GULAB C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, a dismissed employee of respondent no. 1, feels aggrieved by the order of respondent-Board of Revenue dated 21-12-1982 (Annexure S) and seeks a writ of certiorarl for quashing the same by filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) THE respondent No. 1 is a Society registered under the provisions of m. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act'), and the petitioner was, at the relevant time, employed as a Sub-Accountant-cum-Cashier at their Rampur Branch in the City of Jabalpur. It is alleged against him that on 18-11-1974, when the closing cash balance was verified by the Agent of the Branch, 31 hundred rupee notes were found short in two bundles. It is also alleged that on the slips pasted over the bundles, false number of notes contained in the bundles were written. It, however, appears that the cash was made good and the cash book closed. On 27-1-1975, i. e. , after little over 1-1/2 months, the petitioner was placed under suspension and served with a charge-sheet alleging 'temporary misappropriation and seeking his explanation. The petitioner submitted his explanation, after which a departmental enquiry was held in which he was found guilty of the charge of temporary misappropriation of Rs. 3100/ -. Thereafter, by an order dated 19-5-1975 (Annexure-H), the petitioner was dismissed from employment. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Managing Committee, which was dismissed on 27-10-1975 (Annexure J ). The petitioner, therefore, moved the registrar, Co-operative Societies, under Section 55 (2) of the Act, raising a dispute and challenging the legality and validity of his dismissal. The aforesaid dispute was transferred to the Deputy Registrar for adjudication. The respondent-Deputy Registrar, by his order dated 11-3-1981 (Annexure-Q), held that the enquiry conducted against the petitioner suffered from serious illegalities and could not form the basis of his termination. The Deputy registrar further examined the evidence on record as to ascertain if the charge levelled against the petitioner can be said to have been proved and came to the conclusion that the evidence was not sufficient to clearly hold the petitioner guilty. In the opinion of the Deputy Registrar, a serious charge like temporary misappropriation should be proved clearly and exclude all doubts about it. In the opinion of the Deputy Registrar, a serious charge like temporary misappropriation should be proved clearly and exclude all doubts about it. The Deputy Registrar, therefore, set aside the order and directed re-instatement of the petitioner with all benefits. The respondent-Board, therefore, preferred an appeal against the order of Deputy Registrar before the Additional Registrar Co-operative Societies. The Additional Registrar, by nil order dated 31-12-1981 (Annexure-R), agreed with the Deputy Registrar that the domestic enquiry was illegal. The Additional Registrar re-examined the evidence on record to ascertain if the petitioner could be held guilty of the charge. According to the Additional Registrar, there was no direct evidence to prove that the petitioner has done anything in the matter. According to him, the circumstantial evidence also did not point to the guilt of the petitioner. According to the Additional Registrar, the entire case against the petitioner was based on evidence of two witnesses whose testimony itself is doubtful. It, therefore, held that the charge against the petitioner was not proved. The order of the Deputy Registrar was, therefore, upheld. ( 3 ) THAT the respondent-Bank led a second appeal before the respondent board of Revenue under Section 77 (2) of the Act challenging the legality of the order passed by the Deputy Registrar and the Additional Registrar. The said appeal has been allowed by the impugned order dated 21-12-1982 (Annexure-S) by holding that the respondents-Deputy Registrar and Additional registrar had no jurisdiction to order re-instatement of the petitioner. On merits, the respondent-Board held that it was not necessary to insist upon direct evidence for proving the charge against the petitioner and even circumstantial evidence was sufficient. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in J. D. Jain v. Management, State Bank of India, [ air 1982 SC 673 ], to support this view. In this view of the matter, the appeal was allowed and the order of dismissal upheld. It is this order which is impugned in the present writ petition. ( 4 ) THE submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the jurisdiction of the Deputy Registrar and Additional Registrar, while deciding a dispute under Section 55 (2) of the Act, is wide and enables them to direct re-instatement. It is this order which is impugned in the present writ petition. ( 4 ) THE submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the jurisdiction of the Deputy Registrar and Additional Registrar, while deciding a dispute under Section 55 (2) of the Act, is wide and enables them to direct re-instatement. It is further submitted that the finding recorded by the deputy Registrar and the Additional Registrar that the petitioner was not guilty of the charge, was finding of fact duly reached after appreciation of evidence and such a finding could not be disturbed in a second appeal under section 77 of Act. It is further submitted that the Board has only found fault with the finding recorded by the Deputy Registrar and the Additional registrar, but has not applied its own mind to the facts and circumstances of the case with the result that though the impugned order of dismissal is vitiated as being based on an illegal enquiry, and no other authority has applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case to hold the petitioner guilty, yet the petitioner is out of employment. The submission of the learned counsel for the Bank, however, is that a finding on merits of the charge was not a pure finding of fact but a mixed finding of fact and law which could be set aside by the respondent-Board in exercise of its power under the second appeal. ( 5 ) THE controversy regarding the jurisdiction of the Registrar to order re-instatement while adjudicating a dispute under Section 55 of the Act, remains settled by the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Savaram