JUDGMENT - M.S. DESHPANDE, J.:---The question referred for decision by the Division Bench in this case is whether in a case covered by section 50 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (Tenancy Act for short), the provisions of section 41(2) thereof would apply so as to postpone the entitlement of a tenant to purchase the landlord's interest till he ceases to be a person under disability. 2. The petitioner who are widow of one Laxmanrao Wanjari, applied to the Tahsildar, Kelapur on January 16, 1967 for a declaration that the opponent was not a tenant of the land Survey Nos. 1/1, 2 acres 28 gunthas and 3/1-A, 6 acres 39 gunthas of Hirapur and his possession of the lands was illegal and alternatively if it was found that he was a tenant, then for possession under section 50 of the Tenancy Act for possession as the tenant has not exercised his right of purchase within one year from the commencement of the tenancy. The respondent opposed that application on the ground that he was a tenant and urged that in any event section 41(2) of the Tenancy Act applied as the landlords were widows and his right to purchase the land would be postponed for two years until their interest in the lands ceased to exist. The Naib Tahsildar rejected the application in view of his finding that the respondent was a tenant of the disputed lands even from 1959-60 onwards. The Appellate Authority held that the respondent was not a tenant from 1959-60 to 1963-64 and as the tenancy was created after 1-4-1963 and the tenant had not made any offer within one year for the purchase of the land, he was deemed to have surrendered the right to retain possession of the land under section 43(14-A) of the Tenancy Act and the land-ladies were entitled to retain the possession of the whole of the lands in view of section 21 of the Tenancy Act. He, therefore, set aside the order of the trial Court. In revision the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal while affirming the finding that the respondent was not a tenant from 1959-60 to 1963-64, granted the relief of declaration and consequential possession. He, therefore, set aside the order of the trial Court. In revision the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal while affirming the finding that the respondent was not a tenant from 1959-60 to 1963-64, granted the relief of declaration and consequential possession. It, however, held that the land ladies would have no case against the tenant under section 43(14-A) of the Tenancy Act as they are widows and the time limit provided by section 41(2) of the Tenancy Act had not expired. This Court in Special Civil Application No. 505 of 1969 decided on February 2, 1970 set aside the orders of the courts below and remanded the case to the Naib Tahsildar with a direction that the Patwaris should be examined. After remand the trial Court held that the respondent was a tenant not since 1959-60 but only from 1964-65 and rejected the application on the ground that the land ladies being widows the respondent was not entitled to purchase the land till after the expiry of two years from the date on which the widow's interest ceased. In an appeal, the Sub-Divisional Officer, set aside this order after recording a finding that the respondent had never been a tenant and directed the petitioners to seek remedy in a competent Court for restoration of possession. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in revision against this order held that the relief of declaration under section 100(2) of the Tenancy Act, was barred by limitation as the application had not been made within six months from the accrual of the cause of action on or about 1-4-1965 and as the application had been made on 16-1-1967, it was barred by time as the provisions of the Mamlatdars Courts Act applied. It was further held that the respondent had no right to purchase as both the landladies were widows and the question of extension of time and of deemed surrender did not arise for consideration. Thus the order of the trial Court came to be restored. 3. It was further held that the respondent had no right to purchase as both the landladies were widows and the question of extension of time and of deemed surrender did not arise for consideration. Thus the order of the trial Court came to be restored. 3. On behalf of the land-ladies contentions were raised before the learned Single Judge, namely, (1) the period of limitation of six months under section 100(2) of the Tenancy Act was not applicable to the application filed by the land-ladies, (2) the findings of the courts below about the deemed tenancy were wrong, and (3) the Revenue Tribunal was wrong in holding that there was no deemed surrender in view of the fact that the land-ladies were widows. The learned Judge held that the claim for declaration that the respondent was not a tenant, was barred by limitation and the contentions about the finding regarding the deemed tenancy did not survive. He, therefore, proceeded on the assumption that the respondent was a tenant whose tenancy had been created after 1-4-1963. 