V.S. DAVE, J.— This is a reference made to us by Honble Chief Justice for answering the question referred to Division Bench by the learned Single Judge, Honble Sharma J. The question referred to is whether a composite order of attachment of disputed property under section 146 Cr.P.C can be passed by the Magistrate while passing the preliminary order under section 145 (1) Cr.P.C? 2. The aforesaid question arose in a revision petition filed against the order passed by Sessions Judge, Jhunjhunu, whereby he had partly quashed the order of Sub - Divisional Magistrate, Jhunjhunu, dated December 20, 1982 so far as the attachment of the property and appointment of receiver was made. The learned Sub Divisional Magistrate had passed one composite order which was in two parts. In first part he had drawn a preliminary order as required by sec. 145(1) Cr.P.C. and in the second part he had passed an order of attachment and appointed a receiver to manage the property. The learned Sessions Judge while reversing the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to the extent of it being one under section 146 (1) Cr.P.C. placed reliance on a decision of this court reported in Kishan Bihari Birla vs. Prem Kumari Bhati (1). A revision was filed before this Court which come up for hearing before Honble Sharma J. His attention was drawn to the decision of Honble Byas J. in Ram Prasad V. State of Rajasthan (2) and of Honble Kasliwal J. in Girwar Dan Ram Prasad (3) Honble Sharma J. had, already, in an earlier case cited above taken the view that a composite order under section 145(1) and 146(1) Cr.P.C. is illegal and it was this judgment which was relied on by Sessions Judge. Since Honble Byas J. had taken the view that simultaneous order of attachment can be passed and there is no illegality in it so as to call for interference in revision petition and Honble Kasliwal J. had taken the view that a composite order may validly be passed though it is appropriate if the Magistrate passes two separate orders and also that order under section 145(1) Cr.P.C. must precede order under Sec. 146 (1) Cr.P.C. and further it must be clearly borne out from composite order that Magistrate was satisfied separately with regard to existence of conditions for drawing orders under two sections, therefore, Honble Sharma J. in the instant case made a reference to the Larger Bench. This is how this reference has come up before us for answering. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Jagdeep Dhankhar, while supporting the view taken by Honble Byas J. and Honble Kasliwal J. submitted that there is no bar in passing simultaneous or composite order and the only requirement of law is that Magistrate should apply his mind twice and it should be apparent from the order. He placed reliance on the decision of Allahabad High Court in Syed Ahmed V. Rais Ahmed (4). He also placed reliance on Theophil Xess Vs. Chuyan Ekka, (5) a judgment from the Orissa High Court. He also placed reliance on the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mathuralal V. Bhanwarlal (6). 4. On the strength of the aforesaid observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court he submitted that there being no substantial change even after separately enacting section 146 (1) Cr.P.C. the position of law remains the same and there is no legal bar if the Magistrate passes a composite order. 5. Shri M. M. Ranjan appearing on behalf of the non-petitioner submitted that the view taken by Honble Sharma J. is a correct view and further that the words at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of section 145 Cr.P.C will become redundant in case any other interpretation is given. He placed reliance on a decision of the Patna High Court reported in Mahendra Tiwari V. Mt. Lal Pari Devi (7). He also relied on Kottarathil Mavunni Vs. He placed reliance on a decision of the Patna High Court reported in Mahendra Tiwari V. Mt. Lal Pari Devi (7). He also relied on Kottarathil Mavunni Vs. State of Kerala (8) wherein Kerala High Court relied on one of its own earlier judgment in Lilly Franklin V. Wilson (9) delivered by Janki Amma J It is thus submitted by Shri Ranjan that order passed under section 145 Cr.P.C. should be separately signed and it is only thereafter that the Magistrate should apply his mind for the second time and pass a separate order under sec. 145 (1) Cr.P.C. If he has not signed the earlier order, it is submitted, then the order cannot be said to be an order in eye of law and the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an order under sec. 146 (1) Cr.P.C. The words at any time after making the order have no ambiguity and it is submitted that on a plain reading also intention of the Legislature is apparant that two orders should be separately passed. 6. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions and have carefully perused the decisions cited before us. 7. Sections 146 (1) Cr.P.C reads as under: "Sec. 146 (l)-If the Magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 145 considers the case to be one of emergency, or if he decides that none of the parties was then in such possession as is referred to in section 145, or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof: Provided that such Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute." 8. This provision had been newly added in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and in fact is a corollary to sec. This provision had been newly added in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and in fact is a corollary to sec. 145 Cr.P.C. It is section 145 (1)Cr.P.C. wherefrom the Magistrate gets the jurisdiction to proceed with the case i. e. drawing of a preliminary order is the basis of proceedings wherein a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace arises and it is this assumption of jurisdiction which further empowers the Magistrate under section 146 (1) Cr.P.C to pass an order regarding attachment of the property and appointment of receiver. If there is no dispute concerning the immovable property, there would be no jurisdiction in Magistrate to proceed under sections 145 & 146 Cr.P.C. The legality of order under s. 146(1) Cr.P.C. depends on its having been preceded by lawful proceeding under section 145 (1) Cr.P.C. and therefore, it can be said that section 146 Cr.P.C. is in continuation of section 145 Cr.P.C. and passing a preliminary order under section 145 (1) Cr.P.C. is prior in point of time to an order under section 146 (1) Cr.P.C To this extent there is no controversy in either of the decisions cited by learned counsel for both the parties. The only dispute raised and which has been referred is whether a composite order can be passed. Honble Sharma J. while taking the view that a composite order under sec. 145(1) and 146 (1) Cr.P.C. is without jurisdiction and against the spirit of section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. placed reliance on the decision in Kottarathil Mavunnis case (supra). Kerala High Court observed as under: "A composite order under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 145 and under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 146 cannot be passed as an order of attachment under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 146 can be passed only alter the preliminary order under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 145 had already been passed by the Magistrate. Where the Magistrate made a preliminary order under Sec. 145 and stated that he was satisfied that there were sufficient grounds for taking proceedings as there exists serious likelihood of breach of peace concerning the disputed property and further by the later part of the decree he placed the disputed property under attachment under Sec. 146 (1), his order regarding later part would be without jurisdiction." 9. Justice Menon while taking the above view relied on the observations of Janki Amma J. in Lilly Franklins case wherein it was observed as under: "The learned Additional Sessions Judge has held that in the instant case, the order of attachment does not conform to the requirements of Sec. 146 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The conclusion seems to be well-founded. The order of the Magistrate extracted above shows that it is a composite order initiating proceedings under Sec. 145 (1) and at the same time attaching the subject of dispute on the ground that there is an emergency. In other words, the initiation of proceedings under S. 145(1) and the attachment of property are seen effected by the same order. This is not warranted by the provisions of Sec. 146 (1). Sec. 146 (1) begins with the words: "If the Magistrate at any time after making the order in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 145 ........" The expression "after making the order" makes it clear that proceedings under Sec. 145 (1; should precede the order attaching the property, sec. 146 (1) does not contemplate a simultaneous exercize of jurisdiction under Sec. 145 (l)and S. 146(1). The order under S. 145(1) becomes complete only when the Magistrate puts his signature therein. It is only thereafter that he is expected to consider whether it is a case of emergency requiring attachment of property. Since the order attaching property in the instant case did not satisfy the above requirements. It was rightly set aside by the Additional Sessions Judge. Now that the preliminary order under Sec. 145 (l)has been confirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge it is open to the Magistrate to consider whether a case of emergency exists and whether the property should be attached and if he is so satisfied it is up to him to issue fresh order of attachment followed by appointment of receiver." 10. Thus Janki Amma J. has laid emphasis on the Magistrates putting signatures on the order under section 145 (1) Cr. P.C. In our opinion this is reading, the provisions of section 146 Cr. P.C. in between lines. We are in respectful disagreement with the view taken in this case inasmuch as we do not find any restriction in any law that the order under section 145 (1) Cr. P.C. In our opinion this is reading, the provisions of section 146 Cr. P.C. in between lines. We are in respectful disagreement with the view taken in this case inasmuch as we do not find any restriction in any law that the order under section 145 (1) Cr. P.C. is complete only when the Magistrate puts his signature therein and it is only thereafter that he is expected to consider whether it is a case of emergency requiring attachment of the property. While interpreting the provisions of section 145 (1) and 146(1) Cr. P.C. one has to look into the substance rather than the form and rules of technicality need not negative the intention of the Legislature. The Magistrate, while passing the order under section 146(1) Cr. P.C. has to do so in three cases viz. (i) if it is a case of emergency or (ii) if