R. A. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE following substantial questions of law have been formulated by the court at the time of admission of this Second Appeal:"1 Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the lower appellate court has committed a substantial error of law in treating the decision of the Tenancy authority that the respondent-defendant had become the deemed purchaser of the land though admittedly the provisions of the Tenancy Act were not applicable to the lands in question since they are within the limits of Surat Municipal Corporation ?2 Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the lower appellate court committed substantial error of law in holding that the relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act inter alia that contained in sec. 32g apply to the lands in question by virtue of sec. 31 of the Gujarat Devasthan Inam Abolition Act 1969 ?3 Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the lower appellate court therefore consequently committed substantial error of law in holding that the appellants-plaintiffs have no right to file the suit ? ( 2 ) THIS Second Appeal arises out of a suit filed by the present appellant on the ground that he is a beneficiary under the religious public trust owning the suit land bearing s. no. 494 situated in Katargam Taluka Chorasi Dist. Surat and the suit land is a graveyard and the defendants have no right to destroy the said graveyard. Respondents nos. 1 to 4 are the trustees of the public trust and Respondent No. 5 is the tenant and deemed purchaser of the suit land. The lower appellate court has held that Respondant No. 5 was a tenant of the suit land and on the abolition of the Devasthan Inam he became the deemed purchaser and he had also paid the purchase price fixed under sec. 32g of the Tenancy Act. The trustees had carried the matter in appeal under the Tenancy Act and had failed and thus the right title and interest of the trust in the suit land had become extinguished and therefore the plaintiff who claimed to be a beneficiary under the trust had no right to maintain the suit. 32g of the Tenancy Act. The trustees had carried the matter in appeal under the Tenancy Act and had failed and thus the right title and interest of the trust in the suit land had become extinguished and therefore the plaintiff who claimed to be a beneficiary under the trust had no right to maintain the suit. The lower appellate court had also held that the suit land was not used for Sandal Uras; that is a clear finding of fact and no question has been raised on this count. ( 3 ) THE first question of Jaw raised is based on sec. 43c of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act which provides that nothing in secs. 32 to 33 (both inclusive) and 43 shall apply to lands in the areas which on the elate of the coming into force of the Amending Act 1955 are within the limits of a municipal corporation constituted under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 On the basis of this provision the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that since Katargam is within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Surat the provisions of secs. 32 to 32r are not applicable and therefore the decisions and orders of the tenancy authorities are illegal and without jurisdiction. This argument suffers from several fundamental fallacies and is without any factual basis. Even though these questions are being raised for the first time in Second Appeal no attempt has been made to provided factual data and the relevant dates. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that Surat Municipal Corporation had come into existence sometimes in 1968 Assuming that this is so on 1-8-1956 Surat Municipal area was not included within any municipal corporation. It is also not shown that on 1-8-1956 Katargam was within the municipal limits of Surat. In fact it was admitted that prior to inclusion of Katargam in the municipal corporation it was a gram panchayat. On 1-8-1956 Surat was a municipal borough and cl. (c) of sec. 43c also included a municipal borough; but that clause has been deleted by Gujarat Act No. 16 of 1960. Therefore from that time onwards Sec. 43c was not applicable to Surat municipal area and therefore the provisions of sec. 32 to 32r were applicable. On 1-8-1956 Surat was a municipal borough and cl. (c) of sec. 43c also included a municipal borough; but that clause has been deleted by Gujarat Act No. 16 of 1960. Therefore from that time onwards Sec. 43c was not applicable to Surat municipal area and therefore the provisions of sec. 32 to 32r were applicable. This is on assumption that Katargam was included in the municipal area; but there is nothing to show that Katargam was included within the municipal borough of Surat. Since it is not shown that on 1-8-1956 the area of Katargam was within the limits of Surat Municipal Borough or Surat Municipal Corporation there is no scope for any argument whatsoever that proceedings under the Tenancy Act were without jurisdiction. ( 4 ) THE second question is based on the provisions of sec. 88b of the Tenancy Act which provides that certain provisions of the Tenancy Act shall not apply to lands which are properties of a trust for an educational purpose a hospital Panjarapole or Gaushala or an institution for public religious worship. These exemptions in favour of institution for public religious worship were deleted by Gujarat Act No. 16 of 1969. It is only because of abolition of Devasthan Inams as well as of the exemptions in favour of institution of public religious worship that the tenant in the present case became entitled to benefit under Tenancy Act and the provisions of Tenancy Act had become applicable and only thereafter the proceedings under sec. 32g were held for fixing the purchase price. Therefore this argument is also without any basis. ( 5 ) IT was lastly contended that under the provisions of sec. 88 (1) (b) the provisions of secs. 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act are not applicable to the area of Surat Municipal Borough because that area was notified under sec. 88 (1) (b) by the State Government as being reserved for non-agricultural or industrial development by a notification dt. 1-8-1956. On 1-8-1956 Katargam was not in the municipal area of Surat Municipal Borough. The argument is that as and when the municipal limits of Surat Municipal Borough are extended this exemption automatically gels extended. This argument also cannot be upheld; more particularly in view of proviso to sec. 1-8-1956. On 1-8-1956 Katargam was not in the municipal area of Surat Municipal Borough. The argument is that as and when the municipal limits of Surat Municipal Borough are extended this exemption automatically gels extended. This argument also cannot be upheld; more particularly in view of proviso to sec. 88 (1) (b) which expressly negatives such an argument and provides that if after a notification in respect of any area the limits of the area so notified are enlarged on account of addition of any other area thereto then merely by reason of such addition the reservation as made by the notification shall not apply and shall be deemed never to have applied to the area so added. In view of this proviso no further discussion is necessary ( 6 ) IN the result all the contentions raised by the appellant fail and the Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. (KMV) appeal dismissed. .