ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition arises out of proceedings initiated by the transferees of Smt. Sakina Bibi for mutation of their names over the disputed plots. It is noteworthy that Smt. Sakina Bibi had executed sale deed in the year 1965 as well as in the year 1967 and the transferees had moved the consolidation officer for mutation of their names u/s 12 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The petitioner had contested the claim of the aforesaid transferees on the allegations that Smt. Sakina Bibi had no right and title to transfer the disputed plots and that the petitioner had claimed the disputed plots on the basis of oral gift as well as according to him he was the real tenure holder and Smt. Sakina Bibi had only right of enjoyment of the disputed plots, hence she could not transfer the disputed plots. In this connection the petitioner has placed reliance upon the compromise contained in Annexure 1 attached with the writ petition. 2. The relationship between the petitioner and Smt. Sakina Bibi would be evident from the following pedigree: 3. The Consolidation Officer through his judgment dated 10-8-1971 (Annexure II) did not accept the claim of the transferees and ordered that the name of Smt. Sakina Bibi should remain recorded as usual. He has also indicated that the petitioner had got no right in the disputed plots. It appears that the transferees of the petitioner had preferred appeals and the appellate authority through its judgment dated 29-10-1971 rejected the claim of the transferees on the ground that they had not obtained requisite permission under Section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, hence their sale deeds were invalid in law and they could not get mutation. In view of the aforesaid finding the appellate court did not categorically decide the claim of the petitioner. Thereafter the transferees preferred revision petitions which have been allowed by the revisional court through its judgment dated 29-7-1972 contained in Annexure IV attached with the writ petition. Aggrieved by the judgment of the revisional court the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the revisional court has patently erred in recognising the claim of the transferees of Smt. Sakina Bibi in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Aggrieved by the judgment of the revisional court the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the revisional court has patently erred in recognising the claim of the transferees of Smt. Sakina Bibi in the facts and circumstances of the present case. According to him Smt. Sakina Bibi had no tenancy right in the disputed plots and she. could not transfer the same. He has also emphasised that various sale deeds executed by Smt. Sakina Bibi indicated that they were in respect of a part of her holding, hence the sale deeds needed permission of the Settlement Officer of Consolidation u/s 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and in the absence of requisite permission the revisional court has patently erred in recognising the claim of the transferees. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasised before me that in view of the compromise (Annexure 1 attached with the writ petition) Smt. Sakina Bibi had no tenancy right and during her lifetime or till the time she transferred the disputed plots, the petitioner had no right to put forward his claim but due to transfer or surrender by Smt. Sakina Bibi the petitioner got a right and in the circumstances of the present case, his claim should have been accepted and in not doing so the consolidation authorities have patently erred in recognising the claim of the transferees. 6. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted that the present writ petition is not maintainable because the. petitioner has become major and the petitioner has not appeared before this Court through any Counsel, therefore, the present writ petition has become infructuous and should be dismissed on this ground alone. 7. Second submission made on behalf of the contesting opposite parties in the present case is that Smt. Sakina Bibi executed sale deed in favour of the contesting opposite parties in the year 1965 and at that time she had only that much area which was sold. In the year 1967 Smt. Sakina Bibi got more area through a reference u/s 48(3) of the U.P.C.H. Act and she executed another sale deed of the area which she got later. In the year 1967 Smt. Sakina Bibi got more area through a reference u/s 48(3) of the U.P.C.H. Act and she executed another sale deed of the area which she got later. So, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, no question of obtaining permission u/s 5 of the U.P.C.H. Act arose and that the revisional court rightly accepted the claim of the transferees over the plots purchased by them. 8. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. In my opinion the submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party that the writ petition should be dismissed because the petitioner after becoming major has not appeared before this Court through any counsel is without any force. The perusal of the provision of O. 32 would indicate that it is the discretion of the petitioner to appear before the court after becoming major to atone the proceedings or to repudiate the same. If the minor petitioner does not appear in the proceeding after becoming major and his claim is decided in the proceeding, he would be bound by the decision unless his guardian or next friend had not acted negligently or had not defrauded the minor. In this connection my attention has been drawn to the ruling reported in 1982 All LJ 1463. No doubt the aforesaid ruling helps the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party in his contention but on facts it is distinguishable. In the aforesaid ruling the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the minor after becoming major had repudiated by his conduct. In the present case there is nothing to suggest that the petitioner has no intention to proceed with the writ petition. The provisions of O. 32 R. 12 C.P.C. and the ruling reported in AIR 1979 All 242 Hazari v. Suresh lead me to infer that the submission of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party in this regard is without any force. 9. As regards second submission of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties, it is sufficient to indicate that revisional court has patently erred in accepting the claim of the contesting opposite party regarding the sale deed of the year 1967. The Consolidation Officer has indicated in his judgment dated 10-8-1971 that plots Nos. 9. As regards second submission of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties, it is sufficient to indicate that revisional court has patently erred in accepting the claim of the contesting opposite party regarding the sale deed of the year 1967. The Consolidation Officer has indicated in his judgment dated 10-8-1971 that plots Nos. 847, 848, 851 and 853 were Sirdari land and that no Bhumidhari Sanad was on the file to indicate that Bhumidhari had been obtained yet the revisional court has recognised the claim of the contesting opposite party without addressing itself that sirdari plots could not be sold. I think that the impugned judgment suffers from patent error of law insofar as it has recognised the claim of the contesting opposite party based on the sale deed of the year 1967. 10. As regards the claim of the contesting opposite party based on the sale deed dated 17-11-1965 it is noteworthy that in paragraph 25 of the writ petition it has been indicated that several sale deeds were executed in favour of different persons, hence each sale deed was in respect of a part of the holding. Therefore, the sale deeds were bad in law in the absence of permission under Section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Unfortunately the aforesaid paragraph of the writ petition has not been controverted in the counter- affidavit. Therefore, the allegations in paragraph 25 of the writ petition are to be assumed as correct. The perusal of the impugned judgment of the revisional court does not indicate that the revisional court has considered this aspect of the matter, hence its judgment recognising the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the basis of the sale deeds of the year 1965 appears to me erroneous in law. 11. Regarding the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Smt. Sakina Bibi had no tenancy right in the disputed plots hence she could not transfer the same. The perusal of Annexure 1 indicates that the disputed plots were allotted to Smt. Sakina Bibi and she was also liable to pay rent to the Zamindar in respect of those plots and the aforesaid deed is dated 18-2-1952. 1 think that the petitioner's contention has no force. The perusal of Annexure 1 indicates that the disputed plots were allotted to Smt. Sakina Bibi and she was also liable to pay rent to the Zamindar in respect of those plots and the aforesaid deed is dated 18-2-1952. 1 think that the petitioner's contention has no force. If the petitioner was right in his contention, it was obligatory on his part to have contested the claim of Smt. Sakina Bibi during the consolidation operation. When the disputed plots were held as Bhumidhari or Sirdari of Smt. Sakina Bibi, the petitioner does not get any right to assail the sale deed executed by Smt. Sakina Bibi during her lifetime. The learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the ruling reported in 1979 All LJ 1077 Zahoor Ahmad v. Munfait Ali and has contended that in the circumstances of the present case Smt. Sakina Bibi had only limited interest in the plots so she could not sell the plots. In view of the ruling reported in 1980 All LJ 580 : AIR 1980 SC 1329 Bishwa Nath Pandey v. Badami Kaur the ruling relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is no longer good law. The petitioner did not contest the claim of Smt. Sakina Bibi at proper stage, i.e. the proceedings under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, he cannot be permitted to assail the sale deed executed by Smt. Sakina Bibi on the basis of the compromise contained in Annexure 1 attached with the writ petition. 12. During the course of argument the learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the ruling reported in 1981 All LJ 781 Balbhadra v. Board of Revenue. The aforesaid ruling is based upon the terms of a will, hence it is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Through Annexure 1 attached with the writ petition the disputed plots did not vest in the petitioner. Rather, Smt. Sakina Bibi was held entitled to the plots and she was made liable to pay rent to the Zamindar in respect of these plots, hence she became tenant of the disputed plots during her lifetime. It is true that the disputed plots were given to her for possession and maintenance and it was agreed that on her death or surrender the plots would revert to the petitioner's father. It is true that the disputed plots were given to her for possession and maintenance and it was agreed that on her death or surrender the plots would revert to the petitioner's father. According to the then law, Annexure I was executed which gave Smt. Sakina Bibi limited right but during the consolidation operation at the stage of Section 9 it was necessary for the petitioner to have asserted his right. Moreover, the terms contained in paragraph 2 of Annexure I indicate that Sint. Sakina Bibi was entitled to the plots given to her and she was to remain in possession during her lifetime but would not claim tenancy right of Sheikh Ali Raza (her husband). As she was also held liable to pay rent with regard to the plots allotted to her, it is to be seen in law whether she would acquire any tenancy right in the disputed plots or not. It is also to be examined as to whether she acquired tenancy right under the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in the disputed plots or not. In my opinion, she did acquire right in view of the ruling reported in 1980 All LJ 580 . ( AIR 1980 SC 1329 ). 13. During the lifetime of Smt. Sakina Bibi the petitioner had no right and title to the disputed plots. The petitioner had claimed the disputed plots on the basis of oral gift by Smt. Sakina Bibi but he could not establish his claim before the consolidation officer hence his claim was rejected. In appeal also he failed. Thereafter he did not prefer a revision petition about his claim but when the revisional court decided the revision petitions in favour of the transferees of Smt. Sakina Bibi, the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In my opinion, when the petitioner did not press his claim before the revisional court he could not attack the judgment of the revisional court during the lifetime of Smt. Sakina Bibi. On this ground the petitioner has no legal and equitable claim to press in the present writ petition. 14. Difficulty before me is that during the pendency of the writ petition Smt. Sakina Bibi is dead and the sale deeds executed by her in favour of the contesting opposite parties are also not valid transactions. On this ground the petitioner has no legal and equitable claim to press in the present writ petition. 14. Difficulty before me is that during the pendency of the writ petition Smt. Sakina Bibi is dead and the sale deeds executed by her in favour of the contesting opposite parties are also not valid transactions. The question arises whether any interference should be made with the impugned judgment at the instance of the petitioner. In the circumstances of the present case the title of the Gaon Sabha would also emerge in the disputed plots due to invalid sale deeds executed by Smt. Sakina Bibi. The Gaon Sabha is not before this Court. On the death of Smt. Sakina Bibi the petitioner might claim the interest of Smt. Sakina Bibi when the sale deeds executed by Smt. Sakina Bibi in favour of the contesting opposite parties are not valid transactions. To give relief to the persons entitled to the plots in suit, disputed questions of fact will have to be gone into. The contesting opposite parties (transferees of Smt. Sakina Bibi) can also claim the property on the basis of their possession for more than statutory period, hence I do not consider it a fit case where interference should be made with the impugned judgment of the revisional court. I have dealt with the submissions of the counsel for the parties above. In fresh litigation between the parties or at the instance of Gaon Sabha regarding the disputed plots, claims of the litigants will be decided strictly in accordance with law. 15. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. I make no order as to costs in the circumstances of the present case.