4. On behalf of the petitioners reliance was placed on the observations in two ruling of this Court, one of a Single Judge in (Govind v. Udhao)1, 1972 Mh.L.J. 588, and the other a Division Bench in (Vikram Yeshwanta v. Eknath Trimbak)2, 1977 Mh.L.J. 520 and it was urged that section 50 of the Tenancy Act was a complete Code in itself and the provisions of section 41(2) did not apply to the tenancies to which section 50 applied. On the other hand reliance was placed on behalf of the respondent on the ruling of a learned Single Judge of this Court in (Ramkrishna v. Vithal)3, 1980 Mh.L.J. 477 where he took the view that even in a case under section 50 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, section 41(2) will apply and if the landlord is a person under disability the entitlement to purchase the landlord's interest is postponed till be ceases to be person under disability, and the provisions of section 41(2) will be deemed to have been engrafted in section 50 as section 41 has been made applicable mutatis mutandis to provisions of section 50. It would be useful first to consider the statutory provisions. It would be useful first to consider the statutory provisions. Section 50 reads as follows "50(1) Where a tenancy is restored under sections 7, 10, 21, 52 or 128-A or is created by a landlord not being a landlord within the meaning of Chapter III-A in any area after the date specified in sub-section (1) of section 49-A, every tenant holding land under such tenancy and cultivating it personally shall be entitled to purchase within one year from the commencement or as the case may be, the restoration of the tenancy so much of such land as he may be entitled to purchase under section 41 and the provisions of sections 41 to 44 (both inclusive) shall mutatis mutandis apply to such purchase". Section 41(1) and (2) so far as they are material are as follows : "41(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, usage or contract but subject to the provisions of sections 42 to 44 (both inclusive) a tenant other than an occupancy tenant shall, in the case of land held by him as a tenant, be entitled to purchase from the landlord the land held by him as a tenant and cultivated by him personally. (2) Where the landlord is of the following category, namely :--- (a) a minor, (b) a widow, (c) ... ... ... (d) a person subject to any physical or mental disability, such tenant shall be entitled to purchase the landlord's interest under this section after the expiry of two years from the date on which- (i) the landlord of category (a) attains majority, (ii) ... ... ... (ii) the landlord of category (d) cease to be subject to such disability, and (iv) the interest of the landlord of category (b) in the land cease to exist ...........". Section 42 prescribes the extent of land and the conditions under which the tenant may be entitled to purchase under section 41. Section 43 requires the tenant to make an offer to the landlord stating the price at which he is prepared to purchase the property, mode of payment, etc. while section 44 has relevance to the determination of the encumbrance of the land and how the purchase price is to be applied towards satisfaction of the debts. Section 43 requires the tenant to make an offer to the landlord stating the price at which he is prepared to purchase the property, mode of payment, etc. while section 44 has relevance to the determination of the encumbrance of the land and how the purchase price is to be applied towards satisfaction of the debts. Sub-section (14-A) of section 43 provides that if a tenant fails to exercise his right of purchase under section 41 in respect of any land or purchase of any land becomes ineffective, the land shall be deemed to have been surrendered to the landlord, and thereupon the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 21 and Chapter VII shall apply to such land as if the land was surrendered by the tenant under section 20. Under section 49-A ownership of certain lands stands transferred to the tenants on and from 1st April, 1963. 5. Section 41(1) thus confers a right to purchase land on a tenant in respect of the tenancies created prior to 1-4-1963 while section 50 creates and entitlement in the tenant whose tenancy commences after 1-4-1963, to purchase the land and provides a period of one year from the commencement of the tenancy to exercise that right. It is, therefore, clear that while these two sections entitle the tenant to purchase the land, they are independent provisions relating to different situations, one relating to tenancy created before 1-4-1963 and the other to the later tenancies. There is a clear limitation to the right created under section 41(1) as it is made subject to sub-section (2). Whether there is such a limitation on the right created under section 50 would depend on how the latter half of section 50 is construed. However, it is beyond doubt that section 50 create entitlement in a tenant holding land under a tenancy created after 1-4-1963 to purchase within one year the land, and places a restriction by reference to section 41 on the extent of land to be purchased which would be equivalent to the land he would have been entitled to purchase under section 41. It then provides that provisions of section 41 to 44 (both inclusive) shall mutatis mutandis apply to such purchase. It then provides that provisions of section 41 to 44 (both inclusive) shall mutatis mutandis apply to such purchase. Clause (c) in sub-section (2) of section 41 which referred to the Armed Forces was deleted by Maharashtra Act No. 39 of 1964 by which Clause (ii) which referred to the Armed