Judgment :- 1. This is a petition filed under S.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the complaint in C.C. No. 18 of 1985 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate I, Tellicherry on the ground that the complaint has not disclosed an offence punishable under S.420 of the Indian Penal Code, for which it was filed, so far as the petitioner is concerned. 2. The complaint was filed by the first respondent against the petitioner as the first accused and her brother as the second accused. The allegation is that both of them cheated her and dishonestly induced her to deliver Rs. 14,000/- assuring that a Visa will be arranged to her son-in-law for the purpose of going to the gulf countries in order to seek employment. 3. Annexure A is the complaint. A reading of Annexure A shows that there are positive allegations containing all the ingredients necessary for constituting an offence punishable under S.420 of the Indian Penal Code as against both the accused namely the petitioner and her brother. 4. The decision reported in Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan (A.I.R 1983 Supreme Court 67) relied on by petitioner's counsel, quoted with approval an observation from A.I.R. 1977 Supreme Court 1754 which reads: "It is, now settled law that where the allegations set out in the complaint or the charge sheet do not constitute any offence, it is competent to the High court exercising its inherent jurisdiction under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence." Regarding this proposition of law the learned counsel for the first respondent did not raise any objection and no objection could be taken also. But I fail to understand how that could come to the rescue of the petitioner so far as this case is concerned. 5. The petitioner's counsel further relied on Para.10 of the above said decision (AIR 1983 Supreme Court 67) wherein it was held: "It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. 5. The petitioner's counsel further relied on Para.10 of the above said decision (AIR 1983 Supreme Court 67) wherein it was held: "It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under S.482 of the present Code." 6. This paragraph was interpreted by the petitioner's counsel to argue that in deciding whether the complaint discloses the offence the Court has to take into account not only the allegations in the complaint but also the accompanying papers. I do not think that such an interpretation is possible. What is stated in the decision is "if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same". That does not mean that even if the complaint discloses an offence for which it has been filed, the Court is entitled to go into the accompanying papers, for the purpose of exercising the inherent jurisdiction, in order to find that the allegations in the complaint disclosing the offence are not correct. That is clear from the subsequent sentence wherein it is stated "In other words the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out." 7. Allegations set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet, as the case may be, alone are the factors which the High Court could take into account while exercising its jurisdiction under S.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the order passed by the Magistrate in taking cognizance of the offence. That is because while taking cognizance of the offence the Magistrate has to apply his mind to the allegations in the complaint or the charge-sheet in order to satisfy himself that the offences alleged are disclosed and the matter has to be proceeded with. Taking cognizance is a judicial act. That is because while taking cognizance of the offence the Magistrate has to apply his mind to the allegations in the complaint or the charge-sheet in order to satisfy himself that the offences alleged are disclosed and the matter has to be proceeded with. Taking cognizance is a judicial act. If cognizance is taken on a complaint or a charge-sheet which do not disclose the offences alleged, the judicial act of taking cognizance becomes an illegality and as such an abuse of process of court resulting in serious injustice to the persons sought to be proceeded against as accused. That is why it is capable of invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court for the purpose of preventing'the resulting abuse of process in order to secure the ends of justice. Otherwise the accused will have to stand the ordeal of trial and the consequent harassment in order to defend himself on charges not disclosed. 8. Whether the allegations disclosed by the complaint or the chargesheet are correct or not and whether the accused is guilty or innocent are matters for evidence in the case. In almost all the cases it is the duty of the prosecution to adduce evidence, oral or documentary, in order to discharge the burden, to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is the duty of the court trying the case to evaluate the evidence in order to decide the guilt, innocence or otherwise. That function of the trial court to evaluate the evidence for the purpose of coming to conclusions is not the province of the High Court in the exercise of the jurisdiction under S.482 for the purpose of quashing the judicial act of taking cognizance. As argued by the petitioner's counsel the observations in the above decision do not lay down such a proposition of law. If that be so against most of the private complaints and charge-sheets S.482 proceedings could be filed and evidence let in to establish falsity of the offences alleged and disclosed. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on some other decisions also. The first decision is the one reported in D.L. Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (1976 Supreme Court Cases Criminal 380). 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on some other decisions also. The first decision is the one reported in D.L. Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (1976 Supreme Court Cases Criminal 380). At Para.13 of that decision it was held: "It is well settled that when a Magistrate receives a complaint, he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint, disclose the commission of an offence. This is clear from the use of the words "may take cognizance" which in the context in which they occur cannot be equated with "must take cognizance". The word "may" gives a discretion to the Magistrate in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under S.156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence, himself." 