JUDGMENT : D. Pathak, C.J. - By this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner challenges the order of termination of his service dated 22.10.80 (Annexure 10) passed by the General Manager, M/s. Hira Cement Works, Cement Nagar, P.O. Bordol, District Sambalpur, opposite party No. 2. 2. The Petitioner is a qualified Engineer. The details of his qualification and experience have been narrated in the writ petition. 3. Pursuant to an advertisement in the daily Statesman, the Petitioner applied for the post of Mechanical Engineer in the Ferro-chrome Project under the Industrial Development Corporation or Orissa Limited, opposite party No. 4. After the interview, the Petitioner received the appointment letter dated 5.1.76 (Annexure 1) appointing him as Senior Mechanical Engineer for the Ferro-chrome Plant. He joined the post on 31.1.76 F.N. The letter of appointment (Annexure 1) reads as fallows: With reference to your application and the interview you had with us at our Head Office on 24.12.1975, we have pleasure to inform you that you have been selected for appointment as Senior Mechanical Engineer for our Ferro-chrome Plant with a consolidated salary of Rs. 1300/- per month (Rupees thirteen hundred only). You will be on probation for a period of six months which may be extended if so considered by the Management. After completion of your probationary period, you will be fitted in regular suitable scale of pay. You will be posted at the Ferro-chrome Plant, Jajpur Road, for the present, but may be posted to any place of business of our Corporation. Your appointment is purely temporary which may be terminated at any time. If you are agreeable to accept this offer, please return the duplicate copy of the offer duly signed by you as a token of acceptance immediately indicating your date of joining. In terms of the appointment letter, the Petitioner was on probation for a period of six months which wad extended to a further period of six months with effect from 31.7.1976. Then the Petitioner was fitted in regular suitable scale of pay. By order dated 22.11.79, be was transferred to M/s. Hira. Cement Works at Bargarh where he joined on 19.11.1979. He was allotted a quarter for his residence. While in Hira Cement Works, the Petitioner was allowed a further annual increment and the order was communicated to him by letter dated 31-1-80. By order dated 22.11.79, be was transferred to M/s. Hira. Cement Works at Bargarh where he joined on 19.11.1979. He was allotted a quarter for his residence. While in Hira Cement Works, the Petitioner was allowed a further annual increment and the order was communicated to him by letter dated 31-1-80. His scale of pay was revised in Hira Cement Works and the same was intimated to him by order dated 8-9-80. Thereafter, all of a sudden, the Petitioner received the office order No. HOW: PNL: 27443 dated 22.10.80 terminating his service with effect from the afternoon of 22.10.1980 with one month's pay in lieu of notice without assigning any reason whatsoever. The Petitioner was directed to collect one month's pay in lieu of notice from the Accounts Department on the afternoon of 22.10.1980 and he was further directed to collect his final dues on production of the necessary clearance certificate. This order of termination dated 22-10-1980 is Annexure 10 to the writ application. It reads as follows: The Management is pleased to terminate the services of Sri M.N. Sena. Senior Mechanical Engineer, with effect from the afternoon of 22nd October, 80, with one month's pay in lieu of notice. He may please collect one month's pay in lieu of notice from the Accounts Department on the afternoon of 22nd October, 88. He may also collect his final dues on production of necessary clearance certificate. For & on behalf of the I.D.O. of Orissa. Ltd. By Order of Chairman & Managing Director. Sd. Illegible General Manager Hira Cement Works. The Petitioner, on receipt of the order of termination, made a representation on 25.10.80. His representation was, however, rejected, and the order of rejection was communicated to him by letter dated 12.12.80 (Annexure 13). The Petitioner has averred in the writ application that he had not been served with any charge or notice calling upon him to show cause or explain the charges, if any, against him and that the order of termination, without giving him an opportunity of hearing, is in violation of the salutary principles of natural justice. The Petitioner has averred in the writ application that he had not been served with any charge or notice calling upon him to show cause or explain the charges, if any, against him and that the order of termination, without giving him an opportunity of hearing, is in violation of the salutary principles of natural justice. It is also stated that the Petitioner is a permanent employee under the opposite party No. 4 and hence the order of termination contained in Annexure 10 without framing any charge and without institution of a disciplinary proceeding and without giving him a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges is absolutely illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction. The Petitioner has further stated that the termination of his service amounts to dismissal or removal under Article 311 of the Constitution and the said dismissal or removal without his being informed of any charges against him and without his being given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect or such charges, if any, is ultra vires the Constitution being in violation or Article 311(2) or the Constitution. It is further averred that the order of termination without assigning any reason, apart from being, unconstitutional, is also arbitrary and capricious, and the Petitioner verily believes that the said action is the outcome or petty prejudice and jealousy on the part or some officers of the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa Limited. The Petitioner has stated that the illegal and unconstitutional termination or his service and the subsequent demand for vacating the quarter, the stance of paying no heed to the repeated representations of the Petitioner and the threat to disconnect water supply, electricity to the quarter and the actual disconnection without notice, apart from exhibiting total heartlessness, have inflicted terrible harassment and hardship to him and his family resulting in shattering the health of the Petitioner and his wire and disrupting the peacefully or the Petitioner and his family. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. Palit, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, draws our attention to the statements made in some paragraphs of the return filed on behalf or the opposite parties to show that the action of the authority in terminating the Petitioner's service was based on some allegation or misconduct on the part of the Petitioner, and though the order or termination appears to be innocuous, the statements made in the return go to show that behind the back or the order or termination there was motive for terminating the Petitioner's service on certain grounds about which he was never asked to explain nor was any charge sheet served 'on the Petitioner. The learned Counsel points out paragraph 11(i) of the counter affidavit where it has been mentioned that the Petitioner was found to be completely inefficient and a failure in respect or the assignments given to him. In paragraph 11(ii) it has been stated that as the Petitioner had no experience in the Cement Plant, he was attached to the Chief Engineer, Hira, Cement Works, as per Office Order dated 19-5.1980 and was again entrusted with the job of studying drawings, designs and coal circuit or the Kiln Section, etc. as per Office Order dated 21-5-1980. The Chief Engineer, Hira Cement Works, wanted that the Petitioner should study and find out the job himself in order to test his ability and willingness to work, but he tried to get the work done by others through concerned sections of Him Cement Works and was lastly found to be completely incompetent. In paragraph 11(iii) it has been stated that apart from the above, the Petitioner was entrusted with different assignments like drawing and designs for the tile factory at Choudwar but he could not prove himself competent. Again, in paragraph 13(iii) it is stated that the opposite parties had already informed the Petitioner about the proposed termination from service for the aforesaid reasons of unsuitability, inefficiency and as per conditions of service under Annexure 1 to the writ petition. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that though the order of termination is innocuous, yet, the order was passed with a motive to punish the Petitioner. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that though the order of termination is innocuous, yet, the order was passed with a motive to punish the Petitioner. Pointing to the above mentioned statements made in the counter affidavit, he submits that the main reason for termination of the Petitioner's service was on the ground of misconduct, i.e., unsuitability, inefficiency, incompetency and failure to prove worthy of the assignments. According to the learned Counsel, if the aforesaid grounds prompted the authority to pass the order of termination, such order could only have been passed after instituting a departmental proceeding. He further submits that the grounds shown in the return arc indicative of the fact that they are in the nature of imputation of stigma and misconduct attributed to the Petitioner. The service of the Petitioner could only be terminated after following the procedure of law giving the Petitioner an opportunity of being heard. The learned Counsel further submits that as no such enquiry was instituted, nor was any change served on the Petitioner, the order of termination suffers from the vice of unconstitutionality and arbitrariness and is violative of the principles of natural justice. Being conscious of the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia and Others Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Others where it was held that merely because a juristic entity may be an "authority" and therefore 'State" within the meaning of Article 12, it may not be elevated to the position of "State" for the purpose of Articles 309, 310 and 311 which find a place in Part XIV, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner concedes that in the instant case whatever might have been averred in the petition as regards the action taken by the authority, the provision of Article 311 would not be applicable. But as the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa is an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, if any arbitrary action is taken against an employee, such action will be void if the principles of natural justice are not followed. The learned Advocate General at this stage submits that as to whether the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa is an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution would depend upon the facts stated by the Petitioner. The learned Advocate General at this stage submits that as to whether the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa is an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution would depend upon the facts stated by the Petitioner. In paragraph 36 of the writ petition it has been stated: ...since the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa is a Government of Orissa Undertaking fully financed and controlled by the Government of Orissa, it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government of Orissa and is therefore covered by the expression "authority" under Article 12 of the. Constitution and therefore the Petitioner holds, being a permanent employee under the Corporation, !II civil post under the State and therefore the termination of the service under Annexure 10 amounts to a dismissal or removal under Article 311 of the Constitution and the said dismissal or removal without being informed of any charges against him and without being given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of such charges if any, is ultra vires the Constitution being in violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. When this was pointed out, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that if the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa is held to be an authority the Petitioner would be entitled to searing, on the principles of natural justice, before the termination of his service. 