JUDGMENT The judgment or the Court was as follows : Roy, J.: This appeal was directed against the judgment and order dated 26th February, 1985, made in Civil Rule No. 13209(W) of 1983, by Justice Mrs. Khastgir, whereby, the learned Judges, on allowing an application dated 24th January, 1984, filed by the Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 in the writ petition before her and who are also Respondent Nos.2 to 6 in this appeal, vacated the interim order, as Was obtained by the writ petitioner appellant (hereinafter referred to the said petitioner), in the circumstances as indicated hereafter. 2. The said petitioner, who is appellant before us, moved and obtained the concerned Civil Rule on 31st December, 1983, challenging the validity of a decision dated 30tb December, 1983 made by the Respondent State Transport Appellate Tribunal, whereby the grant of a joint contract carriage (Mini Bus) permit in his favour and in favour of Respondent No. 11, on the route Siliguri to Galgalia (hereinafter referred to the said route), by the Respondent, Regional Transport Authority, Darjeeling, in respect of vehicle WGY 2847, which was also stated to be jointly owned by them, was set aside and cancelled. It should be noted that from the appearances of the learned Advocates either before the learned Trial Judge or before us, it appeared that all the Respondents, excepting Respondent No. 1, the Presiding Officer of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, have appeared and were duly represented in both the proceedings and in fact on the basis of the statements made by Mr. Majumder. We have recorded earlier on 20th March, 1985, while fixing the appeal for hearing, that he was appearing for Respondent Nos. 8 to 10, apart from recording the appearances by the other contesting Respondents. We also keep it on record that in a proceedings like the present one, the Tribunal do seldom enter appearance and such non-appearance in this case was also not fatal, as we had the advantage of looking at the order as impeached, which was produced, referred to and relied on by the parties. Mr. Majumder also produced the records of the Regional Transport Authority, before us and he made a statement that these records were also produced and placed before the learned Trial Judge. Mr. Majumder also produced the records of the Regional Transport Authority, before us and he made a statement that these records were also produced and placed before the learned Trial Judge. In fact, there was no dispute or any difference of opinion amongst the learned Advocates appearing before us on such production of the concerned records. 3. It was the case of the said petitioner that he and Respondent No.11, were and are the joint owners of a permanent Contract carriage (Mini Bus) permit, being No. 825/83, in respect of their vehicle WGY 2847 (hereinafter referred to as the said Bus) and pursuant to that permit, they were and arc plying on .he route Siliguri to Galgalia (hereinafter referred to as the said route) and vice versa. Such grant, according to the said petitioner, was received on 9th November, 1983. 4. The said petitioner has stated that on receipt of a notice as issued by the Respondent, Presiding Officer of the Tribunal, he and Respondent No. 11 came to know that the Respondent Nos. 2 to 7 in the writ petition, had filed a revision case against the grant of the concerned permit alleging that such grant, which was made in their favour, by way of circulation procedure, in terms of Rule 55 of the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rule, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules), was void and in colourable exercise of powers or in noncompliance with the necessary requirements of the said Rule inasmuch as the memorandum dated 17th June, 1983, by which the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority concerned sought for the opinion of the members of the concerned Regional Transport Authority, for the proposed grant of the concerned permit, was issued to 4 members only and not to the Chairman, who according to the applicants before the Tribunal was also required to be treated as a member of the concerned Regional Transport Authority and served. The said notice dated 17th June, 1983, was also stated to have been issued by the Secretary concerned, on receiving the application for the concerned permit for the said route dated 16th June, 1983. The said notice dated 17th June, 1983, was also stated to have been issued by the Secretary concerned, on receiving the application for the concerned permit for the said route dated 16th June, 1983. While on this point, it should be noted that section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) lays down the procedure of Regional Transport Authority, in considering application for contract carriage permit and requires, that a Regional Transport Authority shall, (in considering an application for) a contract carriage permit, have regard to the extent to which additional contract carriages may be necessary or desirable in the public interest; and shall also take into consideration any representations which may then be made or which may previously have been made by persons already holding contract carriage permits in the region or by any local authority or police authority in the region to the effect that the number of contract carriages for which permits have already been granted is sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region or any area within the region. The relevant Rules under the said section, would be Rules 54 and 55 of the said Rules. Rule 54 lays down or postulates the manner in which the conduct of business of a Transport Authority should be carried on and Rule 55 deals with application for contract carriage and private carrier's permits and how they are to be• dealt with and disposed of. Rule 55(2) states that upon receipt of an application for a contract carriage permit or for a private carrier's permit, the Secretary of the State or of the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, shall, if the -application is in order, with all reasonable despatch, circulate particulars thereof to members of the Authority together with an intimation whether the matter is to be decided at a meeting of the authority or upon procedure by circulation. In the latter case he shall intimate the date by which the votes of members are required to be received and Rule 55(b) requires that in deciding whether an application for a contract carriage permit or for a private carrier's permit is to be considered at a meeting of the Authority or upon procedure by circulation, the Chairman of a 'State or a Regional Transport Authority shall, without prejudice to the proper examination of the application and any enquiries necessary in connection therewith, have regard to the desirability of a voiding delay in the issue of such permits and shall so arrange its business that such permits shall normally be granted or refused within one month of the receipt of the application. 5. The said petitioner claimed and contended in writ petition that the allegations as made before the Respondent Tribunal by Respondent Nos. 2 to 7, were not only malafide, but they were baseless inasmuch as the concerned notice dated 17th June, 1983 was issued by the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority concerned, after due consultation with the Chairman of the same and such notice was also issued under the authority and/or supervision of the said Chairman, who again was the head of the administration of the Regional Transport Authority. From the statements as made by the said petitioner, it would also appear that the Respondent Nos.2 to 7 further alleged in their revision petition that there was no proper decision communicated to the members of the Regional Transport Authority concerned and there being no letter from the Chairman of such Authority, communicating his decision of the matter by circulation procedure, the grant of the concerned permit was also illegal, improper and without any valid authority. Those allegations were claimed to be baseless, false and malafide and it was stated by the said petitioner that the Regional Transport Authority concerned in this case is consisted of S members (3 official and 2 non official) and the Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling was and is the Chairman of the same and with the consent of the said Chairman, opinions of other 4 members were sought for by circulation procedure and that being the position, the question of obtaining further opinion of the Chairman concerned was not at all genmane. It was pointed out by the said petitioner that in this case. It was pointed out by the said petitioner that in this case. 3 members out of 4 gave their opinions and with the Chairman's consent, such opinion amounted to 4 out of 5 and that being the position, there was no illegality or any irregularity. 6. The said petitioner has also stated that those Respondents Nos. 2-7. in their revision proceedings further alleged there was no sanction for the said route as Galgalia is situated in the State of Bihar and as such, prior approval of the State Transport Authority, West Bengal, for the creation of the said route was necessary and that apart, further allegations were made, that there was no vacancy in the said route Siliguri to Galgalia. as the same was filled up by the grant of a permanent contract carriage (Mini Bus) permit by the R. T. A. concerned, to one Pulak Das. However the said petitioner bas stated that be and Respondent No.11 duly contested the revisional proceedings by claiming that the allegations as made by the Respondent Nos. 2 to 7, were baseless and it has been stated that it was also pointed out that Galgalia is situated in the Stale of West Bengal and not in the State of Bihar as claimed and as such, no prior approval of the said Transport Authority concerned, was required. It was the further case of the said petitioner that the entire route of Siliguri to Galgalia was and is situated within the State of West Bengal and Galgalia being one of the terminus of the said route near the border of Bihar is within the State of West Bengal. 7. It was the further case of the said petitioner that Respondent Nos.2 to 7 were and are admittedly owners of state carriages and that being the position, they were and are not in any way affected by the grant of the permit in respect of the said route to the said bus and furthermore when, the Regional Transport Authority concerned, issued the concerned permit in the public interest and that too, after complying with all and necessary formalities as required under the said Act. 8. 8. By his judgment dated 30th December, 1983, the learned Tribunal directed that the concerned permit as issued in respect of the said bus for the route Siliguri to Galgalia and vice versa, should be cancelled and the said petitioner claimed such order to be erroneous inasmuch as the Respondent Tribunal failed to take into account that the memo dated 17th June, 1983, as issued by the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority concerned, was issued under the supervision of the Chairman of the said authority and all the steps for granting the concerned permit in respect of the said bus for the said route, had been taken with the consent of the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority, Darjeeling. It has also been claimed that the Respondent Tribunal further prejudged the issues while passing the order as impeached or the order cancelling the permit as granted inasmuch as be failed to realise that the opinion of the members of the Regional Transport Authority concerned were and are exclusively of their own and that could be best judges by the members themselves. It was also claimed that the order as impeached was also made by the learned Tribunal in colourable exercise of powers inasmuch as he failed to consider that the Respondent Nos. 2 to 7 were and are operators of state carriages and could not in any way be affected by the grant as made in favour of the said bus for the concerned route. The determination as made by the learned Tribunal was also claimed to be perverse and not supported by the evidence on record. 9. Admittedly, against such determinations this Court, as mentioned hereinbefore, was moved on 31st. The determination as made by the learned Tribunal was also claimed to be perverse and not supported by the evidence on record. 