Judgment :- Gokulakrishnan, J.: Defendants 2 and 3 are the appellants and the plaintiff is the Cross Objector. The suit is for a declaration that the plaint schedule mentioned house bearing Door No.28, Venkararaman Street, Srinivasa Avenue, Madras-28, belongs to the plaintiff absolutely and for directing defendants 2 and 3 to deliver vacant possession of the said house to the plaintiff. The plaintiff further prays for directing defendants 2 and 3 to pay to the plaintiff a sum of Rs.3,600/- being the arrears of rent from June, 1980 to December, 1980 and Rs.2,000/- per month thereafter for use and occupation till they deliver vacant possession to the plaintiff. 2. It is the case of the plaintiff that the second defendant is the wife of the third defendant and that defendants 2 and 3 are residing in the suit house on the strength of the lease deed entered into by the second defendant with the mother of the plaintiff. When the plaintiff was a minor, the suit property was purchased by means of a sale deed dated 6-4-1963. Defendants 2 and 3 were inducted as tenants in the suit property by the mother of the plaintiff. While the plaintiff was at the age of 14, the second defendant entered into an agreement of lease with one W.J.Fernando on 14-5-1976. The said lease agreement states that W.J.Fernando is representing the plaintiff as lessor. It is the further case of the plaintiff that in that lease agreement . it has been falsely mentioned that the plaintiff is the wife of the said Fernando. In and by the lease agreement dated 14-5-1976, the ground floor portion of the building was leased out to the second defendant. Subsequently, the defendant entered into a lease deed with the mother of the plaintiff for eleven months under which the second defendant has taken on lease the entire premises on a monthly rent of Rs.600/-. The plaintiff averred in the plaint that she is not bound by the two agreements referred to above, that defendants 2 and 3 are not entitled to continue as tenants and that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 do not apply to the premises in question. The plaintiff averred in the plaint that she is not bound by the two agreements referred to above, that defendants 2 and 3 are not entitled to continue as tenants and that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 do not apply to the premises in question. Surprisingly, the third defendant sent a letter dated 6-9-1980 to the plaintiff stating that defendants 2 and 3 would not pay any rent to the plaintiff since the first defendant had purchased the suit property. It is further averred in the plaint that the plaintiff is not a party to any of the transactions of the first defendant with reference to the house. The plaintiff questioned the purchaser. The purchase was also questioned by the second defendant by an application under Order 21, rule 58, Civil Procedure Code, wherein the second defendant has alleged that the property belongs to the plaintiff and that her mother M.R.Geetha and her late father M.R.Radha have no interest in the suit property. It is stated in the plaint that the plaintiff is not bound by the decree obtained by the first defendant and the sale effected through execution proceedings in favour of the defendants will not bind the plaintiff in the suit. It is further averred in the plaint that the second defendant has entered . into an agreement dated 15-5-1976 with the mother of the plaintiff for the purchase of the suit property and that such an agreement of sale will not in any way bind the plaintiff. On 11-12-1980, the plaintiff issued a notice to the defendants mentioning the abovesaid facts and calling upon the second defendant to deliver vacant possession of the suit premises. To this notice, the defendants have not sent any reply. According to the plaintiff, she was a spinster, that she never married Fernando, that the alleged agreement entered into by the second defendant with the said Fernando is not binding on her, that the mother of the plaintiff had no right to enter into an agreement of sale on 15-5-1976 as well as the lease agreement in December, 1976 and that the plaintiff is entitled to ignore these two agreements. The plaintiff has also averred in the plaint that the sale in favour of the first defendant is not at all binding upon her and as such, the declaration prayed for and the possession asked for must be granted by the court. With the above-said allegations, the plaintiff has come forward with the present suit. 3. Inasmuch as the dispute between the first defendant and the plaintiff has been settled as on date, it is unnecessary to refer to the written statement filed by the first defendant. 4. Defendants 2 and 3 have filed a common written statement inter alia contending that the third defendant is not a necessary party, that the plaintiff has to strictly prove her parentage and her date of birth, that M.R.Geetha the mother of the plaintiff, is not the legally wedded wife of M.R.Radha, that the plaintiff got married to her maternal uncle Navarthna Fernando on 12-9-1975 in Ceylon and that the same is clear from the deed of agreement for sale executed on 15-5-1976 in favour of the second defendant herein. It is further alleged by defendants 2 and 3 that in pursuance of the sale agreement executed on 15-5-1976 in favour of the second defendant herein, the second defendant was given possession of the suit property in the month of May, 1976 after the vendors had vacated the suit property, that such possession was handed over in pursuance of the agreement of sale, that the second defendant has made improvements to the value of Rs.12,000/- to the suit property, that while handing over possession of the entire suit property the plaintiff husband Navarathna Fernando and her mother received a sum of Rs.8,200/-, that the second defendant has paid the property tax and water tax amounting to Rs.5,802-70 and that all these amounts have to be taken into consideration in favour of the second defendant. Defendants 2 and 3 categorically denied that the monthly rent is Rs.600/-. According to them, the second defendant was paying Rs.300/- per month as per the arrangement entered into for such payment till the completion of the sale and not Rs.600/- It is reiterated by defendants 2 and 3 that the lease agreement dated 14-5-1976 was superseded by the agreement of sale dated 15-5-1976 and that no rents were paid by defendants 2 and 3 as if they were tenants. According to them, the agreement of sale dated 