ORDER I.P. Singh, J. - This contempt petition is admission stage. 2. Dr. Atka Jaiswal, the petitioner has filed this contempt petition against the respondents that they have committed civil contempt by disobeying the order of Munsif West, Allahabad dated 19-1-85 passed in Civil Suit No. 46 of 1985 which is in following terms : "Called out. Plaintiff is present. Defendants are absent. Issue Notice to O.P. -again fixing 25-1-85 for objection disposal. Meanwhile the status quo may be maintained. Urgent steps." 3. In my view since the order was passed by the Court of Munsif so, disobedience if any, has to be proceeded against the respondents under the provisions of O. 39, R. 2-A, C.P.C. and this Court should not take cognizance of the same. 4. The learned counsel has argued that S. 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act confers jurisdiction, power and authority on this Court in respect of the contempt of Courts subordinate to it. This contention, of course, cannot be rebutted but as already mentioned above the disobedience, if any, of any injunction granted or of order made under O. 39, R. 1 or 2 or the breach of any of the terms of which the injunction was granted or the order was made can also be enforced by the Court granting the injunction or making the order as provided under O. 39, R. 2-A, C.P.C. and if that Court finds the respondents guilty of such disobedience or breach then apart from ordering the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached can also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months. 5. The learned counsel for the applicant has argued that when the "remedies" are open in two forums then it is for the applicant to choose the forum and on this principle the mere fact that the remedy under O. 39, R. 2-A C.P.C. is open can be no bar to the present application before this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction, power and authority under the Contempt of Courts Act. In support of this contention he referred to the decision in State v. S.N. Dixit, 1973 All LJ 180 : 1973 ACC 98. In that decision the letter of the officer amounted to libel which is an offence under the Indian Penal Code. In support of this contention he referred to the decision in State v. S.N. Dixit, 1973 All LJ 180 : 1973 ACC 98. In that decision the letter of the officer amounted to libel which is an offence under the Indian Penal Code. The argument that the person at responsible for libel can be proceeded against under the Indian Penal Code and not under the Contempt of Courts Act for committing contempt of Court was repelled. The reason was that the two offences were distinct and the mere fact that the person liable can be proceeded against the "libel" would not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court to punish that person for an offence under the Contempt of Courts Act. 6. But, in the present case, there is only one offence. The point in issue is as to whether that contempt should be punished by this Court under the Contempt of Courts Act or it should be left to be punished by the Court of Munsif under the provisions of O. 9, R. 2-A, C.P.C. This question would involve exercise of discretion by this Court. There is no doubt that the jurisdiction, power and authority to punish the contemner under the Contempt of Courts Act by this Court is discretionary inasmuch as the matter of contempt is between the Court and the contemner and the applicant who moves the application for contempt is only an informer and he had no vested right to get this Court to proceed in the matter. To my mind this Court would be exercising a better discretion if the matter of punishing the contempt of Court subordinate to this Court is left to be dealt with by the subordinate Court itself, if the law permits that way. In this connection reference may be made to the commentaries K.J. Ayer's Law of Contempt of Courts, 6th Edition, 1983, at page 157 which reads as follows: "Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 no doubt invests the High Court with sample powers to take cognizance of such contempt committed with regard to the Courts, subordinate to the High Court, which in an appropriate case may be exercised. But that does not mean that in each and every case of such an alleged contempt the High Court should exercise such powers, allowing the same to be used as a convenient substitute for the specific remedies otherwise provided by law. Violation of an order of injunction constituting disobedience to an order of a Court, subordinate to the High Court, if fulfilled may constitute civil contempt as defined by the Act and the High Court may also be invested with powers to take action for such contempt. But civil contempt is by its very nature remedial, the primary object being to enforce the order for the benefit of the party in whose favour the order had been made. Such being the nature of civil contempt it would be reasonable to think that where the law otherwise specifically provides a remedy for breach of such order as also the means for its enforcement, the parties must normally avail of such remedies and the High Court should not encourage by passing such remedies by initiating proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. Calcutta Medical Store v. Stadmed Pvt. Ltd., (1976-77) 81 Cal WN 209 at 210 7. Of course, in the above observation remedial aspect is given stress but a mere reading of O. 39. R. 2-A, C.P.C. indicates that it speaks of imprisonment to the person guilty of disobedience or breach and that fact introduces "punishment aspect" also. At any rate, the above observation lay emphasis on the point that where alternative remedy is specifically provided by law the parties must normally avail themselves of such remedies and the High Court should not encourage by passing such remedies by initiating proceedings under the Act. 8. The point in question was also discussed in detail by me in an earlier judgment dated 3-9-84 in Civil Misc. Contempt Appln. No. 263 of 1984. Anis Ahmad Khan v. State of U.P., (Reported in 1985 All LJ 30). 9. In view of above discussion, I see no reason to initiate the present contempt proceedings in this Court. This contempt petition is, therefore, dismissed. Of course, the applicant, if so desires, may seek her remedy under O. 39, R. 2-A, C.P.C. in the Court below.