none of the parties was in possession, or (iii) if in no position it is possible to ascertain as to which party is in possession. Such an order if necessary can only follow preliminary order under section 145 (1) Cr. P.C. The words at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of section 145 Cr. P.C. in our opinion have been added so that the Magistrate without mixing up the two may draw the preliminary order first in terms of the section 145 (1) Cr. P.C. and having fixed the date and place of hearing, thereafter consider the question of attachment and appointment of receiver. Therefore, only requirement is that order under section 145 (1) Cr. PC. must precede the order under section 146 (1) Cr. P.C. It is not the requirement of law that order under section 146 (1) Cr. P.C. should be passed only after notice to the either side. 11. The words at any time in our considered opinion mean that the order under section 146 (I) Cr. P.C. can be passed immediately after passing the order under section 145 (1) Cr. P.C, it can be passed at a later hour on the same day, or on any date there-after may be after notice to the other side or otherwise and cannot be restrained to mean that order should be a separately drawn and signed twice. If such a restrictive meaning is given then the words at any time would become redundant. P.C, it can be passed at a later hour on the same day, or on any date there-after may be after notice to the other side or otherwise and cannot be restrained to mean that order should be a separately drawn and signed twice. If such a restrictive meaning is given then the words at any time would become redundant. The plain meaning of the words at any time after making the order under section 145 (1) Cr. P.C. only requires the precedent of order under section 145 (1) Cr. P.C. over order under section 146 (1) Cr. P.C. It need not be signed at two places. The putting of the separate signature is merely an idle formality and cannot begative the intention of the Legislature. It may at best be an irregularity. 12 In Mahendra Tiwaris case the Division Bench of Patna High Court observed as under. "From discussion of the above cases this much is clear that an order of attachment cannot be passed simultaneously in the sense that a Magistrate while initiating a proceeding under section 145 of the Code cannot, at the same time also make an order of attachment. An order of attachment has got to be made subsequent to the initiation of the proceedings in the circumstances mentioned in section 146 (1) of the Code". In the aforesaid case reliance has been placed on the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court: "Now, in a case of emergency, a Magistrate may attach the property, at any time after making the preliminary order. This is the first of the situations provided in Sec. 146 (1) in which an attachment may be effected. There is no express stipulation in Sec. 146 that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate ends with the attachment. Nor is it implied. Far from it. The obligation to proceed with the enquiry as prescribed by Sec. 145 sub-sec. (4) is against any such implication. Suppose a Magistrate draws up a preliminary order under sec. 145(1) and immediately follows it up with an attachment under Sec. 146(1), the whole exercise of stating the grounds of his satisfaction and calling upon the parties to appear before him and submit their written statements becomes futile if he is to have no further jurisdiction in the matter. Suppose a Magistrate draws up a preliminary order under sec. 145(1) and immediately follows it up with an attachment under Sec. 146(1), the whole exercise of stating the grounds of his satisfaction and calling upon the parties to appear before him and submit their written statements becomes futile if he is to have no further jurisdiction in the matter. And yet he|cannot make an order of attachment under S. 146 (1) on the ground of emergency without first making a preliminary order in the manner prescribed by S. 145(1). There is no reason why we should adopt a construction which will lead to such inevitable contradictions. We mentioned a little earlier that the only provision for stopping the proceeding and cancelling the preliminary order is to be found in Sec. 145 (5) and it can only be on the ground that there is no longer any dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. An emergency is the basis of attachment under the first limb of sec. 146 (1) and if there is an emergency, no one can say that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. "The provisions of Ss. 146 and 146 of the 1973 Code are substantially the same as the corresponding provisions before the lv55 amendment. The only noticeable change is that the second proviso to Sec 145(4) (as it stood before the 1955 amendment) has now been transposed to S. 146 but without the words "pending his decision under this section" and with the words at any time after making the order under S. 145 (1)" super-aided. The change, clearly, is in the interests of convenient draftsmanship All situations in which an attachment may be made are now mentioned together in S. 146. The words "pending his decision under this section" have apparently been omitted as unnecessary since S. 145 provides how the proceeding initiated by a preliminary order must proceed and end and therefore, an attachment made at any time after making the order under S. 145 (1) can only continue until the termination of