5. The learned Advocate General submits that the opposite parties in the counter affidavit have specifically stated that the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa is not an "authority" and therefore the writ petition is not maintainable and that there is no question of application of the principles of natural justice in the matter of termination of the service of the Petitioner who was only a temporary employee of the Corporation. In paragraph 21 of the counter affidavit it is stated: The Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa Ltd. is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956. Although the State Government contributed the capital of the Corporation but the affairs of the Company are not fully controlled by the Government of Orissa. The said Company is controlled and managed by their Board of Directors. The said Company does not enjoy monopoly status in the field or business and in the affairs of the State. Although the State Government contributed the capital of the Corporation but the affairs of the Company are not fully controlled by the Government of Orissa. The said Company is controlled and managed by their Board of Directors. The said Company does not enjoy monopoly status in the field or business and in the affairs of the State. The state conferred and State-protected monopoly status is a highly relevant factor in assessing the aggregate weight or the Corporation's ties to the State. The I.D.C. of Orissa Ltd., being a Company to be governed mainly by the Companies Act, there is no question of instrumentality or agency. The said Company is neither a statutory body nor statutory duties to perform. There is no statutory rule governing the condition of service of the employees of the said Company. The Corporation service is quite distinct from State service. Hence, the I.D.C. of Orissa Ltd., opposite party No. 4, is not covered within the expression "authority" or "State" within the meaning of the expression in Article 12 of the Constitution. The learned Advocate General further submits that in order to ascertain whether a corporation is an "authority", there must be material before the court to find out whether in fact it is an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12. In that connection he refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India and Anr. AIR 1981 S.C. 212 , where some tests have been laid down as to when a Corporation can be said to be an entity as a State agency or an instrumentality. The preponderant considerations for pronouncing as such are: (i) financial resources of the State being the chief funding source; (ii) functional character being governmental in essence; (iii) plenary control residing in Government; (iv) prior histroy of the same activity having been carried on by Government and made over to the new body; and (v) some element of authority or command. In Ajayv Hasia's case (supra), the Supreme Court has laid down the tests for ascertaining as to whether a particular juristic entity is an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. It has been said that it is immaterial for determining whether a Corporation is an "authority" and whether the Corporation is created by a statute or under a statute. It has been said that it is immaterial for determining whether a Corporation is an "authority" and whether the Corporation is created by a statute or under a statute. The test is whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and not as to how it is created. The inquiry has to be not as to how the juristic person is born but why it has been brought into existence. The corporation may be a statutory corporation created by a statute or it may be a Government company or a company formed under the Companies Act or it may be a society registered under the Societies Registration Act or any other similar statute. Whatever be its genetical origin, it would be an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 if it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and that would have to be decided' on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of the relevant factors. The concept of instrumentality or agency of the Government is not limited to a Corporation created by a statute but is equally applicable to a company or society and in a given case it would have to be decided, on a consideration of the relevant factors, whether the company or society is an instrumentality or agency or the Government so as to come within the meaning of the expression "authority" in Article 12. A juristic entity which may be "State" for the purpose of Parts III and IV would not be so for the purpose of Part XIV or any other provision of the Constitution. The Petitioner has not, it is submitted by the learned Advocate General, brought out any material in the writ petition to show that the aforesaid factors are present so far as the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa is concerned. It is further submitted that unless there is sufficient material to show that the Corporation is an "authority", a mere bald statement by the Petitioner that the Corporation is a Government of Orissa Undertaking, fully financed and controlled by the Government of Orissa, by itself would not be sufficient to pronounce the Corporation to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government of Orissa covered by the expression "authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution. We have heard the learned Counsel on the rival contention as to whether the Corporation is an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 'In order to determine as to whether 11 juristic person is an I "authority" within the meaning of Article 12, what has to be seen is whether there is so much overall control of the Government that it cannot be anything but an agency of the Government.' In a Bench decision of this Court in Bijoy Kumar Singh