9. Admittedly, against such determinations this Court, as mentioned hereinbefore, was moved on 31st. December, 1983 and the learned Judge, while issuing a Rule, was pleased to grant an interim order in terms of prayer (D) of the petition, by which it was prayed, that injunctions restraining the Respondents and/or each one of them, their servants and/or agents from cancelling the said permanent contract carriage (Mini Bus) permit being No.815/83 issued by the Secretary R.T.A. and/or front interfering in any manner with the plying of the vehicle (WBY 2847) by the petitioner in the-route Siliguri to Galgalia on the basis of the said permit No. 825/83, was passed for a temporary period with liberty to the petitioner to have the same stay order extended upon notice to the Respondent on the same application. The learned Judge, further directed the matter to be placed before the appropriate Bench on 19th January for further orders. He also directed that in the event the application for extension of interim order is not taken up on that date, the interim order will continue till the disposal of the application for extension and made the Rule returnable within four weeks after X-mas vacation. It would appear from the order sheet that on 27th January, 1984, in the presence of the learned Advocates appearing for the parties, directions regarding filing of affidavits were given and it was further directed that the interim order already granted, will continue till the disposal of the application. Such order was made by the C.K. Banerjee. J. 10. The said petitioner has also made statements amongst others that the Regional Transport Authority, in the instant case, did issue a notice under section 50 of the said Act, inviting objections from any person or persons as required under those provisions and the application for the concerned permit dated 17th June, 1983, in the statutory form was duly filed along with the requisite fee of Rs. 10/- in the office of Regional Transport Autbority concerned. It bas also been the further and categorical case, that prior to the granting of the concerned permit in respect of the said bus, another vehicle being No. WGY 2753 was plying as a contract carriage in the said route and the Respondent Nos. 10/- in the office of Regional Transport Autbority concerned. It bas also been the further and categorical case, that prior to the granting of the concerned permit in respect of the said bus, another vehicle being No. WGY 2753 was plying as a contract carriage in the said route and the Respondent Nos. 2-7, had not made any objection for placing the said vehicle WGY 2753 as a contract carriage in the said route and in fact, they had full knowledge of such plying of the said vehicle No. WGY 2753 in the said route. It has also been alleged that the Respondent Syndicate preferred the application dated 2nd September, 1982 to the Regional Transport Authority. Darjeeling, requesting them to fix the timing, inter alia, of the said vehicle WGY 2753 for its plying on the said route and that vehicle bad really plyed regularly on the •said route within the knowledge, consent and without any objection from Respondent Nos.2 Co 7. It has further been stated that the permit holder of the said vehicle No. WGY 2753, made an application to the R.T.A. concerned for placing that vehicle in another route viz. Siliguri to Panitanki instead of the said route, for reasons as disclosed in their application and on allowing the said application, the R.T.A. concerned, allowed the concerned vehicle to ply in the route Siliguri to Panitanki, on the basis of fresh permit and as a consequence thereof; a vacancy was created in the said route and that too as a result of the withdrawal of vehicle No. WGY 2753 and that necessitated the issuance of a new permit, for plying another vehicle in the said route for public interest. Such being the position, the said petitioner has claimed that the Respondent Nos. 2-7 could not really have any objection in the matter of plying of the said bus on the said route, in terms of the permit as granted. The said petitioner has also stated that in the proceedings in the Court below, a supplementary affidavit was also filed, establishing that the grant of the concerned permit in respect of the said bus for the said route was made and in fact, the same was necessary for the convenience of the commuters. The said petitioner has also stated that in the proceedings in the Court below, a supplementary affidavit was also filed, establishing that the grant of the concerned permit in respect of the said bus for the said route was made and in fact, the same was necessary for the convenience of the commuters. It was claimed that the benefit and convenience of the travelling public, being the first and foremost consideration under the said Act, no interference with the grant as made in this case, should have been made by the learned trial Judge. 11. After the order as made by C. K. Banerjee, J., there was an application filed by the Respondent Nos. 2-7 in the proceedings before the learned trial Judge for vacating, varying or modifying the inter m order as was issued, and subsisting in the proceeding. After hearing the parties. and their learned Advocates on their affidavits. by the impugned judgment and order dated 26th February, 1985 Justice Mrs. Khastgir has allowed the ,application and vacated the interim order. 12. It appeared that the Respondent Tribunal while passing its judgment. which was impeached in the writ proceedings, on consideration of the materials and arguments before him, came to the conclusion that the grant of the concerned permit on the said route upto Galgalia, was improper. as the sanction of the State Transport Authority was not obtain, since Galgalia according to the learned Tribunal, was in Bihar and as such. the laid permit was issued on an inter regional route, apart from holding, chat there was non compliance or inappropriate compliance of the concerned circulation procedure inasmuch as the notice in question was not sent to the Chairman of the R.T.A. concerned, by its Secretary. There was another point taken, regarding the maintainability of the revision application under section 64A of the said Act, at the instance of Siliguri Bus Syndicate and others, but such point was negatived by the learned Tribunal, on consideration of the evidence before him. 13. The learned trial Judge, in the judgment and order as impeached, has accepted the findings and observations of the learned Tribunal, so far the non compliance with the circulatory procedure was concerned. It has also been found that the application. 13. The learned trial Judge, in the judgment and order as impeached, has accepted the findings and observations of the learned Tribunal, so far the non compliance with the circulatory procedure was concerned. It has also been found that the application. which was filed by the owners of the said bus, was undated and although under Rule 59 or the said Rules, the concerned application was required to be addressed to the Secretary and not to Chairman, but no application was made to the Secretary of the R.T.A. concerned, and in fact, no notice, as required under section 50 of the said Act, was issued, as a result whereof, the Respondent Nos. 2-7 had no knowledge of the concerned application or the making of the same. The learned trial Judge has further recorded the fact and which was really the admitted fact, that on 16th June, 1983, the owners of the said bus, made their application and on the very next day i. e. on 17th June, 1983, the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority concerned, addressed a letter to 4 members only of the Regional Transport Authority, Darjeeling of the said application and sought for their opinion to the proposed grant of the concerned permit. It has also been noticed by the learned trial Judge, that the D.C. concerned, who was one of the members of the Regional Transport Authority, was not given or served such notice and on 26th July, 1983, the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. informed the owners of the said bus, that the said Regional Transport Authority was pleased to grant them a contract carriage permit for the said route and they were directed to place the vehicle within six months. The learned Judge has also categorically observed that the authorities concerned. in the instant case, proceeded under the procedure which is mentioned hereinbefore, is known as by circulation under Rules 54 and 55 of the said Rules. It has also been observed by the learned trial Judge, that no decision was really taken after receipt of the application from the owners of the said bus by the Regional Transport Authority concerned, as to whether the same should be decided at a meeting of the Regional Transport Authority or they would adopt the procedure by circulation. The learned Judge herself saw the original of the application, which was undated. The learned Judge herself saw the original of the application, which was undated. In fact, the original which was produced before us by Mr.Majumder, testified the fact there was no date given in the said application. Even then, the learned Judge has commented, that even if it was argued that the date of the application was 16th June, 1983, the very fact that on the next day, in a greater hurry, the application in question was sent for circulation and that too not having addressed to all members forming and constituting the Regional Transport Authority, would establish, that proper procedure was not followed. It has also been observed by the learned trial Judge that the notice in question, does not also indicate that the Secretary concerned was authorised to the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority to address the same and the Chairman was not shown as an addressee in the said notice. That being the position, the learned Judge has categorically found that there has been non compliance of Rule 54(d) and the learned Tribunal was justified in making the order in the manner, as the same was done. It has also been observed by the learned trial Judge, that the grant in favour of the owners of the said bus, was made on the around that they were unemployed persons and apart from the bold statements of "public purpose", there has been no statement available from the records that really the permit in question. was granted for such or any public purpose and the grant in question, was really made for extraneous cC1nsideration and not for public interest. 14. It should be noted that at the time of consideration of the application for stay of the impugned order, on 28th March, I 985, we had directed the early consideration and disposal of the appeal, as we thought at that time, that considering the nature of the dispute, the grant and the convenience of the travelling public as involved, every endeavour should be made to have the appeal disposed of. As such, we gave directions for expeditious filing of the paper-books and paper books have really been filed within time, of course, without incorporating the judgment of the learned trial Judge, as we were informed that the copy has not as yet been made available to the appellants, even though they have applied for the certified copy of the same under serial No. 3678 dated 27th February, 1985. For the reasons as aforesaid, we directed the lower Court records to be brought up before us and after giving inspection of the judgment as impeached, we have looked into the judgment and considered the same. 15. Mr. Gooptu, appearing in support of the appeal, after stating the facts of the concerned proceeding, submitted that notice under section 50 of the said Act, which was dated 17th June, 1983, was duly issued but it was the case of the Respondent Nos. 2-7 before the Respondent Tribunal that they have not received the same. A copy of the notice has been disclosed as Annexure "D" to the application for stay dated 28th February, 1985, as filed in this appeal. The said notice would show that on 17th June, 1983, the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, Darjeeling, published the same under section 50 of the said Act, for necessary information about the application for the grant of contract carriage permit for the said route as made by the owners of the said bus and by the same exceptions, if any, were directed to be filed with him, within a period of 30 days from the date of publication of the notice in the office notice board. It was pointed out by Mr. Gooptu, on a reference to the findings and observations by the learned Tribunal that the defence which was taken by the Respondent Nos. 2-7, that the said notice was not served or published, had no basis as the records as produced before the Respondent Tribunal, showed and established that the notice in question, was really published. Mr. Gooptu stated that even inspite of that fact, the Respondent Nos. 2-7 had not taken any exceptions and that being the position, and also in view of the findings of the Respondent Tribunal, there was no locus standi for those Respondent Nos. 2-7, to prefer the revisional application under section 64A of the said Act. Mr. Gooptu stated that even inspite of that fact, the Respondent Nos. 2-7 had not taken any exceptions and that being the position, and also in view of the findings of the Respondent Tribunal, there was no locus standi for those Respondent Nos. 2-7, to prefer the revisional application under section 64A of the said Act. In fact, this was his first sub-missions and he secondly submitted on a reference to the proceedings of the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority, Darjeeling, which has been disclosed as Annexure "E" to the Revision petition No. 18 of 1983, before the Respondent Tribunal, that the Respondent Nos.2-7 had due knowledge of the earlier resolution of the Regional Transport Authority concerned, about the plying of a contract carriage (Mini Bus) on the said route. He, in fact, stated on a reference to the resolution as indicated above, that it would appear that Sarbashree Nilmoni Mullick, M. L. Ghosh and P.K. Dey Sarkar had made an application which were considered along with a mass petition praying for permanent contract carriage (Mini Bus) permit for respective Toutes Siliguri to Galgalia (upto West Bengal border) vice versa and Siliguri to Panitanki and vice versa and on consideration of those applications and so also the representatives of Siliguri Bus Syndicate, who previously objected against the grant of any permit on those routes, they expressed their no objection subject to the condition that the vehicles to be placed should be of the specification of a Mini Bus and the R.T.A. concerned, should not grant any more permit on any economically viable routes so long as the Siliguri Bus Syndicate could provide sufficient number of trips to meet up the public demand. As such. it has been stated, it was decided to grant the contract carriers (Mini Buses) in question, in the interest of public service and that too agreeing with the views of the Siliguri Bus Syndicate. It was thirdly pointed by Mr. Gooptu that the submissions that the said route was an inter regional route, was not proper, as a part of Galgalla is within West Bengal and the said permit has been granted upto that portion. It was fourthly stated by Mr. It was thirdly pointed by Mr. Gooptu that the submissions that the said route was an inter regional route, was not proper, as a part of Galgalla is within West Bengal and the said permit has been granted upto that portion. It was fourthly stated by Mr. Gooptu that relevant findings of the Respondent Tribunal, not having been duly challenged and since the Respondents concerned had only challenged the timings, as were fixed in respect of the vehicle No. WGY 2753, on whose placement to the route Siliguri to Panitanki, there was a vacancy created in the said route and in such vacancy, the said buses has been granted the concerned permit, no interference with the grant should be made. In fact, no a reference to Annexure E to the application for stay dated 28th February. 