v. Board of Revenue [ 1983 JLJ 627 : 1983 RN 353 : 1983 MPLJ 645 ]. The Full bench has examined all earlier cases and particularly the case relied on by the respondent-Board, viz. , Gwalior District Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Ramesh chandra Mangol and others [ 1979 JLJ 689 : 1979 RN 495 : 1979 MPLJ 631 ], to hold that the jurisdiction of the Regis rar is akin to powers of an appellate authority hearing appeal against an original action and includes a right and jurisdiction to issue all such order and directions which the Society itself can pass or issue. According to the Full Bench, the Registrar possessed jurisdiction to grant re-instatement in case the dismissal or removal is found to be illegal and in contravention of the Rules. In view of the Full Bench decision, it is not possible to accept the view of the respondent-Board that the respondent-Deputy Registrar and Additional Registrar acted beyond jurisdiction in directing re-instatement of petitioner. ( 6 ) THE jurisdiction of the respondent-Board of Revenue under Section 77 of the Act, may also be examined, the respondent-Board has been given power to entertain and decide a second appeal against the order and this right is limited to examining whether the order is contrary to law or it has failed to determine some material issue of law or that there has been a substantial error or defect in the procedure as prescribed by the Act so as to effect the decision of the case upon merits. This provision has been interpreted by a division bench of this Court in Barwani Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Board of revenue [1976 MPLJ Note No. 50], to exclude jurisdiction to interfere with a finding of fact unless the same was vitiated in such a way as to attract any of the three grounds mentioned in Section 77 (2) of the Act. Clearly, therefore, the respondent-Board will have no jurisdiction to set aside the finding of the deputy Registrar and the Additional Registrar holding the petitioner not guilty of the charge, unless any of the three conditions mentioned in Section 77 (2)of the Act are attracted. There is nothing in the impugned order of the Board to show that any of these conditions are actually attracted in the instant case. A reading of the impugned order of the Board of Revenue, however, suggest that according to it, the view taken by the respondents Deputy Registrar and additional Registrar was not in accordance with law as contained in J. D. Jain's case (supra ). J. D. Jain's case was dealing with a case of fraudulently altering the amount in the letter of authority. In the pass-book, a sum of Rs. 500/-was shown to havebeen withdrawn, but in the ledger, a demand entry of rs. 1500/- was made. On scrutiny, it was found that the complaisant had given a letter of authority for withdrawal of Rs. 500/-, but the appellant had withdrawn Rs. 1500/- by inserting the necessary figure. In the pass-book, a sum of Rs. 500/-was shown to havebeen withdrawn, but in the ledger, a demand entry of rs. 1500/- was made. On scrutiny, it was found that the complaisant had given a letter of authority for withdrawal of Rs. 500/-, but the appellant had withdrawn Rs. 1500/- by inserting the necessary figure. The Tribunal adjudicating the dispute, held that the evidence recorded by the Enquiry Officer was hearsay and, hence, could not be relied upon. The award was, however, set aside by the High Court in a writ petition on the ground that it was vitiated by misconception of law. In appeal, before the Supreme Court, It was held that strict rules of evidence do not apply to a departmental enquiry. The court also said that for purposes of a departmental enquiry, a complaint, certainly not frivolous, but substantiated by circumstantial evidence, is enough. It was in that context that the Court held that the Tribunal had committed an error in holding that the domestic enquiry was based on hearsay evidence. On facts, that the Supreme Court found that there was direct evidence of witnesses to prove that a complaint was made and this evidence could not be said to be hearsay. The Supreme Court also held that there was no law which enjoins that a complaint should necessarily be in writing. This judgment does not lay down any new rule. In Union of India v. H. C. Goel [ air 1964 SC 364 ] and Nand Kishore v. State of Bihar [ air 1978 SC 1277 ] as also Bhagat ram v. State of H. P. [ air 1983 SC 454 ] it has been held that strict rule of evidence does not apply to departmental enquiries and yet suspicion alone cannot satisfy the requirement of proof in a departmental enquiry. In State if a. P. v. Sree Rama Rao [ air 1963 SC 1723 ], State of Madras v. Srinivasan [atr 1966 SC 1827] and Nand Kishore's case (supra), the Supreme Court laid down the standard of proof required in a departmental enquiry by holding that though the proof as in a criminal trial is not to be insisted upon, there must be evidence sufficient to justify conclusion against an employee. Clearly, therefore, it is not the label attached to a particular type of evidence gathered during the departmental enquiry which should matter. Clearly, therefore, it is not the label attached to a particular type of evidence gathered during the departmental enquiry which should matter. What has to be seen is the nature of evidence and if the same is worth believing, then, it has to be realised that this rule is relating to evidence in a departmental enquiry and not before the adjudicating authority like the Deputy Registrar or the additional Registrar. They would also not be bound by the strict rule of evidence, and a finding reached by the Deputy Registrar and the Additional registrar while adjudicating a dispute under Section 55 of the Act will have to be presumed to be bonafide and correct unless shown to the contrary. The second appellate Court would not be authorised to substitute its own judgment in the matter. ( 7 ) LET us then examine whether the finding recorded by the Deputy registrar or the Additional Registrar satisfied the aforesaid legal guidelines. The case against the petitioner is based on a report lodged by the Branch agent named Mobgaonkar. Though the incident is dated 18-11-74, the report was lodged on the same day or on the next day. Shri Mohgaonkar has given his report on 9-1-1975. There