ORDER Being aggrieved by the disconnection of electric supply to the Waldorf Restaurant by the Calcutta Electric Supply Corp. Ltd, the Writ petitioner moved this application challenging such disconnection not only on the ground that the respondent authority were not entitled to disconnect the said supply but also on the ground that there had been violation of the principles of natural justice in as much as such disconnection of electric supply was not proceeded with by a notice or of an opportunity of being heard before such disconnection was effected. The writ petitioner contended that In as much as there had been no default in payment of the bills for consumption of electricity submitted by the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. Ltd, under the circumstance such act of disconnection was, according to the petitioner, arbitrary, illegal and done in a high handed manner. 2 Waldorf Restaurant situate at 24B, Park Street, Calcutta, is 8 regular consumer of electricity in respect of four meters installed at the premises. The petitioner contended that it had been paying the bills regularly without any default for the actual consumption as submitted by the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. Ltd. Hence when on 29th of June 1984. The Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. Ltd. through its employees disconnected the electric supply all un a sudden, when protested, the respondent Corporation demanded a sum of Rs. 22,000/- as additional charges for consumption of electricity and Rs 6.000/- as security deposit. The petitioner contended that the Calcutta Electricity Supply Corpn. Ltd being vested with the duty of supplying electricity and being a licensee under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 is charged with a public duty as such a statutory authority amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court and having acted arbitrarily, and mala fide by adopting an unreasonable and unfair conduct, hence it was answerable to show Cause as to why such action on the part of the respondent not bit set aside Mr. Justice P. C Borooah (as he then was) on 3rd July, 1984 passed an interim order in terms of prayer (d) and directed for restoration of supply of energy 3. The Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. Ltd, the respondent no. Justice P. C Borooah (as he then was) on 3rd July, 1984 passed an interim order in terms of prayer (d) and directed for restoration of supply of energy 3. The Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. Ltd, the respondent no. 2 stated in its affidavit that the petitioner Waldorf Restaurant had been stealing or pilfering electricity under the circumstances the bills raised by the company did not represent the actual consumption The actual load of the consumer in the said premises was 31.5 K W. but under the agreement of Supply. The petitioner was permitted to consume only 16 K W On spot inspection held on 29th of June, 1984, the respondent no. 2 detected that the connected load was much in excess of the sanctioned load. The petitioner had been bypassing registration of units in the metres concerned Apart from that the seals and other equipment connected with the metres like cut outs, terminal plate and pressure coil links were found to be tampered with at such premises. The pressure coil links were disconnected. The petitioner was informed of the same by the company’s letter dated 4th July, 1984. According to the respondent no.2 on proper calculation it transpired that the petitioner evaded payment in respect of 22.520 electrical units by bypassing such registration. As a result on the basis of such calculation a sum of Rs. 22,295/- represented not the actual consumption but the energy which had been stolen by tampering with the equipments. The terms and conditions of the agreement under which such supply was given, prohibited stealing of energy or bypassing registration of units in the metres falling which the Corporation was entitled to rescind the contract of supply altogether over and above the right of disconnecting the supply temporarily or permanently. In the event of such theft it was the case of the respondent that they were entitled to disconnect and supply even without notice, apart from proceeding with the petitioners and/or the persons responsible for such misdeeds before a Court of Criminal Jurisdiction. In fact a complaint had been lodged with the Park Street Police Station for violation of the conditions of supply. Under the circumstances there could not have been any violation of the principles of natural justice, nor the action complained of could be held to be arbitrary or mala fide. In fact a complaint had been lodged with the Park Street Police Station for violation of the conditions of supply. Under the circumstances there could not have been any violation of the principles of natural justice, nor the action complained of could be held to be arbitrary or mala fide. Lastly, the respondent no.2 contended that it was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this court under the circumstances, the application was not maintainable and was liable be dismissed in limine. Hence in this application, two points required for determination. First of all whether an application under the writ jurisdiction of this Court is maintainable against Calcutta Electric Supply Corpt. Ltd, which is a company incorporated under the companies Act and secondly whether such action of disconnection without any notice was permissible under the fact sand circumstances of the case. 4. Under Article 12 of the Constitution, the expression 'the State' includes the Government and Parliament of India, the Government and legislature of each state and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Govt. of India even though a body of persons may not constitute State within the definition of Article 12, a writ under Article 226 may lie against it, on non Constitutional grounds of contravention of some provisions of the Constitution outside Part III e g. where such body has a public duty to perform or where its acts are supported by the State or public officials. The expression "The State" will include not only executive and legislative organs of the Union and the States but also loca1 bodies such as Municipal Authorities as well as other authorities which include the instrumentalities or agencies of the State or bodies or institutions which discharge public functions of a Governmental character. Every type of public authority exercising statutory powers whether such powers are governmental, quasi governmental or non governmental and whether such authority is under the control of Government or not. In the instant case the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. Ltd. contended that in as much as it was a company not established under any statute no writ lies against such corporation. In the instant case the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. Ltd. contended that in as much as it was a company not established under any statute no writ lies against such corporation. Whereas it was contended on behalf of the writ petitioners that although the respondent was a public limited company but it exercises statutory powers and in many respect can be held to be an instrumentality or agency of the State. It exercise statutory powers as conferred under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and also has to follow the rules formulated thereunder. 5. Under Article 226, the High Courts have power to issue to any persons or authority, directions, orders or writs in the nature of habeas copus, mandamus, prohibition, quo qarranto and cerrioriari or any of them for enforcement of any rights conferred by Part-III or for any other purpose. In the case reported in AIR 1981 SC p. 487 Ajay Hasia .v Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. it was held that where a Corporation is an instrumentally or agency of the Government it must be held to be an authority within the meaning of Article 12 and hence subject to the same basic obligation to obey the fundamental rights as the Government. There it was held that it is immaterial for determining as an authority whether the Corporation is created by a statute or under the Statue in as much as the test laid down is whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the Govt. and not as to how it is created. There the learned Judges of the Supreme Court observed that the Court should be anxious to enlarge the scope and width of the fundamental rights by bringing within their sweep every authority which is an instrumentality or agency of the Government or the corporate personality of which the Government is acting The mantle of a Corporation may be adopted in order to free the Government from the inevitable constraints of led tapism and slow motion but by doing so the Government cannot be allowed to play truant with basic human rights. Otherwise it would be the easiest thing for the Government to assign to' plurality of the Corporations almost every State business such as Post & Telegraph, T. V. Radio, Rail Road and Telephone in short every economic activity and thereby cheat the people of India out of the fundamental rights guaranteed to them That would be a mockery of the Constitution and nothing short of treachery and breach of faith with the people of India. There the learned Judges were of the view that where a corporation is of an instrumentality or agency of the Government it must be held to be an authority within the meaning of Article 12 and hence subject to the Same basic obligation to obey the fundamental rights as the Government The test for determining as to whether a corporation Can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of Government various tests had been laid down in paragraph 9 of the said judgment Out of the six tests, definitely under test no. 3 the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred as also State protected Under test no 4 there is deep and pervasive State control over the activities of the Corporation as a State agent or State instrumentality. Even under test no 5 the functions of the Calcutta Eclectic Supply Corpn. is of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions which is a relevant factor in classifying the Corporation as an Instrumentality or agency of Government. 6. Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. is a public utility concern discharging statutory duties as contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 From the various provisions of the said Act such as grant of licence under S.3 by the State Government for the supply of energy in the entire area of Calcutta and the provision as contained in the schedule is deemed to be incorporated with and formed part of every such licence granted by the State Government. The revocation or amendment of such licence by the State Government including the power to amend such licence is provided under S 4 (a). The revocation or amendment of such licence by the State Government including the power to amend such licence is provided under S 4 (a). Provision for revocation of licence and the sale of undertaking to the State Electricity Board had been provided under S. 5 Under S.22 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 there is an obligation on the licensee to supply energy to all on the some terms and conditions in the same area placed under similar circumstances Hence, the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. is under a statutory obligation to supply energy and cannot make any discrimination between one, consumer and the other placed under similar circumstances The State is entitled to impose duty on consumption of electricity and realise the same through instrumentality of the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. Ltd, Under S.28 of the involvement of the State Government is very much there so far the consumption of electricity is concerned by a consumer. The State Government has the power and authority to constitute an Advisory Board Under S.35 and has the power to appoint Electrical Inspectors and from any decision of such electrical Inspector an appeal shall lie to the appropriate Government The board so constituted shall consist of various members as provided under S. 36(a), Such Board ha- been given power to make rules etc. The provisions as contained in the schedule indicate the control of the State Government over finance. 7. In the case reported In AIR 1979 SC p. 1628 Ramana Davaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors, it was held : - "Now, it is obvious that the Government which represents the executive authority of the State, may act through the instrumentality or agency of natural persons or it may employ the instrumentality or agency of juridical persons to carry out its functions In the early days, when the Government had limited functions, It could operate effectively through natural persons constituting its civil service and they were found adequate to discharge governmental functions, which were of traditional vintage But its the tasks of the Government multiplied, with the advent of the welfare State, it began to be increasingly felt that the framework of civil service was not sufficient to handle the new tasks which were often of specialised and highly technical character. The inadequacy of the civil service to deal with these new problems came to be realised and it became necessary to forge a new instrumentally or administrative device for handling these new problems, It was in these circumstances and with a view to supplying this administrative need that the Public corporation came i to being as the third arm of the Government, As early as 1819 the Supreme Court of the United States is Mac Culloch ", Maryland (1819-19) 4 Wheat 316 held that the Congress has power to charter corporations as incidental to or in aid of governmental functions and as pointed out by Mathew J., in Sukhdev v. Bhagat Ram (1975) 3 SCR 619 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ), such federal corporations would ex hypothesi be agencies of the Government. In Great Britain too, the policy of public administration through separate corporations was gradully evolved and the conduct of basic industries through giant corporations has now become a permanent feature of public life So far as India is concerned, the genesis of the emergence of corporations as instrumentalities or agencies of Government is to be found in the Government of India Resolution on Industrial Policy dated 6th April, 1948 where it was stated inter alia that "management of State enterprise will as a rule be through the medium of public corporation under the statutory control of the Central Government who will assume such powers as may be necessary to ensure this" It was in pursuance of the policy envisaged in this and subsequent resolutions on Industrial Policy that corporations were created by Government for setting up and management of public enterprises and carrying out other public functions, Ordinarily these functions could have been carried out by Government departmentally through its service personnel, but the instrumentality or agency of the corporations was resorted to in these cases having regard to the nature of the task to he performed. The corporations acting as instrumentality or agency of Government would obviously be subject to the same limitations in the field of constitutional and administrative law as Government itself, though in the eye of the law they 'would be distinct and independent legal entities. If Government acting through its officers is subject to certain constitutional and public law limitations. The corporations acting as instrumentality or agency of Government would obviously be subject to the same limitations in the field of constitutional and administrative law as Government itself, though in the eye of the law they 'would be distinct and independent legal entities. If Government acting through its officers is subject to certain constitutional and public law limitations. it must follow a fortiori that Government acting through the instrumentality or agency of cooperators should equally be subject to the same limitations. But the question is how to determine whether a corporation is acting as instrumentality or agency of Government. It is a question not entirely free from difficulty," At paragraph 16 it was further held : "There is also another factor which may be regarded as having a bearing on this issue and it is whether the operation of the corporation is an important public function. It has bean held in the United Stales in a number of case that the concept of private action must yield to a conception of State action where public functions are being performed. Vide Arthur S. Millar. “The Constitutional Law of the “Security State” (10 Stenford Law Review 620 at p. 664). It was pointed out by Douglas, J, in E.S. Evana v. Charles E. Newton (1966) 382 US 296 : 15 L Ed. 2d 373 that “when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental is nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State” Of course, with the growth of the welfare State, it is very difficult to define what functions are Governmental and what are not, because, as pointed out by Villmer. L J. in pfiyer v. Minisry of Health, (1964) 1 Ch. L J. in pfiyer v. Minisry of Health, (1964) 1 Ch. 614, there has been since mid-Victorian times, “a revolution in political thought and a totally different conception prevails today as to what is and what is not within the function of Government” Douglas, J also observed in the same effect in New York v. United States, (1945) 326 US 275 : “ A State’s project is as much a legitimate governmental activity whether it is traditional, or akin to private enterprise, or conducted for profit” Of Helvering v. Cerhardt, (1937) 304 US 405, 426, 427, A State may deem it as essential to its economy that it owns and operate a railroad, a mill, or an irrigation system as it does to own and operate bridges street lights, or a sewage disposal plant. What might have been viewed in an earlier day as an improvident or even dangerous extension of state activities may today be deemed indispensable. It may be noted that besides the so-called traditional functions, the modern State Operates a multitude of public enterprises and discharges a host of other public functions. If the functions of prises and discharges a host of other public functions. If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporations as an instrumentality or agency of Government. This is precisely what was pointed out by Mathew, J. In Sukhdev v. Bhagatram ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ) where the learned Judge said that institutions engaged in matters of high public interest or performing public functions are by virtue of the nature of the functions perform government agencies. Activities which are too fundamental to the society are by definition too important not to be considered government functions.” 8. In the case reported in AIR 1958 Bom page 498 The Baranagor Jute Factory Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Huleshchand Rupchand it was held that normally a writ of Mandanus does not lie against a private individual but a direction on him to do a particular thing appertaining to his office and is in the nature of a public duty then such statutory duty devolving upon a public utility concern is a public Duty. Any public utility concern like an electrical undertaking discharging such statutory function cannot be placed in the same position as a private party. Any public utility concern like an electrical undertaking discharging such statutory function cannot be placed in the same position as a private party. Hence writ can issue at the instance of any consumer of a public utility concern for its failure to perform its duty under the Electricity Act or its licence. Similarly a writ could issue to restrain such an organization form abusing its powers under any of the provisions of the Act or under its licence. In paragraph 47 of the said judgment the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court referred to Corpus Juris Secundum for defining public utility service. In view of such definition the learned Judge was of the view that a writ could lie at the instance of a consumer to a public utility concern for its failure to perform its duty under the Electricity Act or under its licence. After quoting Lord Halsbury’s Laws of England it was held a most extensive remedial nature and is in the form of a command directing any person, corporation or inferior tribunal to do some particular thing as specified appertaining to his or their office is in the nature of a public duty. Hence Mandamus could issue to an official to compel him to carry out the terms of the statute by which the said organization was controlled. 9. In the case reported in AIR 1936 Cal p. 265 sarla Bala Roy v. Chariman, Darjeeling Municipality Mr. Justice R.C. Mitter (as he then was) had to similarly consider a case in connection with the Electricity Act of 1910 and held that a licensee given by the local Government to a person under the Electricity Act conferred the right on the licensee to supply electric energy in a specified area. Beertain statutory powers and duties were conferred and imposed on the licensee and those powers were given for the purpose of enabling the licensee to undertake a public undertaking. Such undertaking being for the public benefit a duty was imposed on the licensee to supply energy to any person who wished to take a supply of energy subject to conditions laid down either in the body of the Act or in the schedule which was incorporated in the licence subject to any addition or modification which the local Government could make. The licensee although could insert any additional clause or condition to the agreement but not contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of the Act Hence the services rendered by the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. Ltd was considered as of a public utility in nature. 