JUDGMENT N. Goyal, J. - Late Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena had taken a structure consisting of Municipal Nos. 243, 244 and 245 or, rent from one Raizada. It consisted of a ground floor and first floor. The Municipal numbers 243, and 245 were on the ground floor while Municipal No. 244 was on the first floor. In other words, the structure consisting of Municipal No. 244 was just above Municipal Nos. 243 and 245. In Municipal No. 245 Dr. Saxena used to have his clinic and medical store while in No. 244 he used to reside with his family. 2 The landlord Sri Raizada transferred the property to Bishmbhar Nath Bajpai and Mohammad Yusuf, opposite parties 3 and respectively Bajpai got the shop No. 245 and the portion of the house No 244, winch was immediately above the shop 245, while Yusuf got a shop 243 (which was not under the tenancy of Saxena) and the portion of the house No. 2 which was above No. 243, 3 Dr Saxena had his own residential house which was under the tenancy of a third person. He got that house vacated under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No 13 of 1972, on the ground of his personal need. hereafter moved into that house but did not vacate the house No 2 Thereupon the two new landlords, namely, Bajpa, and Yusuf, moved the Di net Magistrate',, Rent Control ft Eviction Officer (exercising the powers of the District Magistrate) for declaring the house No. 244 to be vacant. While the proceedings were pending before the Rent Control & Eviction Officer, Dr. Saxena died and the petitioners were brought on record as his legal representatives. After hearing the parties the Rent Control & Eviction Officer declared house No. 244 to be vacant, and further, on the release application of the new landlords, released the respective portion of that house which had been purchased by them in the, favour Shop No. 245 continues without dispute to remain with the petitioners. 4. Against this order the petitioners preferred a revision in the court of District Judge. The IV Additional District Judge, to Whom the revision was transferred dismissed the revision. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. 4. Against this order the petitioners preferred a revision in the court of District Judge. The IV Additional District Judge, to Whom the revision was transferred dismissed the revision. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. Both, the Rent Control & Eviction Officer and the Additional District Judge, have held that the new landlords, namely, Bajpat and Yusuf, have genuine personal need and that the respective portion of the house No. 244 should be released in their favour. This finding of fact does not suffer from any manifest error and there is no ground for interference with the same in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has, however, contended that in as much as the petitioners' tenancy over Municipal Nos. 244 and 245 was one composite tenancy, it was not open to the District Magistrate to have declared part of the building under tenancy to be vacant under Section 12(3) of the Act or to have released such part in favour of the respective landlords. It was necessary for the District Magistrate to have determined whether the tenancy as whole was in respect of a residential building or not, and it was only if the same was in respect of a residential building that the question of declaration of vacancy under Section 12 could arise. It has also been argued that it was not permissible under the Act to split the tenancy of a tenant in the manner it has been done in this case. 7. It is no doubt true that under the general law, namely, under the Transfer of Property Act tenancy cannot be determined in part. It cannot be split except with the consent of parties. The landlord by his unilateral act cannot determine tenancy in respect of a portion of the demised premises. The old Act, namely, U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947, also did not contain any provision for splitting of tenancy or for allotment of a portion of demised premises in favour of a new tenant or for release of such portion in favour of the landlord. 8. The authorities below have, however, held that under the new Act (No. 13 of 1972) such splitting is permissible. This view has been assailed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 9. 8. The authorities below have, however, held that under the new Act (No. 13 of 1972) such splitting is permissible. This view has been assailed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 9. Section 12 (1) opens with the following words; A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or apart thereof after etc. (underlining added) 10. This clearly implies that a tenant can be deemed to have ceased to occupy a part of the building under his tenancy. Learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to persuade me to hold that expression 'part' herein means to cover only those cases where the tenant has under his tenancy a part of a bigger structure and that part is a 'building' under his tenancy. This contention needs only to be noted in order to be rejected. The language of Section 12(1) cannot admit of any such interpretation. It clearly speaks of a tenant of a building and thereafter of the building or a part thereof. The building of which a person is the tenant, although it may be a part of a bigger structure, is itself a building as denned in Section 3(1) of the Act inasmuch as it is roofed structure. When the legislature expressly speaks thereafter of the tenant vacating a part thereof by removing his effects therefrom or by allowing it to be occupied by any person who is not a part of his family, and so on, it is clearly implied that what was referred to was a part of the part or whole which was under the tenancy of the tenant. 11. Section 16(1)(a) as well as (b) also speak of any building. These provisions clearly empower to the District Magistrate to release not only the whole of such building which has fallen vacant (which may be part of a bigger structure, or the whole structure itself) but also any part thereof. Section 2i (1)(a) as well as subsection (5) also speak of release of part of the demised premises. It is only in the case of a suit which can be filed under Section 20 after termination of tenancy that there is no scope for splitting of tenancy. In all other cases, namely, Sections 12, 16 and 21, splitting of tenancy is permissible. 12. It is only in the case of a suit which can be filed under Section 20 after termination of tenancy that there is no scope for splitting of tenancy. In all other cases, namely, Sections 12, 16 and 21, splitting of tenancy is permissible. 12. It is true that subsections (2), (3), (3A) and 3B) of Section 12 do not expressly refer to a part of the building under tenancy. But we have to read the Section 12 as a whole. If we go on to read subsection (4) of the same section, we find that it is expressly provided that any building or a part which the landlord or tenant has ceased to occcupy within the meaning of subsection (1) or subsection (2) or subsection (3) etc. shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be deemed to be vacant. This implies that the legislature contemplated even in respect of subsection (2), (3), (3A) and (3B) that part of the demised premises could be declared vacant. This also follows from the language of Section 16 already Deferred to. This interpretation, in my opinion, will be consistent with the legislative policy underlying Section 12. The philosophy behind these provisions is that in eases where the need of a tenant or even of an owner, in respect of the whole or part of any building, is demonstrably diminished to |a substantial extent that building or part, as the case may be, should be| thrown open into the poll for being available to more needy persons, may be I a new tenant or the landlord himself, in accordance with the provisions of Section 16. It will therefore be illogical and absurd to confine the provisions of subsections (2), (3), (3A) and (3B) to case where the entire building was let out for one purpose only and where, further, the entire building has become redundant from the point of view of the existing occupant's need. 13. In this view of the matter I find myself in complete agreement with the view taken by the authorities below that vacancy can be declared in respect of a part of the demised premises under Section 12(3) and a release can also be ordered in respect of such part of demised premises. 14. 13. In this view of the matter I find myself in complete agreement with the view taken by the authorities below that vacancy can be declared in respect of a part of the demised premises under Section 12(3) and a release can also be ordered in respect of such part of demised premises. 14. As for the further contention that subsection (3) of Section 12 applies only where the demised premises were taken for residential purposes only or where they were taken mainly for residential purposes, it is to be noted that it has been held by the two authorities below that the two portions, namely, the ground floor and the first floor, are structurally totally independent. This finding is indeed supported by the petitioner's own admission in their application dated 1071980 (annexure I tothe writ petition), in para 2 whereof it was clearly stated that the residential house was situate on the first floor while the shop was situate on the ground floor. In view of this express admission the finding recorded in this behalf cannot be taken exception to. As held above, vacancy could be declared in respect of a part of the demised premises if that part be a residential part, under subsection (3) of Section 12; or, for the matter of that, in respect of a nonresidential part under subsection (25 of that section. 15. In view of the above, I find no force in this writ petition which is hereby dismissed with costs. [Petition dismissed.]