G. G. SOHANI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is plaintiff's second appeal. ( 2 ) THE material facts giving rise to this appeal, briefly, are as follows ; defendant No. 1 Sewa Sahakari Sanstha Limited, Mahidpur (hereinafter referred to as 'the society') is a Co-operative Society registered under the M. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). In execution of an award passed in favour of the Society against defendant No. 4 kubersingh, certain parcels of land were attached. The plaintiff averred that title to the said land vested in the plaintiff and that the same could not be attached in execution of the award passed against defendant No. 4. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the present suit for declaration of his title to the suit land. The suit was resisted by defendant No. 1 inter alia on the ground that as notice under Section 94 of the Act was not served or the society before filing the suit the suit was liable to be dismissed. The objection was upheld by the trial Court and the plaint was rejected. The appeal preferred by the plaintiff was also dismissed. Hence, the plaintiff has filed this second appeal. ( 3 ) SHRI Chaphekar, learned Counsel for the appellant, contended that the court below erred in holding that the provisions of Section 94 of the Act were attracted in the instant case. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in deccan or Chante Co-operative Bank Limited v. M/s. Dalichand Junraj Jain and others, [ air 1969 SC 1320 ], it was contended that the suit instituted by the plaintiff was not in respect of any act touching the business of the Society and hence, the provision of Section 94 of the Act were not attracted. In reply, Shri waghmare learned Counsel for the respondents, conteaded that the business of the Society embraced action taken for recovery of the loan and that if attachment affected in the recovery proceedings was being assailed by the plaintiff, compliance with the provisions of Section 94 of the Act was obligatory. ( 4 ) THE short question that arises for consideration in this case is whether the provisions of Section 94 of the Act are attracted in the instant case. That provision reads as under :"94. Notice necessary in suit. ( 4 ) THE short question that arises for consideration in this case is whether the provisions of Section 94 of the Act are attracted in the instant case. That provision reads as under :"94. Notice necessary in suit. No suit shall be instituted against a society or any of its officers in respect of any act touching the constitution, management or business of the Society until the contention of the months next after notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar or left at the office stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claim, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left". From the perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that if a suit is instituted against a Society in respect of any act touching the business of the Society, then compliance with the provisions of Section 94 of the Act is necessary for instituting a suit. The Act has not defined the expression "business of the Society'' but a similar expression occurs in Section 64 of the Act, which provides for settlement of dispute touching the business of the Society. A Full Bench of the bombay High Court bad held in Fakhrudali Nannhay v. V. B. Potdar and another, [air 1962 Bom 62] that whatever a Society did or had necessarily to do for the purpose of carrying out its objects, could be said to be part of its business and that the word 'touching' was very wide and would include any matter, which related to, concerned or affected the business of the Society. These observations of the Bombay High Court were, however, not approved by the supreme Court in AIR 1960 SC1320 (Supra), where it was held that it was difficult to subscribe to the proposition that whatever a Society did or was necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its objection could be said to be part of its business. The Supreme Court in that case held that the word 'business' had been used in a narrower sense and it meant the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the Society, which the Society was authorised to enter into under the Act and the rules and its bye-laws. The Supreme Court in that case held that the word 'business' had been used in a narrower sense and it meant the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the Society, which the Society was authorised to enter into under the Act and the rules and its bye-laws. Having regard to the context, the expression 'business' in Section 94 of the Act, in my opinion, has to be construed in a narrower sense to mean actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the Society, which the Society is authorised to enter into under the Act and the rules and its bye-laws. So construed, it is clear that the question as to whether certain property is or is not liable to be attached and sold for recovery of a loan advanced by a Society to its member cannot be held to be a matter touching the business of the Society and a suit filed for a decision on that question cannot be said to be a suit contemplated by Section 94 of the Act. The Courts below, therefore, erred in law in holding that the plaint was liable to be rejected for want of notice under section 94 of the Act. ( 5 ) FOR all those reasons, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Court below are set aside and the case is sent back to the trial court for deciding it afresh, in accordance with law. Parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 19th April, 1985. The Registry shall arrange to send the record of the case to the trial Court immediately. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed. .