JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner, a dismissed Lower Division Clerk of the respondent No. 1, feels aggrieved by the order of respondent-Industrial Court dated 10-11-1981 (Annexure-L) and seeks a writ of certiorari for quashing the same by filing this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 2. ) THE petitioner was employed as a Lower Division Clerk in Jabalpur Depot No. 1 of the respondent-Corporation and was transferred to Mandsaur by an order dated 14-7-1975 passed by the General Manager. In pursuance to the aforesaid, the petitioner joined his duties at Mandsaur on 29-12-1975. After joining the duties, he proceeded on leave with effect from 30-12-1975 by submitting an application and praying for leave for four days. During the period of this leave, he left Mandsaur and went to Jabalpur where he was said to have continued his long sickness. He continued sending his leave applications praying for leave on medical ground, but no orders were passed on those applications. As a result of it, he remained absent upto 21-9-1976. On 22-9-1976, he reported for duty along with a medical certificate and joined the same on 26-9-1976. The petitioner worked at Mandsaur upto 29-9-1976 and on 30-9-1976, handed over an application for one day leave. Thereafter, he again remained absent and sent his leave application complaining that he was sick and unable to perform his duties. This continued upto 21-11-1976, when he is said to have reported for duty, but was not permitted to join. It appears that during this period, a chargesheet dated 4-5-1976 had been served on him alleging he was absenting from duties without any reasonable cause which amounted to misconduct. Though the charge sheet was received, no reply to the said charge-sheet was filed. The chargesheet was issued by the Divisional Manager, who also appointed one Shri S. C. Mishra to hold the enquiry into the allegations. The petitioner remained absent during the enquiry in spite of notice and was proceeded in his absence. The Enquiry Officer recorded a finding against the petitioner. Thereafter, a show cause notice proposing the punishment of dismissal, was served on the petitioner and his representation received. The petitioner was also given a personal hearing. Ultimately, the Divisional Manager held that the misconduct against the petitioner was fully proved and, consequently, his services were terminated by order dated 4-9-1978 (Ann. l ). Thereafter, a show cause notice proposing the punishment of dismissal, was served on the petitioner and his representation received. The petitioner was also given a personal hearing. Ultimately, the Divisional Manager held that the misconduct against the petitioner was fully proved and, consequently, his services were terminated by order dated 4-9-1978 (Ann. l ). The petitioner, thereafter, filed an application before the Labour Court, bhopal, purporting to be under section 31 read with section 62 of M. P. Industrial relations Act, 1960, praying for his re-instatement and back wages. It appears that the labour Court, by its order dated 17-7-1980 (Annexure-K) held that the domestic enquiry conducted against the petitioner was not in accordance with law, and, therefore, proceeded to examine merits of the case. It also appears that during the proceedings before the Labour Court, the respondent-Management remained ex parte and did not adduce any oral or documentary evidence. The respondent-Labour Court, however, examined the evidence placed by the petitioner on record and held that the illness alleged to have been suffered by the petitioner, was not of a type which could not have been treated at Mandsaur and required leaving his head-quarter. Though a clear finding was not recorded, a reading of the order of the Labour Court makes this Court feel that it was of the opinion that the sickness of the petitioner was not proved. However, taking into consideration the long 20 years of service, the Labour Court directed the petitioners re-instatement without back wages. Both the parties felt aggrieved by the order of the Labour Court and filed their separate revisions. Both revisions were heard and disposed of by the impugned order. The revision filed by the respondent-Corporation was allowed; whereas that of the petitioner was dismissed, after taking the view that the Labour Court having found that the petitioner was absent in an authorised manner, could not have interfered with the punishment. According to the Industrial Court, the order of the Labour Court was without jurisdiction. ( 3. ) IT appears that the petitioner preferred a writ petition against the aforesaid order of the respondent-Industrial Court which was the subject-matter of Miscellaneous petition No. 1383 of 1981. The Division Bench hearing the said writ petition on 8-12-1982, was not inclined to admit the same and issue notice to the respondents. ( 3. ) IT appears that the petitioner preferred a writ petition against the aforesaid order of the respondent-Industrial Court which was the subject-matter of Miscellaneous petition No. 1383 of 1981. The Division Bench hearing the said writ petition on 8-12-1982, was not inclined to admit the same and issue notice to the respondents. It appears that one of the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench, had written the order dismissing the petition. However, the other learned Judge did not sign the said order. In the meantime, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner prayed for permission to withdraw the petition and the permission was granted. Thereafter, the present petition has been filed on the same cause