10 The case reported in AIR 1969 SC p. 1306 Praga Tools Corpr v. C. v. lmanual & Ors has no application to the facts of this case in as much as there the learned Judges were of the view that writ could not lie against a company which Was not statutory in nature, nor having any public duty or responsibility imposed by statute to discharge In paragraph 6 the learned Judges of the Supreme Court observed : "No doubt, Article 226 provides that every High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority orders and writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus. etc or any of them for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and for any other purpose But it is well understood hat a mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty in the performance of which the one who applies for it has a sufficient legal interest".... "It has always required that the applicant for a mandamus should have a legal and specific right to enforce the performance of these duties" Therefore, the condition precedent for the issue of mandamus is that there is in one claiming it a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by one against whom it is sought An order of mandamus is, in form, a command directed to a person, corporation or an inferior tribunal requiring him or them to do a particular thing therein specified which appellants to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. It, however not necessary that the person or the authority on whom the statutory duty is imposed need be a public official or an official body. A Mandamus can issue, for instance, to an official of a society to compel him to carry out the terms of the statue under or by which the society is constituted or governed and also to companies or corporations to carry out duties placed on them by the statutes authorizing their undertakings. A Mandamus can issue, for instance, to an official of a society to compel him to carry out the terms of the statue under or by which the society is constituted or governed and also to companies or corporations to carry out duties placed on them by the statutes authorizing their undertakings. A mandamus would also lie against a company constituted by a statute for the purposes of fulfilling public responsibilities”. 11. In that case Praga Tools Corpn. a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act had no statutory duty or public duty to discharge Under the circumstances, the learned Judges held that the company being an statutory body and one incorporated under the Companies Act was neither a statutory, nor a public duty imposed on it by any statute in respect of which enforcement could be sought by means of a mandamus. 12. The Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. Ltd. contended that this application was not maintainable under Article 226 against the Corporation, in as much as the conditions of supply of energy under the Act of 1910 and the schedule thereto form a part of the contract by and between the consumer and the Corporation for supply of energy not only that also disconnection had taken place by reason of breach of some of the terms and conditions of such contract Hence for a breach of contract no unit would lie against the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. The learned lawyer on behalf of the Corporation relied upon the case reported in AIR 7981 SC p 1368. The Divisional Forest Officer v. Biswanath Tea Co. Ltd. where it was held that is case of breach or contractual right the petitioner could not enforce such right by way of writ petition when there had been no breach of statutory provisions Breach of a term incorporated in the agreement which was a mere reproduction of proviso to the rule 37 of Assam Land Revenue and Local Rates and Regulations did not entitle the petitioner to contend that the respondents were enforcing a statutory provisions. There the learned Judges were of the view that contractual obligation could not be enforced by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction Ordinarily where a breach of contract is complained of a party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract-if the contract is capable of specifically performed or the party may sue for damages and such right to relief flowing from a contract has to he claimed in a civil Court by way of suit. 13. The respondent contended that the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn is a public company limited by share and no shares floated by this company are held by the Government, nor there is any control by the Government either in the Board or over finance. The tests to determine whether a corporate body is a State or other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, various tests had been laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions. In the case reported in AIR 1979 SC p. 1628 Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors out of the various tests laid down therein at least three is control of the Corporation by the State to certain extent Moreover the corporation enjoys State conferred or State protected monopoly status Apart from that the functions carried out by the Corporation are public functions in nature closely related to Governmental functions. Again in the case reported in AIR 1981 SC p. 487 Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors., the test for determining whether a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government had been laid down in paragraph 9 of the said judgment. Similarly such test had been laid down in paragraphs 39 and 40 of the case reported in AIR 1981 SC p. 212 Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India & anr. On Cumulative assessment o the facts and circumstances of this case indicate that the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. Similarly such test had been laid down in paragraphs 39 and 40 of the case reported in AIR 1981 SC p. 212 Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India & anr. On Cumulative assessment o the facts and circumstances of this case indicate that the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. Although a separate legal entity and a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act but it can be considered to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government, so far the supply of electric energy in the City of Calcutta is concerned by virtue of the licence granted by the State of West Bengal they enjoy the status of monopoly business There Can be no doubt that they discharge the functions of public utility A consumer has no choice but to rely upon them for supply of energy in the city of Calcutta. The Calcutta Electric Supply Corpo. has to fulfil the Conditions of licence granted by the State of West Bengal and comply the statutory duties cast upon it by the Indian Electricity Act of 1910 Through the instrumentality and/or agency of the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. the State is performing its functions of supplying energy under the Indian Electricity Act of 1910 The State may not be the true owner nor the real operator but Can there be may doubt that the State exercises