JUDGMENT : S.C. Mohapatra, J. - Petitioner in this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a Crane Operator of the Rourkela Steel Plant under the Steel Authority of India Limited. His claim to the employer for change of his date of birth by recording the same correctly in his service records with the employer having been refused by the employer, he has approached this Court for a direction for change of his date of birth as claimed by him and consequently not to release him from service on 31-12-1983 on the basis of the direction given in the Office order dated 28-5-1983. He has obtained an order of stay of operation of the said Office order. As the employer filed an application for vacating the stay granted by this Court, the present writ application was finally heard out of turn though earlier applications are pending. 2. No standing order or other written instructions has been produced before us to give a comprehensive picture of the procedure for entry into the service, the actions to be taken at the time of joining and the other conditions of service. From the provisions of the rules quoted and the documents filed a sketch for the purpose of this case is prepared. 3. The age of compulsory retirement is 58 years. An employee gives declaration of his age amongst other particulars in a pro forma descriptive roll which is signed by the employee. A Service Book is prepared in respect of each employee where the age of the employee is mentioned. On the basis of the age in the service records an Office order is issued sufficiently earlier indicating the date when the employee would be released from service on attaining the age of superannuation. 4. It is not disputed on behalf of the employer that on 26-8-1968 a circular was issued by it to all its Heads of Departments/Officers bringing to their notice the Head Office Letter dated 23/25-7-1968 relating to the date of birth of the employees. One of the provisions therein is that in case of employees who are not Matriculates, the Certificate from the education institution where the candidate/employee might have studied may be accepted as evidence of age. 5. There is a Co-ordination Committee in Rourkela Steel Plant. One of the provisions therein is that in case of employees who are not Matriculates, the Certificate from the education institution where the candidate/employee might have studied may be accepted as evidence of age. 5. There is a Co-ordination Committee in Rourkela Steel Plant. In its 90th meeting dated 29-11-197, it resolved, as found place in Clause (3) of the Minutes that in case an employee declares only the year of birth, his date of birth should be determined as the last day of the year. 6. As per the practice prevalent, on 12.5.1983 an Office order was issued that the Petitioner would be released from service on 31-5-1983 on reaching the age of superannuation. This is consistent with the intention of the 1968 Circular where it has been mentioned: For example if the date of appointment of an employee is the 16th July, 1968 and if the competent Medical Officer of the Company certifies the age of the employee as 25 years, the date of birth to be recorded in the personal records of the employee will be 16-7-1943. 7. On receipt of the Office order, the Secretary of the Rourkela Mazdoor Sabha raised objection that sufficient notice had not been given to the Petitioner. On this objection, the matter was reopened to be examined and on the basis of the minutes of the Co-ordinate Committee Meeting No. 90 dated 29-11-1975, the date of birth of the Petitioner was fixed as 31-12-1925. Thus, the Office order dated 12.5.1983 was modified by the impugned Office order dated 28.5.1983 directing release of the Petitioner on 31-12-1983 instead of 31-5-1983. 8. On 2-9-1983, the Petitioner submitted a representation for correction of his date of birth on the ground that the entry 35 years as on 4-5-1960 was a mistake. The relevant portion of his representation reads as follows: ...I joined this organisation on 4-5-1960 as a regular employees and sometimes after in the year 1960 I was asked to fill up the necessary form concerning my date of birth and other matters. Since I was not acquainted with the English language I took the help of another worker to fill up the said form and got my date of birth recorded as 1935 through that worker. Since I was not acquainted with the English language I took the help of another worker to fill up the said form and got my date of birth recorded as 1935 through that worker. But unfortunately my date of birth as recorded ill the said form was 35 in the year 1960 has been wrongly interpreted as 35 years in age in the year 1960 instead of 1935 as my date of birth.... Along with this representation, the Petitioner submitted his own affidavit dated 12-8-1983, photostat copies of a transfer certificate dated 17-5-1953 and a medical card claiming his date of birth to be 18-10-1935. The grounds in the representation along with the documents were considered and the Petitioner was intimated in letter dated 3-12-1983 that his request in the representation could not be acceded to and he would stand released from service on superannuation as per Office order dated 28-5-1983. 9. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid Office order and the intimation on his representation, the Petitioner approached this Court on 29-12-1983 to quash the Office order dated 28-5-1983 (Annexure-3) and to get a direction to continue in service up to 18-10-1993 and he obtained an order of stay of the impugned order on 30th December, 1983, the effect of which was that he is continuing in service till date. 10. On being called upon, opposite parties produced the records where the representation of the Petitioner along with the documents was considered. 11. Date of birth of a person is intermingled with his status which is directly connected with the civil right of that person such as the right to office, the right to franchise, the right to continue in service up to a particular age and even dealing with property. This has been clearly explained in a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in State of Orissa v. Indupali Babaji ILR 1971 Cutt. 1368. Normally, such a civil right is to be enforced In a suit since what is the date of birth of a person being an inference from proved facts is a question of fact. This has been clearly explained in a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in State of Orissa v. Indupali Babaji ILR 1971 Cutt. 1368. Normally, such a civil right is to be enforced In a suit since what is the date of birth of a person being an inference from proved facts is a question of fact. Where an enquiry into complicated questions of fact would arise, the High Court in its discretion in appropriate cases would decline to enter upon enquiry into the same in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and may refer the party claiming the relief to a suit as has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei 33 (1967) C.L.T. 583 (S.C.). 12. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. and Others it has been observed tersely ...Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely illsuited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are se inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vest majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged. When has been observed in matters involving the revenue is also true in respect of personal civil right of a person, infringement of which is not inextricably mixed up with public wrongs and does not require prevention of public injury and vindication of public justice. 13. Even in State of Orissa v. Dr. When has been observed in matters involving the revenue is also true in respect of personal civil right of a person, infringement of which is not inextricably mixed up with public wrongs and does not require prevention of public injury and vindication of public justice. 13. Even in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei 33 (1967) C.L.T. 583 (S.C.), (supra), Supreme Court did not go into the question of determining the correct date of birth of the employee. This Court whose judgment was being considered by the Supreme Court also did not enter into the question of fact as to which of the four dates available on record would be the correct date of birth - See Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei v. State of Orissa and Ors. ILR 1964 Cutt. 436. While coming to the conclusion that the State can change the date of birth to the detriment of its employee, the regularity of the enquiry by the State became the subject matter of decision. While State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei 33 (1967) C.L.T. 583 (S.C.), (supra) was dealt with a case of change in date of birth by the employer, in State of Assam and Another Vs. Daksha Prasad Deka and Others. Supreme Court considered the case of change in date of birth claimed by the employee. 14. On analysis of both the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, the following principles emerge: (i) Both the employer and the employee can dispute the date of birth available on the service record of an employee maintained by the employer. (ii) The employer is to resolve the dispute. (iii) Where the employer seeks to change the date of birth advancing the same resulting in the employee reaching of the age of superannuation earlier, the employee concerned must be informed of the case of the employer and the evidence in support of the same and the employee must be given fair opportunity by the employer to meet the evidence and such a case before an adverse decision is taken by the employer. (iv) Where the employee seeks to change the date of birth to gain advantage of a date of superannuation later than the date available from the service record, ordinarily the employer should give the employee proper opportunity to prove his case and should give due consideration to the evidence brought before it. (iv) Where the employee seeks to change the date of birth to gain advantage of a date of superannuation later than the date available from the service record, ordinarily the employer should give the employee proper opportunity to prove his case and should give due consideration to the evidence brought before it. (v) The date of reaching the age of superannuation must be determined on the basis of service record and not on what the employee claims unless the service record is first correct. 15. In the present case, the move for change in the age being made by the Petitioner, it is to be examined whether proper opportunity was given by the employer to the Petitioner to prove his case and whether the evidence adduced by the Petitioner was duly considered. 16. The Petitioner filed his representation and along with the representation filed the documents supporting his claim. Neither in the representation nor in this Court also the Petitioner has based his claim on any other material of which he could get no opportunity to produce the same. Therefore, the conclusion is irresistible that the employer gave sufficient opportunity to the Petitioner to prove his case of actual date of birth. 17. The next question to be considered is whether the evidence adduced had due consideration of the employer. Mr. Ashok Das, the learned Counsel for the opposite parties submitted that the note-sheets produced would disclose the nature of consideration by the employer. The affidavit of the Petitioner dated 12-8-1983 was considered in the note-sheet. Affidavit of the person claiming the date of birth is not a material evidence. It is a self-serving statement in support of the claim. Accordingly, the same was not given any weight. So far as the transfer certificate issued to the Petitioner on 17-5-1953 by the Headmaster, Jalanpur U.P. School is concerned, the same was doubted on the ground of withholding it for last 30 years. At another stage, it was not accepted because an employee is supposed to produce the document like educational certificate at the time of entering the service. Mr. Ashok Das, the learned Counsel for the opposite parties has advanced. argument on the basis of some materials collected by the authorities during. pendency of the writ application that the transfer certificate is not genuine. Our scope in writ jurisdiction being limited, we need not enter into the said question. Mr. Ashok Das, the learned Counsel for the opposite parties has advanced. argument on the basis of some materials collected by the authorities during. pendency of the writ application that the transfer certificate is not genuine. Our scope in writ jurisdiction being limited, we need not enter into the said question. The only other material is the medical card where the age of the Petitioner was written as 46 years in 1982. While considering the same the medical card registar was verified. It was found that medical cards were issued only till 1979. The personal file of the Petitioner not being available, age was not mentioned. On application of the Petitioner for a fresh card in 1982, the same was issued and in absence of the personel file, the age was mentioned on the representation of the Petitioner. The plea of mistake at the time of initial declaration has also been taken note of by the authorities. The reasons given for not attaching any importance to the documents produced by the Petitioner are germane to the issue and would come within the scope or due consideration. 18. Having alternative remedy to get his civil right as to his correct date of birth established which would have bound down the authorities in case of his success where complicated questions of fact like mistake of the Petitioner or even denial or the declaration to be of the Petitioner as advanced by Mr. Dora at the time of hearing, the genuineness of the transfer certificate or the binding nature of the medical card could have been decided on oral evidence, the Petitioner chose the writ jurisdiction which is limited within its scope and not appellate in nature. For sympathy to the Petitioner as submitted by Mr. Dora, we cannot cross the self imposed restriction in writ jurisdiction converting the same to appellate forum. 19. In the result, the writ application fails and is accordingly dismissed. The interim order of stay stands vacated. No costs. D. Pathak, C.J. 20. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed