JUDGMENT : B.D. Agarwal, J. The question referred -for our decision by a learned Single Judge is: Whether the deposit made u/s 7-C of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, could be adjusted u/s 39 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, inspite of the finding that the provisions of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, were not applicable to the accommodation and the deposits were illegal? 2. Briefly stated the facts relevant are that on July 16, 1969 the Appellants instituted Original Suit No. 166 of 1969 in the Court of Munsif, Shikohabad, against the Respondent seeking his eviction from a shop described at the foot of the plaint, besides a sum of Rs. 517.33 as arrears of rent for the period of June 1, 1968 to June 28, 1969, at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month and a sum of Rs. 42.67 as damages for use and occupation for the period of June 29, 1969 to July 14, 1969, calculated at the rata of Rs. 80/- per month and damages pendente lite and future. The allegations are that the Defendant had been tenant of the shop on rent at rate of Rs. 40/- per month, which was in arrears since June 1, 1968. The tenancy was determined by notice u/s 106 Transfer of Property Act given on May 26, 1969. The building having been constructed in 1961-62, this did not fall within the purview of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act, 1947). In defence it was pleaded, inter alia, that the Defendant had made deposit of rent for the period of June 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968, amounting to Rs. 280/- at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month on January 9, 1969, in the Court of the Munsif, Shikohabad, u/s 7-C of the Act, 1947. 3. The trial court found that the building in question was constructed in the year 1961 and hence the Act, 1947, was inapplicable. The notice u/s 106 Transfer of Property Act bad been duly served. Section 7-C of the Act, 1947, could not avail the Defendant because the Act, 1947 was inapplicable. The suit was decreed accordingly on May 15, 1972, for ejectment of the Defendant besides recovery of Rs. The notice u/s 106 Transfer of Property Act bad been duly served. Section 7-C of the Act, 1947, could not avail the Defendant because the Act, 1947 was inapplicable. The suit was decreed accordingly on May 15, 1972, for ejectment of the Defendant besides recovery of Rs. 517.33 as arrears of rent for June 1, 1968 to June 28, 1969, and manse profits pendente lite and future at the rate of Rs. 40/-per month. It was also provided in the operative portion of the decree that the Plaintiffs could withdraw Rs. 280/- deposited by the Defendant u/s 7-C of the Act, 1947, and that this amount shall be adjusted towards the arrears. 4. Aggrieved the Defendant preferred appeal, which was decided by the Civil Judge on September 9, 1974. The sole contention raised by the Defendant-Appellant before the lower appellate court was that he was entitled to the benefit of Sections 39/40 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act, 1972'). This was asserted on the footing that the Act, 1972, came into force on July 15, 1972, when the appeal was pending. A sum of Rs. 2, 294.25 was deposited by him on August 14, 1972, in the appellate court, which included Rs. 1760/- being rent for 1-1-1969 to 31-8-1972; Rs. 234.25 towards the costs of the suit and a sum of Rs. 300/- by way of interest on the said amount at the rate of nine per centum per annum. It was asserted as well that deposit of Rs. 280/- made u/s 7-C of the Act, 1947, on January 9, 1969, had as well to be taken into account. The lower appellate court expressed the view that this was not a valid deposit within Section 7-C of the Act, 1947, but since the trial court had directed the Plaintiffs Respondents to withdraw that amount and to adjust the same towards the arrears of rent, it had to be held that the amount had been paid by the Defendant towards the rent due from him and was, therefore, to be adjusted towards the rent. The finding given was: Though the deposit having been made in the Court of Munsif Shikobabad cannot be held to be a deposit in the Court in which the suit (i.e. appeal) was pending, yet in the aforesaid circumstances, in my view, that amount can be taken into consideration for calculating the entire amount of rent and damages due from him at the relevant date, i.e., to say when the deposit was made in this Court as per provisions of Section 39 x x x x. The Defendant was on this basis accorded the benefit of Sections 39/40 of the Act, 1972. The decree for the eviction was set aside on this footing. 5. Against this the Plaintiffs preferred this second appeal. When the appeal came up for hearing before a learned single Judge, he did not find himself in agreement with the view taken in Murli Dhar v. Smt. Ram Pyari 1978 UPRCC 321 and referred the question reproduced above to larger Bench. This is how the matter is before us for consideration in regard to the question referred to above. 