effective control The policies of the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. may not be controlled by the State but the State reserves its right either to renew or discounting the licence as a result whereof the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn would be deprived of supplying energy to the innumerable consumers in the metropolis of Calcutta. Although S. 3 sub S (2) sub-s (e) of the Act provides that the grant of such a licence in favour of Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn would not in any way hinder and/or restrict the grant of licence to another person within the same area for supply for a like purpose but the face remains as on this day no individual Consumer has any right, authority or opportunity of taking supply of energy for domestic consumption or for commercial purpose directly from the West Bengal State Electricity Board or from Damodar Vality Corpn by completely by passing Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. The duty of the State of West Bengal to supply energy to the consumer had been entrusted to the agency of the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. In strict sense the State may not be the true owner of the undertaking of the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn., nor the State of West Bengal is the real operator but can if be denied that there is effective controller is the State and is not Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. in discharging statutory duties as enjoined by the Indian Electricity Act 1910. 14. It had further been contended that in view of the availability of alternative remedy, this Court should not grant any relief even assuming the Electric Supply Corpn. was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court in as much as Clause IV (3) of the Schedule to the Act of 1910 had provided that in case of any difference or dispute as to the amount of energy to be taken and as to any improper use of energy the matter shall be referred to an electric Inspector and decided by him Such Electrical Inspector is an officer appointed by the State Govt. under S. 36 of the Act Apart from that under S 36 sub-s (2) of the said Act an appeal shall lie from the decision of the Electrical Inspector to the appropriate Government or if the appropriate Government by general or special order so directs to an Advisory Board. Thus there being laid down a detailed statutory procedure for redress of the grievances of any consumer, such procedure has to be followed. In the case of Dunlop India, reported in AIR 1985 SC page 33 the learned Judge of the Supreme Court observed : - “In Tilaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. V. State of Orissa, A.P. Sen, E.S. Venkataramiah and R.B. Misra, JJ. Held that where the statute itself provide the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority, a second appeal to the Tribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to the High Court, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statutory machinery. That it has become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. That it has become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Art. 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters.” 15. In the instant case discontinuation of the electric energy without any prior notice amounts to an extraordinary situation where the court if so thinks fit considering the facts and circumstances of the case may pass an order under Article 226 of the Constitution to redress the grievance of the consumer although there is an alternative remedy provided in the statute itself. In a case of arbitrary disconnection of the energy supplied by the Corporation may call for an immediate order for restoration of the supply which may not be granted by the Electrical Inspector. 16. The petitioners contended that there had been a violation of the rules of natural justice in a much as no prior notice had been given by the Calcutta Eclectic Supply Corpn. to the petitioner before such supply was discontinued on 29th of June, 1984. The Statute does not provide for notice to be given before the exercise of powers under S. 20 sub-s. (3), S. 24 sub-s. (1) S.26 sub-s. (3), Clause VI of the Schedule Second proviso, Clause (a) and Clauses (b) and (d) of the Second proviso to Clause VI of the Schedule to the Act do not provide for nay prior notice. The learned lawyer on behalf of the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation contended that in a case of pilferage or tampering with gadgets any prior notice would caution the consumer which would act prejudicially to the interest of the corporation and thereby defeat the detection of the offence and violation of the terms of the agreement. The learned lawyer on behalf of the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation contended that in a case of pilferage or tampering with gadgets any prior notice would caution the consumer which would act prejudicially to the interest of the corporation and thereby defeat the detection of the offence and violation of the terms of the agreement. Moreover that would entitle the consumer to obtain an order of injunction restraining the Corporation to act any further In as much as the pilferage of electricity results not only loss of revenue of the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. but also to the State Govt. in as much as every Consumer of electricity is bound to pay duty under the Bengal Electricity Duty Act, 1935 to the State Government. Under S. 5 of the said Act CESC as the licensee is required to collect from the consumer and pay the same to the State Government When such consumption is not correctly recorded due to tampering of gadgets the entire electricity consumed is not recorded in the metre and consequently there would be no bill for such energy consumed. Hence there would be not only loss of revenue for the CESC but also the loss of duty payable to the Government The learned lawyers on behalf of the respondents contended that under the conditions of supply, more so under condition no.5(a) the licenser will be provided with metre parts, service cut outs, terminals switch panels, service lines, cables, brackets etc. Those remain the licensee’s property and on no account those could be handled or removed by anyone who is not in the employment of the licensee. The seals which are fixed on the metres and the licensee’s apparatus must not be broken by the consumer and the consumer shall be liable for any damage or injury resulting form such unauthorized actions. If there is any reason of pilferage of electricity or tampering with the metres and other gadgets or any dishonest use of energy such action on the part of the consumer is punishable under the Act and CESC contended that under S. 40 and S.44 the CESC was entitled to disconnect by reason of such illegal or unlawful acts. Such power to disconnect also flows from the provisos of clause VI of the schedule to the Act. Such power to disconnect also flows from the provisos of clause VI of the schedule to the Act. The CESC was also entitled to terminate the contract under the terms of the agreement entered into between the CESC and the consumer. In any event there being disputed questions of fact which required detailed investigation into the facts and technicalities to assess how, when and where such pilferage has taken place or to ascertain the connected load as compared to the sanctioned load in respect of the premises of a consumer which requires local investigation and inspection. Apart from that oral evidence of the experts including the Electrical Engineers may be necessary to ascertain such facts. Hence, this Court should not under the writ jurisdiction entertain such a claim. It was further the case of CESC that a team of engineers of CESC constituting a special anti-pilferage cell carried out an inspection at the petitioner’s premises on 29th of June, 1984 when it was found that the petitioner had been by passing registration of units in the metres by tampering with the seals. As a result the supply had been disconnected forthwith. It was only restored pursuant to an interim order obtained from Mr. Justice P.C. Borooah (as he then was). 