v. Project Administrator, Industrial Development Corporation, Orissa Ltd. 35 (1969) C.L.T. 1140, it has been succinctly held on a consideration of the relevant material that the Industrial Development Corporation, Orissa Ltd. is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and that its entire share capital is contributed by the Government of Orissa and all the shares have been registered in the names of seven officers of the Government of Orissa. They are the Chief Secretary the Secretary to Government" Industries Department, the Additional Secretary to Government, Finance Department, the Secretary to Government, Works Department, the Secretary to Government, Commerce and Supply Department, the Director of Industries, and the Chief Engineer, Electricity. It was held that the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa Ltd. is theretofore, Government company within the meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act and that the writ application could therefore, be considered on the aforesaid accepted position which is not controverted by either party and in support of which the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Corporation were filed on behalf of the opposite party. We have ourselves gone through the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Corporation. Apart from what has been noticed in Bijay Kumar Singh's case 35 (1969) C.L.T. 1140 (supra), we find that the State has complete control over the Corporation. We are noticing only a few of them. Article 33(a). The Board shall not approve any proposal of transfer of shares without first obtaining the written concurrence of all the Directors nominated by the Governor ("Governor" means, the Governor of Orissa as defined in Article 1 of the Articles of Association). Article 49. The Board may, whenever it thinks fit, shall, and when required by the Governor, call an extraordinary general meeting, and extraordinary general meetings shall also be called on such requisition as is provided in the Act (Companies Act). Article 13. Article 49. The Board may, whenever it thinks fit, shall, and when required by the Governor, call an extraordinary general meeting, and extraordinary general meetings shall also be called on such requisition as is provided in the Act (Companies Act). Article 13. The Governor of Orissa shall have the right to nominate one-third of the Directors to the Board including the Chairman of the Board of Director" who shall not be liable to retire by rotation and their appointment shall not be subject to the approval of the Company in general meeting. Article 77(a). The Board of Directors may, in consultation with the Governor of Orissa, appoint such technical and/or other personnel as it may deem necessary as additional Directors. (b) Casual vacancies in the office of any Directors appointed by the Company in general meeting may be filled up by the Board only after obtaining the approval of Governor to such appointment. Article 82. Subject to the approval of the Governor, the Company from time to time appoint one or more of the Directors to the office or Managing Director or Managing Directors or Manager or Managers of the Company or as whole time Director or Directors for such terms and at such remuneration (whether by way or salary or commission or participation in profits or otherwise or partly in one way and partly in another) as the Company may think fit, and may from time to time remove or dismiss him or them from office and appoint another or others in his or their place or places. Article 92 discloses that in case of any equality of votes in matters pertaining to the proceeding of the Board meeting, the Chairman (who is nominated by the Governor) shall have a second or casting vote. Article 103 reads: Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Chairman of the Board DE Directors shall reserve for the approval of the Governor any proposals or decisions of the Directors in respect of any of the following matters, namely: (a) increasing or reducing the issued capital of the Company; (b) winding up of the Company; (c) any other matter which in the opinion of the Chairman be of such importance as to be reserved for the approval of the Governor. No action shall be taken by the Company in respect of any proposal or decision of the Directors, reserved for the approval of the Governor as aforesaid until hit approval to the same has been obtained. The above provisions show the deep and pervasive State control and it may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. It has therefore to be held that the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa is a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and is amenable to the jurisdiction or the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. We have already adverted to the stand taken by the Petitioner that the return submitted by the opposite parties discloses that what prompted the authority to terminate the service of the Petitioner was founded on his being unsuitable, inefficient and incompetent. If these elements wore the foundation of the action taken in terminating the service of the Petitioner, then the Petitioner was entitled to an opportunity to present' his case to show cause about his inefficiency, incompetency and 'Unsuitability and that having not been done, the authority violated the principles of natural justice and hence the action taken by the authority is void and illegal being violative of the principles or natural justice. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner relies on a number or decisions in support of his contention. He relies on the decision in Calcutta Dock Labour Board Vs. Jaffar Imam and Others. That was a case where the Respondents were detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. On their release from detention, the Appellant commenced disciplinary proceedings against them. The principal ground given out in the notices served was that the Respondents were detained for committing acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. No specific allegations, however, were made against them. The records showed that, no evidence was led in the enquiry at all. Orders terminating the services of the Respondents were passed. It was contended that the Appellant was justified in acting upon suspicion, the basis for the suspicion being that the Respondents were detained by orders or preventive detention passed by appropriate authorities and confirmed by the State Government after consultation with the Advisory Board consisting or persons or eminent status and undoubted impartiality. It was contended that the Appellant was justified in acting upon suspicion, the basis for the suspicion being that the Respondents were detained by orders or preventive detention passed by appropriate authorities and confirmed by the State Government after consultation with the Advisory Board consisting or persons or eminent status and undoubted impartiality. It was also alleged by the Appellant that the Respondents were bullies and had terrorised the co-workers to such an extent that no one would have been willing to give evidence against them in the departmental enquiry. On these facts, it was held by the Supreme Court that the services or the Respondents could not have been terminated without holding a proper enquiry. The circumstances that they happened to be detained was no justification for not complying with the relevant statutory provision and not following the principles or natural justice. If the rule of law has to prevail, any attempt to short-circuit the procedure based on considerations or natural justice should be discouraged. Considerations or expediency which arc not permitted by Jaw can have no relevance whatsoever when dealing with the question of the liberty and livelihood of a citizen. The facts of the aforesaid case show that the notices on the Respondents were of such nature and character as to impute misconduct and as there was no proper enquiry, no evidence having been led, the court rightly came to the conclusion that there was a flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice. The order of termination of the services of the Respondents was of penal nature visiting with evil consequences. In such a case, not to follow the principles of natural justice is dearly arbitrary. It is true that all actions against a party which involve penal or adverse consequences must be in accordance with the principles of natural justice, but whether the principles of natural justice would be applicable to a given state of situation or whether this has to be judged in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The basic requirement is that there must be fair play in action, and the decision must be arrived at in a just and objective manner with regard to the relevance of the materials and reasons. The rules of natural justice are flexible and cannot be put into a strait jacket and to any lexicographic and rigid formula. The basic requirement is that there must be fair play in action, and the decision must be arrived at in a just and objective manner with regard to the relevance of the materials and reasons. The rules of natural justice are flexible and cannot be put into a strait jacket and to any lexicographic and rigid formula. In order to sustain a complaint of violation of the principles of natural justice on the ground of absence of opportunity before taking any penal action, it has to be established that prejudice has been caused to the party concerned in passing the order of termination. The next case relied upon is the case of K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India and Ors. AIR 1984 S.C. 213. The Appellant at the relevant time was working as a Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Deoria. On receiving certain complaints about his conduct from Gorakhpur Branch Manager, enquiry was instituted against him for which charges were served on him. During the enquiry, the charges were found to he proved and he was given a chance of personal hearing. After conclusion of the enquiry, the Appellant was dismissed from service in terms of the relevant rules. It was contended by the Appellant that the facts and circumstances revealed that the enquiry was in violation of the principles of natural justice and he mentioned that the statements against him were alleged to have been recorded during the comes of the enquiry but while recording those statements, the Appellant was never informed, nor any statement taken in the presence of the Appellant. The allegations of the Appellant were totally gone into and it was found that he did not want any opportunity of cross-examining some or the officials whose statements were taken. On these facts, the Supreme Court observed that in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences against an officer or an employee of a statutory Corporation like the State Bank of India, there must be an investigation into the charges consistent with the requirements of the situation in accordance with the principles of natural justice as far as these were applicable to a particular situation. Whether a particular principle of natural justice has been violated or not has to be judged in the background of the nature of the investigation conducted in the background of any statutory or relevant rules governing such enquiries. Whether a particular principle of natural justice has been violated or not has to be judged in the background of the nature of the investigation conducted in the background of any statutory or relevant rules governing such enquiries. Here, the infraction of the natural justice complained of was that he was not given an opportunity to rebut the materials gathered in his absence. The Court found that the Appellant was associated with the preliminary investigation that was conducted against him. He does not deny or dispute that information and materials undoubtedly were gathered not in his presence but whatever information was there and gathered, namely, the versions of persons, the particular entries which required examination were shown to him. He was conveyed the information given and his explanation was asked for. He participated in that investigation. He gave his explanation but he did not dispute any of the facts nor did he ask