JUDGMENT - SAWANT P.B., J.: - The point referred for our decision is whether Rule 5 of Order XXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred as the Code) restricts the power of the Court to extend beyond two months the time given to the Government to file its written statement. A learned Single Judge (Puranik, J.) in a decision reported in 1983 Mh.L.J. 621 (Kheta Sons Co. v. State of Maharashtra)1, has taken the view that it does Jahagirdar, J., before whom the present matter came up for hearing was of the contrary view and hence by his referring order dated 12-2-1985 ha referred the question to the Division Bench. 2. A statement of the relevant facts will be necessary to appreciate the controversy. The plaintiff had filed the present suit on 28-4-1983 for declaration that two notifications dated 2-11-1978 and 11-11-1982 issued under the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976 and a notification dated 1-3-983 issued under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were illegal, and for an injunction restraining the Government from taking any steps pursuant to the same. Although the summons with a copy of the plaint was issued to the defendant-Government on 3-5-1983 in Form No. 2 of Appendix-B of the Code, directing them to appear an answer the plaint and to file their written statement on 6-6-1983, the Government only put in its appearance through the Government Pleader on that day and applied for time to file its written statement. The Court granted the time till 24-6-1983. Thereafter, from time to time further applications were made on behalf of the Government for extension of time to file the written statement and the said applications were granted. Ultimately on 3-3-1984 which was one such date to which the suit was adjourned to enable the Government to file its written statement the plaintiff filed an application to the Court for pronouncing judgment under Rule 10 of Order VIII of the Code, on the ground of the failure to file the written statement. However, on the same day, the Government filed its written statement and the Court rejected the application on the ground that the written statement was since filed. However, on the same day, the Government filed its written statement and the Court rejected the application on the ground that the written statement was since filed. It is aggrieved by this order dated 3-3-1984 that the plaintiff preferred the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and the learned Judge has referred the matter to the Division Bench for decision as stated earlier. 3. The sheet anchor of the plaintiff's argument is of course the decision of the learned Single Judge reported in 1983 Mh.L.J. 621 (supra). To support the said judgment, Shri Rege appearing for the petitioner plaintiff invited our attention to Order XXVII and particularly to Rule 5 of the said Order which reads as follows: “The Court, in fixing the day for the Government to answer to the plaint, shall allow a reasonable time for the necessary communication with the Government through the proper channel, and for the issue of instructions to the Government Pleader to appear and answer on behalf of the Government and may extend the time at its discretion but the time so extended shall not exceed two months in the aggregate.” He contended that the expression “to answer to the plaint” in the said rule means nothing short of filing a written statement dealing with the averments in the plaint. Admittedly, the Government had not filed its written statement in the present case within two months from 6-6-1983 which was the first date fixed by the Court for answering the plaint. In fact, the written statement was filed about 9 months after the said date. Since, according to Shri Rege, the Court had no power to extend the time beyond two months two months from 6-6-1983 both the extension of time and the acceptance of the written statement were illegal. The plaintiff was therefore entitled to a judgment under Rule 10 of Order VIII of the Code. To strengthen his argument that “answering the plaint” means filing of the written statement, he invited our attention to Rule 1 of Order VI of the Code which defines pleading to mean plaint or written statement, and contended that plaint is different from claim. To strengthen his argument that “answering the plaint” means filing of the written statement, he invited our attention to Rule 1 of Order VI of the Code which defines pleading to mean plaint or written statement, and contended that plaint is different from claim. Answering the claim according to him is not the same thing as answering the plaint and what is required by Rule 5 of Order XXVII is an answer to the plaint which could only be by filing a written statement. For this purpose, he tried to contrast the language of Rule 1 of Order V where the expression used is “to appear and answer the claim” with the language of Rule 5 of Order XXVII and submitted that where the summons is issued only to appear and answer the claim as contemplated by Rule 1 of Order V, it may be sufficient for the defendant to appear and answer the claim orally. However, when the summons is issued not only to appear and answer the claim but also to answer the plaint as in the present case, the defendant has to file his written statement. Therefore mere appearance by the Government Pleader in the present case for answering the claim was not sufficient. He also tried to derive support to his argument from the distinct contents of Form No. 1 and 2 of the summons given in Appendix B of the First Schedule to the Code to be issued under Rules 1 and 5 of Order V of the Code. Relying on them he submitted that whereas the summons issued in Form No. 1 merely calls upon the defendant to appear and answer all material questions relating to the suit, the summons in Form No. 2 requires the defendant also to file a written statement on the first date fixed for hearing of the suit. In the present case, admittedly the summons was issued in Form No. 2. The Government therefore was required not only to appear but also to file its written statement on the first date fixed for hearing i.e. 6-6-1983 or within two months thereafter. Hence, contended Shri Rege, the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment under Rule 10 of Order VIII of the Code. 4. The Government therefore was required not only to appear but also to file its written statement on the first date fixed for hearing i.e. 6-6-1983 or within two months thereafter. Hence, contended Shri Rege, the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment under Rule 10 of Order VIII of the Code. 4. As against this, Shri Devnani, the learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondents, countered these contentions by taking us through the history of Orders V and XXVII, and of the Forms 1 and 2 of the Summons and submitted that the expression “answering the plaint” in Rule 5 of Order XXVII did not necessarily mean filing of the written statement. 