17. Under Article 226 of the Constitution every High Court shall have the power throughout the feretories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any reason or authority including in appropriate cases any government, directions, orders or writs for enforcement of any of the lights conferred by Part-III, i. e. the fundamental rights or for any other purpose By virtue of the provisions as contained in 36, (1) of the Constitution the General Clauses Act of 1897 is applicable and under S. 3 sub S. (42) of the General Clauses Act the word person shall include any company or association or body of individuals. Therefore such a writ could be issued against a company provided the other test as indicated earlier are fulfilled Lord Halsbury’s Laws of England VI. 14th Ed at page 117 observed :- “An order of Mandamus will be granted ordering that to be done which a statute requires to be done and for this rule to apply it is not necessary that that party or corporation on whom the statutory duty is imposed should be a public official or an official body” 18. 14th Ed at page 117 observed :- “An order of Mandamus will be granted ordering that to be done which a statute requires to be done and for this rule to apply it is not necessary that that party or corporation on whom the statutory duty is imposed should be a public official or an official body” 18. Similarly Sri H.M. Seerval, in his constitutional Law of India 3rd Edn. Vol. II at page 1229 at paragraph 1687 quotes the above passage of Halsbury while dealing with the law in India relating to issue of a writ in the nature of Mandamus. In the same volume of his Third Edition at page 1384, the learned author refers with approval to a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in AIR 1968 Bom. 498 (Nagpur Corporation v. Nagpur Electric & Power Co. Ltd.) in which it was held “ :that the respondent company was a public utility and the statutory duty imposed upon it was a public duty for the enforcement of which a writ of Mandamus would issue.” 19. In the case reported in AIR 1960 Cal, p. 396 Dr. Sudhir Chardra Neogy v. Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. Sinha, J as he then was relied upon the said decision of the Bombay High Court and observed after quoting Corpus Juris secundum 998 that writ would issue at the instance of any consumer to the public utility concerned for its failure to perform its duty under the statute. The learned Judge was of the view that if it can be shown that Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. was violating any provisions of law for which there was no adequate remedy provided then a writ would lie. 20. In the case reported in AIR 1955 Cal. P. 372 Aswini Kumar Samanta v. Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn Ltd. the learned Judges of the Appeal Court had to consider the requirement of consent of the owner of the land and the conditions as imposed under S.21 sub-s (2) and other provisions of the Indian Electricity Act of 1910. There the consumer had moved the writ jurisdiction of this court calling upon the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. To supply the energy in as much as the Eclectic Supply Corpn. Expressed their inability to proceed with the installation of the electric connection unless the landlord consented. There the consumer had moved the writ jurisdiction of this court calling upon the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. To supply the energy in as much as the Eclectic Supply Corpn. Expressed their inability to proceed with the installation of the electric connection unless the landlord consented. Although ultimately on merits the appeal was dismissed but nowhere it was held that such writ did not lie against Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. As per the rules of the CESC the cable could not be taken to the will over the landlord's land without his written permission Although ultimately dismissed by the learned Judges of the Appeal Court such application under Article 226 was entertained by the Trial Judge. 21. In the case reported in AIR 1983 A. P P 125 a writ Was issued against the Managing Committee of a private college in spite of the fact that the said college did not fulfil the requirement of being a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution The learned Judges in the said case did not put any restrictive interpretation to the word person which could mean any person or an authority which has a public or statutory duty to perform, provided however the writ petitioner had sufficient legal interest in the performance of the said duty. 22. Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn have public duties and responsibilities to perform under the statute Indian Electricity Act 1910. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can not only be invoked for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights but also for any other purpose. In the instant case it was necessary to determine first whether the party concerned was a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution if not whether the writ would lie against the Calcutta Electricity Supply Corpn. In the instant case it was necessary to determine first whether the party concerned was a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution if not whether the writ would lie against the Calcutta Electricity Supply Corpn. in as much as it is charged with a public duty imposed by the statute which created a corresponding right in favour of the writ Petitioner which sought to enforce will be on writ jurisdiction Under the circumstances the decisions reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 , AIR 1981 SC 487 and AIR 1981 SC 212 are not relevant for the purpose of determining whether the Wirt would lie against the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn on the ground that it was a public utility concern in the nature of monopoly business discharging public duty as imposed by the Electricity Act of 1910. Even if the petitioner relied to establish that the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. was the State as envisaged under Article 12 of the Constitution but even then the petitioner may contend successfully that it was an authority under Article 12 for the purpose of enforcement of public duty imposed by the statute The trend of decisions find favour of a wide construction be given to Article 12 