JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal by the unsuccessful defendants arises out of a decree of affirmance passed by the learned Additional District Judge, First Court-, Howrah, in a suit for declaration of title, perpetual injunction and recovery of arrear rents. 2. THE case of the plaintiff-respondents was that the schedule 'ka' property measuring. 2 6 decimals' belonged to Ranjit (defendant 1 ka) and Ratan (defendant 1 kha) by virtue of deed of gift dated 27.6.52 executed in their favour by their paternal grand-father Kalipada Samanta, as father and natural guardian of Ranjit and Ratan,. who were minors, sold the property to him (the plaintiff) by a registered sale deed and delivered possession thereof to him. The sale, according to him was for legal necessity and for the benefit of the minors, on 30.5.64 Ranjit who had atained majority by that time, executed a deed ratifying the sale. Ratan also joined the deed being represented by his lather and natural guardian kanai, After his purchase. the plaintiff made a pan boroj (betel plantation) on. 03 decimals ox land described in schedule kha to the plaint. On the remaining. 18 decimals of land described in schedule 'ga' to the plaint, there is a kliari ban and a doba and on the rest of the lands paddy is grown by the plaintiff. Due to certain difficulties in maintaining the pan boroj the plaintiff leased out the same to Kanai for a period of two years commencing from 1st ftaisakh, 1374 B. S. at a rented of Rs. 40/- per annum and in token of the lease a Kabuliat was executed by Kanai. Even after the expiry of the period of the lease, Kanai continued to hold over by payment of rent for the year 1376 B. S. but thereafter he stopped payment, repeated demands for rent produced no result; on the contrary, kanai and his sons Ranjit and Jatan there atened the plaintiff to dispossess him from the rest of the property described in schedule 'ga' to the plaint. Under the circum: ances, tie was compelled to bring the action against them for declaration pf his title to the schedule ' ka' property, for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession of the schedule 'ga' properety and from changing the nature of the pan boroj, i.e., schedule 'kha' property and also for recovery of arreai rents amounting to Rs. 120/-, described in schedule 'ga' to the plaint. 3. KANAI and his two sens contested the suit by filing two sets of written statements which were more or less on the same lines. The defence was that Kanai was highly addicted to wine and that is why Kalipada gifted the schedule 'ka' property to his grandsons Ranjit and Ratan, whom he loved dearly, At the time of the gift both of them were majors and the property could, not, therefore, be sold by their father kanai posing himself is their natural guardian. They also denied execution of the sale deed by Kanai. Alternatively, they pleaded that even if Kanai had executed any such deed, his signature must have been obtained when he was completely drunk. Execution of the deed of ratification by Ranjit and by Kanai as natural guardian of Ratan was denied and the deed was branded as a forged document. The same plea was taken with respect to the kabuliat and if was claimed that Ranjit and Rantan, since the gift, were in possession of the entire property in their own right. According to them, the pan boroj was made by them and not 'by the plaintiff. 4. KANAI died during the pendancy of the. suit and was substituted ;- his sons Ranjit and Ratan, as his sons Ranjit and Ratan, as his heirs and successor. The trial court, on a consideration of the evidence on record, found that both Ranjit and Ratan were minors at the time of the gift as well as the sale of the suit property by Kanai, that the sale was for the benefit of the minors.-that all the impugned deeds, viz., the deed of sale, deed of ratification and the kabultiat were genuine documents, that the kabuliyat was acted upon and that since his purchase the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property, except the pan boroj which the defendants held under him as lessees and that rents from 1376 B. S. onward were in arrears. In view of the above findings, the trial court decreed the suit. 5. ON appeal by the defendants, the lower appellate court. concurred with the findings of the trial court on all the points. In view of the above findings, the trial court decreed the suit. 5. ON appeal by the defendants, the lower appellate court. concurred with the findings of the trial court on all the points. The lower appellate court also held and, quite rightly, that as the sale was made on contravention of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, it was voidable at the instance of Ranjit and Rata-who could bring a suit within three years of attaining majority for setting aside the sale by their father Kanai, during their minority. Since, however, they did not bring any such suit within the period of three years as prescribed by Art. 60 of the Limitation Act, and also did not retain possession of the property notwithstanding the sale, it was no longer open to them to challenge the transfer. 6. IT may be mentioned at the outset that the concurrent findings of the court below that Ranjit on attaining majority ratified the sale (vide : Ext. 7) and also figured as an attesting witness to the kabuliat (vide : Ext. 2) cannot be assailed, in this second appeal. Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the appellants, fairly and frankly concedes this position and further concedes that in view of the above findings of the courts below, the sale is binding on Ranjit and cannot be challenged by him. Mr. Mukherjee, however, strenuously contends that though ratan can no longer bring a suit for setting aside the sale as the period of limitation as prescribed for such "suit by art. 60 of the Limitation Act has already expired, nothing debars him from challenging the sale as a defendant by way of defence, as Art. 60 cannot operate as a bar to such defence. In support of his contention, Mir. Mukherjee has placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Jagarnath Prasad vs. Chunni Lai., reported in air 1940 ALL. 416. 7. IN the case under reference, the question that fell for determination was whether a mortgage of the minor's properly by his guardian without the permission of the District Judge could be challenged by the minor in a suit by the mortgagee to recover the mortgage dues by sale of the mortgaged property. 416. 7. IN the case under reference, the question that fell for determination was whether a mortgage of the minor's properly by his guardian without the permission of the District Judge could be challenged by the minor in a suit by the mortgagee to recover the mortgage dues by sale of the mortgaged property. It was contended on behalf of the mortgagee that the validity of the mortgage could not be questioned as the suit to set aside the transfer of a property by the guardian must be instituted by a ward within three years of attaining of majority, as contemplated by Art. 44 (Old) of the Limitation Act. In negativing the contention, their Lordships held that it is open to the minor as defendant to challenge the transfer of property made by the guardian and Art. 44 would be no bar to such defence as that Article only bars the remedy of the plaintiff to get the transfer set aside. It was further held that a minor is undoubtedly entitled to plead that he is not bound by the mortgage decree provided he lays foundation for such a plea (emphasis supplied). 8. ON a reading of the judgment, it appears that the defendant was still a minor and the time for bringing a suit to set aside the transfer had not run out till then. Moreover, the defendant was in possession of the mortgaged property. Therefore, the above decision, to my mind, cannot have any application to the present case as Ratan attained majority about 7/8 years before the institution of the suit and was also not in possession of the alienated property after the sale. The Allahabad decision nowhere lays' down the proposition that a minor, even after three years of attaining majority, can successfully challenge the transfer made by his guardian during his minority. In fact, such s. broad proposition would inevitably lead to inconceivably absurd result. To cite an instance, a minor may dispossess the purchaser of the property from his guardian 15 or 20 years or even longer than that after attaining majority, without bringing any suit to set aside the transfer within the period specified in Art. 60 of the Limitation Act and in a suit brought by the purchaser to recover possession of the property, challenge the transfer as being not binding upon him. To entertain such a plea would be to frustrate the very object of the Limitation Act which is known as a statute of repose or statute of peace, intended for relief and quite of the 'defendants and to prevent persons from being harassed, at a distant point of time, after committing of the injury complained: of. 9. IN this context, it should be borne in mind that the transfer of the property of a Hindu minor by his guardian without the permission of the court, as contemplated in subsection (2) of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship act 1956, is not ipso facto void but merely voidable at the instance of the minor. The option must, however, be exercised by the minor by means of a suit to set aside the transfer to be brought within three years of his attaining majority. If he chooses to remain silent and does not take any step to set aside the transfer within the period allowed by Art 60 of the Limitation Act inspite of his knowledge of the transfer, he cannot be allowed to challenge it even as a defendant unless, of course, he has all along been in possession of the property, the transfer notwithstanding. 