( 1 ) THIS Civil Revision is directed against the order of the Sub-Judge 1st Class dt. 23-9-83 in execution No. 82/81 in Suit No. 1002/74. The petitioner in the Civil Revision had raised objections in the said execution proceedings for the issue of the warrants of actual possession of premises No. 202/a-1a, Gurdwara Committee Building, Sadar Bazar, Delhi. He claimed the possession of the said premises as a lawful tenant inducted by the defendant Gurdwara Committee ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF, Charan Singh had filed the said suit against the defendant, Gurdwara Committee and the General Secretaries of the said Committee. The suit was for mandatory injunction and perpetual injunction for restraining the letting out or giving the said shop to anybody else and for a mandatory direction to consider the plaintiffs application for letting out the shop to him. The said suit was filed on 25-8-72. The plaintiff alleged that by virtue of an agreement dt. 11-4-55 between himself and defendant No. 1 he was entitled to the said premises. It was alleged by the plaintiff that he was in possession of Quarter No. 11 in the said building and it was agreed that he would surrender the possession of the said Quarter and Shift to Quarter No. 9. It was further alleged that under the said agreement he was also promisee that he would be entitled to get a shop in the said building and in the line of shops occupied by Dasonda Singh to Ram Lal Mochi. It was then alleged that no time limit was fixed for the allotment of a plot. The shop 202/1, which was occupied by Ram Lal Mochi, had fallen vacant. The plaintiff, therefore, claimed that the said shop be let out to him and not to anybody else. The defendants in their written statement claimed that the alleged agreement dt. 11-4-55 had exhausted itself and was not operative. The reason was that instead of Quarter No. 9 the plaintiff later on preferred Quarter No. 1/436 which was much bigger in area and abutted on a 16 wide street as against a 5 wide street abutting Quarter No. 9. Two premises had fallen vacant in the said shop line from time to time but the plaintiff never showed any desire nor made any request for the allotment of said shops. Two premises had fallen vacant in the said shop line from time to time but the plaintiff never showed any desire nor made any request for the allotment of said shops. The suit was filed on 25-8-72 but before that on 6-8-72, the said premises were let out to the objector and some others. But after filing of the said written statement the defendants did not show any interest in the suit and allowed the matter to be proceeded ex parte. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 19-7-78. The plaintiff preferred an appeal. The defendants did not contest the appeal and allowed it to proceed ex parte. The petitioner herein claims that after letting out the shop in question to him the defendant committee in collusion with the plaintiff allowed the suit to be decreed by not contesting the same. The appellate court decreed the suit. ( 3 ) TWO contentions are raised by the petitioner in this revision. The first contention is that the collusive decree between the plaintiff and the defendant cannot put to an end a legal right in favour of the petitioner/third party. It is also contended that the trial court was wrong in ordering issuing warrants of actual possession against the petitioner. The plaintiff was only entitled to symbolic possession in law and not the actual possession. The counsel for petitioner has relied upon Sarup Singh v. Daryodhan Singh AIR 1972 Delhi 142 (FB) in support of the proposition that no warrant of possession can be issued in execution of decree for mandatory injunction. The counsel further argued that his right to lawful tenancy is governed by Delhi Rent Control Act and the tenant cannot be dispossessed except by decree of eviction passed under the Delhi Rent Control Act. He has relied upon the decision of this Court reported in Sunder Dass v. Mulkh Raj, AIR 1981 Delhi 85. The Counsel then submitted that neither of the decisions of this Court were considered by the first appellate court although they were cited before the said court. ( 4 ) THE respondent, however, objected to the maintainability of this revision application. He has submitted that the petitioner had no locus standi and he was not entitled to raise any objection under O. 21 R. 97 Civil Procedure Code or O. 21 R. 101 Civil Procedure Code. ( 4 ) THE respondent, however, objected to the maintainability of this revision application. He has submitted that the petitioner had no locus standi and he was not entitled to raise any objection under O. 21 R. 97 Civil Procedure Code or O. 21 R. 101 Civil Procedure Code. Since the third party, to an execution proceeding, cannot raise any objections, he cannot also file any revision. The counsel further denied the allegation of collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant and urged that in fact there was a collusion between the petitioner herein and the defendant. According to the learned counsel this is clear from the fact that the shop in question was let out to the petitioner in violation of the agreement and after the filing of the suit. On merits it was contended that the petitioner was not a tenant of the defendants. ( 5 ) THE contention of the petitioner that the first appellate court was not competent to order warrants of actual possession in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this court in Sarup Singh v. Daryodhan Singh Civil Revision No. 151 of 1970: (Reported in AIR 1972 Delhi 142) is? to be upheld. The Full Bench of this Court held that a decree for injunction is normally to be executed by detaining the judgment-debtor in Civil prison or by attachment of his property or both under 0. 21 R. 32 (1 ). Ordinarily, these two coercive measures would constitute an effective remedy to compel the judgment-debtor to obey the decree or order of the Court. If the judgment- debtor fails to vacate the premises in spite of having suffered detention in prison there is no impediment to further exercise of punitive powers under R. 32 (1) and (3) according to law. It was further held that since the decreeholder sought a decree for injunction instead of decree for possession, he has to face its legal consequences, and he can have the decree executed only in accordance with the provisions of law governing execution of decrees, for injunction. He cannot employ the arguments of frustration of his object existing behind his suit to obtain a relief from the court which was not envisaged by the suit and not granted by the Court. He cannot employ the arguments of frustration of his object existing behind his suit to obtain a relief from the court which was not envisaged by the suit and not granted by the Court. Issue of a warrant for delivery of possession in execution of a decree for injunction passed in a suit for mandatory injunction is not justified either by O. 21, R. 35 or S. 51 (e ). There is a patent illegality apparent on the face of the record committed by the lower court in directing, warrants of actual possession. The decree, therefore, is not executable. ( 6 ) IF the decree is not executable in law by issue of. ,warrants of actual possession, is the third party who stands to suffer by such a decree without any remedy? Should he be subjected to. suffer loss of possession and his legal rights and be told to file a separate suit to get back his possession? the immediate consequences of the illegal decree of possession is instant dispossession. The initiation of the suit and its prosecution which unfortunately has become a delayed and. long winding affairs would completely frustrate a third party. Order XXI, R. 97 and R. 101 must be interpretated in this background. Is it the intention of law particularly after the amendments to the Civil Procedure Code by the amending Act of 1976 that there should be multiplicity of proceedings and miscarriage of justice in relation to a third party?. ( 7 ) THE respondent decree-holder had an option to file the suit for possession but he did not do so and preferred only to file the suit for permanent/mandatory injunction. But he is a beneficiary of the wrong order of warrants of possession in his favour. While on the other hand the petitioner who is a lawful tenant of the suit premises is to be told that he has no remedy under 0. XXI and that he should file a suit for vindicating his claim. This to my mind is total miscarriage of justice. The Court can in such circumstances exercise its powers under S. 151, if any technical difficulty comes in the way of exercise of its powers under S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. But I do not find that the court is powerless to set right the patent illegalities and miscarriage of justice under S. 115 of Civil Procedure Code. The Court can in such circumstances exercise its powers under S. 151, if any technical difficulty comes in the way of exercise of its powers under S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. But I do not find that the court is powerless to set right the patent illegalities and miscarriage of justice under S. 115 of Civil Procedure Code. itself. In case of the mandatory injunctions the execution court has no jurisdiction to pass an order for warrants of actual possession. No act of court in the course of its proceedings should be permitted to cause injury to a suitor in. the court. Such course of action to set right the illegalities was followed in Soni Vrajlal Jethalal v. Soni Jadavji Govindji, AIR 1972 Guj 148 . In the said. decision relying upon Rodger v. Comtoir D escompte De Peris, (1871) 3 PC 465 at page 475, D. A. Desai, J. as a Judge of Gujarat High Court, in similar circumstances, exercised the power of the High Court under S. 151, Civil Procedure Code. for doing substantial justice in the matter and I am in respectful agreement with the said approach. An additional fact which has adversely affected the petitioner is that the landlord after stating in the written statement that the petitioner was inducted as a tenant and the landlord was receiving rent from him, did not prosecute the suit or the appeal and allowed the ex parte orders to be passed. ( 8 ) THE order of the Execution Court, issuing warrants of actual possession of the suit property, is thus illegal and set aside. The petitioner shall not be disturbed in his possession of the premises on the basis of the said warrants of possession.