1985 in this appeal, and whereby the Siliguri Bus Syndicate had made a request for changing the timings of the Mini Buses of Galgalia to Panitanki and had not taken any other exceptions, Mr. Gooptu submitted that the said Siliguri Bus Syndicate or their constituents viz. Respondent Nos. 2-7 would not be allowed to urge the points in which the said petitioner had succeeded before the learned trial Judge. It was Mr. Gooptu's specfic contentions that the Respondent Tribunal was wrong in its construction of the concerned routes and even though the notice dated 17th June, 1983, whereby the permit in question was sought to be granted by following the circulatory procedure cannot be hold to be improper for not serving or sending the same to the Chairman, as such Act of the Secretary of the R.T.A. concerned, was ultimately approved by the Chairman, no interference should have been made. It was further contended by Mr. Gooptu that the requirements of such service in the instant case were not mandatory, but they were directory and in any event because of the subsequent approval by the Chairman concerned. which would appear from the judgment of the learned Tribunal, there was substantial compliance with the concerned directory requirements. It was further contended by Mr. Gooptu that the requirements of such service in the instant case were not mandatory, but they were directory and in any event because of the subsequent approval by the Chairman concerned. which would appear from the judgment of the learned Tribunal, there was substantial compliance with the concerned directory requirements. It should be noted that before the Respondent Tribunal on production of the file of the authorities concerned in respect of the concerned permit for the said bus, it was sought to be pointed out that such grant, as made in favour of the owners of the said bus, was approved by the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority) Darjeeling. The Respondent 'Tribunal has of course found that, such approval would not mean that the provisions of law and the necessary Rules were not to be followed by the authority. It was Mr. Gooptu's specific submissions that the learned Tribunal was wrong in his findings as above and apart from that fact, he was wrong in holding that the concerned Rule or the requirements thereof, were mandatory. It was also found by the learned Tribunal that since the provisions of section 50 of the said Act were not complied with in the present case, the grant as made, was improper. Mr. Gooptu contended that such findings of the learned Tribunal, were not only wrong but in making them, the learned Tribunal was hypertechnical. 16. Section 63 of the said Act deals with validation of permit for use outside region in which granted. Mr. Gooptu contended that since a part of Galgalia is within West Bengal, so the grant as made by the Regional Transport Authority, Darjeeling, so far the permit is concerned, should be deemed to have been issued upto the territorial limits and jurisdiction of the said Regional Transport Authority, the moresowhen, there is no other legal evidence available. 17. Thereafter, and while on the question of the judgment and order as impeached, Mr. 17. Thereafter, and while on the question of the judgment and order as impeached, Mr. Gooptu, apart from putting forth the submissions as indicated herein before, also stated that the findings of the learned trial Judge, that the application of the owners of the said bus, was undated had no basis whatsoever, as there was not only no ground made out, but in fact, there was no such material on the point, before the Respondent Tribunal and in fact, such determination as made by the learned Trial Judge, were really on a new point and issue. Similar submissions were made by him, so far as the findings of the learned trial Judge in respect of the public purpose was concerned and then, in respect of the findings that there was no application filed by the owners concerned, of the said bus, to the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, Darjeeling, he contended that on the basis of the findings of the Respondent Tribunal, the Respondent Nos. 2-7 should not be heard to say or allowed to argue that notice under section 50 was neither served nor published. 18. That real issue in our view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, should be whether there was due, proper and legal circulation of the application, in terms of the said Act and the Rules, to all the members of the concerned committee and if any decision was required to be taken on such circulation, whether the same should be decided at a meeting by circulation. 19. The statutory form in which the application for a contract carriage permit is required to be made, is Form No. P. Co. P. A. and the application in the instant case, as was filed, bas been disclosed as Annexure B, to the application for stay as filed in this appeal. As mentioned earlier, the said application was dated 16th June, 1983 and the same was on the subject: prayer for granting contract carriage (Mini Bus) permit in favour of Shri Manish Ganguly and Shri Apurea Guha on the route Siliguri to Galgalia. Although the application as mentioned above was dated, but the original as indicated hereinbefore and which was looked into by the learned Trial Judge and so also by us, was undated. The permit in question has been disclosed as Annexure A to the said application daled28th February, 1985. Although the application as mentioned above was dated, but the original as indicated hereinbefore and which was looked into by the learned Trial Judge and so also by us, was undated. The permit in question has been disclosed as Annexure A to the said application daled28th February, 1985. On a reference to the receipt of Rs. 10/- which bas been disclosed as Annexure A to the affidavit-in-opposition dated 10th February, 1984, Mr. Gooptu contended that such receipt would also establish, not only the payment of Rs. 10/-, which was statutorily required to be paid or deposited along with the application, but there was really such an application, duly made, for which the said sum of Rs. 10/- as fee, was paid/deposited and which was accpted by the authorities concerned. It was his further and specific submissions that the learned trial Judge has not made proper determinations on the findings of the Respondent Tribunal on section 50. 20. While on the question of the directory or mandatory nature of the concerned provisions of the statute and the Rules, Mr. Gooptu referred to the case of (1) Sharifuddin v. Abdul Gani Lone, AIR 1980 SC 303 and that too for the purpose of necessary tests which are required to be applied for the purpose of finding out the mandatory or directory character of the provisions. He, in fact, made specific reference to the observations in paragraph 9, which has laid down that the difference between a mandatory rule and a directory rule is that while the former must be strictly observed, in the case of the letter substantial compliance may be sufficient to achieve the object regarding which the rule is enacted. Whenever a statute prescribes that particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow. Thereafter, the argument was taken up by Mr. Sen in the absence of Mr. Thereafter, the argument was taken up by Mr. Sen in the absence of Mr. Gooptu and he, on the basis of the determinations as indicated hereinbefore stated that since the Chairman in the instant case, had approved the action as taken, so there was substantial compliance with the provisions and Rules 54 and 55 of the said Rules, would not in effect strictly apply, as here in our case even though notice was not served on the Chairman, he had duly ratified the action a. taken, by his subsequent approval or alternatively by his subsequent approval by signing of the order. The learned Advocate appearing for Respondent Nos.2-7 of course claimed and contended that those submissions and so also the determinations as made in ( AIR 1980 SC 303 ) would have no application, as here in our case, notice was required to be served on all the members including the Chairman and the subsequent signing by him of the order, would not mean service on him. They also claimed that in the concerned notice, particulars. were not appropriately furnished and the same was not circulated to all members and in fact, the proceeding in the matter of grant of the concerned permit was taken up and disposed of even prior to 30 days, which was notified for filing exceptions, on the basis of the notice under section 50 of the said Act. Mr. Sen of course claimed that since no specific consequence has been provided for such non compliance, if any as in this case or for any non compliance of Rule 54(d), which postulates that in the event of procedure by circulation the Secretary shall send to each member of the Authority such particular of the matter as may be reasonably necessary in order to enable the members to arrive at a decision and shall specify the date by which the votes of members are to be received in the office of the Authority. Upon receipt of the votes of members as aforesaid, the Secretary shall lay the papers before the Chairman, who shall record the decision by endorsement on the form of application or other document, as the case may be, according to the votes received and the vote or votes cast by the Chairman. Upon receipt of the votes of members as aforesaid, the Secretary shall lay the papers before the Chairman, who shall record the decision by endorsement on the form of application or other document, as the case may be, according to the votes received and the vote or votes cast by the Chairman. The record of the votes cast shall be kept by the Secretary and shall not be available for inspection by any person save by a member of the Authority at regular; constituted meeting of the Authority. No decision shall be made upon procedure by circulation, if before the date by which the votes of members are required to reach the office of the Authority, not less than one-quarter of the members of the Authority by notice in writing to the Secretary demand that the matter be referred to meeting of the Authority and even if notice had not been given to each members of the Authority and the Chairman has taken the ultimate decision by endorsement, there was sufficient and substantial compliance and in fact, because of such acts or actions, there was no shortfall in the proceedings, for which any interference was required or would be needed. Therefore, his specific and categorical submissions was that here in this case, there was substantial compliance with Rules 54 and 55 of the said Rules, which in terms of the tests as laid down in AIR 1980 SC 303 , were directory and not mandatory. After this, Mr. Gooptu again took up his submissions and reiterated that there was substantial comp1iance with the concerned Rules, which were directory and not mandatory. To further argument his submissions on directory and mandatory character of the statutes, he referred to €raise on Statute Law, 7th Edition and reply on the topic "discretionary statutory duties" and on the basis of the observations therein and so also those in the case of (2) Middlesex Justices v. R, (1984) APP Case 757 submitted that statutes creating duly are only directory. Thereafter, Mr. Gooptu referred' to Maxwell Interpretation on Statutes, 12th Edition and referred to the Chapter containing "indications attributed to the legislative when it pressed none". Apart from relying on Halsbury 3rd. Edition dealing with the directory and mandatory provisions/character of a statute. Thereafter, Mr. Gooptu referred' to Maxwell Interpretation on Statutes, 12th Edition and referred to the Chapter containing "indications attributed to