Judgment This is a revision petition against the order of acquittal by one of the victims (P.W.1). The case of the prosecution was that the victims, viz., Thomas and his wife Annamariyal were members of a Scheduled Caste and that the accused, nine in number, have formed themselves into an unlawful assembly in order to annoy those two persons and have insulted them. Charges were, therefore, framed under Section 147, Indian Penal Code and Section 7(1) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act. The trial Court by judgment dated 20.10.1983, found that the charge under Section 147, Indian Penal Code was not proved and convicted eight accused, to the exclusion of the ninth one, for an offence under Section 4 of the Act, rejecting the plea of the accused that the victims were Christians and therefore, were not members of a Scheduled Caste. 2. The Appellate Court, viz., the Sessions Court of Ramanathapuram at Madurai, found that the victims were Christians and accordingly held that they were not entitled to the protection under the Act. This is a finding of fact which cannot be reversed in a revision petition against an order of acquittal. Learned Counsel for the revision petitioner has not pointed out any instance of gross mis-carriage of justice as the ones listed by the Supreme Court in Chinnaswamy v. State of A.P., (1963) 3 S.C.R. 412 : A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1788 and Akala Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, (1974) M.L.J. (Crl.) 168 or any instances similar thereto. 3. Learned Counsel for the revision petitioner however, would point out that the appellate Court has committed a grave error of law in not applying Section 12 of the Act to the facts of the case. As per the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner, whenever there is a prosecution for an offence under the Act, there would be a presumption that the victims are members of a Scheduled Caste. As per the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner, whenever there is a prosecution for an offence under the Act, there would be a presumption that the victims are members of a Scheduled Caste. But that is not what is embodied in Section 12 of the Act, which reads as follows: “Where any act constituting an offence under this Act is committed in relation to a member of a Scheduled Caste, the Court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved that such act was committed on the ground of”untouchability“.” From a reading of the above text, it will be clear that the presumption is not in relation to the status of the victim, but in relation to the ground on which the offence was committed. Once it is proved or not disputed that the victim is a member of the Scheduled Caste, if acts, as the ones contemplated for instance in Section 4 or Section 7(1) of the Act, are committed, the Court has to presume that those acts, like insult or refusal of access to a shop, were done on the ground of untouchability. Therefore, the scope of presumption is entirely different from what the learned Counsel would contend it to be. 4. Further, it is noticed that in this case, though the charge was under Section 7 of the Act, the trial Court has convicted the accused for an offence under Section 4 of the Act. Learned Counsel for the revision petitioner would say that the original charge was under Section 7(1) (d) of the Act and that they were convicted for an offence under Section 4 (viii) of the Act. The offence under Section 7(i)(d) is insult on the ground of untouchability. The offence under Section 4 (viii) is the enforcement of disability with regard to occupation of any residential premises in any locality on the ground of untouchability. These are two distinct, different offences. The Court cannot convict a person for an offence for which he was not charged, except in the circumstances mentioned in Sections 221 and 222, Criminal Procedure Code. The trial Court has not indicated that such circumstances existed and in view of the different nature of the offences such circumstances obviously do not exist in this case. For that reason also, the conviction imposed by the trial Court was bad. The trial Court has not indicated that such circumstances existed and in view of the different nature of the offences such circumstances obviously do not exist in this case. For that reason also, the conviction imposed by the trial Court was bad. I do not, therefore, find any reason to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the Appellate Court. This revision petition is dismissed.