15-5-1976 is binding on the plaintiff and that she is bound to execute the sale deed in favour of the second defendant in respect of the suit property on obtaining the income-tax clearance certificate for the suit property. The second defendant is always ready and willing to pay the balance of consideration of Rs.72,000/- and that she is ready to purchase the suit property as she has already paid aft advance of Rs.3,000/-out . of the sale consideration of Rs.75,000/- and that she is always ready to pay the balance of the sale consideration and to obtain the sale deed executed by the plaintiff in favour of the second defendant. The second defendant has also given the details for the payment of Rs.5,802-60 towards various tax dues payable by the plaintiff. Defendants 2 and 3, after alleging that the agreement of sale executed by the plaintiff’s husband and her mother should be specifically enforced, contended that they are demanding the same as a counter-claim in the suit filed by the plaintiff. The counter claim was valued at Rs.75,000/- and a court fee of Rs. 3,800/- was paid for the same. In the counter claim mentioned in the written statement itself, the second defendant prayed for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 15-5-1976 in respect of the suit property and wanted a direction to the plaintiff from the court to execute a deed of sale in favour of the second defendant in respect of the suit property and in default requested the Court itself to execute the sale deed in favour of the second defendant. For all these reasons, defendants 2 and 3 contended, that the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for delivery of the vacant possession of the suit property nor the arrears of rent and mesne profits and that the suit has to be dismissed by decreeing the counter claim made by defendants 2 and 3. 5. On these pleadings, the learned single Judge of the Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the agreement for sale dated 15-5-1976 in favour of the second defendant is true, vaild and binding on the plaintiff? 2. Whether the second defendant has been ready and willing to perform her part of the contract? 3. Whether the second defendant is entitled to specific performance of the above agreement for sale? 4. Whether the agreement for sale dated 15-5-1976 in favour of the second defendant is true, vaild and binding on the plaintiff? 2. Whether the second defendant has been ready and willing to perform her part of the contract? 3. Whether the second defendant is entitled to specific performance of the above agreement for sale? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to vacant possession? 5. Whether the third defendant is a necessary party to this action? 6. To what relief are the parties entitled? 7. After elaborately discussing the evidence on record, the learned Judge found that the suit property belonged to the plaintiff absolutely, that defendants 2 ‘and 3 should deliver vacant possession of the same to the plaintiff, that the second defendant has to pay a sum of Rs.3,600/- to the plaintiff towards the arrears of rent from July, 1980 to December, 1980 at Rs.600/- per month, that defendants 2 and 3 should pay damages for use and occupation at Rs.1,000/- per mensem from 1-1-1981 till delivery of possession and that the plaintiff has to pay defendants 2 and 3 a sum of Rs.20,802-80 as compensation as a condition precedent to taking delivery of possession. In the result, the learned Judge decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff but dismissed the counter of the second defendant for specific performance. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned Judge of this court, defendants 2 and 3 have preferred the above appeal while the plaintiff has preferred the cross objections questioning the finding of the learned Judge directing the plaintiff to pay defendants 2 and 3 a sum of Rs.20,802-80 as compensation as a condition precedent for taking delivery of possession. 8. Mr.A.Shanmughavel, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the sale agreement Exhibit D-21 is valid and binding on the plaintiff, that there was a demand for payment of income-tax arrears as exhibited by Exhibits D-A to D-20 against the plaintiff and that the agreement to sell effected is for legal necessity and as such, binding upon the plaintiff. It is then submitted by Mr.A.Shanmughavel, that as part . performance of Exhibit D-21, the appellants were put into possession of the suit property and that there is no time limit fixed for enforcing Exhibit D-21 agreement. It is then submitted by Mr.A.Shanmughavel, that as part . performance of Exhibit D-21, the appellants were put into possession of the suit property and that there is no time limit fixed for enforcing Exhibit D-21 agreement. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants, who were put into possession of the suit property in pursuance of Exhibit D-21, had spent large amounts in improving the suit property, and in paying the water tax and property tax and other connected charges. Hence, it is submitted by Mr.A.Shanmughavel, that the appellants’ possession has to be protected under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. He then contended that even apart from the nature of possession, which entitles the appellants to purchase the property by virtue of Exhibit D-21, the possession of the appellants cannot be disturbed in a Civil Court since the rent payable is only Rs.300/- and not Rs.600/- as claimed. It is further submitted by Mr.A.Shanmughavel, that the agreement Exhibit D-21 is only voidable and not void, that the natural guardian of the plaintiff is her mother M.R.Geetha since the plaintiff is the illegitimate child of M.R.Radha, that Exhibit D-21 has been validly executed by M.R.Geetha representing the plaintiff and that the agreement was effected in order to discharge the income-tax arrears. As regards the counter-claim for specific performance of the agreement Exhibit D-21, Mr.A.Shanmughavel submitted that the same is within time since it has been filed within three years from the date of repudiation by the plaintiff under Exhibit P-5 notice. Finally, he submitted that the claim for damages decreed in favour of the plaintiff is without any evidence. 9. Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the suit property belongs to the plaintiff, that she has repudicated Exhibit D-21 agreement by issue of Exhibit P-5 notice, that the person who represented the plaintiff in Exhibit D-21, is not a natural guardian and that under section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the de facto guardian cannot dispose of or deal with the property. He further submitted that there is a clear finding by the learned Judge that there is no proof of marriage between Fernando and the plaintiff and that finding cannot be assailed in this appellate court. He further submitted that there is a clear finding by the learned Judge that there is no proof of marriage between Fernando and the plaintiff and that finding cannot be assailed in this appellate court. In any event, Mr.Soma-yajulu states that Exhibit D-21 the agreement is a void document since the plaintiff is not represented either by natural or legal guardian. In respect of the argument of Mr.A.Shanmughavel with regard to section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, Mr.Somayajulu submitted that there is no valid agreement to sell the suit property, that Exhibits D-2 to D-6 will spell out that the appellants continue in the suit property only as tenants and that Exhibit A-21 does not spell out that the appellants are put into possession of the suit property. Hence, according to Mr.Somayajulu, the appellants cannot invoke Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. As regards the necessity to sell the suit property he submitted, that the assessment order issued under Exhibit D-14 relates only to M.R.Geetha in her individual capacity, that the suit property under Exhibit P-2 was purchased only for Rs.35,000/- and that the assessment is for Rs.75,000/-. 10. Mr.Somayajulu, learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that Fernando is an inter-meddler, that the marriage of the plaintiff with Fernando has not been proved and that Fernando cannot represent the plaintiff in view of section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. According to the learned counsel, Exhibit D-21 is an inchoate and incomplete agreement, that it will not give the intending purchaser any right for specific performance, that it is a contingenet agreement and that the contingency being, the permission of the Court should be obtained for selling the minor’s property. In any event, the learned counsel submits that the counter-claim is barred by limitation in view of Article 54 of the Limitation Act. In respect of the improvements made by the appellants, for which a decree has been granted, the learned counsel for the plaintiff contends, that the appellants are not entitled for such improvements made. The learned counsel further submits that the rent for the suit property is Rs.600/- per month and as such, the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 would not apply to this case. The learned counsel further submits that the rent for the suit property is Rs.600/- per month and as such, the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 would not apply to this case. In respect of the memorandum of cross-objections filed by the plaintiff, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the damages awarded at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per month by the learned Judge is palpably low and that the learned Judge ought to have fixed it at Rs.2,000/- per month. In the memorandum of cross-objections, the plaintiff questions the cost awarded for the additions made by the appellants. 11. On these contentions, the points that arise for determination in the appeal and the memorandum of cross-objections are: 1. Whether the agreement Exhibit D-21 is binding upon the first respondent/ plaintiff? 2. Whether the first appellant/second defendant is entitled to specifically enforce the agreement Exhibit D-21? 3. Whether the first appellant/second defendant is entitled to get the benefit under section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act? 4. Whether the suit property is attracted by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act? 5. Is the counter-claim filed by the first appellant/second defendant for specific performance barred by limitation? 6. Whether the first respondent/plaintiff is entitled to enhanced compensation for use and occupation? 7. Whether the appellants/defendants 2 and 3 are entitled to enhanced compensation for improvements made and expenses incurred. 12. Point Nos.1 to 3: Exhibit D-21 is the agreement of sale on the strength of which the counter-claim for specific performance has been made by the second defendant. Exhibit D-21 was executed by the plaintiff represented by her husband Navarthna Fernando as her guardian and M.R.Geetha, wife of M.R.Radha. This is in favour of the second defendant. Exhibit D-21 is dated 15-5-1976 and is in respect of the suit property. The suit property was purchased as early as 6-4-1963 from one S.Jayaraman and the same is in favour of the plaintiff describing her as Radhika aged about one year, daughter of M.R.Geetha Fernando. In that sale deed, Geetha Fernando has acted as the guardian of the plaintiff. The property was purchased for a sum of Rs,35,000/-. In Exhibit D-21 it has been specifically averred that the plaintiff married Navarathna Fernando on 12-9-1975 and from that date onwards, the said Navarathna Fernando has become the guardian of the plaintiff. In that sale deed, Geetha Fernando has acted as the guardian of the plaintiff. The property was purchased for a sum of Rs,35,000/-. In Exhibit D-21 it has been specifically averred that the plaintiff married Navarathna Fernando on 12-9-1975 and from that date onwards, the said Navarathna Fernando has become the guardian of the plaintiff. The necessity for executing Exhibit D-21 was stated to be that the suit property was attached for payment of income-tax amounting to Rs.50,686-50. It is further stated in Exhibit D-21 that the first vendor therein is a minor and that the vendors will take steps to move the proper court and obtain sanction for the sale. It is then averred in Exhibit D-21 that out of the sale price, the purchaser will pay the income-tax dues so far as the property is concerned and other binding debts. Thus, it is clear from Exhibit D-21, that the plaintiff was represented by Navarathna Fernando, describing himself as the husband of the plaintiff and obtaining the sanction of the proper court for selling the minor’s property was made as a condition precedent in Exhibit D-21. The necessity for selling the suit property is stated to be the attachment of the same for the income-tax arrears. 