the legislative when it pressed none". Apart from relying on Halsbury 3rd. Edition dealing with the directory and mandatory provisions/character of a statute. It was his submissions on the basis of the incidence of interpretation that "shall" as used in the instant case, should mean "may" and as ' such also, the power which was required to be used was discretionary and not mandatory. Then, Mr. Gooptu made a reference to the case of (3) State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 , where it has been observed that the use of the word "shall" in a statute, though generally taken in a mandatory sense does not necessarily mean than in every case it shall have that effect that is to say, that unless the words of the statute are punctiliously followed, the proceeding or the outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid. On the other hand, it is not always correct to say that where the word "may" has been used, the statute is only permissible or directory in the sense that non-compliance with those provisions will not render the proceeding invalid. After this and for the purpose of finding out the tests as to whether non-compliance with the provisions of statute, would be penal or not, reference was made by Mr. Gooptu to the case of (4) Jagannath v. Jaswant Singh & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 210 where it has been observed amongst others that the general rule is well-settled that the statutory requirements of election law must be strictly observed and that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely 8tatutory proceeding unknown to the common law and that the court possessed no common law power. It is also, well-settled that it is a sound principle of natural justice that the success of a candidate who has won at an election could not be lightly interfered with and any petition seeking such inference must strictly conform to requirements of the law. None of these propositions, however, has any application if the special law itself confers authority on a Tribunal to proceed with a petition in accordance with certain procedure and when it does not state the consequences laid down by it. None of these propositions, however, has any application if the special law itself confers authority on a Tribunal to proceed with a petition in accordance with certain procedure and when it does not state the consequences laid down by it. It is always to be borne in mind that though the election of a successful candidate is not to be lightly interfered with, one of the essentials of that law is also to safeguard the purity of the election process and also to see that people do not got elected by flagrant breaches of that law or by corrupt practices. In cases where the election law does not prescribe the consequences or does not lay down penalty for non-compliance with certain procedural requirements of that law, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal entrusted with the trial of the case is not affected. Lastly, Mr. Gooptu contended that in order to make any inference in a matter like the present one or to find out whether the provisions of a statute is directory or mandatory, the legislative intent must be looked into and considered. To support such submissions, he relied on the decision in the case of (5) Banwarilal Agarwall v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 849 , where amongst others, it has been observed that no general rule can be laid down for deciding whether any particular provision in a statute is mandatory, meaning thereby that non-observance thereof involves the consequence of invalidity or only directory, i. e., a direction the non-observance of which does not entail the consequence of invalidity, whatever other consequences may occur. But in each case the Court has to decide the legislative intent. To decide this the Court has to consider not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statute the intended benefit to public of what is enjoined by the provisions and the material danger to the public by the contravention of the same. Apart from the above and over and above the submissions as recorded hereinbefore, Mr. To decide this the Court has to consider not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statute the intended benefit to public of what is enjoined by the provisions and the material danger to the public by the contravention of the same. Apart from the above and over and above the submissions as recorded hereinbefore, Mr. Gooptu contended that since a Rule has been issued, this court would not be justified in making a final determination or any determination, which would have the effect of finality at this interlocutory stage and at this stage, if at all, this court can consider the question of the right, if any existing, the balance of convenience and about the existence of a prima facie case only. It was his specific submissions that on the basis of those tests, there must not be any interference now and the Appeal Court can only direct the learned trial Judge, to have the original proceedings disposed of at an early date. 21. Mr. Majumder appearing for Respondent Nos. 8-10 apart from adopting the submissions of the appellant, claimed firstly, that the provisions of section 50 were complied with in the instant case. It was claimed secondly, by him that since no objection was taken by the Respondent Nos. 2-7, even though the notice in question was duly published, so they had no locus standi to move the respondent Tribunal- under section 64A of the said Act. It was submitted by him thirdly, on a reference to Rules 54 and 55 or on construction of them and testing those Rules in the facts and circumstances in the instant case that the proceedings were initiated by the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority concerned and in any event, the notice in question was not required to be served on him in the facts of this case. It was lastly and fourthly, claimed by Mr. Majumder that even though the grant as made was wrong, at this stage, this Court should not make any interference or direct any interference to be made, since that would prejudice the public policy and public interest as involved. 22. Mr. Tarun Kumar Roy. It was lastly and fourthly, claimed by Mr. Majumder that even though the grant as made was wrong, at this stage, this Court should not make any interference or direct any interference to be made, since that would prejudice the public policy and public interest as involved. 22. Mr. Tarun Kumar Roy. appearing for Respondent No.11, also adopted the submissions as recorded hereinbefore and it was also his submissions that since the writ as asked for, amongst others, was a Writ of Certiorari and if it is found that the findings of Respondent Tribunal are correct, then no interference can or should be made or must be directed. In fact, be stated that Tribunal's relevant findings on facts have not been challenged by the Respondent Nos. 2-7. He also adopted the submissions of Mr. Gooptu on the question of directory and mandatory nature of the concerned Rules and the procedure for circulation. The submissions on the power of the Court in interfering in a matter, where a writ of or a writ in the nature of Certiorari bas been asked for, is well-settled and the submissions of Mr. Roy in that view of the matter cannot be ignored in a proper case or they cannot be said to be not substantial at all. In support of his submissions, Mr. Roy placed reliance on the case of (6) P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology, AIR 1981 SC 789 , where departmental proceedings were started against A, a lecturer of a collage. He tendered a letter of apology and simultaneously a letter of resignation just when the proceedings were to commence. The resignation was accepted and It was to be effective from a subsequent date. Within a few days thereafter he was relieved from service on payment of all dues. A filed an appeal against the order to the State Government under section 20 alleging that his resignation was not voluntary. The Government appointed an inquiry officer but rejecting the enquiry report held that the resignation was not voluntary and ordered his reinstatement. Within a few days thereafter he was relieved from service on payment of all dues. A filed an appeal against the order to the State Government under section 20 alleging that his resignation was not voluntary. The Government appointed an inquiry officer but rejecting the enquiry report held that the resignation was not voluntary and ordered his reinstatement. In petition against this order filed by the College, the High Court quashed this order of the Government, by observing that the order of the High Court was beyond its jurisdiction under Article 226 and the High Court had transgressed its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by entering upon the merits of the controversy by embarking upon an enquiry into the facts as to whether or not the letter of resignation submitted by the appel1ant was voluntary. The question at issue as to whether the resignation was voluntary was a matter of inference to be drawn from other facts. The question involved was essentially one of fact. It cannot be questioned that the Government undoubtedly had the jurisdiction to draw its own conclusions upon the material before it. In fact, Mr. Roy made specific reference to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Judgment, which has observed that the Government was competent to come to the conclusion that it did upon the facts appearing on the record. The High Court could not speculate as to what were the 'circumstances' which out-weighed the finding recorded by the Additional Director of Technical Education holding that the appellant had voluntarily submitted his resignation. The fact remains that the report submitted by him was not accepted by the Government and it came to the conclusion that the letter of resignation could not be treated to be voluntary the Government was circumspect in viewing the circumstances surrounding the submission of the letter of resignation with certain amount of suspicion. The finding reached by the Government does not necessarily mean that the letter of resignation was obtained from the appellant under coercion. The finding reached by the Government does not necessarily mean that the letter of resignation was obtained from the appellant under coercion. It may well be that the appellant was acting under an element of compulsion for be had become a victim of the situation brought about by the holding of a departmental enquiry and if the appellant placed in such circumstances submitted a letter of resignation it would not necessarily give rise to an inference that his act in doing so was voluntary and the High Court has viewed the matter from a wrong perspective. In quashing the order of the Government the High Court observes that its finding is based on no evidence but proceeds on conjectures and surmises. In doing so, it ignores the long line of decisions starting from (7) T. C. Rasappa v. T. Nagappa, (1965) 1 SCR 250: AIR 1954 SC 440 laying down that the supervision of the High Court exercised through Writs of Certiorari goes on two points. One is the area of jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise, the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise. Such writs are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue then in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record and such act, commission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. It was rightly observed in Rasappa's Case that a Writ of Certiorary will not issue as a cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie to bring up an order on decision for re-hearing. It exists to correct error of law when revealed on the face of an order decision or irregularity or absence of or excess of jurisdiction when shown. 23. Mr. Dey, after placing form No.P.Co. P.A., as framed under Rule 59(a)(iii) of the said Rules, stated that there is no doubt that the intended application should be made in that from, which is a statutory one, but the application dated 16th June, 1983, Annexure 'A' to the affidavit-in-opposition dated 11th March, 1985 of the Respondent Nos. 2-7 would show that the same was not made in such statutory form but was made on a plane paper. 2-7 would show that the same was not made in such statutory form but was made on a plane paper. It was also Mr. Dey's contention that the concerned authority, was to decide and he satisfied the existence or otherwise of public interest under section 50 of the said Act, but such decision was not in fact taken or arrived at by them. It was the further contention of Mr. Dey that on a reference Rule 55 of the said Rules, the concerned application was not in form and order and on a reference to the pink form of the application as produced by Mr. Majumder, Mr. Dey further contended and pointed out that the same was undated and column 7 of the same was not duly filled up. That being the position, Mr. Dey further claimed the application in question, to be not in form. 24. The date of the application was in Annexure" A" as mentioned above, was 16th June, 1983 and by his Memo No. 903(N) MV dated 17th June, 1983, the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority concerned, informed all the members of the Committee, excepting the Chairman, about the application for the grant of permanent contract carriage (Mini Bus) permit on the said Route, by the owners of the said Bus, and asked for their opinion and on the same day i. e. 17th June, 1983, the said Secretary by another Memo No. 908/3/MV, issued a notice under section 50 of the said Act, inviting objections within 30 days from the date of publication of the same in the office notice board. The respondent Nos. 2-7 claimed that this notice was neither issued nor served or received by them, but the findings of the learned Tribunal is otherwise. It was Mr. Dey's specific contention that such simultaneous proceeding was bad, the moresowhen, the decision in respect of the grant, was taken without waiting for 30 days as above, which was the date for filing objections. Such grant of the concerned permit before the expiry of the period of 30 days to file objection, according to Mr. Dey, was an error apparent on the face of the records. 