JUDGMENT - S.J. DESHPANDE, J.:---The plaintiff has filed this revision challenging the order dated 30th July, 1982 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nanded in Civil Suit No. 10 of 1976 by which the learned Judge set aside the record of compromise made by the learned Judge on 28th July, 1976. He further ordered that the suit to proceed according to law. 2. The plaintiff had filed a suit against two defendants claiming recovery of possession on the ground that the plaintiff is the adopted son of deceased Dattram and defendant No. 2 who happens to be daughter-in-law of defendant No. 1, is denying his title. Defendant No. 1 is the mother of deceased Dattram. Both the defendants are disputing the title of the plaintiff who is the adopted son of deceased Dattram. It was alleged by the plaintiff that defendant No. 2 falsely claimed to be the wife of deceased Dattram. In fact, she was not related to Dattram at all. Dattram never met defendant No. 2. 3. It was also disclosed by the plaintiff that defendant No. 1 had filed a Civil Suit No. 52 of 1974 against defendant No. 2 claiming possession and ownership of certain lands and which was pending in the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Hadgaon. The plaintiff claimed that he alone is the owner and entitled to possession of the lands belongings to deceased Dattram. He also relied on a wall and prayed for a decree of possession of the suit lands. This suit was filed on 14th February, 1976. 4. During the pendency of this suit, on 28th July, 1976, a compromise was arrived at between the parties. The terms of the compromise were reduced to writing. The compromise was filed by the concerned Advocates. It bears the signature of the plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 has put her thumb mark on the compromise. The summary of the compromise shows that deceased Dattram adopted the present plaintiff on 14-8-1974. As Dattram was suffering from T.B., he was taken to the hospital at Pune for the treatment of that disease, where he died. Before leaving for Pune, the said Dattram had executed a Will dated 22nd August, 1974 in favour of the present plaintiff and by which, he conferred all rights of ownership in regard to the property upon the plaintiff. 5. Before leaving for Pune, the said Dattram had executed a Will dated 22nd August, 1974 in favour of the present plaintiff and by which, he conferred all rights of ownership in regard to the property upon the plaintiff. 5. Paragraph 5 of the terms of the compromise mentions that defendants No. 1 was to remain in possession of Survey No. 76 of Mouza Walki Khurd, Taluka Hadgaon which was one of the properties in dispute, till her life time. The area of this land is 8H. 58 Ars. It was mentioned in the compromise that defendant No. 2 who is not a party to this revision, is falsely claiming to be the wife of deceased Dattram. The said deceased Dattram died on 19-9-1974. Under this compromise, defendant No. 1 agreed and accepted the status of the plaintiff to be the adopted son and also admitted that he will be entitled to the possession of disputed lands. The defendant No. 1 put her thumb mark on this compromise. One Shri A.T. Nalwade, Advocate, also signed on behalf of her. For the plaintiff, his Advocates has also signed and plaintiffs' signature is also found on the compromise. 6. The above compromise was field in the Court and the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), made the following order on 28th July, 1976. "Plaintiff is present. Plaintiff admits his signature. Defendant No. 1 admits her thumb mark. On behalf of defendant No. 1 Mr. Nalawade Advocate is present. Plaintiff and defendant No. 1 admit the contents. Compromise be read and recorded." Sd/- Civil Judge S.D. Nanded. The suit, however, remained pending as no final order of termination was passed. 7. It appears that on 18th June, 1979, the suit was stayed by the order of the Court. However, this order seems to have been set aside at the instance of defendant No. 2 who was on the record and the suit came to be posted at the instance of defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 2 made an application on 8th June, 1981 to set aside the order of stay. The trial Court granted this application and posted the suit for evidence on 15th January, 1982. It means that from 1976 till 1982, the suit was pending in the Court against defendants Nos. 1 2. 8. Defendant No. 2 made an application on 8th June, 1981 to set aside the order of stay. The trial Court granted this application and posted the suit for evidence on 15th January, 1982. It means that from 1976 till 1982, the suit was pending in the Court against defendants Nos. 1 2. 