of action and claiming the same relief. ( 4. ) THE first and important question is whether the petitioner having withdrawn his first petition, could maintain the present petition on the same cause of action ? The submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is not that the earlier order operates as res judicata but is that such a course should not be encouraged by this Court, as it has the tendency of undermining the established procedure. It is not necessary to examine this matter in any detail, as, admittedly, the earlier order does not operate as res judicata. Indeed, there is no order on merits. Then, the Division Bench which admitted the present petition, would be deemed to have noticed the earlier order, as it was mentioned in the present writ petition and a copy of the order filed as Annexure-M. Clearly, therefore, this is a case where one of the learned Judges constituting the division Bench and hearing the petitioners earlier writ petition, was not inclined to admit the same whereas, the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench, subsequently admitted the petition without any hesitation. These differences are natural and should not be exaggerated. As long as the earlier judgment does not operate as res judicata, the earlier order permitting the petitioner to withdraw the petition, should not cause any prejudice to him. ( 5. ) SERIOUS arguments were addressed about the legality of the order of punishment passed by the Divisional Manager. These differences are natural and should not be exaggerated. As long as the earlier judgment does not operate as res judicata, the earlier order permitting the petitioner to withdraw the petition, should not cause any prejudice to him. ( 5. ) SERIOUS arguments were addressed about the legality of the order of punishment passed by the Divisional Manager. It was submitted that the petitioner was employed by the General Manager of the erstwhile Central Provinces Transport services which was a departmental undertaking of the M. P. State Government and his services were transferred to the present Corporation without prejudice to his conditions of service. It is not disputed that as a Government servant, the petitioner was entitled to the benefits of Article 311 of the Constitution and, hence, his services could not be terminated by an authority inferior in rank than the appointing authority. In Ram Gopal sharma v. M. P. S. R. T. C. Bhopal ( 1978 MPLJ 858 ), a Division Bench of this Court has considered the matter in detail and has held that the protection continues to be available to an employee of the respondent-corporation. It is, therefore, submitted that the order of dismissal passed by the Divisional Manager, who is admittedly an authority inferior in rank than the General Manager, was illegal. Even if this argument is accepted, the petitioner is not entitled to re-instatement and back wages, as the only effect of this would be to render the order of dismissal illegal and leave the entire matter to be decided by the respondent-Labour Court. It cannot be disputed that in industrial matters, an employee is not entitled to re-instatement only by showing that his dismissal was illegal. The industrial jurisprudence developed in this country by various decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court, aims at finally deciding the matter once for all in the wider interest of industrial peace and social justice. Once an order of dismissal is found to be defective for any reason whatsoever, the Labour Court gets jurisdiction to examine the materaial on record and arrive at its own independent conclusions on allegations made against a workman. On such an enquiry, if a Labour Court finds the employee guilty of either the charges levelled against him or of some other charge connected with it, it gets jurisdiction to inflict proper penalty on the delinquent employee. On such an enquiry, if a Labour Court finds the employee guilty of either the charges levelled against him or of some other charge connected with it, it gets jurisdiction to inflict proper penalty on the delinquent employee. The position remains the same even if the order of dismissal is found to have been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to pass such an order (see R. K. Nair v. G. M. Bhilai Steel Plant (1977 MPLJ 497 ). In the instant case, the Labour Court had acquired this jurisdiction by holding that the domestic enquiry preceding the order of dismissed was not legal and proper. The argument would, therefore, provide only an additional ground for giving jurisdiction to the Labour Court to examine the material on record. Under the circumstances, no benefit can be given to the petitioner even if it was to be held that the order of dismissal was not passed by the authority competent to pass the same. ( 6. ) THE main and the important question for consideration in the present petition is : whether the Labour Court in a case like the present one, had the jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment ? According to the respondent-Industrial Court, the labour Court had no such jurisdiction. It has relied upon the decision of the Supreme court in Workmen of F. T. and R. Co. v. The Management ( AIR 1973 SC 1227 ). In this case, the Supreme Court was considering the effect AIR 1966 SC. 1827 and Nand kishores case (supra ). The Supreme Court laid down the standard of proof required in a departmental enquiry - by holding that though the proof as in a criminal trial is not to be insisted upon, there must be evidtitute its-own judgment in the matter, sunder:- " (9 ). Once the misconduct is proved