is quashed and the said Respondent is directed to decide the appeal filed by the Petitioner afresh in accordance with law, in the light of the observations made above. There shall be no order as to costs.