5. We are in agreement with the submissions made by Shri Devnani for reasons which follow. The provisions for the issue of summons are found in Order V of the Code. The summons is issued under Rule 1 read with Rule 5 of the said Order and is either for appearing and answering the claim in the suit or also for filing the written statement. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 prior to its amendment only spoke of summons to appear and answer the claim. The addition of the second proviso to the said sub-rule by the amendment of 1976, empowered the Court to direct the defendant to file his written statement also , on the date of his appearance mentioned in the summons. However in spite of this addition, sub-rule (2) of the said Rule was not amended, and this sub-rule states what the defendant who has received the summons under sub-rule (1) , has to do. According to sub-rule (2), even when the summons directs the defendant to file written statement, the defendant may either appear in person or through his pleader duly instructed and able to answer all material questions relating to the suit or through a pleader accompanied by some person able to answer all such questions. Hence whether the summons is issued only for appearing and answering the claim or also for filing the written statement, it is a sufficient compliance of such summons if the defendant appears as provided in sub-rule (2). It is not necessary that he should also file his written statement even if the direction in the summons to do so. Hence whether the summons is issued only for appearing and answering the claim or also for filing the written statement, it is a sufficient compliance of such summons if the defendant appears as provided in sub-rule (2). It is not necessary that he should also file his written statement even if the direction in the summons to do so. There is no distinction between appearance for answering the claim and for answering the plaint which Shri Rege painfully tried to make. The difference if any is semantic and they mean the same thing. In any case for our purpose the difference is inconsequential. Rule 5 of Order V further requires the Court to determine at the time of issuing the summons, whether it shall be for the settlement of issues only or for the final disposal of the suit. Form No. 1 of the summons is entitled “Summons For Disposal of Suit (Order 5, Rules 1, 5)” and Form No. 2 of the summons is titled Summons For Disposal of Suit (Order 5, Rules 1, 5)”. The title of Form No. 2 is not changed in spite of the amendment of the contents of the Form to bring it in consistency with the addition of the second proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 1. The amendment is by way of an addition, the summons remains one for the settlement of issues. Thus the addition of the direction in Form No. 2 of the summons for filing the written statement has made no difference to the nature of the summons, just as the addition of the second proviso to sub-rule (1) has not made any difference to the obligations cast on the defendant under sub-rule (2). Thus even if we scrutinize the relevant provisions from this angle, we reach the same conclusion viz. whether the summons is issued with a direction to file the written statement or not, the defendant may appear in any of the manners laid down under sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of the said Order. 6. The language of Rule 5 of Order XXVII is pari materia with Rule 6 of Order V. These Rules say that the day fixed by the summons for the defendant “to appear and answer” shall be so fixed as to allow him sufficient time to do so, having regard to certain factors mentioned therein. 6. The language of Rule 5 of Order XXVII is pari materia with Rule 6 of Order V. These Rules say that the day fixed by the summons for the defendant “to appear and answer” shall be so fixed as to allow him sufficient time to do so, having regard to certain factors mentioned therein. The expression used in both these Rules is similar viz. “to appear and answer”. Rule 7 of Order V as amended, however, makes a distinction between a summons to appear an answer only and a summons to appear and answer and/or for filing a written statement. Before the amendment, the Rule did not refer to the summons for filing a written statement. The rule was amended to make a provision for summons to file a written statement consequent upon the addition of the second proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of the said Order, by the amendment of 1976. Before the said amendment, there was no provision in the Code for the issuance of a summons for filing a written statement. The summons was issued either for final disposal of the suit with a direction to the defendant to produce, on the day fixed for his appearance, all his witnesses and documents or for settlement of issues only. In both cases the defendant was directed to “appear and answer” all material question relating to the suit and no more. Inspite of the amendment to Rules 1, 5 and 7 of Order V and to Form No. 2 of the Summons, however, sub-rule (2) of Rule 1, Rule 6 and the first part of the said Form No. 2 remained unchanged. The Form No. 2 was amended only by an addition of the direction to file the written statement and to produce documents. That addition has to be made in the summons only when the Court gives such direction, and not in every case. It is not disputed that in suits governed by Order XXVII, the summons has to be issued under Order V, Rules 1, 5 and 7 and either in Form No. 1 or 2 of Appendix B. There is no special form prescribed for summonses in such suits. On the scrutiny of the relevant provisions both prior and subsequent to the amendment, also, therefore, the inference is clear viz. On the scrutiny of the relevant provisions both prior and subsequent to the amendment, also, therefore, the inference is clear viz. that what is contemplated by Rule 5 of Order XXVII is the appearance and answering on behalf of the Government without an obligation to file a written statement on the first day fixed by the summons for hearing for the suit. The direction to file a written statement is not in the contemplation of the said Rule. The summons envisaged in the said Rule is only to appear and answer the plaint or the claim in the suit. It is with reference to this obligation on the part of the Government that the Rule has prescribed the outer time limit of two months. The further direction to file a written statement has to be given in the summons not because of the compulsion of the said rule but independently of the same. When, however, such additional direction is given it will not be circumscribed by the time limit prescribed there. 