13. In Exhibit D-14, the assessment order relating to M.R.Geetha, the Income-tax authorities estimated her total income at Rs.75,000/-. The order states that in respect of the purchase of the house property bearing Door No.28 Venk3traman street, Srinivasa Avenue, Madras-28, the income for purchasing the said house was taken to be that of M.R.Geetha and she was assessed for the assessment year 1964-65. This assessment order makes it very clear that the assessment is for the Income of M.R.Geetha and not that of the plaintiff. As per Exhibit D-10, the Income-tax authorities attached the suit property for the arrears of tax payable by M.R.Geetha. Even from Exhibit D-10 it is clear that the tax is due only by M.R.Geetha and not by the plaintiff. No doubt, the suit property was attached by the Income-tax Department. Mr.Shanmu-ghavel, learned counsel for the appellants, strenuously contended that it is the plaintiff who has to pay the income-tax for which the attachment was effected and as such, there was necessity for Exhibit D-21 agreement. In the connection, he points to sections 161 and 166 of the Income-tax Act. No doubt, the suit property was attached by the Income-tax Department. Mr.Shanmu-ghavel, learned counsel for the appellants, strenuously contended that it is the plaintiff who has to pay the income-tax for which the attachment was effected and as such, there was necessity for Exhibit D-21 agreement. In the connection, he points to sections 161 and 166 of the Income-tax Act. Section 160 of the Income-tax Act defines as to who is the representative assessee. Section 161 of the Act states that in cases of assessment as a representative assessee, it shall be assessed in his own name. Section 166 of the Act deals with direct assessment and recovery upon a person on whose behalf or for whose benefit the income therein referred to is receivable. This section says that there is no bar for such direct assessment and recovery. Reading these three sections, it is clear that the income alleged must be referable to the income of the minor. In this light, we can consider the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. 14. In Narasa Reddy v. Income-tax Officer, Nellore, (1960)2 An.W.R.20= 39 I.T.R.629= A.I.R.1960 Andhra Pradesh 614, a Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court had occasion to consider as to whether sections 40 and 16(3)(a)(ii) of the Income-tax Act can co-exist. In that decision, the Bench after holding that it can co-exist and there is no discrimination as such offending Article 14 of the Constitution, found that where the income is received by the guardian on behalf of the beneficiary, the guardian is made liable. This decision, in our view, has nothing to do with the case on hand. 15. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Ahmedabad v. D.J. Vaidya, A.I.R. 1959 Bombay 298, a Bench of the Bombay High Court held that section 41 of the Income-tax Act is mandatory in its language and that the basic idea underlying section 41 is that the liability of the trustees should be co-extensive with that of the beneficiaries and in no sense a wider or a larger liability. Even this decision, according to our view, has no application to the facts of the present case. The mere attachment of the property belonging to the plaintiff without any relation to the tax liability of the plaintiff cannot, in our opinion, create a legal necessity for selling the plaintiff’s property. Even this decision, according to our view, has no application to the facts of the present case. The mere attachment of the property belonging to the plaintiff without any relation to the tax liability of the plaintiff cannot, in our opinion, create a legal necessity for selling the plaintiff’s property. If there is any wrong attachment for the tax due by M.R.Geetha, the mere facts that M.R.Geetha is . the guardian of the plaintiff, cannot in any way, affect the right of the plaintiff in the suit property and an illegal attachment cannot take away the right of the plaintiff in the suit property. As we have seen from the assessment order narrated above, the liability is that of M.R.Geetha and she has been individually assessed for her income of Rs.75,000/-. The assessment order do not spell out that M.R.Geetha was assessed in respect of the income derived by the plaintiff. If that be so, it is futile to argue that there was legal necessity for selling the suit property. 16. To fortify the contention that for legal necessity a guardian can alienate the property of a minor, Mr.A.Shanmughavel, learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the agreement to sell, i.e. Exhibit D-21, was in effect executed by M.R.Geetha, mother of the plaintiff, and as such, the document is only voidable and cannot be void. For all these propositions, the learned counsel cited the following decisions, SRIKAKULAM SUBRAHMANYAM v. KURRA SUBBA RAO, (1948)2 M.L.J.22= 75 I.A.115= I.L.R. (1949) Mad.141= 61 L.W.441= A.I.R. 1948 Privy Council 95; MINOR RAMALINGAM REDDY v. BABANAMBAL AMMAL, (1950)2 M.L.J.597= A.I.R.1951 Madras 431; VADAKATTU SURYA-PRAKASAM v. AKE GANGARAJU, (1955) An.W. R.818 A.I.R.1956 Andhra Pradesh 33, (Full Bench); POPAT NAMDEO SODANVOR v. JAGU PANDU GOVEKAR, A.I.R.1969 Bombay 140; LINGA REDDY v. RAMACHANDERAPPA, A.I.R.1971 Mysore 194; E.VENKATAKRISHNA REDDY v. MINOR AMARABABU, (1971)2 M.L. J.466; MRS.CHANDNEE WIDHYA VATI MADDEN v. Dr. C.L.KATIAL, (1964)2 S.C.J.824= (1964)2 S.C.R.495= A.I.R.1964 S.C.978; NATHULAL v. PHOOLCHAND, (1971)2 S.C.J. 51= (1970)2 S.C.R.854= A.I.R.1970 S.C.546; MANIK CHAND v. RAMACHANDRA, (1980)4 S.C.C.22= (1980)2 S.C.R.1104= A.I.R.1981 S.C.519 and BISWANATH CHARIT v. DAMODAR PATRA, A.I.R.1982 Calcutta 199. We do not think it is necessary to deal with all these decisions since the learned counsel for the appellants must as the first proposition prove that Exhibit D-21" was executed by M.R.Geetha as guardian of the plaintiff and that it is for legal necessity. We do not think it is necessary to deal with all these decisions since the learned counsel for the appellants must as the first proposition prove that Exhibit D-21" was executed by M.R.Geetha as guardian of the plaintiff and that it is for legal necessity. In paragraphs supra we have stated that the attachment by the Income-tax Department cannot bind the property of the plaintiff inasmuch as the said attachment is in respect of the tax due from M.R.Geetha individually. Exhibit P-2 sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff as early as on 6-4-1963 is for a sum of Rs.35,000/- but M.R.Geetha was assessed for a sum of Rs.75,000/-as her income. These facts clearly establish that the income in the hands of M.R.Geetha was sought to be assessed and not the income of the plaintiff. Exhibit. D-21 clearly states that the plaintiff was represented by Navarathna Fernando as guardian. It is alleged that Navarathna Fernando is the husband of the plaintiff. The evidence on record clearly establishes that the plaintiff is a Hindu. Exhibit P-1 clearly establishes that the plaintiff was born on 21-8-1962. The sale deed Exhibit P-2 is dated 6-4-1963. Thus, at the time of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, she was one year old. The agreement to sell the suit property under Exhibit D-21 is dated 15-5-1976. On that date, the plaintiff was only 14 years old. In Exhibit D-21 Navarathna Fernando is described as the husband of the plaintiff, who was barely 14 years old on that date. Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, states that the natural guardian of a Hindu minor, in respect of the minor’s person as well as in respect of the minor’s property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property), are: a) in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl - the father and after him, the mother, provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother; b) in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl -the mother, and after her, the father. Section 11 of the very same Act reads as follows: "After the commencement of this act, no person shall be entitled to dispose of, or deal with, the property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of his or her being the de facto guardian of the minor." 17. P.W.1 in her evidence has categorically denied the marriage between her and Navarathna Fernando. The appellants herein have failed to prove that the plaintiff married Navarathna Fernando. From the facts of the case it is clear that the appellants were content to rely upon the averments in Exhibit D-21 for the purpose of proving that the plaintiff married Navarathna Fernando. The learned Judge of this Court has also dealt with all these aspects of the case including that of Exhibits D-2 and D-3, wherein the plaintiff has described herself as Miss.Radhika and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not married to Bavarathna Fernando and hence, he cannot validly represent the plaintiff in Exhibit D-21. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning of the learned Judge. Further M.R.Geetha, the mother of the plaintiff in Exhibit D-21 clearly accepts Navarathna Fernando as the guardian of the plaintiff. On the basis of the finding of the learned Judge with which we agree, we can safely come to the conclusion that Navarathna Fernando cannot deal with the suit property in view of the clear prohibition under section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. The position is made clear in RANGABATHA GOUNDER v. KUPPU-SWAMI NAIDU, (1976)2 M.L.J.128 wherein a learned Judge of this Court has held as follows: The provisions of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act provide that it is the father who is the natural guardian of his minor children and the mother will become the natural guardian only after the death of the father. The Act also provides that the natural guardian alone has got the power to deal with the immovable properties of the minors, and that too, with the permission of the Court. The further effect of this Act is that it has taken away the power of the de facto guardian to deal with the property of a Hindu minor, which power was available to a de facto guardian under the prior Hindu Law in certain stated circumstances. The further effect of this Act is that it has taken away the power of the de facto guardian to deal with the property of a Hindu minor, which power was available to a de facto guardian under the prior Hindu Law in certain stated circumstances. While the father is alive he alone is the natural guardian of the children and the mother could be termed only as a de facto guardian if it is established that the minor children are living with the mother. Even then, under section 11 she has no competency to deal with the immovable properties [of the minors, and therefore, the alienation effected by the mother in the instant case acting as the guardian of her minor children is totally void. Section 11 of the Act abrogates the power of the de facto guardian to deal with any property of a minor, whether it is an undivided interest in a joint family property or not. Unlike sections 6 and 9 which while referring to the minor property expressly states excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property and the words other than the undivided interest referred to in section 12 respectively section 11 does not exclude any such undivided interest of a minor in the joint family property from its scope and therefore the incompetency of a de facto guardian to deal with a minor’s property extends to all the properties of a minor without any exception. In yet another decision reported in Angammal v. Balasubramanian, (1980)1 M.L.J.242, this position was succinctly dealt with by Ratnam, J. who has held as follows:The alienation by a de facto guardian for legal necessity was held to be valid under the old Hindu Law. The position has been totally altered by the introduction of section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. After 25th August, 1956, any alienation by a de facto guardian is void ab initio and such a guardian is incompetent to make the alienation bind the minor. The position of an alienee from such a de facto guardian has been held to be that of a trespasser Further section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act clearly prohibits dealing with immovable property of a minor without the prior permission of the Court. The position of an alienee from such a de facto guardian has been held to be that of a trespasser Further section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act clearly prohibits dealing with immovable property of a minor without the prior permission of the Court. In DARBARA SINGH v. KARMINDER SINGH, A.I.R.1979 Punjab and Haryana 215, it was held as follows: The provision in sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Act makes it expressly clear in unqualified terms that the personal covenant of the guardian shall not be binding on the minor. It means only this that, when looked from the standpoint that the aforesaid interdiction is added at the fag-end of section 8 (1) by way of proviso to the clause that preceded it, a guardian though well within his right to enter into a contract for the benefit of the minor, but the said contract would not be enforceable against the minor even when it was entered for his benefit and would be voidable at his instance.