8. On 18th March, 1982, defendant No. 1 made an application to the Court praying that the compromise recorded by the Court on 28th July, 1976 be set aside as it was recorded by committing fraud on her. This application was filed by the defendant No. 1 stating in the beginning as follows : ^^ojhy nkO;kr eh oknh cjkscj lqYgkukek dsyk vkgs- vlh uksan >kyh vlwu lqYgkukE;kph rlnhd lq)k lUekuuh; dksVkZauh dsyh vkgs- ijarq R;kr v|ki QSlyk >kysyk ukgh o vkrk dkjokbZ rk- 20 3 ”2 jksth iqjkR;klkBh vkgs- R;kiwohZ eh vkt Lor%gksoqu gtj >kyh vkgs-** The English translation of the above extract is that : "In the above suit, I have entered into compromise which has been recorded and certified by the Hon'ble Court. But there is no decision passed and the proceedings are kept for evidence on 20th March, 1982. Before that, I myself have presented to the Court." In para 2 of this application, the defendant No. 1 stated : ^^gs dh eh nk[ky dsysyk lqYgkukek eyk /kksdk nsoqu d:u ?ks.;kra vkyk vkgs- [kjh gdhdr eh 'kiFk i=dkar lkaxhryh vkgs rjh lkgsckauh rh lqykukek fLodk: u;s o lqYgkukek >kyk ukgh vls letqu iqjkok ?ksoqu ;ksX; rks U;k; |kok o ekÖ;koj >kysyk vU;k; nwj djkok-** The English translation of the above Marathi extract is : "That the compromise which I have filed has been obtained by committing fraud on me. The true state of affair is told by me in my affidavit which is filed alongwith this application. The compromise may not be accepted by the Court and treating it that it has not been arrived at, the Court should take evidence in this case and give justice to me injustice done to me may be redressed." 9. This application was opposed by the plaintiff stating that defendant No. 1 has entered into compromise voluntarily and there has been a delay of more than six years. This, defendant has verified on affidavit at Hadgaon itself. The defendant has not given any particulars of fraud. This application was opposed by the plaintiff stating that defendant No. 1 has entered into compromise voluntarily and there has been a delay of more than six years. This, defendant has verified on affidavit at Hadgaon itself. The defendant has not given any particulars of fraud. She has not disclosed even when she came to know of the fraud. She has been instigated at the instance of some other persons to file this application. So the application be rejected. This reply was filed by the plaintiff on 22nd March, 1982. 10. In support of the application dated 18th March, 1982, an affidavit was filed by defendant No. 1 and she examined herself and one more witness, Bhagwanrao Marotrao who is her daughter's son, in evidence. The plaintiff filed a pursis saying that he does not want to lead any evidence. 11. The trial Court, on the basis of the above record, went into the merits of the compromise and thought that defendant No. 1 was an illiterate lady and the circumstances in which the compromise was recorded, render it sufficient to infer that the compromise is tainted by fraud and undue influence. The delay itself is rather self-explanatory and the dispute pertains to valuable rights of immovable property. So the learned Judge allowed this application and set aside the formal compromise saying that no decree in terms of compromise be passed. It is this order which is being challenged in this revision by the plaintiff. 12. Before I discuss the merit of the order, it may be mentioned here that defendant No. 2 who was originally a party to the suit, came to be deleted from the record at the instance of the plaintiff. On 23rd March, 1982, a pursis was given by the plaintiff praying that he does not want to proceed against defendant No. 2 and the suit be dismissed against her. Accordingly the suit was dismissed by the trial Court deleting the name of defendant No. 2 on 23rd March, 1982. The present revision is, therefore, restricted only to the claim of defendant No. 1 who is the adoptive grandmother of the plaintiff. 13. The learned Advocate for the plaintiff invited my attention to the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The present revision is, therefore, restricted only to the claim of defendant No. 1 who is the adoptive grandmother of the plaintiff. 13. The learned Advocate for the plaintiff invited my attention to the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows : "Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement (in writing and signed by the parties), or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith (so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit.) (Provided that there it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment)" Under the provisions of Rule 3 of Order 23, the Court has to record the compromise when it is presented to the Court and it is signed by the parties or their Advocates. The claim may be adjusted by the parties in any manner, whether wholly or partly. As far as possible, the claim in compromise may relate to the subject matter in the suit. But in some cases in addition to the subject matter of the suit, the parties may also agree by the compromise to adjust their claims fully. Wording of this Rule 3 clearly shows that it must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the suit has been adjusted fully or in part by a lawful compromise. The term 'lawful compromise' has been the subject of decision in various courts. Wording of this Rule 3 clearly shows that it must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the suit has been adjusted fully or in part by a lawful compromise. The term 'lawful compromise' has been the subject of decision in various courts. I may immediately refer to the decision of our Court which was relied upon by the learned Advocate for the plaintiff, reported in I.L.R. 1949 Bombay 13, where this Court observed : "That the Court shall order such agreement or compromise to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith, so far as it relates to the parties to the suit." These are the words used in Rule 3. According to this Rule, the Court has to satisfy on two points that there was an agreement between the parties and secondly, it was a lawful agreement. If an agreement before