for any opportunity to call any evidence to rebut these facts. He did ask for a personal hearing and he was given such opportunity of personal hearing. His explanations were duly recorded. He does not allege that his version had been improperly recorded nor did he question the veracity of the witnesses or the entries or the letters or documents shown to him upon which the charges were framed and upon which he was found guilty. In view of the above factual situations, their Lordships have held that it cannot be said that in conducting the enquiry or framing of the charges or arriving at the decision, the authorities concerned have acted in violation of the principles of natural justice merely because the evidence was not recorded in his presence or that the materials gathered, the gist of which was communicated to him, were not in his presence. It has been further observed that in order to sustain a complaint of violation of the principles of natural justice on the ground of absence of opportunity of cross-examination, it has to be established that prejudice has been caused to the Appellant by the procedure followed. With the aforesaid observation, the appeal was dismissed. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner next relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in The Manager, Government Branch Press and Another Vs. D.B. Belliappa. That was a case where the service of a temporary non-gazetted Class IV employee was terminated. With the aforesaid observation, the appeal was dismissed. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner next relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in The Manager, Government Branch Press and Another Vs. D.B. Belliappa. That was a case where the service of a temporary non-gazetted Class IV employee was terminated. The order of termination was challenged by the Respondent in the High Court. The brief narrative of the facts is that Belliappa was appointed as a Compositor in the Government Branch Press, Mercara. On December 29, 1966, the Branch Manager of the Press served a notice on him stating that he had taken outside the Press some copies of the ballot papers relating to the Director's election of Coorg Cardamom Co-operative Societies, Mercara. He was required to show cause before 2 p. m. on the next day why disciplinary action shall not be taken against him as per rules. It was further stated in the notice that failure to comply with the notice would result in the Respondent's suspension and further disciplinary action against him. On 3rd January, 1967, an order of termination of service was served on the Respondent stating therein that the appointment of Belliappa was purely temporary and terminable at any time without any previous notice and without reasons being assigned. The Respondent approached the High Court in a writ petition and his petition was allowed holding that the impugned order contravened the guarantee of equal treatment embodied in Article 16. The High Court did not give any reasons in its order but stated that the reasons given in the decision of that. Court in another writ petition were applicable. In the result, the impugned order by which the Respondent's services were terminated was set aside and it was declared that he would be entitled to all the benefits flowing from the Court's order including reinstatement and the like. In appeal, the Supreme Court held that on the facts found therein to the effect that the services of the temporary Government servant were terminated without giving any reason while some other employees junior to him were retained in service, the order of termination is bad being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was further held that the termination of service was made arbitrarily and not on the ground of unsuitability or other reason. It was further held that the termination of service was made arbitrarily and not on the ground of unsuitability or other reason. The Court also observed that it was perhaps open to the Government to say in view of the complaint alluded to in the showcase notice against the integrity and fidelity of the employee that the former had lost confidence in the latter and considered him unsuitable to be continued in the post which was one of trust and confidence. But when Government instead of taking any such plea has with obdurate persistency stuck to the position that the employee's service has been terminated without any reason, it amounted to nearly admitting that the power reserved to the employer under the conditions of employment has been exercised arbitrary. In this case, on the facts found, the Court rightly made the observation as above because earlier the Respondent was given notice alleging certain misconduct and that no proper enquiry was held in the matter. Hence the action taken in terminating the services of the Respondent was rightly taken to be arbitrary. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner also refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation and Another Vs. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee in order to show that even though no rule or regulation had been framed by the Corporation, the employer cannot terminate the service of its employee without due enquiry in accordance with the rules of natural justice. The Supreme Court laid down the principle in the following terms: Even if at the time of the dismissal of the Respondent-employee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation, the statutory regulations had not been framed or had not come into force, then also, the employment of the Respondent was public employment and the statutory body, the employer, could not terminate the services of its employee without due enquiry in accordance with the statutory Regulations, if any, in force, or in the absence of such Regulations, in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Such an enquiry into the conduct of a Public employee is of a quasi-judicial character. Such an enquiry into the conduct of a Public employee is of a quasi-judicial character. The Court would, therefore, presume the existence of a duty on the part of the