Forces also came to be deleted. The portion "Not being a serving member of the Armed Forces" which originally appeared in section 50 was substituted by "Not being a landlord within the meaning of Chapter III-A" by Maharashtra Act No. 39 of 1964 which inserted Chapter III-A by way of special provision of determination of tenancy by landlords who are or have been serving members of the Armed Forces and for purchase of their lands by tenants. It is noteworthy that the other three categories, namely, minor, widow, and person subject to any physical or mental disability which appear in sub-section (2) of section 41 were not excluded from the operation of section 50 while excluding the members of the Armed Forces expressly by an amendment. To appreciate how unqualified the right under section 50 is, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of section 38 in Chapter III of the Tenancy Act which relates to termination of tenancy by landlords and special right of tenants. Under section 38(1) the landlord may after giving notice to the tenant in writing before the 15th day of February, 1961 and making an application for possession under section 36 on or before 31st day of March, 1961, terminate the tenancy of the landlord by the tenant other than an occupancy tenant if he bona fide requires the land for cultivating personally. Under sub-section (2) of section 38, if the landlord is a minor, a widow or a person under any physical or mental disability, the time within which to apply is extended by one year after he attains majority or ceases to be subject to such disability and in a case of a widow by the successor in title within one year from the date on which the widow's interest in the land ceases to exist. But these and similar provisions of sections 39 and 39-A do not apply to the leases created after 1-4-63 which are governed by section 50. But these and similar provisions of sections 39 and 39-A do not apply to the leases created after 1-4-63 which are governed by section 50. Clearly, if no provisions were made for resuming possession by the aforesaid three categories, by extending the time within which they could have applied for obtaining possession, it would not be correct to say that section 41(2) would apply to such cases and under that section the tenant was to be given an extended period for making an offer to purchase. 6. In this context it is necessary to compare the provisions of Chapter III-A which apply to Armed Forces, a category expressly excluded. Section 57-B creates right in favour of the landlord to terminate the tenancy but sub-section (3) thereof provides that nothing in this chapter shall apply to a tenancy of land created after obtaining possession thereof under the provisions of this chapter by a landlord who was ceased to be a serving member of the Armed Forces; but the provisions of section 50 shall apply to such tenancy as they apply in relation to tenancy created after the date referred to in sub-section (1) of section 49-A; or entitle a landlord who has ceased to be a serving member of the armed force as a result of his being duly dismissed or discharged after a Court martial or on account of bad character or as a result of desertion, etc. to terminal the tenancy under this section. Section 57-D of Chapter III-A permits a tenant holding land from a landlord who is a serving member of the Armed Force to purchase from him the land in certain circumstances, and sub-section (2) thereof provides a period of one year which is extended in cases where the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 57-B apply. This would show that where protection was to be granted to a minor, widow and a person under physical on mental disability, adequate provisions was made in the Act and the fact that this was not done in respect of that category of landlords by section 50 expressly, would show the legislative intent that section 41(2) was not to apply to the tenancies covered by section 50. 7. 7. Shri Dhabe the learned Counsel for the respondent contended that by the last limb of section 50 the provisions of sections 41 to 44 were made applicable mutatis mutandis to such purchases and this would mean that sub-section (2) of section 41 also applied. The Supreme Court while considering the meaning of the expression "mutatis mutandis" in (Ashok Service Centre and another v. State of Orissa)4, 1983 Sales Tax Cases page 1 in section 3(2) of the Orissa Additional Sales Tax Act 1975, observed as follows : "Before considering what provisions of the principal Act should be read as part of the Act, we have to understand the meaning of the expression "mutatis mutandis". Earl Jowitt's "The Dictionary of English Law (1950)" defines "mutatis mutandis" as "with the necessary changes in points of detail". Black's Law Dictionary (Revised 4th Edn. 1968) defines "mutatis mutandis" as "with the necessary changes in points of details meaning that matters or things are generally the same, but to be altered when necessary, as to names, offices and the like. (Housman v. Waterhouse)5, 191 App. Div. 850; 182 N.Y.S. 249, 251". In Bouvier's Law Dictionary (3rd Revision Vol. II), the expression "mutatis mutandis" is defined as "The necessary changes. This is pharse of frequent practical occurrence, meaning that matters or things are generally the same, but to be altered when necessary, as to names, offices, and the like". Extension of an earlier Act "mutatis mutandis" to a later Act brings in the idea of adaptation, but so far only as it is necessary for the purpose, making a change without altering the essential nature of the thing change, subject of course to express provisions made in the later Act". It is thus clear that when a substantive right is conferred by section 50 of the Tenancy Act on the tenant to purchase within one year without any reservation, the provision for the application of the provisions of section 41 to 44 "mutatis mutandis" to such purchase cannot be read as having the effect of negativing the rights conferred and reading restrictions on the right which were not expressly stated. The intention to extend the period of one year cannot be read by taking recourse to the use of the phrase "mutatis mutandis" as doing so would in effect repeal the provisions requiring the exercise of the right within a limited period. The intention to extend the period of one year cannot be read by taking recourse to the use of the phrase "mutatis mutandis" as doing so would in effect repeal the provisions requiring the exercise of the right within a limited period. It is apparent that if the operation of section 50 were intended to be excluded in the case of disabled landlords the exclusion would have been by an express provision. Applying the test laid down by the Supreme Court, the "mutatis mutandis" clause would bring in the idea of adoptation, but so far only as it is necessary for the purpose, making a change without altering the essential nature of the thing changed, subject of course to the express provisions made in the later Act. We are clear that reading the limitations which sub-section (2) puts on the entitlement to the right under sub-section (1) of section 41, also in section 50 would amount to altering the essential nature of the right conferred by section 50 and reading into it the exclusion which was not intended and an extension of time which is entirely unwarranted. 8. In view of the clear statutory provisions which we have indicated, we find that the right conferred by section 50 is not subject to the provisions of section 41(2). 9. We may now refer to the decided cases. In Govinda v. Udhao 1972 Mh.L.J. 588, Chandurkar, J., as he then was, observed : "Under section 50 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1958, the tenant is entitled to purchase only so much land as he may be entitled to purchase under section 41. Section 41 deals with the right of a tenant to purchase land and this right is subject to the provisions of section 42 which sets out the extent of the land which the tenant may purchase under section 41. The restrictions in section 42 are imported by reference to section 41 into section 50 of the Act. Section 50 also refers to other conditions, namely, that a tenant must be a tenant who is holding land under a tenancy created after 1-4-1963 or which is restored to him and he must also cultivating that land personally. Section 50 is thus a self-contained provisions dealing with the kinds of tenancies referred to therein, namely, tenancies created after 1-4-1963 and tenancies restored under any of the provisions mentioned therein. Section 50 is thus a self-contained provisions dealing with the kinds of tenancies referred to therein, namely, tenancies created after 1-4-1963 and tenancies restored under any of the provisions mentioned therein. It also deal with the extent of the land which the tenant is entitled to purchase and it also deals with the time within which this right to purchase given by section 50 must be exercised i.e. within one year from the commencement of the tenancy. ................A surrender fictionally takes place and merely because the tenant continues in possession after he has failed to exercise his right of purchase within one year from the commencement of tenancy the landlord cannot be deemed to have granted a fresh lease for the next year. The consequences in section 43(14-A) follow irrespective of inaction of the landlord in not taking any steps to take possession of the land from the tenant who has failed to exercise his right to purchase". In Vikram Yeshwanta v. Eknath Trimbak, 1977 Mh.L.J. 520 the Division Bench of this Court while considering the provisions of sections 36, 50 and 43(14-A) of the Tenancy Act, observed that where there is a deemed surrender because of the failure on the part of the tenant to exercise his right to purchase within one year from the commencement of the tenancy or the restoration of the land, obviously the right to obtain possession will accrue on such failure. On a proper reading of section 50 and 43(14-A), the right to obtain possession will be deemed to have been accrued to the landlord as soon as there is failure on the part of the tenant to purchase within one year as contemplated in section 50 and the period of two years under section 36(2) will start running from that date and not from the date of finding in the enquiry under section 21(1) and (2). While referring to the decision of the learned Single Judge in Govinda v. Udhao, 1972 Mh.L.J. 588 the Division Bench stated that they were in agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in that decision, and it was not necessary to re state the reasons of the said view. Shri Dhabe, however, urged that the question of applicability of sub-section (2) of section 41 had not been considered in either of these cases. Shri Dhabe, however, urged that the question of applicability of sub-section (2) of section 41 had not been considered in either of these cases. That may be so, but as we have already indicated, both the decisions make it clear that section 41 deals with the right to purchase land and this right is subject to the provisions of section 42 which sets out the extent of the land which the tenant may purchase under section 41 and the restrictions in section 42 are imported by reference to section 41 into section 50 of the Act. Thus the application of the provisions of sections 41 to 44 "mutatis mutandis" cannot have the effect of over riding the essential features of section 50. We were, however, referred to the observations of a learned Single Judge in Ramkrishna v. Vithal, 1980 Mh.L.J. 477 after referring to Vikram v. Eknath 1977 Mh.L.J. 520 and Govinda v. Udhao, 1972 Mh.L.J. 588 the learned Judge observed as follows : "The distinguishing features of this case is that hear the starting point of limitation for conferral of right of compulsory purchase has not arisen at all in view of section 41(2) of the Act. The sole question is whether the provisions of section 41(2) regarding postponement of entitlement to purchase the landlord's interest till the time he ceases to be a person under disability applies to section 50 or not. The argument is that in such cases, section 41(2) will apply and these provisions will be deemed to have been engrafted in the provisions of section 50 of the Act as in term, section 41 has been "mutatis mutandis" made applicable to the provisions of section 50. I think, the argument on this point is extremely sound and has to be accepted". Relying on these observations Shri Dhabe argued that the provisions of section 41(2) must be regarded as having been engrafted in section 50 of the Act. That was a case where the landlord was a person subject to physical and mental disability and the learned Judge held that the right to purchase was postponed. Relying on these observations Shri Dhabe argued that the provisions of section 41(2) must be regarded as having been engrafted in section 50 of the Act. That was a case where the landlord was a person subject to physical and mental disability and the learned Judge held that the right to purchase was postponed. In view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa, 1983 Sales Tax Cases page 1 to which we have referred, it would not be permissible for us to hold that in view of the provisions of sections 41 to 44 having been "mutatis mutandis" made applicable to the provisions of section 50, the provisions of sections 41 to 44 must be deemed to have been engrafted in section 50. As we have already pointed out, those provision would have to be made applicable without altering the essential nature of the thing changed namely the right to purchase conferred by section 50 on a tenant to purchase the land within one year from the commencement of the tenancy. In our view the provision of sub-section (2) of section 41 would not apply to a case covered by section 50 and the period of one year provided by section 50 for exercising the right to purchase will not be extended even if the landlord belonged to the three categories, namely a minor, a widow or a person subject to any physical or mental disability and we answer the reference accordingly. 10. Shri Dhabe submitted that in the event of our holding that section 41(2) does not apply to the right conferred by section 50, the matter will have to be sent back to a learned Single Judge for passing appropriate orders. We do not consider that necessary in view of the clear finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in his judgment that if his view that sections 41 to 44 applied only so far as the extent of land to be purchased and the provisions of sections 41 to 44 shall "mutatis mutandis" apply, and this clause does not make any provision about disabled landlords in section 41(2) applicable to the provisions of section 50, then the petition deserves to be allowed and the application filed by the landladies for possession of the land from the respondent also deserves to be allowed. We have pointed out that the alternative prayer of the applicants in the original application filed on January 16, 1967 was also for possession of the whole of the land because they held only 27 acres of land and their holdings would not exceed three family holding and section 21(1) entitled them to retain the whole of the land mentioned in the application. The learned Single Judge has clearly recorded that this alternative prayer for possession would have to be granted if his view were to be accepted. Since we agree with the view of the learned Single Judge who made the reference and, with respect, are unable to agree with the view of the learned Judge in Ramkrishna v. Vithal, 1980 Mh.L.J. 477, sending the matter back to the learned Single Judge is entirely unnecessary. 11. Consistently with the view taken by us and the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge, we would make the rule absolute and direct that possession of the lands in dispute shall be delivered to the petitioner. The petitioners would be entitled to their costs of this petition while the respondent will bear his own. -----