25. Mr. Such grant of the concerned permit before the expiry of the period of 30 days to file objection, according to Mr. Dey, was an error apparent on the face of the records. 25. Mr. Dey then contended that under section 50 of the said Act and Rule 55 of the said Rules, the Regional Transport Authority concerned, has two modes open to the grant of contract carriage and they may be, either in a meeting or by circulation. The first procedure according to Mr. Dey, should be deemed and considered to be the normal one and the other procedure, according to him, is a special procedure. In this case, admittedly the special procedure was restored to. The concerned notice, the particulars whereof have been indicated hereinbefore, has fully given the particulars of the applicants, secondly, the type and character of the vehicle, for which such application has been made and thirdly, the route for which the application has been filed. Mr. Dey claimed that by supplying these particulars in the concerned notice dated 17th June, 1983, the requirements of Rule 55 have not been complied with or satisfied. The asking of or insisting the opinion of the four members of the Committee, by the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority concerned, according to Mr. Dey, was not in conformity with Rule 55 of the said Rules, which according to him by sub-rule (a) requires, that on receipt of the concerned application, the Secretary of the appropriate authority, if such application is in order, without unnecessary delay, circulate particulars of the application in question, to the members of the concerned Authority, together with an intimation, whether the matter is to be decided at a meeting of the Authority or on circulation procedure and in case the latter procedure is decided to be followed, the members should be intimated about the date by which their votes are required to be cast or given. The above being the requirements of Rule 55(a), Mr. Dey pointed out that thus, there was no compliance with the requirements of the Rule inasmuch as, apart from the three notifications as indicated earlier, the other requirements of Rule 55(a) were not notified in or by the notice dated 17th June, 1983. The above being the requirements of Rule 55(a), Mr. Dey pointed out that thus, there was no compliance with the requirements of the Rule inasmuch as, apart from the three notifications as indicated earlier, the other requirements of Rule 55(a) were not notified in or by the notice dated 17th June, 1983. In short, he argued that the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority concerned, has asked for the opinion of some of the members and not all of them and such asking of the opinion, was not in conformity with Rule 55 of the said Rules. It should be noted that not only Rule 55(a), but also Rule 54 of the said Rules require, a date to be fixed by which the votes of the members, meaning thereby their opinion, should be received in the office of the Authority and here in this case, the notice in question is unfortunately, silent about such date, by which the members, who were served with the notice, were required to give their opinion. It is also clear that in terms of Rule 54(d), after such and necessary receipt of the opinion from the members of the committee, through the Secretary, the Chairman of the same, shall record the decision by endorsement on the form of the application or other documents, as the case may be, according to the votes received and the vote or votes cast by him, and apart from other formalities, the said Rule further requires that no decision shall be made on such circulation procedure, if before the date by which the votes of the members are required to reach the office of the Authority, not less than one quarter of the members of the Authority, by notice in writing to the Secretary, demand that the matter be referred to the meeting of the Authority. There is of course no evidence available in this case that such a demand was made. The word "such particulars" as used in Rule 54(d), according to Mr. Dey, would mean and require that in sending the matter for opinion of the members of the Committee, the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority concerned, should send the particulars, firstly regarding the desirability of the route and secondly, the necessity or the public interest' involved in the grant to be made. In this case, Mr. Dey, would mean and require that in sending the matter for opinion of the members of the Committee, the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority concerned, should send the particulars, firstly regarding the desirability of the route and secondly, the necessity or the public interest' involved in the grant to be made. In this case, Mr. Dey, on a reference to the notice claimed that neither of such requirement were satisfied under Rule 55(a) either of the procedures as mentioned above was permissible and as indicated, the procedure by circulation was adopted in this case. Mr. Dey further contended that even on such circulatory procedure, the members of the Committee, under or in terms of Rule 54(d) were required to cast their votes, but in this case, as a matter of fact, no vote was cast by them. Such casting of votes being possible in various ways and means including the expression of the intention of the members through their representation, it is difficult to hold that no vote was cast by the members, as from the records as produced by Mr. Majumder, it appeared that Mr. Gour Chakraborty, a member of the Committee, on 19th June, 1983, wrote his 'no objection' on the office copy of the notice dated 17th June, 1983, which was issued under Memo No. 909(4)/MV. Mr. Ratanlal Brahmin, another member of the Committee, by his undated letter being Serial No.5 in the records as produced, gave his "no objection" and similarly Shri S.K. Das, Executive Engineer, P.W.D. (Roads), Siliguri, another member of the Committee, by a letter of 20th June, 1983, Serial No.6 of the document, as kept in the file, gave his "no objection". In the records as' produced, of course there was no document or record available, showing that the other member, Shri A.K. Gooptu, Superintendent of Police, Darjeeling, to whom the notice was sent, had given any vote. Thus, from the records as produced, it appeared clear that out of the four addresses of the notice, three had given "no objection" to the proposal. There is no doubt and that too on the basis of the records as produced and made available, that a guist of the concerned application was served on four of the members and one of them as mentioned above did not cast his vote in either way. 26. Mr. There is no doubt and that too on the basis of the records as produced and made available, that a guist of the concerned application was served on four of the members and one of them as mentioned above did not cast his vote in either way. 26. Mr. Dey, thereafter submitted that the grant as made, was not proper, as in directing such grant to be made, on acceptance of the votes in the concerned circulation procedure the Chairman concerned, has not recorded or given due and appropriate reasons. Mr. Dey stated that under section 67(1) of the said Act, an application for a contract carriage permit or a private carriers permit may be made at any time, but while granting the permit, the Regional Transport Authority concerned, is required to record reasons in terms of the observations In the case of (8) Bherulal v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur & Ors., AIR 1977 Raj 29 , where it has been observed that the laconic order and sometimes even a one-line order by the Regional Transport Authority in granting the temporary permit creates problems in finding whether the R.T.A. had applied its mind and come to a firm finding that the traffic requirements required the grant of a temporary permit. Much time energy and avoidable litigation will be saved if the R.T.A., which is a quasi judicial authority was to take some pains to write a little more detailed order in granting or refusing temporary permit, so that the appellate revisional authority as well as the High Court may be in a position to appreciate the various considerations and reasons why a temporary permit was granted or refused. In the instant case the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority has directed the grant to be made only by endorsing "as proposed". Such disposal or the grant as made, was thus claimed by Mr. Dey, to be improper irregular and unauthorised. On a further reference to the order dated 26th July, 1983, granting the concerned permit to the owners of the said Bus in respect of the said Route, being Annexure "D" to his clients, affidavit-in-opposition dated 11th March, 1985, Mr. Such disposal or the grant as made, was thus claimed by Mr. Dey, to be improper irregular and unauthorised. On a further reference to the order dated 26th July, 1983, granting the concerned permit to the owners of the said Bus in respect of the said Route, being Annexure "D" to his clients, affidavit-in-opposition dated 11th March, 1985, Mr. Dey pointed out that it is strange that in the said communication, there has been no mention about the date of decision of the Regional Transport Authority concerned and the public purpose or such interest, has not also been indicated. Such being the admitted position, Mr. Dey also challenged the propriety and validity of the grant. 27. It was Mr. Dey's categorical submissions also that non-service of the procedure for circulation on the Chairman of the Committee was fatal, as by such non-service, necessary service on the committee was not duly made. The respective contentions of the parties on this aspect have been indicated hereinbefore. To augment his submissions on the point Mr. Dey placed reliance on the decision in the case of (9) Young v. Ladies Imperial Club Ltd., (1920) All ER (Reprint) 223. The Rules of the club in that case provided that, if the conduct of any member, either in or out of the club house, should, in the opinion of the executive committee, be injurious to the character and interests of the club, the committee should have power at once to suspend such member and to recommend her to resign, and if she should not resign within a month, she could then be expelled. The plaintiff, a member of the club, had certain differences with another member, A Mrs. L.,and, as a result of her conduct then, the secretary of the club wrote to her stating that the committee recommended her to resign. The plaintiff did not do so, and after a month had passed, a meeting of the members of the committee was called, save that no notice was sent to one member who sometime previously had intimated her desire to be relieved of the obligation to attend meetings of the committee. The notice summoning the meeting stated that the object of the meeting was "to report on and discuss the matter concerning the plaintiff) and Mrs. The notice summoning the meeting stated that the object of the meeting was "to report on and discuss the matter concerning the plaintiff) and Mrs. L. the committee passed a resolution that the plaintiff's name should be erased from the list of members, so that she ceased to be a member of the club. In an action by the plaintiff, for an injunction restraining the defendants from erasing her name and a declaration that she was still a member of the club and on those facts, it has been held that (i) every member of the committee should have been summoned to the meeting summoning could only be waived where it could not possibly have any result as whereas member was at such a distance that a summon could not reach him in time to allow him to communicate with the committee, or, possibly, in the case of illness, to grave, that the member affected could not request that the meeting be adjourned or express his views in writing if he knew sufficient of the matter to be discussed; the reasons for the member of the committee not being notified in the present case was quite inadequate; and, therefore, the meeting and the resolution passed there at were not valid, and the plaintiff was entitled to succeed; (ii) the notice summoning the meeting was insufficient; when the expulsion of a member of similar action was contemplated a more definite notice should be given as by such words as "to take such action as may be thought necessary under (the relevant rule of the club's rules)". 