6. Sri S.P. Srivastava learned Counsel for the Appellants argued that Section 39 (read with Section 40) of the Act, 1972, contemplates deposit in the court before which the suit/appeal is pending on the date of commencement of the Act and where deposit made instead was u/s 7-C of the Act, 1947, but the accommodation being a post 1951 construction the Act, 1947 did not apply, the tenant cannot on that basis claim relief against eviction. A deposit as this does not serve to extinguish, it is urged, the liability of the tenant for rent of the period in question. 7. For the Respondent-tenant, on the other hand, the learned Counsel Sri A. D. Saunders submitted that on May 15, 1972 the trial court while deciding the suit directed that the Appellants-landlords shall withdraw Rs. 280/- deposited by the Respondent and this amount shall be adjusted on the arrears of rent. The landlords did not appeal against this part of the decree; the Respondent cannot now withdraw the amount to his credit and hence it should be held that the amount was made available to the landlords. Consequently, the Respondent, it is contended, gets benefit u/s 40 read with Section 39 of the Act, 1972. 8. The landlords did not appeal against this part of the decree; the Respondent cannot now withdraw the amount to his credit and hence it should be held that the amount was made available to the landlords. Consequently, the Respondent, it is contended, gets benefit u/s 40 read with Section 39 of the Act, 1972. 8. We may make it clear at the outset that the reference being of a specific question alone we confine ourselves to deciding the same and not the second appeal. The facts thereof have been mentioned above in order merely to explain the backdrop in which the controversy arose. The question expressly assumes that the case pertains to an accommodation: 1. to which the Act, 1947, did not apply; and 2. to which in consequence Section 7-C was also not attracted. 9. Sections 39 and 40 of the Act, 1972, read as under: 39. Pending suits for eviction relating to building brought under regulation for the first time- In any suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply, pending on the date of commencement of this Act, where the tenant within one month from such date of commencement or from the date of his knowledge of the pendency of the suit, whichever be later, deposits in the Court before which the suit is pending, the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine percent per annum and the landlord's full cost of the suit, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to Sub-Section (1) or in Clauses (b) to (g) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20, and the parties shall be entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and to adduce additional evidence where necessary. Provided that a tenant the rent payable by whom does not exceed twenty-five rupees per month need not deposit any interest aforesaid. 40. Provided that a tenant the rent payable by whom does not exceed twenty-five rupees per month need not deposit any interest aforesaid. 40. Pending appeals in suit for eviction relating to buildings brought under regulation for the first time- Where an appeal or revision arising out of a suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply is pending on the date of commencement of this Act, it shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 39, which shall mutatis mutandis apply. 10. Section 7C of the Act, 1947, which was in pari materia with Section 30 of the new Act, in so far as relevant, provided: 7-C (1). When a landlord refuses to accept any rent lawfully paid to him by a tenant in respect of any accommodation the tenant may in the prescribed manner deposit such rent and continue to deposit any subsequent rent which becomes due in respect of accommodation unless the landlord in the meantime signifies by notice in writing to tenant his willingness to accept. * * * * (6) In any case where a deposit has been made, as aforesaid, it shall be deemed that the rent has been duly paid by the tenant to the landlord. 11. The situation dealt with in Sub-section (1) of Section 7-C is the refusal of the landlord to accept the rent which was lawfully payable to him. In Mohd. Bashir v. Azizul Qadar 1966 AWR 442 a Full Bench clarified that the word "paid" appearing in Sub-section (1) is a mistaken expression for "payable". And also that the legal fiction in Sub-section (6) comes into play immediately after the deposit has been made. There is no reason to hold that the rent should be deemed to be paid in a case where Section 7-C applies only when the court made an order allowing the landlord to withdraw the money. The Supreme Court in Dr. Brahmanand v. Smt. Kaushalya Devi 1977 (UP) RCC 381 thus construed the words "paid to him by a tenant" used in Section 7-C: As we have earlier pointed out, a liberal construction of the expression "paid to him by a tenant " in Section 7-C(1) is necessary. Physically offering payment when the relations between the parties are strained is to ask for trouble and