of the Constitution. The licence granted to the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. under the Indian Electricity Act of 1910 has created monopoly in its favour with liberty to carry the business of supplying energy in the city of Calcutta to the exclusion of all others with the protection of the State. It is in the nature of discharging the State's duty through its sole agents i.e. the Calcutta Electricity Supply Corpn. Through the various provisions as indicated earlier the Government exercises control over the activities of the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. So far imposition and collection of revenue is concerned including the tax payable to the local Government. The Government has also a nominee on the board of management of Calcutta Electric Supply Corpo. Even the option had been given to the Government to take over of the undertaking of the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. Hence the Corporation discharging such function cannot act arbitrarily. Even if the provisions of Article 14 are not attracted unless the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpa. Even the option had been given to the Government to take over of the undertaking of the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. Hence the Corporation discharging such function cannot act arbitrarily. Even if the provisions of Article 14 are not attracted unless the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpa. is held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 but any arbitrary action can be challenged in as much as role of arbitrariness has an important aspect of administrative law. There is an obligation on the C.E.S.C. to supply electricity to ail consumers and it is a public duty which creates corresponding right in favour of such consumers. Once such right to consume electricity on performance of all terms and conditions are estab1isned the respondent authorities cannot act arbitrarily by disconnecting such supply upon its whim and caprice. Hence, this Court is of the view that such a writ petition is maintainable against Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn at least to enforce its obligation to render public duty of supplying electric energy to the consumer under the Indian Electricity Act of 1910 However, there being an alternative efficacious remedy as provided in the Act and the schedule the under in the normal Course of events it would be obligatory for a consumer to pursue the procedure as provided In the statute. But the existence of such alternative remedy does not debar the Court from granting relief in proper cases, under Article 226 of the Constitution, to remedy an arbitrary mala fide action on the part of the Corporation. 23. It was contended on behalf of the writ petitioner that the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. has no authority to disconnect the power supply by virtue of the provisions as contained in S. 44 and Clause 5(a) of the Conditions of supply but such clause does not empower the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpo. to disconnect in as much as if the seals which are fixed on the metres and of the Corporation's apparatus be broken by the consumer then the consumer shall be liable for any damages or injury resulting from Such unauthorised action But there is no provision for discontinuation of the electric supply Under the circumstances the said conditions of supply as contained in S. 5(a) would not empower the C.E.S.C to forthwith discontinue the supply. Under S 44 of the said Act a consumer can be prosecuted in a Criminal Court for the said offences but even then that section does not empower the C. E. S. C to disconnect or discontinue the supply. Under S. 26 of the Act departmental proceedings can be drawn against the consumer for violation of any of the terms and conditions of such supply. In addition to the criminal proceedings in such a case the C.E.S.C would be entitled under clause VI of S. 26 to refer the dispute to the Electrical Inspector after giving two days notice of its intention to do so. Calcutta Eclectic Supply Corpn. has the power under sub clause (2) to remove the meter which had been given to the consumer on hire But that clause does not empower the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. to discontinue the supply In addition to all these actions it would also be open to the C.E.S.C. to recover compensation in the event of any loss or damages caused to it by taking appropriate legal proceedings, but that too under S. 48 does not empower the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. to discontinue the line However, it was the case of the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. that the proviso to clause VI of the Schedule and the various sub clauses thereunder be deemed to be incorporated with and formed part of every licence granted under S.3 But then there was no allegation that the efficient supply of energy to any other person had been interfered with unduly and improperly by the consumer Nor there is any allegation that the consumer had made any alteration or addition to any electric wires, fittings, works or apparatus within the premises without notifying the same to the Corporation In the instant case a specific Case held been made out that the writ petitioner had tampered with the metre by bypassing the registration of the actual energy supplied. It had further been contended by the writ petitioner that a drastic action like discontinuing energy supply without notice would be invalid in as much as even If the statute did not provide or was silent as to requirement of any prior notice the Court could supplement the statutory Provisions to make it consistent with the principles of natural justice if such action taken involved civil consequence The example given by the learned lawyer appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner that in the case of abrupt non supply of energy has caused much incontinence not only to the consumers but to the large number of customers who attended the premises to enjoy the Chinese cuisine but he posed a pertinent question as to what would happen to a case where the consumer has a nursing home and the patient's life, under going a major operation may be at stake if the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. decided to take such a drastic action without any notice to the consumer by discontinuing the supply abruptly which may fatally affect the life of such a patient In as much as the doctrine of natural justice has been considerably expanded by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court even if the statute did not provide for such notice before disconnection of the energy summarily if should by necessary implication be implied. In the case reported in AIR 1978 SC p. 851 Mohinder Singh Gill & anr v The Chief Election Commissioner, NEW Delhi & ors the learned Judges in paragraph 76 observed : "We have been told that wherever the Parliament has intended a hearing it has said so in the Act and the rules and inferentially where it has not specificated it is otiose. There is no such sequatur. There is no such sequatur. The silence of a statute has no exclusionary effect except where it flows from necessary implication Article 324 vests a wide power and