10. This decision was pointed out for the purpose of arguing that the offence under S.420 of the Indian Penal Code for which the complaint has been filed by the first respondent, being cognizable, the Magistrate ought to have referred the complaint to the Police under S.156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code for investigation and taking of cognizance without forwarding the same to the Police under S.156(3) is not justified. I do not think that the above observations warrant such a conclusion. There are several courses open to the Magistrate and he is free to choose any of them and the above decision does not intend to impose any fetter on his rights. It only says that if the course under S.156(3) is adopted the Magistrate is justified in doing so. 11. Simply because a complaint discloses a cognizable offence the magistrate is not bound to forward it to the Police for investigation under S.156(3). An order under S.156(3) is only in the nature of a reminder or intimation to the Police to exercise their investigational powers under S.156(1). Such an investigation begins with collection of evidence under S.156(1) and ends with the filing of charge under S.173. An order under S.156(3) is only in the nature of a reminder or intimation to the Police to exercise their investigational powers under S.156(1). Such an investigation begins with collection of evidence under S.156(1) and ends with the filing of charge under S.173. Under S.200 the Magistrate can straight away take cognizance by examining the complainant upon oath and witnesses present, if any, and issue process under S.204. Nothing prevents his discretion in this respect even if the offence is cognizable. The provision for making over for enquiry or trial under S.192 is also there. He need postpone the issue of process and decide to inquire by himself under S.202(1) or direct investigation by a police officer or by such other person only if he thinks that such a procedure is necessary for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. The words used in S.202(1) are only "may, if he thinks fit" which means that it is left to him to decide whether process under S.204 has to be issued straight away or whether it has to be postponed for the purposes enumerated therein. In this connection it is advantageous to quote the principles laid down in P.S. Sulaiman v. Eachara Warrier (1978 KLT 424): "There is nothing in the Code prohibiting Magistrate after taking cognizance of an offence and examination by him of the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, under S.200 from straightaway issuing process under S.204. The question then is whether the proviso to S.202(2) stands in the way of doing that. That proviso is one to S.202(2). S.202(2) is specific that what is contained therein is applicable only to the inquiry referred to in S.202(1). In S.202(1) what is provided is that if the Magistrate thinks that postponement of the issue of process against an accused under S.204 is necessary for deciding whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding he "may" either enquire into the case himself or direct investigation to be made by a police officer. Mark the word 'may' there. That shows that it is open to him not to postpone the issue of process under S.204 of the Code also. Mark the word 'may' there. That shows that it is open to him not to postpone the issue of process under S.204 of the Code also. If be does not think fit to postpone the issue of process against the accused it is open to him to straightaway issue process under S.204 after examination of the persons contemplated by S.200 of the Code. The choice is solely with the Magistrate. It is a matter entirely in his discretion. No fetter should be placed on that discretion. To tell the Magistrate that it is always desirable that in private complaints involving offences triable exclusively by the Court of Session he should follow the provisions of the proviso to S.202(2) is to interfere with that discretion and that is not warranted by S.202(2). Proviso (a) to S.202(1) shows that direction regarding investigation by a police officer should not be made by the Magistrate if the offence complained of is exclusively triable by a Court of Session. In such a case, if he thinks that postponement of issue of process is necessary for finding out whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding he has to inquire into the case himself. And if he does that the proviso to S.202(2) is immediately attracted. That proviso makes it obligatory on his part to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and then to examine them on oath. But such a procedure is not contemplated if the Magistrate thinks after complying with the provisions of S.200 that it is not necessary to postpone the issue of process against the accused for the purpose of finding out whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding." 12. Nirmaljith Singh Boon v. The State of West Bengal and another (1973 S.C.C. Criminal 521) pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner also will not help him. That decision only says that for the purpose of taking cognizance under S.190(1)(a) the Magistrate has to apply his mind and he need resort to S.156(3) only when he applied his mind and decided to do so. It follows that there is no illegality, want of jurisdiction or abuse of process of court in taking cognizance and straightaway issuing process after being satisfied on recording the sworn statement of the complainant and witnesses, if any present. 13. It follows that there is no illegality, want of jurisdiction or abuse of process of court in taking cognizance and straightaway issuing process after being satisfied on recording the sworn statement of the complainant and witnesses, if any present. 13. In this case when the complaint was filed by the first respondent the Magistrate recorded the sworn statement, took cognizance and issued process. The petitioner's complaint is that no enquiry was conducted under S.202 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Postponement of cognizance and an enquiry contemplated under S.202 is necessary only if the Magistrate, who takes cognizance of the offence, deems fit to do so. Even without such a postponement and an enquiry under S.202(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code the Magistrate can take cognizance after recording the sworn statement of the complainant and witnesses, if any, if he is satisfied that for the purpose of taking cognizance that is sufficient. Therefore, there is absolutely no question of any irregularity or illegality in the process of taking cognizance by the learned Magistrate. 14. The provisions of S.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code are mainly intended to prevent abuse of the process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. At this stage it may not be fair or proper to come to a conclusion that the complaint filed by the first respondent before the Magistrate amounts to an abuse of the process of Court. The allegations in the complaint disclose an offence for which it was filed. Therefore, no question of securing the ends of justice by invoking the inherent powers of this Court will arise at this stage. In fact if at all there is anything which amounts to abuse of process of Court that is only the present petition which was filed before this Court. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.