be impractical. Physically offering payment when the relations between the parties are strained is to ask for trouble and be impractical. But harassing the landlord straightway depositing the rent in court without fulfilment of the conditions required by Section 7-C is also unwarranted. Section 7-C 16) by using the expression" where the deposit has been made as aforesaid takes us back to Section 7-C(1). This is to say, the deposit is permissible only when the condition in Section 7-C(1) is complied with. If the landlord refuses to accept rent paid to him a deposit hi permissible. But payment need not be by physical tender, person to person. It can be by money order, or through messenger or by sending a notice to the landlord asking him to nominate a bank into which the rent may be regularly paid to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord refuses under these circumstances, then a court deposit will be the remedy. 12. In relation to an accommodation falling outside the purview of the Act, 1917, as in the present, the landlord could sue for eviction on determination of the tenancy by notice given u/s 106 Transfer of Property Act. Provided the notice is valid, there would ordinarily be no other restraint against securing eviction in such an action. The new Act accords relief, however, to the tenant under Sections 39/40 depending on the fulfilment of certain conditions: (i) the suit is for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply; (ii) the suit/appeal be pending on the date of commencement of the Act 1972; (iii) the deposit made in written one month from such date of commencement or from the date of the tenant's knowledge of the pendency of the suit/appeal whichever be later; (iv) the deposit is in the court before which the suit/appeal is pending; (v) the deposit is of the entire amount or rent and damages for use and occupation together with interest at the rate of nine percent per annum and the landlord's full cost of the suit/appeal. 13. The expression "the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation" denotes in our opinion such amount as is under the law due to the landlord. This is in contrast to the language employed in Order XV Rule 5 CPC viz. 13. The expression "the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation" denotes in our opinion such amount as is under the law due to the landlord. This is in contrast to the language employed in Order XV Rule 5 CPC viz. "the entire amount admitted by him to be due." If the legislative intention behind Section 39 had been to permit deposit of such amount as the tenant admits to be due, there is no reason why the same words would not have found place in Section 39 also. We are conscious that Section 20(4) of the Act 1972 expressly contains the words "due from him' but the absence thereof in Section 39 is of little consequence because the same sense is conveyed by use of the word "the entire amount of rent..." in unqualified terms. This necessarily leaves out such amount of rent or damages for use and occupation as has been paid before the commencement of the Act, 1972 or duly tendered and is kept in deposit in some court or other authority and has been appropriated to the credit of or made available to the landlord by some direction of court or otherwise. Whatever has thus been paid/tendered and deposited ceases to be payable further by the tenant and, therefore, it seed not be deposited over again. It depends on the facts of a case whether there has such payment/tender and deposit covered under a direction of the court been made or not. 14. The crucial words appearing in Section 39 material for purposes of this discussion are "deposits in the Court before which the suit is pending." There is no dispute that in view of the mutatis mutandis Clause of Section 40, the deposit in a case where on the date of commencement of the Act 1972 the appeal was pending, the amount contemplated by Section 39 would have to be deposited within one month of the commencement of the Act in the Court before which the appeal or revision is pending--R.D. Ram Nath & Co. v. Girdhari Lal 1975 AWC 138 (Division Bench). This indeed is the plait meaning of the language employed in Section 39. v. Girdhari Lal 1975 AWC 138 (Division Bench). This indeed is the plait meaning of the language employed in Section 39. Can the ordinary natural meaning of the express language used in unambiguous terms as herein be given a go-by on the basis of the doctrine of beneficial construction so as to accord credit to a deposit in any other Court is broadly the question before us. 15. The rule of construction is to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament "but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used." The primary of literal construction according to Maxwell: Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) 29 implies that: Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The decision in this case, said Lord Morris of Borthy-y-Gest in a revenue case, "Calls i'or a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. The desirability or the undesirability of one conclusion as compared with another cannot furnish a guide in reaching a decision. "Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be. The interpretation of a statute is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just and expedient: words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reasons appears why they should not be embraced or excluded, The duty of the court is to expound the law as it stands, and to leave the remedy (if one be resolved upon) to others. 