†In G.Annamalai Pillai v. The District Revenue Officer, South Arcot, Cuddalore, (1984) T.L.N.J.403 a Bench of this Court had occasion to consider as to when exactly the avoidance by the minor becomes operative. In that case, the Bench held that when the minor avoided the lease executed by his father, the fourth respondent, the lease becomes void from its inception and no statutory right could, therefore, accrue is favour of the appellant therein. So far as the present case is concerned, the plaintiff by her lawyer notice Exhibit P-5 dated 11 -12-1980 has clearly stated that the agreement Exhibit D-21 is not binding on her. This is a clear repudiation and as such, the agreement Exhibit D-21, even assuming for the sake of argument that the same has been executed by a natural guardian, is void from its inception. 18. Mr.Somayajulu, learned counsel for the plaintiff further contended that Exhibit D-21 depends upon getting a permission from the Court for selling the minor’s property. Hence, it is an inchoate and incomplete agreement and as such, it will not give a right to the appellant to specifically enforce the same. 18. Mr.Somayajulu, learned counsel for the plaintiff further contended that Exhibit D-21 depends upon getting a permission from the Court for selling the minor’s property. Hence, it is an inchoate and incomplete agreement and as such, it will not give a right to the appellant to specifically enforce the same. In this connection, the learned counsel relied on the decision reported in Gobardhan Lal v. Sheo Narayan Sahu, A.I.R.1929 Patna 202 wherein a Division Bench has usefully referred to the decision in Narain v. Aukhoyt (1886) I.L.R.12 Calcutta 152 wherein the Calcutta High Court has held as follows: "A certificated guardian of certain minors entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to sell certain land belonging to them for a fixed price contingent upon the leave of the Court, which was necessary, being obtained to the transaction, and a portion of the purchase money was paid by the plaintiff. The Court sanctioned the sale but at a higher price than that agreed on between the plaintiff and the guardian, and the latter sold to the third party. The plaintiff, thereupon sued the minors by their guardian as next friend and the third party for specific performance of the agreement to sell to him at the price mentioned in the agreement. Held: that the contract was not one which could be specifically enforced, and that section 26, Specific Relief Act, did not apply. The contract as it stood, was never a complete contract at any time, as it was contingent upon the permission of the Court, and the permission of the Court did not extend to the whole contract as agreed upon between the parties." Applying the above said principle to the case on hand, it is clear that the permission of the Court to sell the minor property is a condition precedent for executing the sale deed as per the sale agreement Exhibit D-21, Since it has to depend upon a permission and since such a permission has not been obtained, there is no question of specifically enforcing the sale agreement Exhibit D-21. In the above said background, we are afraid, we cannot appreciate the argument of Mr.A.Shanmughavel, learned counsel for the appellants, putting forth section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. In the above said background, we are afraid, we cannot appreciate the argument of Mr.A.Shanmughavel, learned counsel for the appellants, putting forth section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. Inasmuch as there is no valid agreement as found by us in paragraphs supra, there is no question of the appellants being in possession of the suit property lawfully. If their possession is not lawful, the doctrine of part performance cannot be invoked. Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act reads as follows: "Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part-performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part-performance of] the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer had not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract; Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part-performance thereof." The benefit of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act can be availed of only by those who were put into possession by virtue of a legal document. Inasmuch as Exhibit D-21 is ab initio void even from its inception as found by us in paragraphs supra, the doctrine of part performance cannot be availed of by the appellants herein. Further, Exhibits D-4 to D-6, receipts given by M.R.Geetha to the second defendant, amply establish that the possession of the suit property by the second defendant is not in the capacity of the owner thereof but only as a tenant. Further, Exhibits D-4 to D-6, receipts given by M.R.Geetha to the second defendant, amply establish that the possession of the suit property by the second defendant is not in the capacity of the owner thereof but only as a tenant. Hence, we find points 1 to 3 against the appellants. 19. Point No.4 The suit filed by the plaintiff is for declaring the suit property as her absolute property and for directing the appellants to deliver vacant possession of the same. There is a prayer in the suit for directing the appellants to pay a sum of Rs.3,600/- being the arrears of rent from June, 1980 to December, 1980 and Rs.2,000/- per month for use and occupation till the appellants deliver vacant possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. There is a specific averment in the plaint to the effect that the appellants entered into the deed of lease for eleven months with the mother of the plaintiff undertaking to pay a monthly rent of Rs.600/- and that the plaintiff is not bound by that agreement. In the written statement filed by the appellants, they have stated that the rent for the building is only Rs.300/- and not Rs.600/- as alleged by the plaintiff. It has also been stated in the written statement that the second defendant was paying Rs.300/- per month as per’ the arrangement entered into for such payment