the Court is put forth and on the face of it, it discloses that it is contrary to the public policy, or it is otherwise tainted by fraud, the Court has no option but to record the compromise in accordance with the agreement presented before it. A compromise, by way of an agreement, stands on the same footing as a contract. It is not necessary for the Court to enquire into the further details because in terms of the agreement, if they do not disclose any defect prima facie, can be accepted and such agreement can be recorded by the courts. It is possible that the agreement, on the face of it, may be void. In such case perhaps the Court may not record it. Such agreement may not be enforceable per se. But the agreements may be voidable and in such cases, it is not possible for the Court to judge the efficacy of these agreements. If the Court is satisfied on the point of lawful nature of the agreement and if it is otherwise not against any law, the Court has no option but to record the compromise. 14. In this case, the learned Civil Judge before whom the compromise was filed, has made an endorsement and accepted it saying that the compromise was read and recorded, parties accept that they have put their signatures. He has also mentioned that the Advocates also accepted their signatures and parties signatures. 14. In this case, the learned Civil Judge before whom the compromise was filed, has made an endorsement and accepted it saying that the compromise was read and recorded, parties accept that they have put their signatures. He has also mentioned that the Advocates also accepted their signatures and parties signatures. In a case like this where compromise has been read and recorded, it goes a long way against the person challenging such a compromise. Heavy burden must be put on the party, here in this case on the defendant No. 1, that the compromise which was recorded by the Court, was not explained to her and the admission contained in the compromise was procured by fraud. When a Presiding Officer of the Court records any such compromise, this should be treated as judicial record made by him in discharge of his judicial duties. The Court's records are to be taken as authentic. When the Presiding Officer of a Court records such an order in this case it has been done by him, the order itself is the true evidence of what happened in the Court at that moment. If such orders which are read and recorded by the Court are subject to challenge merely on the allegation, the sanctity of the Court records will be shaken. Apart from it I think that, in such a case, a presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act will be attracted and a heavier burden must lie on the party who wants to displace the authenticity of the Court record. Unfortunately in this case, the defendant herself has admitted that the Court had certified the compromise and a copy of the compromise was recorded by the Court. Once the defendant had made such an admission in her own application, her further version that fraud was committed on her compromise on her and compromise was entered into by fraud, could not be a proper stage for investigation in the proceedings where the Court has gone a step further in making the compromise a part of the judicial record by putting an endorsement, as has been done in this case. 15. 15. I am afraid that the learned trial Judge recorded the evidence of parties also i.e. defendant No. 1 and her own witness and he was also forced to observe in his judgment as follows :--- "It is true that in view of the endorsement of my learned predecessor on the impugned compromise that plaintiff and defendant-1 admitted the contents thereof, the grievance of the first defendant that she was wholly unaware about the contents of the compromise, does not merit consideration." This observation of the learned Judge clearly shows that he was quite aware of the endorsement made by his predecessor and he has expressed it in clear words. However, he fell into error in surmising that defendant No. 1 did not fully understand the legal implications thereof and he was further influenced by the fact that the property is immovable property involved in the suit and the circumstances surrounding the case do render the impugned compromise as tainted by fraud and undue influence, appeared to be more nearer the truth. These observations of the learned Judge are nothing but imaginary. There were no particulars of fraud stated in the application at all. The affidavit was not filed in detail by the party setting out certain facts which may constitute a ground for saying that fraud was committed. The learned Judge confused both fraud and undue influence and observed that the said compromise is tainted by fraud and undue influence. The facts which go to establish fraud and the facts which go to prove influence may be overlapping. Yet there is a clear distinction between the two factors i.e. a transaction being obtained by undue influence and a transaction being entered into by committing fraud. The affidavit does not clearly make out in what circumstances, the fraud was committed. There is no denial that defendant No. 1 was present in the Court. The allegation that she was formerly acting under the advice of one Dattram Mahadji Patil and she discovered only after five years that he was deceived her, appears to be highly improbable. 