dismissing authority to observe the rules of natural justice, and to act in accordance with the spirit of Regulation 16 which was then on the anvil and came into force shortly after the impugned dismissal. The rules of natural justice in the circumstances of the case required that the Respondent should be given a reasonable opportunity to deny his guilt, to defend himself and to establish his innocence which means and includes an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses relied upon by the Appellant Corporation and an opportunity to lead evidence in defence of the charge as also a show-cause notice for the proposed punishment. The facts giving rise to the above case are that the Respondent was employed as a Warehouseman under the Corporation. There was a complaint of theft and misappropriation of stocks and various other irregularities against him. A preliminary enquiry was held by the Managing Director of the Corporation and charges were framed against him and served on him on November 28, 1960 requiring him to submit his explanation and to indicate the evidence, if any. On receiving the charge-sheet, the Respondent addressed a communication requesting the Managing Director to furnish him with certain papers which were accordingly furnished. Thereafter the Respondent submitted his explanation on January 19, 1961. In his explanation he specifically demanded that he wanted to cross-examine certain witnesses the particulars of which were mentioned by him. He further gave the names and particulars of certain other witnesses stating that he wanted to examine them in defence. Nothing happened thereafter till April (sic), 1961 on which date the Managing Director passed an order dismissing the Respondent from service with effect from the date of his suspension. The above facts disclose that there was imputation of certain misconduct against the Respondent for which there was no propel enquiry and accordingly the order of, dismissal was held to be bad. We are or opinion that the principles laid down in the above decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner are dependent on the facts of those cases and that they do not apply to the facts of the ease in hand. 6. We are or opinion that the principles laid down in the above decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner are dependent on the facts of those cases and that they do not apply to the facts of the ease in hand. 6. The learned Advocate General submits that assuming that the Petitioner was holding the post under an "authority", the action taken was on the terms of the contract of employment, he being a temporary servant. He has drawn our attention to certain observation of the Supreme Court in Champaklal's case AIR 1854 S.C. 1854, where it has been stated that the mere use of the expressions like "terminate" or "discharge" is not conclusive and in spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned in Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India (UOI), namely: (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences and if either of the tests is satisfied, it must be held that the servant had been punished. It has been further observed that even though misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service, the motive operating on the mind of the Government is wholly irrelevant. It has also been observed that even where Government does not intend to take action by way of punishment against a temporary servant on the report of bad work or misconduct, a preliminary enquiry is usually held to satisfy Government that there is reason to dispense with the services of a temporary employee or to revert him to his substantive post, for Government does not usually take action of this kind without any reason. Therefore, when a preliminary enquiry of this nature is held in the case of a temporary employee or a Government servant holding a higher rank temporarily, it must not be confused with the regular departmental enquiry (which usually follows such a preliminary enquiry) when the Government decides to frame charges and get a departmental enquiry made in order that one of the three major punishments already indicated may be inflicted on the Government servant. Sometimes, the preliminary enquiry is really for the satisfaction of the Government to decide whether punitive action should be taken or action should he taken under the contract or the rules in the ease of a temporary government servant or a servant holding a higher rank temporarily to which he has no right. 7. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General that as there is no imputation of misconduct to the Petitioner or words attaching any stigma to his character and reputation, it must be held to have been passed in course of administrative routine. In such a case, the overriding test would always be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or is the foundation of the order. The learned Advocate General refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Another Vs. Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur where their Lordships of the Supreme Court on consideration of a number of a decisions of that Court including the one in A.G. Benjamin's case (1967) 1 L.L.J. 718, have laid down certain principles. In A.G. Benjamin's case (1967) 1 L.L.J. 718, the Appellant was temporarily employed as Stores Officer in the Central Tractor Organisation. As he was not a confirmed government servant, his services could be terminated under Rule 5 of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 with one month's notice on the either side. The services of the Appellant were terminated on April 23, 1954. As he was not a confirmed government servant, his services could be terminated under Rule 5 of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 with one month's notice on the either side. The services of the Appellant were terminated on April 23, 1954. There had been certain complaints against him in respect whereof the Chairman of the Central Tractor Organisation sent a notice to him asking him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him and an enquiry officer was