JUDGMENT : A. S. Qureshi, J. In the present petition, the petitioner is challenging the judgment and order dated 18th July, 1978 passed by the learned Member, Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, remanding the matter back to the Mamlatdar and A.L.T., Godhra, for giving an opportunity to the respondent landlords to explain the contents of postcards etc. on the record of the case. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the remand order is not justifiable as both the parties were given full opportunity to lead the evidence they wanted and to controvert any documentary evidence against them. It is also urged on behalf of the petitioners -tenants that the petitioners and their ancestors have been cultivating the land in question for more than 40 years from now. According to the petitioners, in 1945 -46, the name of Petitioner No. 2 Pratapsinh Samantsinh Parmar was entered as tenant. At some time, the land stood in the name of the father of the. present petitioner Vakhatsinh Samantsinh was entered in the record of rights as protected tenant. The petitioners had also produced besides postcards, money order receipts and other papers to show that the petitioners and their ancestors were cultivating the suit land belonging to Laldas Purandas Trivedi, the father of the Respondents. 2. Mr. J. M. Patel, the learned counsel for the respondents has urged that the remand order is justifiable as the respondents should be given an opportunity to explain the apparent admissions contained in the postcards whereby the petitioners are shown to be the share croppers. Mr. Patel has laid considerable stress on the fact that in the record of rights, the land in question is said to be under the personal cultivation of the respondent -landlords and that some agreements of service (Nokar Namas) are produced on record. Hence according to Mr. Patel, there is strong documentary evidence to show that the land in question was under the personal cultivation of the respondent landlords. Hence, if the matter is remanded back to the Mamlatdar and A.L.T., the landlords will have an opportunity to explain the apparent admissions by their ancestor Laldas to the effect that the petitioners were share croppers and not the servants. This contention of Mr. Patel cannot be accepted. Hence, if the matter is remanded back to the Mamlatdar and A.L.T., the landlords will have an opportunity to explain the apparent admissions by their ancestor Laldas to the effect that the petitioners were share croppers and not the servants. This contention of Mr. Patel cannot be accepted. Although, the respondent landlords have taken care to see that in the record of rights they are shown as personally cultivating the land in question and have been further careful to obtain agreements of service (Nokar Namas) from the petitioners. But besides this, they have not brought anything on record to show that they were in fact cultivating the land personally. There is no evidence that they had the farm implements or bullocks or they had purchased seeds, fertilisers, etc. or any proof of having sold the produce of the land to anybody at any time. Even the agreements of service (Nokar Namas) are also for the past few years. The land is said to be in cultivation of the petitioners -tenants for about 40 years. If the petitioners were in fact servants, there would have been Nokar Namas for all the previous years. It is also difficult to believe that the petitioners and their ancestors were in service of the respondent land -owners. With this state of affairs, it appears that the Tribunal was not justified in setting aside the well -considered judgments and orders passed by the Mamlatdar/A.L.T. and the Deputy Collector who have taken into consideration all the material evidence before them. The learned Member of the Tribunal seems to have given too much importance to the entry in the record of rights and the agreements of service (Nokar Namas). These Nokar Namas are held by the revenue authorities to be bogus and are not relied upon. The learned Member has given undue importance to the entry in the record of rights, a few agreements of service (Nokar Namas) and the fact that witness Mugutlal Laldas Trivedi landlord, was not confronted with the postcard written by his deceased father Laldas. The Tribunal has observed that "This is not only a miscarriage of justice but it is a very gross miscarriage of justice which has totally vitiated the findings of the Assistant Collector." It is difficult to understand what the learned Member has in mind while making distinction between "miscarriage of justice" and "very gross miscarriage of justice". The Tribunal has observed that "This is not only a miscarriage of justice but it is a very gross miscarriage of justice which has totally vitiated the findings of the Assistant Collector." It is difficult to understand what the learned Member has in mind while making distinction between "miscarriage of justice" and "very gross miscarriage of justice". According to the accepted principles "miscarriage of justice" is indeed a judicial catastrophy. Without even using the epithet "very gross", the idea is quite clearly conveyed by the words "miscarriage of justice". By using vituperative language or strong epithets, the cause of justice is not advanced in any manner. The judicial language is expected to be temperate and more emphasis deserves to be laid on the substance of the matter rather than expressing the roused emotions in a strong language. 3. On a careful consideration, it appears that the impugned order of remand passed by the Tribunal is not justifiable. The Tribunal should have disposed of the matter on merits on the material before it. 4. Mr. Patel has also urged that the High Court's powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are very limited and hence, it would not be open to this court to interfere with the remand order passed by the Tribunal in this case. He has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and Others, AIR 1984 SC 38 , wherein the Supreme Court has held that under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court in its supervisory jurisdiction cannot correct errors of law. It is limited only to seeing that the Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record much less an error of law. Relying on this decision of the Supreme Court, Mr. Patel has urged that the impugned remand order in this case, cannot be set aside by this court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This submission of Mr. Patel also must be rejected. The Tribunal had all the material before it to dispose it of according to law. Patel has urged that the impugned remand order in this case, cannot be set aside by this court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This submission of Mr. Patel also must be rejected. The Tribunal had all the material before it to dispose it of according to law. Instead of doing that, the Tribunal has ordered the matter to be remanded to the Mamlatdar/A.L.T. for what it calls confronting the witness Mugutlal with the postcard said to have been written by his deceased father Laldas, wherein Laldas had complained, among other things, that the petitioners were not giving his share of the crop. This admission by Laldas could have been denied by Laldas himself if he was alive. Witness Mugutlal cannot be confronted with the postcard. In fact, there is no justification whatsoever for remanding the matter back and therefore the Tribunal has failed to exercise its jurisdiction and decide the matter instead of remanding it to the Mamlatdar. It is, therefore, not correct to say that this court has no power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside the impugned order of remand passed by the Tribunal. 5. In the result, the petition succeeds. A writ of certiorari shall issue quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment of the Tribunal. The matter is remanded back to the Tribunal to dispose it of according to law on the material before it. It is clarified that the observations made in this judgment regarding the reasons why the order of remand is not justifiable, would not be taken to be the finding of this court. The tribunal will decide it on its own on the basis of the material before it. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.