28. Thereafter, on a reference to the affidavit-in-opposition dated 2nd April, 1984, as filed in connection with the vacating application, Mr. Dey pointed out that the said bus was plying, not as a contract, but as a stage carriage on the said route and furthermore, the same was plying on the said Route beyond the West Bengal border and such manner and extent of plying was unauthorised under the said Act. It has also been stated that the Respondent Nos. 2-7 have plied and are plying on the said route within West Bengal. It bas also been alleged that the said bus picks up passengers beyond West Bengal border and charging fees for such journey from the passengers concerned. It has also been stated that the Respondent Nos. 2-7 have plied and are plying on the said route within West Bengal. It bas also been alleged that the said bus picks up passengers beyond West Bengal border and charging fees for such journey from the passengers concerned. It has also been stated that the appropriate authorities' under the said Act, have been informed about such irregular plying of the said bus, but these representations have produced no result. 29. Mr. Dey, thereafter referred to the records as produced by Mr. Majumdar and contended that the decision as taken to initiate the grant in favour of the owner of the said Bus with the note or endorsement "as proposed", as written by the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority concerned, was no determination at all in the eye of law or a proper order, in terms of the observations in the case of Bherulal v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur & Ors. (Supra). It was restated and re-argued by Mr. Dey that the offer letter dated 26th July, 1983, was not a proper, legal and valid one, as the same has not been in the tune of the requirements of the said Act and the said Rules. Mr. Dey, in support of his submissions, that there was no public need in the matter of the grant on the said Route, referred to the proceedings of the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority concerned, as held on 9th/10th August, 1983, while considering the application of one Subodh Chandra Mukherjee of Siliguri, for a permanent contract carriage permit, for the route Siliguri to Bauridanga. Such prayer was not acceeded to, as there was no demand from the general public of the locality, for introduction of the route. The above record has been disclosed as Annexure "G" to the affidavit-in-opposition of Respondent Nos. 2-7 dated 11th March, 1983. This document or record, in our view, would not be of any help or assistance to Mr. Dey, as firstly, there is no evidence that the route as involved is a part of the said Route or within the same and secondly, the offer letter in respect of the said bus for the said Route was issued much prior to 9th/10th August, 1983. Mr. Dey, as firstly, there is no evidence that the route as involved is a part of the said Route or within the same and secondly, the offer letter in respect of the said bus for the said Route was issued much prior to 9th/10th August, 1983. Mr. Dey, also on a reference to the said pleadings dated 11th March, 1983, submitted that at present and at all material times there was or is no dearth of vehicles in the said route and the existing number of vehicles are quite sufficient, if not so and if necessary, the said Respondent Nos. 2-7 can have their spare vehicles placed on the said Route. 30. It was Mr. Dey's specific contention that an application for a contract carriage may be made at any time under section 57(1) of the said Act, which is not the case in respect of a stage carriage. The application for a contract carriage is of course required to be made under the provisions of section 49 of the said Act, which provision were claimed by Mr. Dey, to be mandatory. He denied the submissions of Mr. Gooptu that the provisions of Rules 54 and 55 of the said Rules are directory and not mandatory and as such, if there was or has been substantial compliance with them, which according to Mr, Gooptu was the case in this proceeding, there would be no illegality or any irregularity, for which any interference would be possible. It was Mr. Dey's (specific and further submissions that since the circulatory notice dated 17th June, 1983, as issued by the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority was not inconformity of the requirements of Rule 54(d), so the submissions of Mr. Gooptu as mentioned above, testing on the basis of the determinations in the case of (10) In re: Presidential Election, 1974, AIR 1974 SC 1682 , to the effect that in determining the question whether a provision in mandatory or directory, the subject-matter, the importance of the provision, the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act will decide whether the provision is directory or mandatory. It is the duty of the courts to get at the real intention of the Legislature, would not hold good and furthermore 80, when in the instant case, on consideration of the provisions of the' said Act, the real intention of the Legislature should be held to be that due and appropriate notice to be served on the members of the Regional Transport Authority, including the Chairman of the same, in terms of Rule 54(d) read and considered with Rule 55 of the said Rules. It was Mr. Dey's further submissions that the use of the word "shall" in Rules 54(d) and 55(a) and (b) shows and establishes that the requirements under them are mandatory and not directory and that too in the context of the acts or actions as required to be taken. Those submissions were sought to be supplemented by Mr. Dey on a reference to the case of (11) Shri Rangaswami etc. & Ors. v. The Sagar Textile Mills (P) Ltd. & Anr., AIR 1977 SC'1516, where it has been observed that the word "may" is capable of meaning "must" or "shall" in the light of the context and where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word "may" which denotes, discretion should be construed to mean a command. Apart from the above, reference was made by Mr. Dey to Chapter 13 of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) and then, to the case of (12) Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normandin; (1917) AC 170, which has laid down the circumstances under which a statutory provision for the performance of a public duty should be treated as being merely directory. Thereafter, reference was made by Mr. Dey to Chapter XXIV and more particularly to section 262 of Crawford on Statutory Construction, which lays down that ordinarily the words "shal1" and "must" are mandatory, and the word "may" is directory, although they are often used inter-changeably in legislation. This use without regard to their literal meaning generally makes it necessary for the courts to resort to construction in order to discover the real intention of the legislature. Nevertheless, it will always be presumed by the court that the legislature intended to use the words in their usual and natural meaning. This use without regard to their literal meaning generally makes it necessary for the courts to resort to construction in order to discover the real intention of the legislature. Nevertheless, it will always be presumed by the court that the legislature intended to use the words in their usual and natural meaning. If such a meaning, however leads to absurdity, or great inconvenience, or for some other reason is clearly contrary to the obvious intention of the legislature, then words which ordinarily are mandatory in their nature will be construed as directory, or vice versa. In other words, if the language of the statute, considered as whole and with due regard to its nature and object, reveals that the legislature intended the words "shall" and "must" to be directory, they should be given that meaning. Similarly, under the same circumstances, the word "may" should be given a mandatory meaning and specifically where the statute concern the rights and interests of the public, or where third persons have a claim dejure that a power shall be exercised, or whenever something is directed to be done for the sake of justice or the public good, or is necessary to sustain the statute's constitutionality. 31. Yet the construction of mandatory words as directory and directory words as mandatory should not be lightly adopted. The opposite meaning should be unequivocally evidenced before it is accepted as the true meaning, otherwise, there is considerable danger that the legislative intent will be wholly or partially defeated. 31. While the words "shall", "must" are the ones generally involved in determining whether a statute is mandatory or merely permissive, there are other words and expressions which create the same problem and to which the same principles are equally applicable. For instance, chief among these less widely used words or expressions, are "shall have the power", "shall be lawful", "shall be the duty", "may and shall" or "shall and may" and words "authorised" and "ought". 33. While on the questions of the directory and mandatory nature of a Rule, Mr. Gooptu, apart from relying on Craies on Statute Law as mentioned hereinbefore, made further reference to the case of the Justices of the Peace for Middlesex -Vs- The Queen, (1884) 9 App. Cases 757. The main facts of that case were that, at the time when the Prison Act, 1877 (40 & 41) came into force. Gooptu, apart from relying on Craies on Statute Law as mentioned hereinbefore, made further reference to the case of the Justices of the Peace for Middlesex -Vs- The Queen, (1884) 9 App. Cases 757. The main facts of that case were that, at the time when the Prison Act, 1877 (40 & 41) came into force. C was the Governor of a prison which by that Act, was transferred to the Home Secretary. Upto that time, the County Justices had been the prison authority. Soon after the Act came into force, C retired, and the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury awarded him an annuity calculated upon 38th/60 of his salary and emoluments, or 1/60th per annum for thirty eight years; viz., 23/60ths for his twenty three years of actual service under the County Justices; with 10/60ths added for ten years, because he had retired for the purpose of faciliting improvements in the organisation of the prison department; 5/60ths added for five years under section 4 of the Superannuation Act, 1859 (22 Vict. C. 26). The Commissioners apportioned 28/60ths of the annuity to be paid by the County Justices out of the county rates, under sixty years of age, and was not incapacitated by illness or otherwise. The Commissioners did not make or lay before Parliament a special minute within the meaning of section 7 of the Superannuation Act, 1859 and on such fact, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal, it has been held. that the provision in section 7 of the Superannuation Act, 1869 as to a special minute was directory only; that the Commissioners had power to make the award under the Prison Act, 1877, section 36, and the Superannuation Act, 1859 as 2, 4 and 7 ; and that the County Justices were liable for the proportion charged upon them. In fact, Mr. In fact, Mr. Gooptu referred to the observations of Lord Black Bun, to the effect, that there is a numerous class of cases in which it has been held that certain provisions in Acts of Parliament are directory in the sense that they were not meant to be a condition precedent to the grant or whatever it may be, but a condition subsequent, a condition as to which the responsible persons may be blameable and punishable if they do not act upon it, but their not acting upon it shall not invalidate what they have done, third persons having nothing to do with that. While on such question as mentioned above, further reference was made by Mr. Gooptu, to Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd Edition), Volume-36, paragraph 656, which postulates the requirements which make as enactment directory or mandatory. It would appear that starting from the case of (13) Howard v. Bodington, (Ii77) PD 203 upto the case of (14) Philips v. Goff, (1886) 17 QBD 805 and thereafter, in the case of (15) Pope v. Clarke, (1953) 2 All ER 704, it has been the decision that where a statute requires an act to be done at or within a particular time, or in a particular manner, the question arises whether the validity of the act is affected by a failure to comply with what is prescribed. If it appears that Parliament intended disobedience to render the act invalid, the provision in question is described as "mandatory", "absolute", "inoperative" or "obligatory" if, on the other hand, compliance was not intended to govern the validity of what is done, the provision is said to be "directory" and on the basis the other celebrated decisions as mentioned, it bas also been observed that no universal rule can be laid down for determining whether provisions are mandatory or directory; in each case the intention of the legislature must be ascertained by looking at the whole scope of the statute and, in particular, at the importance of the provision in question in relation to the general object to be secured. Thus, it is not possible to generalise by reference to the nature of what is prescribed. Thus, it is not possible to generalise by reference to the nature of what is prescribed. No great reliance can be placed either, on the suggestion that provisions framed purely in affirmative language are normally construed as directory, though the converse proposition, that negative provisions are