where some 'direct consequence on candidates emanates from its exercise we must read this functional obligation" 24 In the Case reported in AIR 1981 SC p. 136 S. L Kapoor v. Jagmohan & ors, the learned Judges in paragraph 10 observed : "One of the submissions of the learned Attorney General was that when the question was one of disqualification of an individual member Section 16 of the Punjab Municipal Act expressly provided for an opportunity being given to the member concerned whereas S. 238(1) did not provide for such an opportunity and so by necessary implication, it must be considered that the principle audi alteram partem was excluded We are unable to agree with the submission of the learned Attorney General It is not always a necessary inference that if opportunity is expressly provided in one provision and not so provided ill another, opportunity is to be considered as excluded from that other provision. It may be a weighty consideration to be taken into account but the weightier consideration is whether the administrative action entails civil consequences. This was also the view taken in Mohinder Singh Gill". The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi (1978) 2 SCR 272 ( AIR 1978 SC 851 ), where it was observed (at p. 316) : "We have been told that where ever the Parliament has intended a hearing it has said so in the Act and the rules and inferentially whole it has not specified it is otiose. There is no such sequitur. The silence of a statute has no exclusionary effect except where it flows from necessary implication Art. 324 vests a wide power and where some direct consequence on candidates emanates from its exercise we must read this functional obligation". 25. But the concept of natural justice is not a rigid one and it can be appropriately tailored to suit each occasion. 25. But the concept of natural justice is not a rigid one and it can be appropriately tailored to suit each occasion. Hence, in the facts and circumstances of the Case where there are serious allegations of pilferage or diversion of electric supply so that the matter does not register the actual consumption and in view of such allegations on the basis of repeated conduct on the part of the writ petitioner it was not obligatory, on the part of the C.E.S.C to give such notice, before disconnection There being disputed questions of fact which require elaborate examination. local inspection and evidence of expert is to establish such irregularity, this Court sitting over writ jurisdiction would not assume such duties, more so when there are disputed questions of facts 'which would require to be determined on evidence. 26 In the case reported in AIR 1977 SC p. 1496 M/s. Radhakrishna Agarwall & ors. v. State of Bihar & ors it was held : "It is true that Art. 14 of the Constitution imports a limitation or imposes an obligation upon the State's executive power under Art. 298 of the Constitution. All constitutional powers carry corresponding obligations with them. This is the rule of law which regulates the operation of organs of Government functioning under a Constitution. At the very threshold or at the time of entry into the field of consideration of persons with whom the Government could contract at all, the State, no doubt, acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the individual citizens import into every transaction entered into in exercise of its constitutional powers" But after the State or its agents have entered into the filed of ordinary contract the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se No question arises of violation of Art. 14 or of any other constitutional provision when the State or its agents, purporting to act within this field. perform any act In this sphere. they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and ale bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers come special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract" 27. perform any act In this sphere. they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and ale bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers come special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract" 27. Hence in a Case of pure breach of contract the aggrieved party may not be entitled to a relief under Article 226 but where the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract the relations are not governed by the Courts constitutional provisions but by the valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter se. Unless some statutes steps in and confers some special statutory powers or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from the contract. In the instant Case the contract entered into by and between the petitioner the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn contains statutory terms and obligations. 28. In the Case reported in AIR 1983 SC p. 848 The Gujarat State Financial Corpn v. M/s Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd. it was held that being an instrumentality of the Government and falling under the other authority under Article 12 of the Constitution the rule inhibiting the arbitrary action by the Government would equally apply where such corporation dealing with public whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or otherwise cannot act arbitrarily and its action must be in conformity with some principles which meets the state of reasons and relevance. 29 In the case reported in AIR 1983 Gauhati p. 60 Thokchom Hemabali Devi & Ors v. State of Manipur & Ors where it was held that the right of a Consumer to receive energy flows from the provisions of the Electricity Act and not from any contract between the licensee and the Electricity Board. 29 In the case reported in AIR 1983 Gauhati p. 60 Thokchom Hemabali Devi & Ors v. State of Manipur & Ors where it was held that the right of a Consumer to receive energy flows from the provisions of the Electricity Act and not from any contract between the licensee and the Electricity Board. There it was held that any invasion of the right of the licensee due to any action of the Electricity Board can be challenged in writ petition even if the petitioner’s right to receive the energy was controlled and governed by the Manipur Electricity Supply Regulations in as much as those regulations were statutory in character and were expressly made in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 21 of the Act In that case the supply of electric energy was slashed down from 35 H. P. to 10 H. P. without giving the consumer an opportunity of showing cause. It was held that such order was to the prejudice of the licensee and was violative of the principles of natural Justice. There the learned Judges were of the view that the right the petitioner sought to enforce was not contractual right but such right to receive energy flows from the provisions of the Act. 30. under the circumstances this Court is of the view that although such a writ would lie against the Calcutta Electric Supply Corpn. in proper cases as discussed hereinbefore but in the facts and circumstances of this Case so do not warrant for such interference under the writ jurisdiction more so when the petitioner has not come before this Court with clean hands Under the circumstances, the petitioner's application is rejected. Application rejected.