till the completion of the sale. This averment clearly makes out that the second defendant was paying rent even subsequent to Exhibit D- 20. Exhibit P-5 is the notice issued by the plaintiff to the defendants. In this notice it is stated that as per the lease deed, the monthly rent is Rs.600/-. The appellants sent a reply in Exhibit D-1 wherein they have specifically averred that the agreement of sale Exhibit D-21 is binding upon the plaintiff, that in pursuance of the said agreement, the appellants were given possession of the suit property and that the suit premises was handed over to the appellants not as tenants pure and simple but in pursuance of the agreement of sale dated 15-5-1976. Exhibit D-1 further states that since the plaintiff wanted to have income from the property, it was arranged that Rs.300/- should be adjusted towards the sum of Rs.8,200/- received from the appellants by Navarathna Fernando and M.R.Geetha every month and another sum of Rs.300/-to be paid every month till the sale transaction is completed. Thus, Exhibit D-1, spells out that the appellants have been put into possession by virtue of the agreement Exhibit D-21, that they were not tenants as such, and that, as an arrangement, a sum of Rs.600/-has to be paid to the plaintiff till the sale transaction is completed. In view of these averments in Exhibit D-1 it is too much for the appellants to say that the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 alone will apply to the facts of the case. If they say that they are not the tenants, the remedy for the plaintiff to get possession is only by way of a civil suit. If the appellants say that they are paying Rs.600/- per month only as an arrangement and if that is to be construed as rent, definitely, the building will be outside the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. In the light of these facts, we are not able to appreciate the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants when ha states that the rent is only Rs.300/- per month, that the appellants should be construed as tenants paying only Rs.300/- per month, that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that the authorities constituted under’ the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 can have jurisdiction. Further, under Exhibit D-29, the mother of the plaintiff issued a notice dated 13-12-1977 to the appellants calling upon them to vacate the premises. In that notice, it has been specifically averred that the second defendant entered into an agreement of tenancy for a fixed period of eleven months on a monthly rent of Rs.600/-and that the agreement expired on 30-11-1977 by efflux of time. In that notice, it has been specifically averred that the second defendant entered into an agreement of tenancy for a fixed period of eleven months on a monthly rent of Rs.600/-and that the agreement expired on 30-11-1977 by efflux of time. To this notice, the appellants through their counsel issued a reply under Exhibit D-30, specifically alleging that an agreement of sale had been entered into, that since the sale will be delayed owing to the fact that there will be delay in obtaining court permission, in order to give income from the suit property, an arrangement was made, that in and by the arrangement, a further sum of Rs.300/- has to be paid towards sale consideration apart from the sum of Rs.8,200/- already paid and that another sum of Rs.300/- has to be paid every month till the sale consideration is completed. Thus, even from Exhibits D-29 to D-30, it has been amply established that the appellants were paying at the rate of Rs.600/- per month even as early as from the date of the agreement Exhibit D- 21. These established facts cannot in any way be affected by Exhibits D-4 to D-6 since the payment of the additional sum of Rs.300/- apart from the sum of Rs.300/-, mentioned in these documents can only be construed as rent. Mr.Somayajulu, learned counsel for the plaintiff also points to the evidence of D.W.1, who is the third defendant, and states that inasmuch as D.W.1 has stated that he is willing to pay a sum of Rs.75,000/- in spite of the fact that he has deposed that more than Rs.24,100/- has been paid already, shows that a sum of Rs.300/-were paid towards rent and that the case of the plaintiff that the rent for the building is Rs.600/- per month is fortified. Even in the written statement, the appellants have offered to pay a sum of Rs.75,000/- less Rs.3,000/- advance already paid. All these aspects have been considered by the learned single Judge of this Court and a finding has been given to the effect that the monthly . rent agreed upon is Rs.600/- and hence, the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act have no application to this residential building. All these aspects have been considered by the learned single Judge of this Court and a finding has been given to the effect that the monthly . rent agreed upon is Rs.600/- and hence, the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act have no application to this residential building. From the evidence on record, which we have discussed in paragraphs supra, we are in complete agreement with the reasoning and finding of the learned single Judge of this Court on this aspect of the case. 22. Point No.5: The learned single Judge of this court has, no doubt, held that the counter-claim filed on 19-2-1982 by the appellants for specific performance of the agreement is hopelessly barred by limitation. This finding is arrived at on the basis that in Exhibit D-29 notice there is a clear repudiation of the agreement for sale. Mr.A.Shanmughavel, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that only in Exhibit P-5, the plaintiff has repudiated the agreement Exhibit D-21. Exhibit P-5 is dated 11-12-1980. The counter claim was filed on 19-2-1982. Hence, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, the counter claim is well within three years as provided in Article 54 of the Limitation Act. Article 54 of the Limitation Act states that for specific performance of an agreement, the period of limitation is three years from the date fixed for the performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that the performance is refused. No doubt, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, basing on Exhibit D-29, which is dated 13-12-1977, contended that the counter-claim filed on 19-2-1982 is beyond the period of three years and as such, it is barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act. We