16. According to defendant No. 1, in the cross-examination she has stated : "I came to know that the fraud practised on me by Dattram 3 years back." She was deposing in the year 1982. It means that she came to know of the fraud on or about in the year 1979 itself. 16. According to defendant No. 1, in the cross-examination she has stated : "I came to know that the fraud practised on me by Dattram 3 years back." She was deposing in the year 1982. It means that she came to know of the fraud on or about in the year 1979 itself. Inaction for more than five years is very significant in this case to Judge the truth of the allegations made in the affidavit in regard to fraud and undue influence. There is absolutely no evidence to show that the agreement which was arrived at was otherwise unlawful. In any event, I do not think that there is any merit in the contention that the allegations about fraud and undue influence can be investigation at this interlocutory stage. In this connection, I may refer to the proviso to Rule 3 itself, which clearly says that the Court is under an obligation to decide the question in regard to adjustment or satisfaction without adjourning the matter and if adjournment is sought, the Court is further under an obligation to record reasons. The intendment of the Legislature, in this connection, has to be ascertained from the words used in the proviso which are to this effect : "That when it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question." These words in the proviso clearly show that the attack on the adjustment or satisfaction can be made at the time of presentation of the compromise itself and the Court is bound to consider it whether such an adjustment or satisfaction was arrived at or not. This proviso was added by Amendment of 1976. The object of adding this proviso seems to be that the denial to any adjustment or satisfaction as stated in this Rule, is subject to attack by the other party. At the moment when the compromise is presented and the Court accepts and records it, as has been done in this case that the compromise was read and recorded, this was the proper occasion for the defendant if she wanted to dispute the adjustment or even the satisfaction of the Court. It must be said in fairness, in this case atleast, that defendant No. 1 has not chosen to assail the proceedings of the Court at all. It must be said in fairness, in this case atleast, that defendant No. 1 has not chosen to assail the proceedings of the Court at all. There is absolutely no allegation against the record made by the Court. The record clearly shows that the Advocates were present and parties were also present. The endorsement of the learned Judge, therefore, is made after informing the parties and their Advocates. Under these circumstances, the challenge to this compromise will be impermissible at such a late stage, especially after a lapse of five years. In my judgment, the proviso to Rule 3, Order 23 of the Code requires that denial to any adjustment by any party, must be at the moment when the compromise is being presented for accepting and recording the same before the Court. The purpose of this proviso seems to be that a summary enquiry may be made by the Court in regard to this denial of adjustment or satisfaction and the Court may immediately pass a decree in accordance with the terms as mentioned in Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The true intendment of the Legislature seems to be that the Court has no option but to accept and record the compromise and accordingly pass a decree immediately as far as possible. Unless for the reasons given in the proviso, if the Court thinks it fit to decide the question, some time may be granted to the party. The obligation to decide the disputed nature of adjustment as provided in the proviso and the further obligation to pass decree in accordance with the compromise clearly shows that it is discretionary for the Court to refuse to record the compromise. The defendant's allegation that the compromise was an outcome of fraud is, therefore, beyond the scope of enquiry and investigation on the plain terms of Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code. The defendant's allegation that the compromise was an outcome of fraud is, therefore, beyond the scope of enquiry and investigation on the plain terms of Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code. In this connection, I may refer to a judgement of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1956 Bombay 569 (Misrilal Jalamchand and another v. Sbhachand Jalamchand and others)1, in which this Court has observed : "The Court has power under Rule 3, where an agreement or compromise is denied, to decide whether as a fact the alleged agreement or compromise was made, and if it is satisfied that it was made, to record it." These observations are relied on by the learned Advocate for the defendant to support his contention that when a plea of undue influence or fraud is raised, then the Court may also consider the same. However, I do not think that this case will be of any assistance to the defendant as the ratio of the decision seems to be that it may not be necessary to go into recording of finding of the undue influence in such matters. This case further of no application to the facts of the present case because in that case, the challenge was to the very validity of the compromise because there was some dispute about the signature having been obtained