is no explanation for the delay in lodging the report The Deputy Registrar not only considered the report, but tried to assertain if the same was supported by evidence of other witnesses. In this context, evidence of K. K. Maratha and A. K. Yadav was considered to hold that though there was some talk about the shortage, it is not cleat as to what actually was the shortage and how it was made up. Inspite of it, the fact remained that the shortage, if any, was made up immediately. There is no evidence to show that the petitioner paid the money from his pocket or by borrowing from some one or by going home for obtaining the money. In the absence of this evidence, it would not be proper to hold that it was the petitioner who made up the shortage. In case, the shortage was not made up by the petitioner, it would be difficult to hold that he was guilty of temporary misappropriation. In the absence of this evidence, it would not be proper to hold that it was the petitioner who made up the shortage. In case, the shortage was not made up by the petitioner, it would be difficult to hold that he was guilty of temporary misappropriation. A charge of temporary misappropriation would require to be proved by establishing that the petitioner had received the money, had not deposited the same having kept it for himself, and later on made up the shortage. None of the three facts are established from evidence on record. The Additional Registrar, who examined the material once again, placed much reliance on the documentary evidence and found that there was nothing either in the cash-book or cashier's cash summary to indicate that there was a shortage as alleged. The Additional Registrar, no doubt, found some marks having been made with red ink in the cashier's cash summary, but found nothing to show how, by whom and why those marks were made. The cash summary prepared by the petitioner was scrutinized by the Agent, but evea that note did not contain any shortage, etc. The Additional Registrar found total absence of evidence to show as to how the alleged shortage was made up by the petitioner. In the opinion of the Additional Registrar, there was total absence of evidence and, hence, it was doubtful if the incident itself had taken place. The view of the Additional Registrar cannot be said to be illegal, as a charge like temporary embezzlement or misappropriation has to be proved to the satisfaction of the authority. If the Deputy Registrar and the Additional registrar were not satisfied with the evidence and were not prepared to hold that the petitioner was guilty, it cannot be said that they had committed any illegality in the matter. There is no law which requires a quasi-judicial authority adjudicating a dispute to hold the petitioner guilty, even if from the evidence on record, they are not satisfied and not prepared to record such a finding. What has been overlooked is the fact that these authorities were not considering the correctness or otherwise of the findings recorded by the enquiry Officer, but were themselves recording their independent findings based on evidence on record. What has been overlooked is the fact that these authorities were not considering the correctness or otherwise of the findings recorded by the enquiry Officer, but were themselves recording their independent findings based on evidence on record. The proceedings before the Enquiry Officer and his findings stood vitiated because of several illegalities discovered in the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer and no value would, therefore, be attached to the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Clearly, therefore, the conclusions reached by the Deputy-Registrar and the Additional Registrar were just and proper conclusions and, hence, no fault could be found with the same. Though they were not bound by the strict rule of evidence, they were not even not bound to accept the ipse dixit of the witnesses to hold the petitioner guilty of serious charge of temporary embezzlement. The approach of the respondent-Deputy Registrar and Additional Registrar, therefore, did not give rise to any question of law enabling the respondent-Board of Revenue to exercise its second appellate jurisdiction. ( 8 ) THERE is another aspect of the matter. In case the domestic enquiry against the petitioner was vitiated as held by the Deputy Registrar and additional Registrar, the order of dismissal would stand vitiated and this, by itself, would entitle the petitioner to obtain the relief of re-instatement. The respondents-Deputy Registrar and Additional Registrar have, however, not followed this technical approach and wanted to be satisfied about the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. This was clearly within their jurisdiction. In case, the domestic enquiry is held to be vitiated and no finding against the petitioner is recorded, the petitioner would be entitled to re-instatement. Unfortunately, this aspect of the matter lost sight of the respondent-Board of Revenue. The board of Revenue has not set aside the view of the Deputy Registrar and the additional Registrar about the departmental enquiry and, hence, it may be held that the findings about the invalidity of the departmental enquiry has been concurred. If this be so, a further finding that the petitioner was guilty was necessary to deny him the relief of re-instatement. There is, however, no such finding. The Board itself was not competent to reappreciate evidence and record its own findings, unless it bad found an error of law in the finding recorded by the Deputy Registrar. If this be so, a further finding that the petitioner was guilty was necessary to deny him the relief of re-instatement. There is, however, no such finding. The Board itself was not competent to reappreciate evidence and record its own findings, unless it bad found an error of law in the finding recorded by the Deputy Registrar. So, if the order of the Board of revenue has to be given effect to, the petitioner would be entitled to reinstatement. In view of the discussion aforesaid, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the Board of Revenue is quashed and the order of the respondents-Deputy Registrar and the Additional Registrar are restored. No order as to costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed. .