either in the enquiry conducted by an employer or by the evidence placed before a Tribunal for the first time, punishment imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is so harsh as to suggest victimisation. " This proposition seems to have been relied upon by the Industrial Court for arriving at the conclusion that the respondent-Labour Court had no jurisdiction. " This proposition seems to have been relied upon by the Industrial Court for arriving at the conclusion that the respondent-Labour Court had no jurisdiction. The Industrial court has not discussed the ambit and scope of this principle and has not even considered whether the misconduct alleged against the petitioner was proved during the departmental enquiry. This principle would clearly be applicable in those cases where the employee is found guilty of the charges levelled against him, as in such a case, the final conclusion of the Management would be correct in spite of the illegality in the domestic enquiry. In spite of it, it may be stated that none of the cases discussed by the supreme Court in the judgment in earlier paragraphs, support this proposition in so far as it takes away jurisdiction of the Tribunal to impose a punishment different than the one reached by the Management. Indeed, some of the cases discussed by the Supreme court point to the contrary. In Punjab National Bank v. AIR N. B. E. Federation ( AIR 1960 SC 160 ), the passage quoted in para 18 of the Supreme Court judgment itself indicates that the Tribunal once it gets jurisdiction to consider merits of the charges, has to decide for itself not only whether the misconduct alleged is proved, but also what would be proper order to make in case the misconduct alleged is proved. To the same effect is the passage quoted in para 20 of judgment from its earlier decision in management of Ritz Theatre (Pr.) Ltd. v. Its Workmen ( AIR 1963 SC 295 . Be that as it may, the aforesaid principle having been clearly stated by the Supreme Court, is binding upon this Court and, hence, this Court is under a legal obligation to give effect to the same. There is, however, no justification in extending the ambit and scope of this principle, particularly when the entire law on the subject remains changed by subsequent legislation. In the instant case, the petitioner was charged for remaining absent without leave and without reasonable cause. The Labour Court, of course, found that he remained absent without leave, but there is no finding that his absence was without any reasonable cause. Indeed, a perusal of the Labour Court judgment makes it clear that he was found suffering from high blood pressure and gastric trouble. The Labour Court, of course, found that he remained absent without leave, but there is no finding that his absence was without any reasonable cause. Indeed, a perusal of the Labour Court judgment makes it clear that he was found suffering from high blood pressure and gastric trouble. Clearly, therefore, he was found to be absent because of his illness. In the opinion of the Labour court, the illness was not of such a type which could not have been treated at Mandsaur. This, however, is not sufficient to hold that there was no reasonable cause for his absence. Illness and particularly the high blood pressure, requires the patient to take complete rest. Since the petitioner was suffering from high bood pressure, it cannot be said that his absence was without any reasonable cause. Clearly, therefore, it was not a case where the misconduct as alleged, was found proved. It was a case where only a part of the charge was proved and, hence, in such cases, the question of upholding the order of punishment passed by the Management, would not arise. Clearly, therefore, the above quoted principle enunciated in Workmen of F. T and R. Co. s case (supra) has no application in the instant case. The Industrial Court, unfortunately, did not consider this aspect of the matter and applied the aforesaid principle without considering the facts and circumstances of the case. The decision of the Industrial Court is, therefore, patently illegal. In Hasib Khan vs. State Industrial Court (MP No. 219 of 1972, decided on 27th Sept. 1977=1979 (1) M. P. W. N. No. 1.), this Court had the occasion to deal with those circumstances where the Labour Court may be justified in interfering with the punishment. Even in M of K. C. of W. C. v. Presi. Officer Jabalpur (1979 MPLJ 722), this court reduced the punishment and substituted the same by a lesser punishment, as it felt that the punishment inflicted was harsh. These decisions point to the law that the labour Court can, under certain circumstances, interfere with the punishment. The law having been laid down too broadly by the Industrial Court and applied without considering the facts and circumstances of the case, its decision cannot be sustained. ( 7. ) IN view of the discussion aforesaid, the petition partly succeeds. These decisions point to the law that the labour Court can, under certain circumstances, interfere with the punishment. The law having been laid down too broadly by the Industrial Court and applied without considering the facts and circumstances of the case, its decision cannot be sustained. ( 7. ) IN view of the discussion aforesaid, the petition partly succeeds. The impugned order of the State Industrial Court, in so far as it sets aside the order of the Labour Court re-instating the petitioner without back wages, is set aside. The petitioner is held entitled to be re-instated without back wages. No order as to costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition partly allowed.