JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - The dispute in the present case relates to land of Khata No. 250 consisting of two plots namely, 520 and 585 situate in village Beoli, Tahsil Salon, District Rae Bareli. In the basic year Khetauni the names of petitioner Hakeem Masihuzzaman and all the opposite parties 1 to 6 were recorded as Cotenureholders. Admittedly, these aforesaid plots are grove plots. Petitioner filed objection claiming 1/4th share in the said grove land with the allegation that his grandfather Abdul Sattar and Hafiz Mohd. Usraan, sons of Khuda Bux, were groveholders. It has been asserted that Abdul Sattar, grandfather of petitioner, had in his lifetime given half share, out of his half share, to his son Mohd. Suleman. Thus, on the death of Abdul Sattar, Mohd. Suleman was entitled to 1/4th share in the said disputed grove and the opposite parties 1 and 2, who are uncles of the petitioners, would be entitled to only l/8th share each. It is not disputed that opp. parties 3 to 6 are entitled to half share in the groves in dispute being successors of Hafiz Mohammad. The case was contested by the opposite parties 1 and, 2, who are stepbrothers of Mohammad Suleman born from the second wife of Abdul Sattar. They denied the aforesaid allegation of the petitioner and asserted that the petitioner and opposite parties 1 and 2 are entitled to l/6th share each in the said grove plots. They asserted that Abdul Sattar had not given half share out of his half share to Mohd. Suleman and the allegation to that effect is absolutely wrong. The Consolidation Officer, after taking evidence of the parties, decided the case vide order dated 15121971 and gave l/6th share to the petitioner. Aggrieved by this order, petitioner preferred appeal which too was disnvssd by order dated 27th August, 1973. Still feeling aggrieved the petitioner filed revision which was also dismissed, vide order dated 25101975. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri B. K. Singh, urged that the consolidation authorities have legally erred in not giving 1/4th share to the petitioner in the aforesaid groveplots. His contention was that the petitioner was granted l/4th share in another holding Khata No. 161 by Consolidation Officer, vide order dated 1671971, and, as such, the said order which was passed in favour of the petitioner on the aforesaid basis giving him ? His contention was that the petitioner was granted l/4th share in another holding Khata No. 161 by Consolidation Officer, vide order dated 1671971, and, as such, the said order which was passed in favour of the petitioner on the aforesaid basis giving him ? share, would operate as resjudicata in the present case. In support of his contention learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in 1978 SC 1283 (The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. The Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and another, wherein it has been held that : It is well known that the doctrine of res judicata is codified in S. 11 CPC, but it is not exhaustive. S 11 generally comes into play in relation to Civil Suits. But apart from the codified law the doctrine of res judicata has been applied since long in various other kinds of proceedings and situations by courts in England, India and other countries. The rule of constructive resjudicata is engrafted in Explanation IV of S. 11 and in many other situations also principles not only of direct resjudicata but of constructive res judicata are also applied. If by any judgment or order any matter in issue has been directly and explicitly decided the decision operates as res judicata and bars the trial of an identical issue in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. The principle of res judicata also comes into play when by the judgment and order a decision of a particular issue is implicit in it, that is, it must be deemed to have been necessarily decided by implication; then also the principle of res judicata on that issue is directly applicable. When any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former proceeding but was not so made, then such a matter in the eye of law to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to bring about finality in it is deemed to have been constructively in issue and, therefore, is taken as decided. 3. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid decision, but in the present case I find that the order dated 1671971 cannot be so construed as has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. 3. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid decision, but in the present case I find that the order dated 1671971 cannot be so construed as has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. I have gone very carefully through the aforesaid order dated 1671971 Annexure 3) passed by the Consolidation Officer in respect of another land of Khata No. 161. In the said decision the Consolidation Officer has not recorded any finding to the effect that the petitioner is given 1/4th share in the said holding, namely, Khata No. 161 on the ground that he was coopted as a cotenureholder by Abdul Sattar giving him half share out of his half share. As no finding has been recorded on the said question which is in controversy in the present case and, as such, I do not find that the aforesaid order dated 1671971 (Annexure 3) passed by the Consolidation Officer in respect of the Khata No. 161 would operate as res judicata in the present case. 5. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the opposite party that against the said order contained in Annexure 3, dated 1671971, appeal was filed by the opposite party and the same was allowed and the case was remanded by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, vide order dated 1811972, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure C1 to the counter affidavit. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri B. K. Singh has urged that the order dated 1811972 which has been annexed as Annexure C1 was not passed in appeal against the order dated 1671971 contained in Annexure 3, but it was an order passed in appeal against another order. Petitioner has not annexed any such order against which the order dated 18172 passed by the Settlement Officer. Consolidation, in appeal could be attributed. But, be that as it may, as already observed above, the said order dated 1671971 Annexure 3) cannot be said to be operative as res judicata between the parties because by that order the relevant question in issue in the present case has not been decided by the Consolidation Officer. In the present case the petitioner has claimed that his father was coopted as a cotenureholder by Abdul Sattar giving him half share out of his half share in the groves in dispute. In the present case the petitioner has claimed that his father was coopted as a cotenureholder by Abdul Sattar giving him half share out of his half share in the groves in dispute. This question was apparently not in issue in the case decided by the Consolidation Officer in respect of the Khata No. 161 because no reference of such a case had been made in the order dated 1671971, which is Annexure 3. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further urged that even if said order dated 1671971 be not treated to be operative as res judicata, the impugned orders passed by opposite parties 1 to 3, deserve to be quashed because they have committed an error in not holding Suleman to be cotenureholder along with Abdul Sattar by cooption. In the year 1924 Abdul Sattar is said to have coopted Abdul Suleman and had given him half share out of his share in the said groves. In support of his contention learned counsel had referred to the extract of a Chitthi Batwara of the year 1924 wherein name of Hafiz Mohd. Usman and Abdul Sattar, sons of Khuda Bux, and Mohd. Suleman son of Abdul Sattar, was recorded as cotenureholder. Learned Deputy Director of Consolidation had considered Chitthi Batwara and has observed that the same is of no help to the petitioner. Abdul Sattar, admittedly, died sometime in the year 1941 when U.P. Tenancy Act was in force. Thus, on his death all his three sons born from two wives, would be entitled to inherit the property in equal shares. It has come on record that in the third settlement of 1332 F equivalent to 192425, the names of Abdul Sattar and Mohd. Usman sons of Khuda Bux were alone recorded as groveholders on Khata No. 74 of grove plots in dispute namely, plots Nos. 520 and 535. A certified copy of the Khetauni is Annexure A1 to supplementary affidavit. In view of this subsequent settlement record of the year 1332 F wherein Abdul Sattar and Mohd. Usman were alone recorded as groveholders of the groves in dispute, I am unable to hold that the petitioner was coopted as cotenureholder by his father Abdul Sattar giving him half share out of his half share in the groves in dispute. The cooption by a tenant to a holding could be only made with the written consent by the Landlord. The cooption by a tenant to a holding could be only made with the written consent by the Landlord. No such written consent by the landlord was said to have been given nor any such written consent was filed by the petitioner in support of his alleged claim of cooption in the holding in dispute by Abdul Sattar. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that since name of Mohd. Suleman was recorded along with the sons of Abdul Sattar in the Chitthi Batwara, and, as such, implied consent of the landlord will be deemed to have been given by the recorded landlord. I am unable to agree with this contention. Learned counsel further urged that the U.P. Tenancy Act was not in force in the year 1924 and, as such, written cooption was not necessary. During Oudh Rent Act a tenant could not coopt any person as cotenant to the holding held by him. Learned Counsel urged that since during Oudh Rent Act there was no express prohibition in the Act, and, as such, a tenant could coopt. I am unable to agree with this contention. The creation of tenancy was a matter of contract between landlord and a tenant and during Oudh Rent Act, tenancy was also not inheritable. The heirs could remain in possession for a period of five years as provided under Sec. 48(3) of the Act and if they were not ejected and also if land was not resettled with others by the landlord within a period of three years, the heir or heirs in occupation could legally acquire status of the statutory tenancy rights m the holding after the expiry of three years as was provided under Sec. 3(18) of the Oudh Rent Act, In the Oudh Rent Act there was no provision permitting a statutory tenant or a groveholder to coopt another person as a cotenureholder or cogroveholder. And apart from it, in my opinion, there could be no cooption of another person by a tenureholder as cotenant in any manner without the express consent of the landlord. In this view of the matter I do not find that during Oudh Rent Act the tenureholders, Hafiz Mohd. Usman and Abdul Sattar, sons of Khuda Bux could coopt Suleman in the holding in dispute, and, as such, merely on account of the solitary entry in the Chitthi Batwara in the name of Mohd. In this view of the matter I do not find that during Oudh Rent Act the tenureholders, Hafiz Mohd. Usman and Abdul Sattar, sons of Khuda Bux could coopt Suleman in the holding in dispute, and, as such, merely on account of the solitary entry in the Chitthi Batwara in the name of Mohd. Suleman, along with his father, the petitioner cannot claim half share in the holding in dispute. In the 3rd settlement in the year 1332 F the names of Abdul Sattar and Mohd. Usman, sons of Khuda Bux, alone were recorded, and, as such, I am not able to place any reliance on the Chitthi Batwara for upholding the alleged cooption of Mohd. Suleman by Abdul Sattar. In view of the above, I do not find any error has been committed by opposite parties 1 to 3 in giving 1/6th share to the petitioner to which he appears to be legally entitled to. No error has been committed by the opposite parties 1 to 3 in determining the share of the parties and I do not find any case is made out for interference by this court in exercise of powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. In the result the writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs. (Petition dismissed.)