prima facie mandatory, would seem on principle, to be less open to oriticism and ultimately it has been pointed out, on the basis of other celebrated decisions, that although on universal rule can be laid down, provisions relating to the steps to be taken by the parties to legal proceedings in the widest sense have been construed with some regularity as mandatory, and it bas been observed that the practice bas been to construe provisions as no more than directory, if they relate to the performance of a public duty, and the case is such that to hold null and void, acts done In neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice, to person who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, without at the same time promoting the main object of the legislature. Mr. Gooptu further contended, that to find out the exact meaning of the word 'shall", as used in the provisions under consideration, the nature, design and consequence of the statute will have to be taken into consideration and to establish those submissions, he referred to Crawford on Statutory Construction and Interpretation of Laws, which in Article 269 lays down that as a general rule, a statute which specifies a time for the performance of an official duty will be construed as directory so far as the time for performance is concerned, especially where the statute fixed the time simply for convenience or orderly procedure. But there are various exceptions. For instance, the language may be such that the performance of the act within or at the specified time, is imperative. As a result, if the statute contains prohibitive or negative words relating to the time within which the act is to be performed, it will be considered mandatory. Furthermore, a statute may even make time, the essence of the official act. In such a case, the requirement as to the time of performance is also mandatory. Moreover, the consequences of failing to perform the official act within or at the designated time, may be considered, as indicative of the legislative. Furthermore, a statute may even make time, the essence of the official act. In such a case, the requirement as to the time of performance is also mandatory. Moreover, the consequences of failing to perform the official act within or at the designated time, may be considered, as indicative of the legislative. Even the nature of the act is entitled to consideration. 34 Furthermore, it may be asserted as a general rule, that where a statute imposes upon a public officer, the duty of performing some not relating to the interests of the public, and fixes a time for the doing of such act, the requirement as to time is to be regarded as directory, and not as a limitation of the exercise of the power, unless it contains negative words, denying the exercise of the power after the time named, or unless from the character of the act to be performed, the manner of its performance, or its effect upon public interests or private rights, it must be presumed that the legislature had in contemplation that the act bas better not be performed at all then be performed at any other time than that named. It should also be noted that Mr. Dey, in his usual fairness stated that the observations in paragraph 9 of the case of Sharif-Ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone (Supra), to which reference was made by Mr. Gooptu, even though wholesome, are distinguishable and they would not have any preferential application in this case than the other judgments as cited by him. 35. Mr. Dey further submitted that the defects as caused in this case, in not complying with the notice under section 50 of the said Act, cannot be cured, the more so when expression of opinions by the members as served were made before the expiry of the period stipulated, for filing objections by the said notice under section 50 of the said Act and such being the position, the submissions advanced by Mr. Gooptu on balance of convenience would not be available or would supply, and such submissions could have been appropriate, if the order as made, was otherwise valid. It was the categorical submission of Mr. Dey that the theory of balance of convenience must not be allowed to be applied or brought in, in a case where the order itself is invalid. Mr. It was the categorical submission of Mr. Dey that the theory of balance of convenience must not be allowed to be applied or brought in, in a case where the order itself is invalid. Mr. Dey also contended that section 50 of the said Act gives a substantial right or to protect the same and that being the position, it cannot be said that the Respondent Nos. 2-7 have no locus standi in this case, as urged by Mr. Gooptu, since they were and are interested and in fact were and are trying to protect their available rights under section 50 of the said Act. 36. The relevant facts and the submissions of the respective parties, on the basis of the findings of the Respondent Tribunal have been indicated hereinbefore. Admittedly, under the said Act read with the said Rules, it was and still is open to the Regional Transport Authority concerned, to consider the question of grant in respect of a contract carriage (Mini Bus), if the other formalities and perapherals are duly complied with and completed, firstly by a decision in open meeting, which is the normal procedure and secondly, by circulation, which is a special procedure. As indicated earlier, section 50 of the said Act lays down the procedure of Regional Transport authority, in considering application for contract carriage permit and Rule 54 of the said Rules lays down how the Transport authority should conduct their business and as indicated earlier, sub-rule (d) of the said Rules would be of a relevant consideration for this case. Rule 55 in its turn lays down the procedure for disposal of applications for contract carriage and private carrier's permits. It is an admitted fact that the application by the owners of the said bus, for a contract carriage for the said route, was made on 16th June, 1983 and the notice under section 50 of the said Act, inviting objections within the stipulated time as mentioned hereinbefore, was issued by the Secretary of the Regional Transport authority concerned, on 17th June, 1983. By such notice, 30 days time for filing representation was fixed from the publication of the concerned notice in the office notice board and by another notice of the same day, the said Secretary of the concerned authority, asked for the opinion of the four members of the Regional Transport authority, in connection with the proposed grant of the concerned permit. This notice was not admittedly served on the Chairman of the Committee. It should also be noted that a memo of 16th July, 1983, the owners of the said bus were informed that their application for the grant of contract carriage (Mini Bus) permit for the said route, was granted and they were directed to place the vehicle within six months of the issue of the said order. 37. On the basis of the pleadings and defence, either before the Respondent Tribunal or before the learned trial Judge and so also before us, we have got to determine first, as to whether the notice dated 17th June, 1983, which was served on four members of the concerned Committee and not on the other member viz. the Chairman of the said Committee, was proper or whether the same was in due and substantial compliance with the requirements of the provisions of the said Rules. The submissions of the authorities concerned viz. that there was no illegality or any irregularity committed by the Secretary of the Regional Transport authority concerned, in not serving the concerned notice on the Chairman of the Committee have been noted hereinbefore and on those facts and also on the other facts as available, viz., that the Chairman concerned has subsequently signed the proceedings, Mr. Gooptu contended that the defect, if any or if at all, has either been condoned or rectified and ratified by such subsequent signing by the Chairman concerned. In the event of procedure by circulation, Rule 54(d) of the said Rules requires Chat the Secretary shall send to each member of the authority such particulars of the matter as may be reasonably necessary, in order to enable members, meaning thereby, them, to arrive at a decision and shall specify the date, by which the votes of the members are to be received in the office of the authority. The said sub-rule further requires that upon receipt of the concerned votes as mentioned above, the Secretary shall lay the papers before the Chairman, who shall record the decision by endorsement on the form, of application or other documents, as the case may be, according to vote received and the vote or votes cast by him. The said sub-Rule(d). thus in our view requires and that too mandatorily, that in the event of procedure by circulation, the Secretary shall send such particulars of the matter as may be reasonably necessary, for the purpose of enabling the members to arrive at a decision to each member of the authority, after specifying the date by which the votes of the members are to be received in its office. The notice dated 17th June, 1983, the relevant particulars whereof have been indicated and disclosed hereinbefore, did not specify the particulars and satisfies the above tests. The said notice only indicates a bout the application as filed by the owners of the said bus, for the grant of a permanent contract carriage (Mini Bus) permit for the said route and has asked for the opinion of the four members of the concerned Committee and the five members, who composed the Committee, to inform about their opinion at their earliest convenience, the said notice was not thus addressed to the Chairman of the Committee concerned, although he was a member of the said Committee and has not also specified the date, by which the votes of the members are to be received in the office of the authority concerned. That being the position, in our view, there was admitted shortfall or short comings in the said notice or the same was not in due compliance with the provisions of Rule 54(d) of the said Rules. Rule 55(a) also postulates that on receipt of an application for a contract carriage permit (Mini Bus), the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority concerned, if such application is in order, without least possible delay, circulate particulars thereof, to members of the authority, together with an intimation whether the matter to be decided at the meeting of the authority or upon procedure by circulation and in case the decision, to have the matter decided by circulation, the said Secretary shall intimate the date by which the votes of members are required to be received. Thus, so far the fixing of the date for casting the votes by the members, was not also fixed in the instant case in terms of Rule 55 (a). That apart, the said Rule 55(a) requires the circulation and the particulars of the concerned application. Here in the instant case by the concerned in the date 17th June, 1983 same particulars have been given but not all. By all, we mean that such particulars as given by the owners of the said bus in this application. We cannot of course say or lay down that under any circumstances, the special procedure, to have the grant made through circulation, is not permissible and possible. The same is certainly possible in an appropriate case where exigencies of circumstances would justify and demand the same. 38. Under the normal procedure, in terms of section 60 of the said Act, a Regional Transport authority while considering an application for a contract carriage permit or the issue of the same, must have regard to the extent, to which the additional contract carriages must be necessary or deserve in public interest and shall take into consideration, any representation which may then be made or which may previously have been made by persons already holding contract carriage permit in the region or by any local authority or police authority in the region, to the effect that the number of contract carriages, for which permits have already been granted is sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region or any area within the region. In this case, Respondent Nos. 2-7 cannot certainly have any locus standi to file any objection or representation as owners of contract carriages as they are admittedly plyers of stage carriages. But Respondent No.2, Siliguri Bus Syndicate, which is a company registered under the Companies Act, can certainly claim to have the right and authority to object to the grant as sought to be made in favour of the owners of the said bus in the said route, as a local authority and that being the position, they can very easily claim to filed their representation in terms of the notice under section 50 of the said Act. It should be noted here that it was the claim and contention of Respondent Nos. 2-7 before us, that such notice under section 50 as disclosed, was neither published nor served on them. It should be noted here that it was the claim and contention of Respondent Nos. 2-7 before us, that such notice under section 50 as disclosed, was neither published nor served on them. Those submissions by the Respondents concerned cannot be acceded to, as the Respondent Tribunal, on consideration of facts and the available records before him, has come to the definite conclusion that such notice under section 50 was issued. That being the position, the complaint about non service or non-issuance of the notice under section 50 of the said Act, as raised by the Respondent Nos. 2-7, should fail. 39. But, one thing is certain that the notice under section 50 of the said Act and so also the other notice, to have the decision through the concerned circulatory process, were issued on the same date i.e.17th June, 1983, which was on the next day when the application by the owners of the said bus, for the said route, was received. If that is so and when it is an admitted fact that such notice was issued, the authority concerned in our view, should have waited for the representations to be received. 