the proceeding. The words "pending his decision under this section" have apparently been omitted as unnecessary since S. 145 provides how the proceeding initiated by a preliminary order must proceed and end and therefore, an attachment made at any time after making the order under S. 145 (1) can only continue until the termination of the proceeding. At the termination of the proceeding, if he finds one of the paries was in possession as stipulated, the Magistrate must make an order as provided in S. 145 (6) and withdraw the attachment as provided in S. 146 (l) since there can be no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace once an order in terms of S. 146 (6) is made". In Mathuralals case their Lordships of the Supreme Court after considering Chandu Naiks case held as under: "There is no express stipulation in S. 146 that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate ends with the attachment. Nor is it implied. Far from it. The obligation to proceed with the enquiry as prescribed by S. 145, sub-sec. (4) is against any such implication. The only provision for stopping the proceeding and cancelling the preliminary order is to be found in sec. 145(5) and it can be on the ground that there is no longer any dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. An emergency is the basis of attachment under the first limb of S. 146 (1) and if there is an emergency, no one can say that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace". Their Lordships of the Supreme Court neither considered the question whether a simultaneous order or a composite order can be passed or not. Their Lordships only considered the Magistrates jurisdiction under section 146 Cr. P.C. On a careful reading of this decision of the Supreme Court we are unable to come to the conclusion which has been arrived at by Patna High Court. In Patna High Courts case there is no mention as to on which observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court they had reached the conclusion that simultaneous orders under section 145 & 146 Cr.P.C. cannot be passed. We are in respectful disagreement with the view expressed by the Honble Judges of the Patna High Court. 13. We will now consider the cases cited by Shri Dhankhar. In Theophil Xess Vs. We are in respectful disagreement with the view expressed by the Honble Judges of the Patna High Court. 13. We will now consider the cases cited by Shri Dhankhar. In Theophil Xess Vs. Chuyan Ekka (supra) Orissa High Court has observed as under: "A Magistrate who wants to pass an order under Sec. 146(1), has at first to pass an order under Sec. 145 (1) in order to assume jurisdiction to attach the property under Sec. 146 (1). There is nothing in the said two sections or in the Cr. P.C. to prevent a Magistrate to pass the said two orders in the same strain and in the same sitting, the order under Sec. 146 (1) just following the order under Sec. 145 (1) of the Code." We do not get any assistance from this decision as neither the facts are mentioned nor there is discussion of law. However, we are in agreement with the conclusions arrived at for the reasons which we have mentioned in this judgment. Honble Bays J. in Ram Prasads case relying upon the observations made in Ramavtar V. Dhanraj (10) held that passing of the orders simultaneously both under sections 145 and 146 Cr. PC. is not illegal. In our opinion the word simultaneously may not be proper phraseology which ought to have been used while deciding the scope as in our opinion the order under Sec. 145 (1) must precede order under section 146 (1) Cr. P.C. and the two orders are separate one after another though they have been signed at the bottom and there is no illegality in doing so. Honble Kasliwal J. in Girwardans case discussed several cases except the judgment of Honble Byas J. and that of Sharma J. But after detailed discussions of the various decisions on either side held that composite order may validly be passed. He, however, held that it is appropriate if the Magistrate passes two separate orders. 14. We are thus in agreement with the view taken by Honble Kasliwal J. in Girwardans case that a composite order signed at one place can be passed and the only requirements are that order under Sec. 145 (1) Cr. He, however, held that it is appropriate if the Magistrate passes two separate orders. 14. We are thus in agreement with the view taken by Honble Kasliwal J. in Girwardans case that a composite order signed at one place can be passed and the only requirements are that order under Sec. 145 (1) Cr. P.C. must be separate than the one under Sec. 146 (1) Cr.P.C. The order under Sec. 145 (i) must precede the order under Sec. 146 (1) Cr.P.C. Both the orders must satisfy the conditions for drawing the orders under the two sections and if this is all done, then the order is a valid order. 15. We, therefore, conclude that the Magistrate can pass a composite order of attachment on disputed property under Sec. 145 (1) while passing the preliminary order under Sec. 145 (1) Cr.P.C. but such an order is only valid in the following circumstances; (a) The order under Se1 145 (1) should be separately drawn than the order under Sec. 146 (1) Cr.P.C. (b) That the order under Sec. 145 (1) must precede order under Sec. 146(1) Cr.P.C. (c) It must be borne out from both the orders that they satisfy separately the existence of the conditions for drawing such orders under the two sections. 16. The reference is answered accordingly.