16. With regard to what is meant by the expression, "the plain meaning of the words of a Statute", it is necessary on all occasions to give the legislature credit for employing these words which will express its meaning more clearly than any other words. "The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Act themselves. "The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Act themselves. If the words of the Statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound these words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver" Graies on Statute Law, 7th edition (1971) at p. 64-65. 17. In Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd. 1980 (2) All. E.R. 696 the House of Lords reiterated that the dominant purpose in construing the provisions of a Statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, cardinal rule of construction is that "the legislature speaks its mind by using correct expressions. The Court should thus adopt a literal construction unless there are compelling reasons otherwise. If a literal construction of particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature then the court may do some violence to the words and achieve the obvious intention. Another rule of interpretation is that a Statute must be construed according to its plain language and neither should anything be added nor substracted unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that legislature clearly so indicated." 18. In Shivram Anand Shiroor Vs. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik and Another, (1984) 1 SCC 588 , the Supreme Court was concerned with interpretation of Section 13A(1) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, enabling a landlord (member of the armed forces) to recover possession of any premises if the court is satisfied that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held. It was argued that the statement of objects and reasons indicated that the member of the armed forces must have himself given possession. The Supreme Court declined to read this into the Statute holding that the intention of the Legislature is expressed with sufficient clarity by the language of Section 13A(1) and there is nothing to suggest that the intention of the Legislature was other than what had been said. The Supreme Court declined to read this into the Statute holding that the intention of the Legislature is expressed with sufficient clarity by the language of Section 13A(1) and there is nothing to suggest that the intention of the Legislature was other than what had been said. The principle enunciated at page: 592 was: It is true, as pointed out by the learned single Judge, the Bombay Rent Act is a welfare legislation designed among other matters, to protect tenants from harassment and unreasonable eviction by landlords and it should, therefore, be interpreted in a broad and liberal spirit so as to further and not to constrain the object of the Act. We also agree that the exclusionary provisions in the Act should be construed strictly so as to give a wide amplitude to the principal object of the legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive grounds. But this does not mean that the intention of the Legislature, expressed with sufficient vocabulary clarity or gathered by reference to permissible sources, may be by passed to accommodate individual versions to what may appear reasonable. The task of all interpreters is to ascertain intention. It is often said, where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there can arise no question of construction. Such words ordinarily speaks for themselves. Since the words must have spoken as clearly to legislators as to Judges, it may be safely presumed that the Legislature intended what the words plainly say. This is the true basis of the so-called golden rule of construction that "where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature". A court should give effect to plain words, not because there is any charm or magic in the plainness of such words but because plain words may be expected to convey plainly the intention of the Legislature. 19. Much to the same effect is the view expressed in Motor Owners' Insurance Company Limited Vs. Jadavji Keshavji Modi and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 660 , namely-that harsh consequences following upon an interpretation are not considered as the governing factor in the construction of a Statute, unless its language is equivocal or ambiguous. 