10. ON the side of respondents, three decisions have been cited by Mr. Mukherjee two of this Court and the third one of the Madras High Court to support his contention that since no suit was brought by Ratan to set aside the transfer made by his father Kanai within three years of attaining majority, it is no longer open to him to challenge the transfer even by way of defence. In the case of Panchu vs, Hrishikesh Ghose, reported in AIR 1960 Cal 446 , there was a permanent settlement of the minor's property by his defactor guardian in favour of one Satish Chandra Ghose. The plaintiff, as purchaser of the property from Satish Chandra Ghose, brought a suit for declaration of his title, and for recovery of possession of the suit property on the ground that he had been dispossessed by the erstwhile minor and his cosharers. The plaintiff, as purchaser of the property from Satish Chandra Ghose, brought a suit for declaration of his title, and for recovery of possession of the suit property on the ground that he had been dispossessed by the erstwhile minor and his cosharers. Both the trial court and the lower appellate court found that the transfer was not made for legal necessity or for the benefit of the minor, that possesion of the demised property remained throughout with the guardian of the minor and other cosharers of the minor and that the minor was in possession of his own interest since after he attained majority. In that view of the matter, the courts below held that it was not necessary for the minor to set aside the transfer within three years of attaining majority and the provisions of" Art. 28 (Old) of the Limitation act had, therefore, no application to the case as the minor was all along in possession of the alienated property. There was a second appeal before this Court by the plaintiff which was dismissed by a learned single Judge. In dismissing the appeal, the learned Judge made the following observations :- "under Article 44, Limitation Act, if a minor desires-me to set aside a transfer of property by his guardian, he must bring a suit within three years of his attaining majority. A minor would be compelled to bring such a suit where the transfer was made by his lawful or de jure guardian without legal necessity or against the minor's interest. A minor would also be required to bring a suit to have a sale by his guardian, whether de jure or de facto, set aside when a minor is out of possession and cannot, except through the aid of the court, recover possession of the property. But where the minor is in possession of the alienated property, the alienation notwithstanding, it is not necessary for the minor to resort to a court of law and obtain a formal declaration that the alxenation by the guardian was bad and should be set aside. But where the minor is in possession of the alienated property, the alienation notwithstanding, it is not necessary for the minor to resort to a court of law and obtain a formal declaration that the alxenation by the guardian was bad and should be set aside. " In the next case, Rabi Narayan vs. Kanak Prova Debi, reported in AIR 1965 Cal 444 , the purchaser of the minor's property from his father and natural guardian brought a suit for recovery of possession of the property upon her eviction there from by the defendant who subsequently purchased the property from the minor after he had attained majority. The defence taken was that the sale deed on which the plaintiff was relying was bad because the guardian had no power to sell the property to her and the sale by the guardian was illegal and bad. On the above facts, it was held by a learned single judge of this Court that since the nor, on attaining majority, did not avoid the sale toy a so within the period prescribed by Art. 44 (Old) of the Limitation Act, the defence of the transferee defendant was not sinkable 11. THE Madras case cited by Mr. Mukherjee, learned Advocate for the respondent, appears to have no direct bearing upon the instant case and it is, therefore, unnecessary to discuss it. 12. FROM the ratio of the decisions discussed above, it would appear that in order to avoid a transfer of the minor's property by his guardian, then minor must bring a suit to set aside the transfer within three years of his attaining majority, as prescribed by Art. 60 of the Limitation Act, unless he is in possession of the alienated property, the alienation notwithstanding, in which case such a suit will not be necessary and the right of the minor to the property will not be extinguished under Section 2,7 of the Limitation Act. In the instant case, it has been found by both the courts below and the finding is not challenged before me that the plaintiff obtained possession of the alienated property' from kanai, that he made the pan boroj on 08 decimals of land described in schedule 'kha' to the plaint and, in the year 1967, i. e., about eight years after his purchase, gave lease of the pan boroj to Kanai who executed the kabuliat (vide : ext. 2). The kabuliat was also found to have been acted upon as Kanai paid rents for three years after the lease. It has also been found by the courts below that the plaintiff is in possession of the remaining. 18 decimals of land described in schedule 'ga' to the plaint. Thoug Ratan is in possession of the pan boroj with his elder brother, Ranjit, his possession is that of a mere lessee under the plaintiff and not in his own right as the owner of the property. In such circumstance ratan, not having brought any suit to set aside the transfer within three years of his attaining majority, cannot now challenge the transfer which must bind him. 13. FOR the foregoing reasons, the contention of Mr. Mukherjee appearing on behalf of the appellants must be over-ruled. As no other ground has been urged by Mr. Mukherjee, the appeal fails. In the result, the appeal is dismissed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are affirmed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.