40. Before making our determination on the other facts, we must also record that the learned trial Judge bad the occasion to look into the file as produced by the Regional Transport Authority concerned, which bas also been produced before us and from there, it appeared that the application by the owners of the said bus, for the said route was certainly not a dated one and it was merely stated in that application, which was in the pink coloured form and were particularly in column-7, that such application was made for the interest of the public. The form of such application is P.C. P.A. as framed under Rule 59(a)(iii) of the said Rules and item 7, requires the mentioning of 'particulars of service to be performed by the contract carriage (not necessary in case of a motor cab), and the manner in which it is claimed that the public convenience will be served. "Such application under Rule 59 is mandatorily required to be addressed to the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. But, in the instant case, the same was addressed to the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority, Darjeeling. "Such application under Rule 59 is mandatorily required to be addressed to the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. But, in the instant case, the same was addressed to the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority, Darjeeling. That being the position, we also find and hold that the application in question, as filed by the owners of the said bus, for the said route, was not also in form, more particularly when the same was statutorily required to be addressed to the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority. 41. There is no doubt or any dispute that the Regional Transport Authority, Darjeeling, consist of five members, three official and two non official and the Deputy Commissioner is one of the members of the said authority, who was not served with the notice as mentioned above and such notice was issued by the Secretary concerned to four members only. We have mentioned earlier that the Chairman does not figure as an addresses of the concerned notice dated 17th June, 1983, although he was and still is the members of the Regional Transport Authority, Darjeeling and as such, agreeing with the findings of the learned trial Judge and so also that of the Respondent Tribunal on that issue, must succeed. 42. It should also be noted that Rule 53 of the said Rules, lay down the manner and procedure how the Chairman of the Authority is appointed, and we have indicated hereinbefore, our views in respect of Rule 54(d) or the compliance with the same, as needed. On our findings on Rule 54(d), we do not agree with the submissions of Mr. Gooptu that the notice is question was not required to be issued or addressed and served on the Chairman concerned, as the matter was initiated from his end the said Chairman occupied special position in the Authority or that no compliance, as held by us, was needed or necessary, as the proceeding was ultimately signed by him, the effect whereof was, to cure, rectify and ratify the defect, if any. The Chairman concerned, no doubt has ultimately approved of the auction, but that to our mind, should not mean. that the requirements of law of the statutory provisions as indicated hereinbefore, were or are not required to be followed or complied with. The Chairman concerned, no doubt has ultimately approved of the auction, but that to our mind, should not mean. that the requirements of law of the statutory provisions as indicated hereinbefore, were or are not required to be followed or complied with. We have also indicated our views on section 50 of the said Act and the compliance as required thereunder and on such findings, we have no other way but to accept the observations as made by the learned Tribunal, which have also been upheld and approved by the learned trial Judge. We also agree with the determinations of the learned trial Judge that all steps in the matter of having the matter disposed of through the circulatory process, were taken in hot haste or in great hurry and it is strange that in the relevant and concerned circulatory notice, it has not been mentioned or indicated that the Secretary concerned was authorised by the Chairman of the Authority to issue and address the same in such manner as disclosed hereinbefore. In fact, the records as produced showed and established that the Secretary concerned, after narrating the facts of the case, on 11th June, 1983 recorded, "(1) Opinion of R.T.A. members as per B.M. Rule 1940, Rule 54(d) may be sought, and (3) notice for 30 days inviting objections may be issued" and on that date, the said Secretary has further recorded that "Letter seeking opinion of members R.T.A. and notice u/s. 50 prepared and put up F.F.O. signature." Then, on 1.7.83, under the signature the Secretary, particulars regarding the objections as received from the 3 members of the concerned authority have been recorded and it has also been recorded that notice under section 50 of the said Act, has also been published under the office Memo No. 908/3/MV dated 17.6.83 if app. prayer for grant for permit may be considered after the period of objection for 30 days in connection with the notice under section 50 is over. Thereafter, it would appear from the notings of the concerned Secretary dated 18.7.83, that notice under section 50 has been published under this office Memo No. 908/3/MV dated 17.6.83 and no objection/representation reed till today if app. contract carriage (Mini Bus) permit to be issued now as all the formalities has been observed for which pages 1 and 2 of the note-sheet may kindly be perused. contract carriage (Mini Bus) permit to be issued now as all the formalities has been observed for which pages 1 and 2 of the note-sheet may kindly be perused. On the basis of the above notings, the Chairman has on 25th July, 1983 has given the sanction by writing "as proposed". the learned trial Judge has also commented after looking at the records or doing through them, that from the records it would indicate that apart from a bald statement of "public purpose" that such permit was granted for public purpose and the reasons for such grant for such public purpose was not mentioned. Observing as such and upholding the contentions as the learned Advocates for Respondent Nos. 2-7 and as appearing before her, the learned trial Judge has also observed that the permit in question was granted for extraneous considerations and not for public interest. We also do not find any justification to disagree with such findings of the learned trial Judge. 43. The next question which we shall have to consider and determine, as to whether the provisions of the service of notice on the members of the Authority, are directory or mandatory and if at all, whether there has been a substantial compliance in this case. On the basis of the determination in Re: Presidential Election (Supra) and those in Shri Rangaswami etc. & Ors. v. The Sagar Textile Mills (P) Ltd. & Anr. (Supra) and the observations in Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normandin (Supra) there is no doubt that to find out whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory, the subject-matter, the importance of the provisions, the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, will have to be found out and considered, apart from finding out whether the concerned statute makes provisions for the performance of a public duty. To find out the exigencies as above, the legislative intent will also have to be found out and that in our view, can also be considered in the matter of finding out whether the provisions of a statute are directory or mandatory. To find out the exigencies as above, the legislative intent will also have to be found out and that in our view, can also be considered in the matter of finding out whether the provisions of a statute are directory or mandatory. Since in this case, the provisions of a statute as indicated hereinbefore do require that certain acts will have to be done in terms of a particular procedure as required to be followed, so the provisions under Rule 54(d) and Rule 55, in so far as they relate to the service of notice on members of the Authority, in our view, should be held and found to be mandatory and not directory. Thus, we hold that since the mandatory requirements of the Rules have not been followed or complied with duly, so the very initiation of the circulatory process, which ultimately culminated to the grant of the concerned permit to the owners of the said bus for the said route should be deemed to be void, irregular, improper, unauthorised and without jurisdiction. On the basis of the language of the Rules, we are also of the view that it was also imperative on the Secretary of the Authority concerned, firstly to have the necessary sanction for such circulatory process as involved from the Chairman of the Authority and thereafter, the concerned notice should have been served to all the members, including the said Chairman, as he was a constituent member of the Authority. We feel and observe that the subsequent approval as given by the Chairman concerned, without otherwise recording his reasons, to the grant as made, has made not remedied, rectified or ratified the earlier action, the more so when, the same in our view was void ab initio. The observation in Sherif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone (Supra), to which reference was made by Mr. Gooptu, in out view and that too in the facts and circumstances of the case, are distinguishable. We also feel that the use of the word "shall", in the places as indicated in the sections and Rules as mentioned above, also make those provisions mandatory and not directory. 44. Gooptu, in out view and that too in the facts and circumstances of the case, are distinguishable. We also feel that the use of the word "shall", in the places as indicated in the sections and Rules as mentioned above, also make those provisions mandatory and not directory. 44. Above being the position, there is no doubt that the grant as made in favour of the owners of the said bus and for the said route, was void, ab initio, unauthorised and absolutely without jurisdiction and that being the position, the other submissions of Mr. Gooptu, on the question of balance of convenience in our view would not be available. Those submissions of Mr. Gooptu, could have been appropriate, if the order as made, was otherwise valid. The Rule of balance of convenience we feel should not be made available in a case like this, where the initial action is void and absolutely without jurisdiction and unauthorised. We have observed earlier that section 50 of the said Act gives a substantial right, if not to all the Respondent Nos. 2-7 in this case but at least to Respondent No.2, viz., the Siliguri Bus Syndicate and that being the position, the said Respondent No.2 will certainly have the right to challenge ,he grant as made in the instant case, in view of the character of such grant and the circumstances in which the same was made. Thus, the submissions of Mr. Gooptu on the question of balance of convenience and locus Handi should fail. 45. For the views as above, the submissions as put forward by the appellants cannot be accepted and as such, this appeal must fail and we order accordingly. The appeal is thus dismissed. There will be no order for costs. 46. Not the question should be as to in what form, we should make the order. 45. For the views as above, the submissions as put forward by the appellants cannot be accepted and as such, this appeal must fail and we order accordingly. The appeal is thus dismissed. There will be no order for costs. 46. Not the question should be as to in what form, we should make the order. The effect of the order as made by us, in our view would virtually dispose of the Rule and that being the position, we direct the file of Civil Rule No. 13209(W) of 1983 be placed before the appropriate Bench for necessary order we however keep it on record that the order as made by us, would not create any prejudice for the authorities concerned to consider the question of the grant in respect of the said route now, if so advised, in accordance with law, which should, in our view, also include the determination to be made, after disposal of any exception to the grant, if duly received. We also keep this on record that we have not made any determination on the allegations or the said Bus's plying to the Bihar part of Galgalia, as we are of the view that since R.T.A., Darjeeling has issued the permit on the said Route, which is not an inter-regional one, they should take appropriate steps in the case of such violation. The prayer for stay is refused. Sengupta, J.: I agree.