JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the legality of the order dated 2-1-1984 (Annexure-F), passed by inc. respondent No. 1 cancelling the appointment of the petitioner a Microbiologist. ( 2. ) THE facts of the case are within a narrow compass and are almost admitted. It appears that there are two posts of Microbiologists in Biological Nitrogen Fixation scheme of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research and Stale Plan Scheme for rhizobium Culture and Production. These posts were occupied by Dr. H. G. Sharma and Dr. B. G. Apte. The post occupied by Dr. Sharma fell vacant in July 1980 consequent upon his being shifted to Soil Test Crop Responses Scheme and it was decided to advertise this post. The Advertisement (Annexure-A) was, therefore, issued on 22-7-1980 inviting applications for the post. The advertisement required the following qualifications : -Ph. D. in Soil Science/agricultural Chemistry with specialization in Soil microbiology or published work of an equivalent high standard. Para 4 of the advertisement specified that the post is sanctioned under I. C A. R. Scheme for Biological Nitrogen Fixation The petitioner as well as the respondent No. 3 applied in pursuance, to this advertisement and were interviewed by the Selection committee. The Selection Committee was constituted by three eminent scientists of the country, viz. , (i) Dr. N, S. Subba Rao of Indian Agricultural Research Institute, New delhi, (ii) Dr. A. C. Gaur, Professor of Microbiology of Indian Agricultural Research institute, New Delhi and (iii) Dr. Santsingh, Emeritus Scientist of Institute of agricultural Sciences, Banaras Hindu University. The Selection Committee submitted is recommendations to the respondent No. 2 for their consideration. In the panel prepared by the Selection Committee, one Dr. L. N. Verma was shown at Serial No. 1 whereas, the petitioner was shown at Serial No. 2. The recommendations of the selection Committee were approved by the Board of Management of the respondent no. 2 and consequently, the petitioner and Dr. L. N. Verma were appointed by an order dated 11-5-1982 (Annexure-B ). The respondent No. 3, who was one of the candidates, could neither be selected nor appointed. It appears that after the issue of the advertisement on 22-7-1980, Dr. B. G. Apte, who held the second post of microbiologist, retired on 31-8-1980 and, hence, the second post also fell vacant. The respondent No. 3, who was one of the candidates, could neither be selected nor appointed. It appears that after the issue of the advertisement on 22-7-1980, Dr. B. G. Apte, who held the second post of microbiologist, retired on 31-8-1980 and, hence, the second post also fell vacant. Since on the date of appointment, two posts of Microbiologists were available. Dr. L. N. Verma and the petitioner were appointed against the aforesaid two posts. It may be mentioned that the second post vacated by Dr. Apte, was not advertised. It appears that the respondent No. 3 felt that the appointment of the petitioner against the second post, which was not advertised, was illegal and represented against the appointment to the respondent No. 1. The matter was examined by the respondent No. 1 under section 14 (2) of the Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwavidyalaya Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the act) and it was felt that the advertisement being only for one post, appointment on the second post was in violation of Statute 6 (a) (i) of the University and, hence, the appointment of the petitioner was contrary to the law. The respondent No. 1 also felt that the petitioner did not have a Ph. D. and his published work could not be equated with the Ph. D. Degree and, hence the appointment was illegal. The respondent No. 1, therefore, issued a show cause notice to the petitioner as also to the Board of management on 2-5-1983 (Annexure-C) requiring them to show cause why the resolution of the Board of Management approving the appointment of the petitioner, be not annulled. It appears that the petitioner as also the Board of Mangement represented against the proposed annulment by submitting their separate replies. The Board of management, in their reply, admitted that the advertisement was for one post only, but submitted that it was not necessary for them to advertise the second post which had fallen vacant in the meantime. The respondent No. 1 on consideration of the representation, passed the impugned order dated 2-1-84 (Annexure-P ). annulling the resolution of the Board of Management dated 7-5-82 regarding the appointment of the petitioner to the second post of Soil Microbiologist. It is this order which is impugned in the present petition. ( 3. The respondent No. 1 on consideration of the representation, passed the impugned order dated 2-1-84 (Annexure-P ). annulling the resolution of the Board of Management dated 7-5-82 regarding the appointment of the petitioner to the second post of Soil Microbiologist. It is this order which is impugned in the present petition. ( 3. ) THE submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order illegally and unjustifiably holds that published research papers of the petitioner were not of equivalent high standard and has, therefore, illegally held that the petitioner was not entitled to be appointed as a Microbiologist. It is further submitted that the advertisement (Annexure-A) did not specify the number of posts for which applications were invited and, hence, it should be read to cover all vacancies which might be available on the date of appointment. The learned counsel for the respondent university, however, supports the order on the ground that conclusions reached by the respondent No. 1 are not only correct, but are also otherwise just and fair in the context of facts and circumstances of the case. It is also submitted that the advertisement is clear and specific and relates to the post sanctioned under I. C. A. R. Scheme for Biological nitrogen Fixation, and, hence, the second post which was not advertised, could not have been filled. Reliance is placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in