have carefully gone through Exhibits D-21, D-29, D-30 and P-5, which are the relevant documents to decide the question of limitation. In Exhibit D-21, which is the agreement to sell, it is stated, that the sale has to be effected within a month of the receipt of the sanction order from Court and communication of the same to the appellants herein. It is an admitted fact, that no such sanction has been obtained from Court uptill today. Exhibit D-29 is the notice issued by M.R.Geetha to the appellants. It is dated 13-12-1977. It is an admitted fact, that no such sanction has been obtained from Court uptill today. Exhibit D-29 is the notice issued by M.R.Geetha to the appellants. It is dated 13-12-1977. Exhibit D-29 is a simple notice for eviction on the ground that the lease agreement has come to an end. There is absolutely no reference to the sale agreement Exhibit D-21 in Exhibit D-29 nor repudiation of the same. To construe Exhibit D-29 and Exhibit D-30, which is the reply for Exhibit D-29, as the repudiation of the sale agreement Exhibit D-21 is against the facts of the case. In Exhibit P-5, which is dated 11-12-1980, the plaintiff in unequivocal terms, has repudiated the agreement dated 15-5-1976. The counter-claim filed is on 19-2-1982. As per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, this counter-claim is well within a period of three years from Exhibit P-5 wherein the agreement of sale Exhibit D-21 was for the first time repudicated. Hence, the finding of the learned Judge to the effect that the counter claim is barred by limitation cannot be sustained. Accordingly, we hold, that the counter claim is within the period of limitation. 23. Point No.6: In the memorandum of cross-objections filed by the plaintiff, she has claimed damages at the rate of Rs.2,000/- per month with effect from 1-1-1981 and has also questioned the legality of granting a sum of Rs.17,802/- by way of improvements to the appellants by the learned single Judge. The appellants in their grounds of appeal questioned the finding of the learned single Judge fixing the damages at Rs.1,000/- per month when there is absolutely no evidence to fix the damages at Rs.1,000/-. It was further contended by the appellants that the order of Shanmukham, J. in Application No.253 of 1981 fixing the damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs.1,000/-per month is only tentative subject to the final assessment of such damages in the main suit. The appellants have further claimed that the learned Judge ought to have given compensation over and above Rs.20,802-80. 24. Shanmukham, J. in Application No.253 of 1981, considering the fact that the rent was fixed as early as 1976 at Rs.300/- per month and also the area occupied by the appellants viz., 2,700 sq. feet, thought it fit that a sum of Rs.1,000/- as damages may be tentatively fixed and accordingly fixed the same. 24. Shanmukham, J. in Application No.253 of 1981, considering the fact that the rent was fixed as early as 1976 at Rs.300/- per month and also the area occupied by the appellants viz., 2,700 sq. feet, thought it fit that a sum of Rs.1,000/- as damages may be tentatively fixed and accordingly fixed the same. As regards the final fixation of damages, the learned Judge has left it to be decided by the learned Judge who disposes of the suit finally. The learned Judge who disposed of the suit, after taking into consideration that the rent for the premises is Rs.600/- per month and also referring to the fact that the appellants apart from their occupation were receiving a sum of Rs.210/- by sub-leasing the other portion, fixed the damages at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per month. The claim of, Rs.2,000/- per month as damages by the plaintiff has not been made out by cogent and acceptable evidence. Shanmukham, J. who disposed of Application No.253 of 1981, has discussed in detail before tentatively fixing the sum of Rs.1,000/- as damages per month. We completely agree with the reasoning and finding of Shanmukham, J. on this aspect of the case also that of Kader, J. who disposed of the suit finally and fix the damages at Rs.1,000/- per month. 25. Point No.7: As regards the compensation claimed by the appellants, we are not able to differ from the finding and award made by the learned single Judge of this Court. It is for the appellants to plead and establish the compensation claimed by them. As far as we could see, there is no evidence substantiating the payment of Rs.8,200/- towards sale consideration. Further, as we have discussed in paragraphs a sum of Rs.300/- towards rent was being adjusted out of the sum of Rs.8,000/- said to have been paid by the appellants. Apart from this evidence, Exhibits’ D-22 series, D-36, D-37 and D-49 series establish the spending of a sum of Rs.16,197-70 towards improvements to the building in question. Exhibit D-48 series establish the payment of water tax, etc., to the tune of Rs.1,605-10. Further, under Exhibit D-21 agreement the second defendant has paid a sum of Rs.3,000/- as advance. Calculating these proved amounts towards improvements, etc., the compensation that has to be paid comes to Rs. 20,802-80. This is the amount awarded by the learned single Judge of this Court. Further, under Exhibit D-21 agreement the second defendant has paid a sum of Rs.3,000/- as advance. Calculating these proved amounts towards improvements, etc., the compensation that has to be paid comes to Rs. 20,802-80. This is the amount awarded by the learned single Judge of this Court. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning and finding of the learned Judge of this Court on this aspect of the case also and hold that the award of Rs.20,802- 80 as compensation is correct. 26. For the fore-going reasons, we are of the view that the appeal and the memorandum of cross- objections should fail and accordingly, they are dismissed. However, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in both the appeal and the memorandum of cross-objections. The order of the Court was made by 27.Gokulakrishnan, J. This matter is posted on the request made by Mr.A.Shanmughavel, learned counsel for the appellants. On behalf of the appellants, Mr.Shanmughavel prays for four months time to vacate the portion in the possession of the appellants. Taking into consideration the facts of this case, the appellants are granted four months time from today to vacate and deliver vacant possession of this portion in their occupation.