7. The same result follows from a scrutiny of Rules 5-B, 6 and 7 of Order XXVII, Rule 5-B casts an obligation on the Court to endeavour, where it is possible to do so consistently with the nature and the circumstances of the case, to assist the parties in arriving at a settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit. It also requires the Court to adjourn the proceedings for such period as it thinks fit to enable attempts to be made to effect such settlement if there is a reasonable possibility of the same. This is to be done at any stage of the suit or proceeding which would necessarily include also the stage prior to the filing of the written statement, for unless the Government appears, there would be no question of ascertaining whether there is any possibility of a settlement in the proceeding or not. It will be inconsistent with the time limit of two months given in Rule 5 of Order XXVII to adjourn the proceedings for such time as the Court thins fit, if the said limit is to be applied for filing the written statement. It will be inconsistent with the time limit of two months given in Rule 5 of Order XXVII to adjourn the proceedings for such time as the Court thins fit, if the said limit is to be applied for filing the written statement. Secondly, it stands to reason that the Legislature made the said provision in Rule 5-B for settlement of the litigation even before the Government was called upon to file or it filed its written statement, for the Legislature did not want the Court to wait for a settlement till the written statement was filed. To hold otherwise would mean that the settlement contemplated in Rule 5-B could only be after and not before the written statement was filed. That does not appear to be the intention of the Legislature since the Legislature appears to be anxious that the settlement should take place as early as possible and therefore, even at the initial stage of the proceedings before the written statement with the consequent delays, is filed. The provisions of Rule 6 make it further clear that what is contemplated by Rule 5 is not the filing of the written statement but only the appearance and answering the claim or the plaint. For Rule 6 provides that the Court may direct the attendance of a person who may be able to answer any material questions relating to the suit when the Court finds that the Government Pleader is not accompanied by such person. If what is contemplated in Rule 5 is the filing of the written statement, then there is no question of the Court directing the attendance of the person in question after the written statement is filed. By its very nature, Rule 6 contemplates a situation where the Government Pleader may appear not only without a written statement but also without a person who is able to answer material questions relating to the suit. If this is so, then Rule 5 will necessarily have to be construed to mean that it envisages only an appearance on behalf of the Government to answer the claim or the plaint on the first day of the hearing fixed by the summons either with or without a person able to answer material questions relating to the suit. 8. Rule 7 also favours the same construction. 8. Rule 7 also favours the same construction. It provides for situation where a public officer is the defendant, and states that such public officer may apply to the Court to grant extension of time fixed in the summons as may be necessary to enable him to make a reference to the Government before answering the plaint and to receive orders thereon through proper channel. The state for making such application to the Court cannot be before the first date fixed by the summons to appear and answer the plaint. It is not suggested that in spite of the absence of reference to the Government and orders received thereon, the public officer should not only appear but also file his written statement in answer to the plaint. On the contrary it is to enable the officer to make the necessary reference and obtain the required orders that sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 provides that the Court shall extend the time for so long as appears to it to be necessary. This power given to the Court will be inconsistent with the time prescribed in Rule 5 if the said limit is to be construed as a limit for filing the written statement. 9. The learned Single Judge in the decision reported in 1983 Mh.L.J. 621 (supra) has relied on the report of the Joint Committee as well as the Statements of Reasons annexed to the Bill which introduced the change in Order XXVII. Shri Rege for petitioner invited our attention to an extract from the report which is reproduced in paragraph 9 of the judgment. Since there is a reference to the time-limit to file the written statement in the said extract. Shri Rege contended that when Rule 5 of the said Order places a restriction of two months, it can only be for filing the written statement and not merely for appearing and answering the claim or the plaint. We are afraid that this construction of the said Rule is not permissible on the basis of the observations made in the Report of the Committee. We have to construe the final enactment as it emerges after the Bill is passed. Between the report of the Committee and the final Act there are various stages, and the provisions of the bill may undergo many changes. We have to construe the final enactment as it emerges after the Bill is passed. Between the report of the Committee and the final Act there are various stages, and the provisions of the bill may undergo many changes. It is therefore, not safe to reply upon the reports of the Committees for the construction of the enactment particularly when the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous. It is for this reason that we are in respectful disagreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in that case and hold that the view taken there is not a correct interpretation of the provisions. 10. In the result we declare that Rule 5 of Order XXVII does not place restriction on the power of the Court to grant extension of time for filing the written statement. The limit of two months' extension prescribed there is for appearing and answering the claim by or on behalf of the Government. The step and stage of filing a written statement is distinct and separate from that of appearing and answering the claim. 11. The petition is therefore, dismissed and the Rule is discharged Interim stay is vacated. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----