19. Much to the same effect is the view expressed in Motor Owners' Insurance Company Limited Vs. Jadavji Keshavji Modi and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 660 , namely-that harsh consequences following upon an interpretation are not considered as the governing factor in the construction of a Statute, unless its language is equivocal or ambiguous. "If the language is plain and capable of one interpretation only, we will not be justified in reading into the words of an Act a meaning which does not follow naturally from the language used by the legislature." 20. Rent Control Act is a piece of social legislation and is meant mainly to protect the tenants from frivolous evictions. The settled principle in construing such legislation is that the court should adopt a beneficient rule of construction, that construction should be preferred which fulfils the policy of the Act and is more beneficial to the parsons in whose interest the Act has been passed. Jivabhai Purshottam Vs. Chhagan Karson and Others, AIR 1961 SC 1491 ; Mahadeolal Kanodia Vs. The Administrator-general of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 936 . This rule however is not absolute. It is not attracted in the absence of ambiguity or a doubt arising on the language of the text. Dealing with the Payment of Gratuity Act which also is a piece if social welfare legislature the Supreme Court referring to the rule of beneficial construction observed in Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd. Vs. Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act and Others, (1984) 4 SCC 356 : When however the language is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to it whatever may be the consequence, for, in that case, the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. When the language is explicit, its consequences are for the Legislature and not for the Courts to consider. The argument of inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the Statute is obscure and there are two methods of construction. 21. The Supreme Court followed this up with a note of caution (at 365) similar to one given in Mahadeolal Kanodia (supra): In their anxiety to advance beneficent purpose of legislation, the Courts must not yield to the temptation of seeking ambiguity when there is none. (See also : Kewal Singh Vs. 21. The Supreme Court followed this up with a note of caution (at 365) similar to one given in Mahadeolal Kanodia (supra): In their anxiety to advance beneficent purpose of legislation, the Courts must not yield to the temptation of seeking ambiguity when there is none. (See also : Kewal Singh Vs. Smt. Lajwanti, (1980) 1 SCC 290 , arising from Rent Control Legislation. In regard to beneficient construction, Maxwell: Interpretation of Statutes (p. 92) is of view that the construction of a statute must not so strain the words as to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the language. Read Dickerson on The Interpretation and Application of Statutes, 1975 suggests that if manifest legislative purpose is broader than, or conflicts with, manifest legislative intent, the latter should normally prevail (p. 98). Again at p. 206, the emphasis laid by the learned author Is on saying, that: The Court will not extend the law beyond its meaning to take care of a broader legislative purpose...the Court will refrain from exercising its creative function to apply the rule announced in the Statute to situations not covered by it, even though such an extension would help to advance the manifest ulterior purpose of the Statute. 22. In construing the words, "the landlord's full cost of the suit" appearing in Section 39, this Court has adhered to the rule of plain, ordinary and natural meaning. The Division Bench in R.D. Ram Nath & Co. v. Girdhari Lal (supra) for instance, was of the opinion that: The expression 'full cost of the suit' in respect of a pending suit will represent the amount of court fee paid on the plaint and other documents and other taxable expenses incurred by the landlord by the date of deposit together with such amount of the Advocate's fee and the fee of his clerk as is taxable on the contested scale whether any certificate of fee has or has not been filed by the date of deposit. In case of a first appeal or revision filed against a decree or order of the trial court it will represent the costs awarded to the landlord in the decree or order together with the amount paid as court fee on the memorandum of appeal or revision and other documents and other taxable expenses incurred in the first appellate or revisional Court including the Advocate's fee and the fee of his clerk which are to be computed in the manner stated above. In case of second appeal or revision filed against a decree or order of the first appellate or revisional Court it will represent the costs awarded to the trial court as well as the first appellate or revisional Court together with the amount paid towards court fee on the memorandum of appeal or revision and on other documents and other taxable expenses incurred in the second appellate or revisional Court including the Advocate's fee and the fee of his clerk which are to be computed in the manner stated above. 