appointed, but before the enquiry could be completed, the Chairman recommended that the services of the Appellant should be terminated under Rule 5 observing in his note to the Secretary that: The departmental proceedings will take a much longer time and we are not sure whether after going through all the formalities we will be able to deal with the accused in the way he deserves. Acting upon this suggestion the Appellant was served with the order complained of. The order was to the effect that the Appellant was being informed that his services were no longer required in the organisation and the same were terminated with effect from the date on which the notice was served on him. He was further informed that in lieu of the notice, he would be given one month's pay and allowances due to him. The Supreme Court distinguished the facts in that case from those in Madan Gopal Vs. State of Punjab and held that the principle of Madan Gopal Vs. State of Punjab could not be applicable and the appeal was dismissed. On a conspectus of the cases discussed by the Supreme Court, the following propositions were laid down in State of Punjab and Another Vs. Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur, : (1) The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the Rules of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Article au of the Constitution. (2) The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial. (3) If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. (3) If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. (4) An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. (5) If there be a full-scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311, i.e., an Enquiry Officer is appointed, a charge-sheet submitted, explanation caned for and considered, any order of termination of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said Article. The learned Advocate General refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in Commondore Commanding, Southern Naval Area, Cochin v. V.N. Rajan AIR S.C. 965, where it was held that where the decision to terminate the services of the servant had been taken at the highest level on the ground of unsuitability of the servant in relation to the post held by him and it was not by way of any punishment and no stigma was attached to him by reason of the termination of his services, termination could not be said to be vitiated for non-observance of Article 311(2). The learned Advocate General also refers to the decision in Oil and Natural Gas Commission and Ors. v. Dr. Md. S. Iskander Ali AIR 1880 S.C. 1242. The facts giving rise to the appeal before the Supreme Court are that the Respondent was appointed on a temporary basis to the post of a Medical Officer in the Corporation of the Appellant. Under the terms and conditions of his service, he was to remain on probation for a period of one year which could be extended at the discretion of the appointing authority. The Respondent was appointed on October 15, 1965. It appears that during the period of his probation there were some reports against him as a result of which a departmental enquiry was held against him but which does not appear to have been proceeded with nor was any punishment, imposed on him. The Respondent was appointed on October 15, 1965. It appears that during the period of his probation there were some reports against him as a result of which a departmental enquiry was held against him but which does not appear to have been proceeded with nor was any punishment, imposed on him. After he had completed the period of one year on 15-10-1966, his probation was extended for another six months and before his, services were terminated, there was no express order either confirming him or extending the period of probation. Ultimately, by an order dated 28th, July, 1967, the services or the Respondent were terminated with effect from 28th July, 1967. On the broad spectrum or these facts, after noticing the confidential character roll reflecting the assessment or the work or the Respondent which clearly showed that the officer was careless and lacking in sense or responsibility, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that from the undisputed facts it is manifest that even if misconduct negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the employer to terminate the services of the employee, a power which the Appellants undoubtedly possessed, even so as under the terms of appointment or the Respondent, such a power flowed from the contract of service, it could not be termed as penalty or punishment. 8. We find that the Petitioner is a temporary servant under the Corporation about which there is no dispute. As such, the Petitioner does not have any right to the post. The action taken in terminating the service of the Petitioner was on the basis of the terms of the contract of employment. The order of termination or the service or the Petitioner does not contain any stigma or refer to any charge of misconduct on the part of the Petitioner. The Petitioner's services were apparently terminated because on an overall examination of his record he was found unsuitable for being retained in service. Even in the return what has been said is only an assessment of the work of the Petitioner in order to find out whether such a temporary servant is to be retained in service or not. The authority did not take any disciplinary action against the Petitioner on any charge. The service of the Petitioner has been terminated in terms of the contract of employment and not by way of any punishment. The authority did not take any disciplinary action against the Petitioner on any charge. The service of the Petitioner has been terminated in terms of the contract of employment and not by way of any punishment. Hence, we do not think the authority in passing the order of termination any way violated the principles of natural justice. 9. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in this writ application and it is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not make any order for costs. S.C. Mohapatra, J. 10. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed