JUDGMENT D. N. Mehta, J. - This is an Application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, praying that this Court should exercise its inherent powers to quash the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 72/S/1982 pending in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, 7th Court, Dadar, Bombay. 2. The brief facts leading to the present petition are that the Petitioner P.G. Bhavnani was cited as Original Accused No. 2 and his mother Shri T.G. Bhavnani had been cited as Accused No. 3 in a Criminal Complaint filed by Respondent No. 1 herein on behalf of his employers M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company who carried on business as Chartered Accountants. One H.D. Gandhi who was cited as Accused No. 1 in the Complaint was an employee of the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company. 3. It appears that by an Agreement of Leave and Licence dated 8-5-1972 between Smt. T.G. Bbavnani the mother of the present Petitioner and the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company, a flat bearing No. 50 on the 13th floor of Building 'D' of Venus Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Worli, Bombay, was given on Leave and Licence basis by the mother of the present Petitioner to the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company. The Complainant C L. Patil who has filed the complaint on behalf of the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company bas averred that in June 1972 the said flat was entrusted to Accused No. 1 Gandhi in his capacity as an officer of the firm with a specific understanding that he would occupy the said flat during his employment with the firm. The compensation in respect of the said flat was paid by the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company. The Complainant stated that the deposit of three months rent or compensation, i.e. Rs. 2,550/- was also paid by the firm to Accused No. 3 the mother of the present Petitioner. 4. Sometime in December 1972 Accused No. 3 the mother of the present Petitioner expired. I am informed at the Bar by Shri Chari, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioner and Shri Vashi, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Complainant, that Accused No. 3 has been discharged and the case has been dropped against her. 4. Sometime in December 1972 Accused No. 3 the mother of the present Petitioner expired. I am informed at the Bar by Shri Chari, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioner and Shri Vashi, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Complainant, that Accused No. 3 has been discharged and the case has been dropped against her. It may be mentioned here that Accused No. 3 the mother of the present Petitioner had bequeathed the said flat by her will to her grand daughter Champa Shyam. Uttamsingh. 5. On 31-3-1975 the Leave and Licence Agreement dated 8-5-1972 expired by efflux of time. However, no fresh agreement was drawn up and the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company continued to be in possession of the flat as the Licensees thereof. 6. Sometime in December 1979 Accused No. 1 Gandhi resigned his post with M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company with effect from 31-3-1980. Gandhi, however, continued in occupation of the said flat till June 1982. By his letter dated 12-6-1980 Gandhi informed his erstwhile employers M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company that he had surrendered the flat which he occupied, to Accused No. 2, i.e. the present Petitioner. In the said letter Accused No. 1 Gandhi stated that the fiat had been acquired by him and that it was only for the purpose of convenience that the Agreement had been entered into on his behalf by the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company. Accused No. 1 Gandhi also stated in the said letter that since he had given an undertaking to the Licensor to surrender the flat no sooner he vacated the same, he had surrendered the fiat to the Licensor, i.e. the present Petitioner and that he would not pay any compensation in respect of the said flat after June, 1982. 7. The Complainant stated in the Complaint that on the above facts it became obvious that Gandhi who was an ex-employee of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company bad entered into a conspiracy with Accused No.2, i.e. the present Petitioner, and pursuant to the said conspiracy had surrendered the flat to the Licensor. i.e. the present Petitioner, to the detriment of the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company. i.e. the present Petitioner, to the detriment of the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company. In the Complaint the Complainant stated that by virtue of the Amendment to the Rent Act of 1972, on and from 1.2.1973, the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company had become "deemed tenant" in respect of the said premises. The complainant stated that he apprehended that Accused No. 1 may leave the country for good. I am informed at the Bar by Shri Char that Accused No. 1 has already left India and is residing abroad. On these facts the Complainant has filed a Complaint against Gandhi as Accused No. 1, P.G. Bhavnani as Accused No. 2 who is the present Petitioner and his mother T. G. Bhavnani against whom the Complaint has already been dismissed as stated heretofore. The Accused have been charged with the offence of conspiracy under Section 120-B as also with criminal breach of trust under Section 408, criminal trespass under Section 441 and114 of the Indian Penal Code. 8. Shri Chari, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, has submitted that the Complaint does not reveal any offence as against his client Accused No. 2, in that it does not show that Accused No. 2 had entered into any agreement with the said Gandhi Accused No. 1 with a view to commit criminal breach of trust in respect of the said premises or to commit the offence of criminal trespass. Shri Chari stated that the said premises belonged to his client Accused No. 2 and there could be no question of criminal trespass, since his client was the owner of the premises. Shri Chari contended that effectively it was Gandhi who was the Licensee although only for the sake of convenience the name of the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company had been entered in the Agreement. If, therefore, Gandhi surrendered the said premises on his resigning from the firm, then it could not be said that Gandhi had committed any offence. If any event, according to Shri Chari, even if Gandhi had committed any offence, his client Accused No. 2 who was the Licensor could not be charged with the offence of criminal breach of trust in respect of the said premises or criminal trespass. If any event, according to Shri Chari, even if Gandhi had committed any offence, his client Accused No. 2 who was the Licensor could not be charged with the offence of criminal breach of trust in respect of the said premises or criminal trespass. Shri Chari argued that if the Complaint did not reveal any offence as against his client, then this Court ought to exercise its inherent powers in order to quash the process and the proceedings against his client. 9. Now before I consider the submissions of Shri Chari, it will be pertinent to cite the observations of the Supreme Court with regard to the scope and jurisdiction of this Court in exercising the inherent powers of this Court in quashing proceedings. In the case of R.P. Kapoor v, State of Punjab1 Their Lordships were pleased to lay down certain categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings could be exercised by the High Court. Their Lordships observed: "It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an inter-locutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal, proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be Justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may for instance, furnish cases under this category. Absence of the requisite sanction may for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases fatling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between, a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation mayor may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under S. 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained." 10. The Supreme Court in another ruling in the case of Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana2, was pleased to observe: "It surprises us in the extreme that the High Court thought that in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the, Code of Criminal Procedure, it could quash a First Information Report. The Supreme Court in another ruling in the case of Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana2, was pleased to observe: "It surprises us in the extreme that the High Court thought that in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the, Code of Criminal Procedure, it could quash a First Information Report. The police had not even commenced investigation into the complaint filed by the Warden of the University and no proceeding at all was pending in any court in pursuance of the F.I.R. It ought to be realised that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases." 11. Keeping the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court in mind, I shall now consider the submissions made by Shri Chari. According to Shri Chari, the Complaint filed by C.L. Patil who is an employee of the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company did not reveal any offence as far as his client was concerned in respect of offences under Section 120B or Section 408, Section 441 and Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. Now, I may state at once that as far as the present Petitioner is concerned, he cannot be charged under Section 408 of the Indian Penal Code, inasmuch as that Section deals with criminal breach of trust committed by a clerk or a servant employed as such who is entrusted with any property. The correct Section which ought to have been applied is Sec 406, I.P.C. I also agree with Shri Chari that once two persons were charged with conspiracy under Section 120B, they could not be charged again with abetment under Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. However. I am afraid, I cannot agree with Shri Chari when he states that the Complaint does not reveal any offence so far as his client, the present Petitioner, is concerned. 12. The facts, as stated by the Complainant and which facts I must assume to be correct at this stage, appear to be that M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company had entered into a Leave and Licence Agreement with the mother of the present Petitioner and had taken the premises in Venus Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. on leave and licence basis. 12. The facts, as stated by the Complainant and which facts I must assume to be correct at this stage, appear to be that M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company had entered into a Leave and Licence Agreement with the mother of the present Petitioner and had taken the premises in Venus Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. on leave and licence basis. The compensation was paid by the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson 2nd Company and what is important is that the deposit of three months compensation amounting to Rs. 2,550/- was also paid by the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company. Shri Chari has laid some stress on the fact that it was Gandhi Accused No. 1 who used to pay compensation to M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company, who in their turn paid the same to the Licensor. Now, it may be that an arrangement had been arrived at between Gandhi as the employee in occupation of the flat and the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company as employers whereby Gandhi paid the compensation to the firm. However, the compensation was at all times paid by the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company. It is, therefore, difficult to understand the submission of Shri Chari that in reality Gandhi was the Licensee and not the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company. 13. Shri Chari has also submitted that although Gandhi, Accused No. 1, tendered his resignation to the firm of M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company sometime in December, 1979 and severed his connections with the said firm from 31-1-1980, he was permitted to occupy the premises for the next two years till June. 1982 when he vacated the premises and surrendered the same to the Licensor, i.e. the present Petitioner. Assuming that Gandhi severed his connection with M/s. A F. Fergusson and Company from January 19.0 and that he was permitted by his erstwhile employers to continue to occupy the premises, that certainly would not give Gandhi any right in the said premises. In any event, it would not entitle Gandhi to surrender the premises to the Licensor of his own accord without first taking permission of his ex-employers M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company, who were the Licensee. In any event, it would not entitle Gandhi to surrender the premises to the Licensor of his own accord without first taking permission of his ex-employers M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company, who were the Licensee. It is pertinent to note that Gandhi did not inform his employers M/s. A.F. Fergusson and Company of his intention to relinquish the flat in favour of the Licensor, the present Petitioner. It was only after he had surrendered the flat to the present Petitioner that Gandhi informed his employers by a letter dated 12-6-1982 of the fact that he had already surrendered the flat to the Licensor, i.e. the present Petitioner. Gandhi, therefore, faced his ex-employers M/s. A. F. Fergusson and Company with a fait accompli. Prima facie therefore, there is certain evidence to show that there was a conspiracy between Gandhi and the present Petitioner. It may be that in the course of the Trial and when oral evidence has been, led, the present Petitioner may by able to disprove the fact of any conspiracy between him and Gandhi. At this stage I do not think it can be stated that the Complaint does not disclose any offence against the present Petitioner. 14. With regard to Shri Chari's contention that the owner of the premises cannot be charged with criminal trespass in respect of the said premises, again I am afraid, I cannot accept that submission. If an owner of certain premises leases out such premises to another, or permits use thereof by another, and wrongfully enters into the said premises, then certainly such an owner commits criminal trespass. I may, however, make it clear that this is only a prima facie view and the entire issue can be investigated at the trial with the help of evidence led by the Prosecution and by the Defence. At present I do not think I can come to the conclusion urged by Shri Chari that the Complaint prima facie does not disclose any offence against the Petitioner. 15. In the result, rule is discharged. Interim stay stands vacated. Rule discharged. 1. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866. 2. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2229.