on the compromise through the Advocate. The grievance was that the signature itself was obtained on the compromise by committing fraud or by undue influence and the Court may enquire into it while accepting the compromise and deciding it as lawful. This is another reason why the observations give little support to the contention of defendant and therefore, it cannot be pressed into service in this case. 17. I may also refer to the judgement of the Privy Council which was referred to in Misrilal Jalamchand's case (cited supra) reported in 1930 Privy Council 158 (Sourendra Nath Mitra and others v. Tarubala Dasi)2, wherein it was observed: "The words of Rule 3 do not in terms appear to confer a discretion on the Court in recording a compromise and passing decree according to it. But without deciding whether discretion is inherent or not even if the discretion in inherent, where no injustice of any kind is established, and it is established that the suit had been adjusted either wholly or in part by a lawful compromise, it is the duty of the Court to record the agreement and pass a decree in accordance therewith." These observations of the Privy Council are quite clear to show that the Court has no power in regard to passing of decree on compromise if the compromise is presented before the Court and if it is otherwise lawful and not vitiated by any further reason as being contrary to law. In this case, the lawful nature of the compromise is not challenged at all, although an attempt was made by the learned Counsel for the defendant that the compromise in regard to defendant No. 2 could not have been adjusted as the compromise in regard to the acceptance of the status is itself doubtful as the adopted boy who is the plaintiff was aged 19 years and such an adoption may not be permissible. But this is outside the scope of lawful adjustment of his suit. The only thing which the Court has to see under Rule 3, Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure is whether (a) there could be an adjustment or compromise and (b) whether such adjustment or compromise is lawful. Once these two needs are established as they are established in this case, the further challenge on the ground of fraud and undue influence or misrepresentation or the agreement is otherwise vitiated on such other similar grounds must be left to be decided by an independent suit and no investigation is contemplated in view of the clear provisions of Rule 3, Order 23. 18. The learned trial Judge, therefore, committed an error in deciding the matter of undue influence and fraud as set up by defendant No. 1 in her affidavit and also recording a finding on such a scanty evidence which according to me also on merits is not very satisfactory. The learned Judge himself was forced to observe that the defendant was made fully aware of the contents of the compromise at the time when it was recorded. The learned Judge himself was forced to observe that the defendant was made fully aware of the contents of the compromise at the time when it was recorded. The learned Judge further committed an irregularity in ignoring the fact that the delay of five years was not such a circumstance which---could have been easily overlooked. The order of the learned Judge is based on total misreading of the provisions of Rule 3, Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure which introduces a defect of jurisdiction in his judgement. It is also doubtful whether the learned Judge himself could have, in the circumstances, reviewed the order of his predecessor. That apart, in view of clear provisions of Rule 3, Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was an error on the part of the learned Judge to have started an enquiry in regard to plea of undue influence and fraud, set up by defendant No. 1 in her application. The Court has, therefore, acted illegally and the judgement of the trial Court is, therefore, not in accordance with law. 19. I may here mention a peculiar feature of this case. It appears that after the order was passed by the learned Judge on 30th July, 1982, revision against that order came to be filed in this Court on 30th September, 1982. However, the matter was placed for admission on 1st December, 1982 when this Court granted rule and also stayed further proceedings of the lower Court. Despite the above order of stay which was granted in this case, it appears that the lower Court was not informed of the stay order. From the record it appears that the stay order was actually communicated to the trial Court, but it seems that the suit came to be dismissed for default and stay order which was communicated, remained unnoticed. The proceedings continued and the suit also was resorted as stated above. The proceedings continued on the file of the learned Judge till 1982 and appears that the stay order was not brought to the notice of the lower Court and the proceedings continued and it appears that the order of the learned Judge which was in impugned in this revision became effective. As a consequence of this order, the record of the compromise was ignored and learned trial Judge proceeded with the trial of the suit. As a consequence of this order, the record of the compromise was ignored and learned trial Judge proceeded with the trial of the suit. During the pendency of this suit, it appears that the evidence of plaintiff also came to be recorded on 15-12-84. In that evidence, the plaintiff mentioned and deposed in support of his case and also stated that compromise was recorded, but it was rescinded by defendant No. 1. 