ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. The facts of the case leading to the present writ petition are as under:- "One Chandra Kishore Pandey, who is respondent No. 2 in the present petition, was working on the post of clerk in the Nagar Palika, Mirzapur. He was appointed temporarily on the aforesaid post on 5th Sept., 1955, and was, subsequently confirmed on 1st April, 1956. During his period of service, somewhere in the year 1974, he was placed under suspension, and, ultimately, by an order dated 9th May, 1977, his services were terminated. He, consequently, filed an appeal against the order of termination before the Commissioner, Varanasi. The Commissioner, Varanasi, by his order dated 24th August, 1978, set aside the termination order dated 9th May, 1977, and reinstated him, but the other punishments regarding stoppage of increments etc. were maintained. After the appeal was allowed by the Commissioner, Chandra Kishore Pandey made several representations to the authorities of the Municipal Board for paying his earlier dues on the ground that his family was starving and that his matter regarding payment of his arrears may be disposed of very expeditiously. In spite of several reminders and personal approaches, when nothing was done, on 11th Jan., 1979, a letter was written by respondent No. 2 to the Administrator, Nagar Palika, Mirzapur, stating therein about the inactivity on the part of the Nagar Palika. He further stated that for the reasons stated in that letter, it might not be possible for him to work any further and, therefore, thought fit to resign with effect from 14th Jan., 1979. After this letter was written, Chandra Kishore Pandey was not paid any arrears, but, on the other hand, it is alleged by the petitioner that on 3rd Feb., 1979, the alleged resignation dated 11th Jan., 1979, was accepted by the Nagar Palika, and the services of the petitioner were terminated. 3. It is alleged by the respondent No. 2 that on 4th Feb., 1979, he had sent a telegram revoking the resignation letter dated 11th Jan., 1979, which, according to the petitioner, was received after the acceptance on 3rd Feb., 197g. Aggrieved by the order accepting the resignation on 3rd Feb., 1979, respondent No. 2 filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Varanasi. Aggrieved by the order accepting the resignation on 3rd Feb., 1979, respondent No. 2 filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Varanasi. The Commissioner, Varanasi, by his order dated 2nd Oct., 1983, allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Administrator, Nagar Palika, accepting the resignation of the petitioner, which is alleged to have been given by him on 11th Jan., 1979. This order dated 2nd Oct., 1983, has now been impugned in the present petition. 4. I have heard Sri S. C. Budhwari, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri D. S. P. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, Chandra Kishore Pandey. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before me. His first contention is that no appeal lay to the Commissioner against the order dated 3rd Feb., 1979, by which the resignation of the petitioner was accepted. The second submission of the learned counsel is that the view taken by the Commissioner, that the resignation has been accepted by the Administrator unconditionally, is a finding manifestly erroneous, as the resignation was not conditional at all. 6. In support of the first submission, the learned counsel has relied upon the U. P. Municipal Servants Appeals Rules, 1967. These Rules have been published in the U. P. Gazette dated 1st July, 1967. Rule 3 of these rules is as under:- "3. Appeals.- Subject to the propositions of the Act, appeal against an order of punishment shall lie- (i) to the President in a case in which the order of punishment is passed by a punishing authority other than the President under S. 76, (ii) to the Commissioner of the Division in a case in which the order of punishment is passed by the punishing authority under S. 74, or of the President under S. 76." 7. It is not disputed that the present case comes under sub-cl. (ii) of R. 3-Learned counsel has argued that an order accepting a resignation is not an order of punishment and, as such, no appeal lay to the Commissioner. 8. An order of punishment has been defined under R. 2 (iv) as under:- "2 (iv). It is not disputed that the present case comes under sub-cl. (ii) of R. 3-Learned counsel has argued that an order accepting a resignation is not an order of punishment and, as such, no appeal lay to the Commissioner. 8. An order of punishment has been defined under R. 2 (iv) as under:- "2 (iv). "Order of punishment" means, an order of resolution passed by the competent authority which has the effect of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a servant or of imposing on him any other penalty specified in R. 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Boards Servants (Inquiry, Punishment and Termination of Service) Rules, published under Notification No. 1619-F/X-A-14-53, dated April 8, 1960." 9. It is clear from the definition of the order of punishment that an order or resolution passed by the competent authority, which has the effect of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a servant, is to be treated as an order of punishment under the Rules. In terms, the order may not state that it is dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. But if the effect of that order is either dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, it would come under the definition of an order of punishment under the Rules. 10. In the instant case, the resignation was given by respondent No. 2 on llth Jan., 1979. It is alleged by the respondent that on 4th Feb., 1979, he had revoked the resignation. It has been further alleged that it was a conditional designation. These were all disputed questions. The ultimate effect of accepting the resignation amounted to removal of the respondent No. 2 from the services of the Nagar Palika. in the circumstances, in my opinion, it would clearly be an order of punishment. Since the order, in my opinion, is an order of punishment within the meaning of R. 2 (iv) of the Rules, it cannot be said that no appeal lay under R. 3 to the Commissioner. The first submission, therefore, made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, is not well founded. 11. In regard to the second submission, the alleged resignation letter dated 11th Jan., 1979, has been attached as Annexure I to the petition, in the letter, the respondent No. 2 has, in the beginning, stated the details of the representations made by him for payment of his arrears of salary. 11. In regard to the second submission, the alleged resignation letter dated 11th Jan., 1979, has been attached as Annexure I to the petition, in the letter, the respondent No. 2 has, in the beginning, stated the details of the representations made by him for payment of his arrears of salary. He, therefore, stated that he has made oral requests a number of times. He further stated that it appears that some subordinate officials are aggrieved by his request for payment of his arrears or that there is some secret motive behind the non-payment. If that be so, he is not prepared to work further in the Corporation and, consequently his resignation may be accepted with effect from 14th Jan., 1979. It has not been disputed that his resignation was not accepted on 14th Jan., 1979, but was accepted on 3rd Feb., 1979. The Commissioner in the impugned order has given detailed reasons as to in what circumstances, the respondent No. 2 was forced to give this letter dated 11th Jan., 1979, and the difficulties which he was facing. It is clear from the letter dated 11th Jan., 1979, that it was not an unconditional resignation. It was clearly stated that in case the subordinate officials were aggrieved or there was some secret motive behind the nonpayment then he was not prepared to work in the Nagar Palika. The Nagar Palika did not reply to this submission made by the respondent No. 2 and instead accepted the resignation unconditionally. It cannot, therefore, be said that the view taken by the Commissioner was, in any manner, manifestly erroneous. 12. In the result, I do not find any force in the second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In view of the above, the petition is dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.