23. A learned Single Judge took the view in Kamta Prasad Vs. Behari Lal, AIR 1977 All 109 , that a deposit has to be made in the revisional Court only when a revision against the final order was pending and not where a revision against some interlocutory order was pending. This was disapproved recently by a Division Bench of which one of us (B.D. Agarwal, J.) was a member and in agreement with the view expressed by another learned Judge in Banarsi Lal v. Smt. Sagiran Begum 1983 AWC 505 it was held vide Smt. Phoolwati v. Gyan Chand Varma 1984 AWC 1001 that: It is noteworthy that Section 39 of the Act speaks of "the landlord's full costs of the suit" and not to cost awarded to the Plaintiff in the suit. The Legislature has also eschewed the use of such words as costs of the decree for eviction which could restrict the meaning to those proceedings only which directly resulted in eviction. In our opinion the plain meaning of "full cost of the suit" is not only cost of the decree for eviction and the revision or appeal arising out of it but also the cost of such other incidental proceedings as are directly triggered off by the suit for eviction. 24. In our opinion the plain meaning of "full cost of the suit" is not only cost of the decree for eviction and the revision or appeal arising out of it but also the cost of such other incidental proceedings as are directly triggered off by the suit for eviction. 24. This accords with the decision arrived at by another Division Bench reported in Dr. Amar Nath Agarwal v. 1st Additional District Judge 1982 AWC 786 holding that: x x x x x Section 39 since is mandatory, it is necessary for a tenant to deposit the entire amount required by it. A tenant cannot get the benefit provided for by Section 39 by making substantial compliance of the same. Substantial compliance of Section 39 would not serve the purpose. We, therefore, hold that if the deposit made by a tenant falls short of the amount or amounts required to be deposited u/s 39, the tenant would not be entitled to take resort to the principle of substantial compliance and get the benefit of Section 39. Section 39 prescribes for depositing the particular amounts in the manner prescribed therein. The failure to comply with the said requirement leads to the consequence of depriving the tenant of its benefit. Since we have found above that substantial compliance of Section 39 is of no avail to a tenant, the question of his bona fides does not arise. Even if a tenant has acted in good faith without deceit or fraud or innocently, the benefit of Section 39 cannot be extended to him. 25. In advertent or accidental deficiency detected in the amount of deposit may be overlooked but this is founded not upon beneficial construction placed on Section 39, but a different principle, namely, "de minimis non curat lex" (the law does not concern itself about trifles). 26. This being the accepted criteria for construing the words "full cost of the suit" appearing in Section 39, we are unable to find rational or adequate justification to adopt a different approach to interpret "deposits in the Court before which the suit is pending". 26. This being the accepted criteria for construing the words "full cost of the suit" appearing in Section 39, we are unable to find rational or adequate justification to adopt a different approach to interpret "deposits in the Court before which the suit is pending". The entire Section 39 deserves beneficient construction but with this qualification that in the absence of ambiguity, or, the meaning being obscure, we have to resist the temptation to innovate into the plain words an ambiguity and stretch them to include a Court other than a Court where the suit or appeal is pending. The apparent or suggested meaning leaves little reason to believe, in our opinion, that this does not equally represent the legislative intent. 27. Sri Saunders placed strong reliance on the case reported in Murli Dhar v. Smt. Ram Piari Nigam 1978 (UP) RCC 321. This and another decision in Ram Kripal v. Mukat Lal 1978 AWC 183 also by a learned Single Judge follow Smt. Mathura Devi v. Kailash Chand Bhatia 1977 (2) RCJ 354. We, therefore, turn to Smt. Mathura Devi. The Act 1972 became applicable to the building in that case on June 24, 1976. The suit was brought in the Court of Small Causes on 10th July, 75. The District Judge disposed of the revision on May 10, 1976. At the commencement of the Act there was revision pending in this Court. Of the three deposits in question the first was made in the Trial Court; the second deposit was made before the Judge in Revision and the last deposit was made on May 14, 1976, again in the Trial Court in pursuance of a conditional stay passed by this Court. The question arose whether benefit of these deposits could be claimed for purposes of Sections 39/40. The landlord's counsel contended, that these deposits had to be excluded