20. The learned Advocate for the defendant here pointed out to me that in this case as the evidence was recorded by the Court and the plaintiff has deposed himself in the Court, it should be deemed that he has repudiated the compromise. He invited my attention to a judgement of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in A.I.R. 1961 Madhya Pradesh 245 (Indore Bench) (Firm Ramchandra Mathuralal v. Kalusingh Nathraj)3. In this case, the plaintiff has continued to prosecute the suit and led the evidence also. The learned Judge in this case has, therefore, observed : "Once a compromise is arrived at, he should not proceed with the suit. He should ask the Court to record the compromise and satisfy it that the agreement is genuine. If he, however, changes his mind and the other party also acquiesces, the compromise is washed out, and the suit should proceed on merits." But he cannot later on, when his hopes do not materialise, come back to the compromise. His conduct amounts to a repudiation of the compromise; and it is no less a repudiation because it is tacit. The moment the plaintiff began to continue prosecuting the suit, it was open to the defendant either to acquiesce in it, and thereby co-operate in the sabotage of the compromise, or invite the Court to record it and stop the plaintiff in his further progress with the suit. The defendant choose the former. Thus apart from the allegations made by the defendant, in his petition, which would no doubt call for an enquire, the conduct of the plaintiff himself disentitles him to ask that the compromise should be recorded." These observations are relied on by the learned Advocate for the defendant and apparently, it appears that I would have also agreed to these observations, subject to the distinguishing feature which I will point out immediately. The observations which were quoted by me above, apparently support the contention of the learned Advocate for defendant. The conduct of the plaintiff in leading evidence has been interpreted to mean that he has repudiated the compromise earlier recorded. It may be borne in mind that, in this case, the evidence was led by the plaintiff or the party concerned without mentioning the compromise. In the present case, the plaintiff has referred to the compromise and stated that it was rescinded by the other party. In addition, there is an order of the Court setting aside the said compromise. If the compromise was set aside by the order of the Court and the suit has proceeded in ignorance of the stay order passed by this Court. I do not think that any proceeding in which the plaintiff might have given evidence, he should be at a disadvantage because of the compulsion to proceed with the suit as required by law under the orders of the Court. 21. In this case, this Court had already ordered stay of further proceedings on 1st December, 1982. The order which was passed by the Court setting aside the compromise itself was challenged in revision. The substantive challenge to this order being made in revision and stay order also having been obtained from this Court, I do not think that any further proceedings conducted by the courts below will be further protected and will have any weight or significance. So long as the order of the Court setting aside the compromise was in existence and it was not challenged, the proceedings of the Court were quite competent and it cannot be assailed. But as the order of setting aside compromise itself is now challenged in this revision, it is difficult to apply the ratio of Ramchandra Mathuralal's case (supra) and hold that the plaintiff's above conduct has repudiated the compromise as contended by the learned Advocate for the defendant. Assuming for a while, in this case, that the plaintiff would have only filed revision application against the order setting aside the compromise and would not have applied for stay, yet the judgment of this Court would have the prevailing effect and the binding result of the judgement of this Court cannot be defeated by conduct of further proceedings by the lower Court. In my judgement, therefore, this contention of the learned Advocate for the defendant based on the ratio of Ramchandra Mathuralal's case is not of any assistance in this case and it is, therefore, rejected. 22. In the result, the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Judge dated 30th July, 1982 is set aside. The order passed by the learned Judge on 28th July, 1976 is held to be quite valid and competent. I, therefore, direct the learned Judge to pass an appropriate order in terms of the compromise entered into by the parties following the provisions contained in Rule 3, Order 23 and make an appropriate decree in terms of the compromise, as far as defendant No. 1 is concerned. The compromise will bind only her, as I am told the suit as far as defendant No. 2 is concerned, is dismissed. As far as defendant No. 1 is concerned, the suit must be held to be pending as no final order has been passed against her. I, therefore, direct that the record be sent to the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nanded who will pass appropriate order accepting the compromise and shall make an order in terms of the compromise, Rule is, therefore, made absolute. No order as to costs.