V. K. Seth v. State of M. P. 1980 M. P. LJ. 287. ( 4. ) BEFORE considering the respective contention of the parties, the legal provision may be looked into. S. 12 of the Act specifies the Officers of the Vishwavidyalaya and includes Officers as may be declared by the Statute to be the Officers of the vishwavidyalaya. Statute 3 specifies the Officers who would be included in this category. It is not disputed that the Microbiologist would be an Officer of the University for purposes of these provisions. Section 23 of the Act provides that appointment of these Officers shall be made in such a manner as may be prescribed by the Statutes and regulations. Statute 5 provides for constitution of a Selection Committee for selecting candidates to fill vacancies. The procedure required to be followed by the Selection committee is given in Statute 6. Section 23 of the Act provides that appointment of these Officers shall be made in such a manner as may be prescribed by the Statutes and regulations. Statute 5 provides for constitution of a Selection Committee for selecting candidates to fill vacancies. The procedure required to be followed by the Selection committee is given in Statute 6. Statute 6 (a) (i) provides that all posts of Officers of the vishwavidyalaya as detailed under section 12 of the Act and Statute 3 and teachers shall be filled up by selection based strictly on merits and All India advertisement. The selection Committee is, therefore, required to examine the merits of the applicants and recommend a panel of not more than three names for each vacancy arranged in order of merits to the Vice-Chancellor. Statute 7 requires the Vice-Chancellor to submit the panel recommended by the Selection Committee to the appointing authority with his own recommendations. The appointing authority may accept and approve the recommendations or return the recommendations refusing to accord approval, giving reasons in writing thereof, in which case the Vice-Chancellor shall, in due course, present another panel of recommendees in order of merit to the appointing authority. In case the appointment is approved, the person is appointed. Clearly, therefore, every vacancy is required to be advertised on All India basis. The purpose of All India advertisement appears to be to attract talents from all over the country so as to make qualitative selection and, thereby, ensure merit. The importance of qualitative selection based on merits, cannot be under-estimated in a technical institution like the respondent No. 2. Clearly, therefore, the aforesaid procedure is intended to achieve the objective necessary for efficient running of the Vishwavidyalaya. Even otherwise, this would be the requirement under Art. 16 of the Constitution of India, which admittedly applies in the instant case. Art. 16 guarantees equality in the matter of appointment to all citizens of India and obliges the authorities to effectuate this constitutional guarantee in actual practice by adopting a method which guarantees consideration to all incumbents. Though advertisement of vacancy may not be the only method of translating this constitutional guarantee in actual practice, it is by-far the best method available. Though advertisement of vacancy may not be the only method of translating this constitutional guarantee in actual practice, it is by-far the best method available. Under the circumstances, it is clear that not only the Act and the Statute mentioned above, but also Art. 16 of the Constitution obliges the authorities of the respondent Vishwavidyalaya to advertise each vacancy, thereby giving opportunity to all concerned to offer themselves for appointment against the post. What is true about advertisement, is equally true about the qualifications. Statute 34 authorises the academic Council of the Vishwavidyalaya, subject to the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, to prescribe the qualifications for candidates for various grades of teachers of the Vishwavidyalaya and make Regulations for this purpose. It is not disputed that a candidate for the post of Mirobiologist is required by the Regulations to have a Ph. D. Degree in Soil Science/agricultural Chemistry with specialization in Soil Microbiology or published work of an equivalent high standard. It is common ground that unless these qualifications are possessed by the petitioner, he would not be entitled to be appointed as a Microbiologist. Section 14 (2) of the Act empowers the Chancellor to annul any proceeding of any officer or authority of the Vishwavidyalaya by an order in writing, if the same is not in conformity with the Act Or the Statute or the Regulations made therein. Proviso to this section requires the Chancellor to serve a show cause notice on the Officer or the authority concerned to show cause why such an order should not be made and further requires him to consider the cause shown, in case the same is submitted to him within the time specified for the purpose. It is. therefore, not seriously disputed that the respondent-Chancellor would be under a legal obligation to annul the resolutions of the Board of Management in case the appointment of the petitioner suffered from any legal defect. ( 5. ) A perusal of the impugned order indicates that the respondent-Chancellor was of the opinion that the published works of the petitioner were not his published works and were otherwise not of a quality which could equate them with Ph. D. Degree. According to the respondent-Chancellor, the petitioner has published some short notes in journals jointly with others, which could not be treated to be equivalent to a Ph. D. Degree. D. Degree. According to the respondent-Chancellor, the petitioner has published some short notes in journals jointly with others, which could not be treated to be equivalent to a Ph. D. Degree. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Selection committee which consisted of highly qualified and eminent scientists of the country, having equated his work with a Ph. D. Degree, the Chancellor should not have differed with those scientists, particularly when he has neither the expertise nor the necessary qualification to make such a comparison. That the persons constituting the Selection committee in the instant case are persons of repute, is beyond doubt. That the opinion of such a body of experts should receive due consideration and be treated with utmost respect, is also not doubted. In spite of it, it cannot be accepted that the opinion expressed by the Selection Committee should be treated as final. In a country ruled by the rule of law, it is the law which is supreme, and has got to be given effect to. The law requires the recommendations of the Selection Committee to be considered and approved by the Board of Management. The law further confers the power on the board of Management to differ with the recommendations of the Selection Committee and even reject the same. The law further empowers the respondent-Chancellor to annul the proceedings of the Board of Management in case the same are not in conformity with the law. If this be the rule of law, the experts should make the choice before acting as members of a body like the Selection Committee. If they choose to act as such, they cannot claim any immunity and their opinion is bound to be scrutinized by the Board of Management and the Chancellor in accordance with the law and is bound to be set aside if it is not in line with the legal thinking. In this view of the matter, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner must be rejected on the short ground that the law attaches no finality to the opinion of the members of the Selection committee howsoever high or eminent they might be and not only the respondent-Board of Management, but also the respondent-Chancellor is entitled to scrutinize and judge the legality of their opinion. ( 6. ( 6. ) IT, however, remains to be examined if the opinion of the respondent chancellor that the petitioner does not have the necessary qualification. is correct? The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that his work may be short and yet, is of high quality and has even been quoted in some of the text books on the subject. It is also submitted that since the petitioner has done major part of the research and has played the leading role, he is entitled to full credit for the research, in spite of the fact that the papers have been published jointly with others. It is not the jurisdiction of this court, nor this Court has the necessary expertise, to pronounce a judgment on the quality of the papers published by the petitioner. This job must be left for consideration of the authorities created by the Act. The respondent-Chancellor being the head of the institution, has the means to correctly decide the matter and his opinion will not be brush aside by this Court. In the instant case, however, it may not be necessary to even deal with this problem, as in the opinion of this Court, research papers published by the petitioner jointly with others, cannot be equated with a Ph. D. thesis so as to bring him on par with persons holding the Ph. D. Degree. The qualification prescribed in the advertisement has been stated in the earlier part of this order. A fair reading of the advertisement makes it clear that normally a candidate should have a Ph. D. Degree to qualify for appointment. A Ph. D. Degree is obtained after research done by the individual for which he alone gets the credit. The conferment of a Ph. D. on an individual is nothing but the recognition of the fact that he has conducted the research which is found to be of the requisite standard. A research conducted jointly with others and the resultant thesis would not entitle anyone of them to a Ph. D. Degree. Under the circumstances, anything which makes a candidate entitled to be considered along with persons holding the Ph. D. Degree, should be not only similar in all respects, but also be the work for which credit should be given to the candidate. In case a Ph. D. Degree. Under the circumstances, anything which makes a candidate entitled to be considered along with persons holding the Ph. D. Degree, should be not only similar in all respects, but also be the work for which credit should be given to the candidate. In case a Ph. D. Degree cannot be obtained by a person on the basis of research done jointly, there is no reason why a paper written jointly with others, should bring him on par with persons holding a ph. D. Degree. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is responsible for the entire published work, cannot be accepted on the face of it, as the works are credited not only to the petitioner but to few others also. Then, the jurisdiction of this Court in a case like the present one, remains limited to examining whether the view taken by the respondent-Chancellor, is the correct view. Even if two views are possible, this Court would not be justified in substituting its own view to the view expressed by the respondent-Chancellor. The law in this regard should be taken to be more or less settled because of the following decisions of the Supreme Court, viz. , vice-Chancellor v. S. K. Ghosh AIR 1954 S. C. 217, Bool Chanel v. Kurukshetra university AIR 1968 S. C. 292, V. S. Vishwavidyalaya v. Rajkishore AIR 1977 SC 615 , jammu University v. D. K. Rampal AIR 1977 S. C. 1146 and Sadhu Ram v. Delhi transport Corporation AIR 1984 S. C. 1467. It cannot be doubted even for a moment that the opinion of the respondent-Chancellor that the petitioner not having published any research paper independently, cannot be said to have published work of equivalent high standard so as to equate him with the holder of a Ph. D. Degree, is the correct opinion. Indeed, it is the only opinion which could have bees expressed in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the context of requirement of the advertisement. Clearly, therefore, there is no scope of exercise of extraordinary powers of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India in the present case. ( 7. Indeed, it is the only opinion which could have bees expressed in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the context of requirement of the advertisement. Clearly, therefore, there is no scope of exercise of extraordinary powers of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India in the present case. ( 7. ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of this Court in miscellaneous Petition No. 2780 of 1983, decided on 28-12-1984 (M. A. Quadri v. Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwavidyalaya) to support his submission that even if the research paper was published jointly, each one of the authors can be credited with having done independent research work. In the aforesaid case, this Court was called upon to decide whether a co-author of a published research work can be given the credit of doing independent research work. It was the opinion of this Court that under certain circumstances, several persons doing research work independently, may pool their experiences to write a paper jointly and the fact that the paper has been written jointly, by itself would not be sufficient to deny credit of independent research experience to them. The aforesaid case is not an authority for the proposition that a research work published jointly would be the work of each and every author thereof independently. The end product, i. e. the published research work even in the aforesaid case, was accepted as the work of all the authors jointly. The case is, therefore, if at all, an authority for the proposition that no one can get individual credit for the entire work if the work had been published jointly in the name of several persons. ( 8. ) THOUGH the aforesaid conclusion is sufficient to dismiss the present petition, the second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner may also be examined. Submission is that advertising the vacancy sought to be filled, is not the mandatory requirement of law and, hence, there was no illegality in filling the vacancy. The legal provisions have been noticed in the earlier part of this order and sufficiently show that it is not only legal but also the constitutional requirement to advertise every vacancy sought to be filled. The legal provisions have been noticed in the earlier part of this order and sufficiently show that it is not only legal but also the constitutional requirement to advertise every vacancy sought to be filled. In V. K. Seths case (supra), a similar rule came to be interpreted by a division Bench of this Court when it was held that the jurisdiction of the Public Service commission to issue an advertisement is dependent upon a requisition issued by the state Government. In the absence of a requisition, there would be no advertisement and, hence, no post could be filled. True that this case does not hold that advertisement is also the requirement of law and would, by itself, be sufficient to vitiate the appointment. This case is an authority for the proposition that the jurisdiction of the public Service Commission is dependent upon receipt of a requisition from the State government and if there is no requisition for any particular post, the Commission would not be entitled to recommend candidates for appointment against the said post. This is true even if the post is advertised by the Public Service Commission. The advertisement, however, is the method of ensuring equality enshrined under Art. 16 of the Constitution of India, and in the absence of anything better or equally satisfactory method, the same has to be accepted as a part of this constitutional requirement. In case this requirement is dispensed with, the authorities would get arbitrary power to appoint persons without following the requisite procedure. It is not unthinkable that in the absence of an advertisement, no one who is otherwise entitled to be considered for appointment, would have staked his claim. In such a case, the merit would be the surest casualty and the entire purpose of selection would remain frustrated. Clearly, therefore, it is the legal obligation of the authority to advertise every vacancy that the authority wish to fill by appointing candidates. It is equally clear that failure to observe this legal requirement, would affect the selection on merit and would vitiate the appointment. ( 9. ) IT may, therefore, be examined if the advertisement is such as to include not only the existing first vacancy but also the subsequent vacancy caused due to retirement of Dr. B. G. Apte on 31-8-1980. It is true that the advertisement does not mention the number of posts to be filled. ( 9. ) IT may, therefore, be examined if the advertisement is such as to include not only the existing first vacancy but also the subsequent vacancy caused due to retirement of Dr. B. G. Apte on 31-8-1980. It is true that the advertisement does not mention the number of posts to be filled. It is also true that in subsequent advertisement number of posts to be filled have been specified by the Vice-Chancellor. This, however, is not sufficient to hold that the advertisement in question is for both the posts. Documents filed by the respondent No. 1, particularly the nothings on the representation of Dr. Sharma, clearly indicate that it was decided to advertise the particular post held by Dr. Sharma and not all posts which might fall vacant in future (Annexure-R-2 ). This is also clear from the advertisement (Annexure-A ). Clause 4 of this advertisement clearly specifies that the post for which the recruitment is being held, is sanctioned under i. C. A. R. Scheme for Biological Nitrogen Fixation. It is not disputed that only one post exists under I. C. A. R. Scheme for Biological Nitrogen Fixation and, hence, it must be held that only this post was advertised. The post against which the petitioner was appointed was not under I. C, A. R. Scheme, but was a post under State Plan Scheme for Phizobium Culture and Production and was therefore not advertised. Since the post was not advertised as required by the Statute, the view taken by the respondent-Chancellor cannot be said to be either illegal or perverse in any manner. ( 10. ) IN view of the discussion aforesaid, no infirmity whatsoever is detected in the impugned order. The petition, consequently, fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.