from consideration on ground that they were made prior to the date since when the Act became applicable to the house in suit. Learned Single Judge negatived this contention observing that if the deposit has already been made which fully or partly satisfies the amount claimed by the Plaintiff, its repetition would be pointless tautology and would reduce the provision to a mere ritual and defeat the object of the legislature inasmuch as many a tenant might find it well nigh impossible to make the deposit twice. We are in respectful agreement with the conclusion on this aspect for the reason that, as explained earlier, whatever has been paid or duly tendered and deposited prior to the commencement of the Act is no longer outstanding and, therefore, that cannot be included within the "entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation" within the meaning of Section 39. We find ourselves, however, unable to subscribe to the reasoning of the learned Judge that the language of Section 39 is some-what ambiguous inasmuch as "it does not expressly say as to whether the amount already deposited should be adjusted or not" and, therefore, the rule of beneficial construction is attracted. In our opinion the language of Section 39 excludes by necessary implication whatever has been paid or duly tendered and deposited prior to the commencement of the Act, and, therefore, on the principle of plain meaning itself, the provision cannot be interpreted to require payment or deposit being made over again. 28. For the landlord in Smt. Mathura Devi the argument also was that the deposits were not made in the High Court where the proceedings were pending at the relevant time and hence they had to be excluded. On the facts of that case there really arose no question to interpret or give effect to the words "in the Court where the suit is pending"-- the reason being that was a case where it was found that "nothing was due against the Defendant so as to call for any further deposits" (Para 18). The first of the three deposits had been made in the Trial Court where the suit was then pending; the second was in the revisional court and the third again before the Trial Court but in terms of an interim order of this Court. The whole controversy, therefore, turned over the question whether at the commencement of the Act in reference to the building in dispute there remained any rent outstanding. That being answered on facts in the tenants' favour, there was no occasion or need any longer to deposit any further amount in the High Court before which the revision was pending when the Act commeneed. That being answered on facts in the tenants' favour, there was no occasion or need any longer to deposit any further amount in the High Court before which the revision was pending when the Act commeneed. This decision cannot, therefore, be taken to be an authority for the proposition that even where at the commencement of the Act there is rent outstanding against the tenant, he can take advantage of a deposit made by him u/s 30 of the Act, and not in the Court before which the suit/appeal or revision, as the casa may be was pending at the relevant date. It is noteworthy that the learned Judge also cited R.D. Ram Nath & Co. v. Girdhari Lal (supra) which we have referred earlier. It is necessary to discuss in greater detail the decisions in Murlidhar, 1978 (UP) RCC 321, Ram Kripal 1978 AWC 183 because they merely follow Smt. Mathnra Devi (supra) on this point. While Section 39 confers a right on the tenant, it also deprives the landlord a valuable right to claim eviction of his tenant by a simple determination of tenancy u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in respect of new buildings which were not subject to operation of the Act, 1972 in view of Section 2(2) at the time of the institution of the suit. Section 39 has, therefore, to be construed in that light. The decision in Shyam Kishore Agarwal v. VII Additional District Judge, Kanpur 1984 (2) ARC 534 also stands distinguished because it pertains to the interpretation of Order XV Rule 5(1) read with Explanation 3 and in no unsubstantial measure that is influenced by the weight which has been attached by the Supreme Court from time to time to Sub-rule (2) the like of which does not appear in so far as Section 39 is concerned. 29. 29. For the reasons set out In the above we answer the question referred in the negative but with this qualification, however, that in cane the Court were to find that under some order or direction of the Court below attaining finality the amount deposited had become adjustable towards the rent before the commencement of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 in relation to the building in dispute, the same would not be required to be deposited over again in order to enable the tenant to obtain the benefit of Section 40 read with Section 39 of this Act. 30. The papers may now be laid together with this opinion before learned Single Judge as the Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice directs.