A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) SHOULD the court pass an ex-parte ad-interim order staying the process of election of a Panchayat and thereby countermand the mandate of the people? Would this be in consonance with the basic principles of democracy ? these questions are at the centre of controversy required to be resolved in this petition. ( 2 ) THE respondents No. 1 and 2 filed a suit being Regular Civil Suit No. 861 of 1985 in the Count of Civil Judge (SD) Vadodara and prayed that the Notification (Annexure A) dated 5/06/1985 issued by the Deputy Collector and Returning Officer of the Election of Tarsali Gram Panchayat the declared illegal and void and the proceedings taken by the respondents-original defendants be also declared illegal and void and they be restrained from holding the election and be directed to convert the Grant Panchayat into Nagar Panchayat and be further directed to declare the Gram Panchayat as Nagar Panchayat. The aforesaid suit was filed on 13/06/1985 On the same day the respondent-Plaintiff submitted an application Exh. 5 praying that the respendants be restrained from proceeding further with the election pursuant to the Notification dated 5/06/1985 The trial court directed the respondents to maintain status quo till further orders and made the notice returnable on 18/06/1985 ( 3 ) THE aforesaid order passed by the trial court is challenged in this petition. It is an undisputed position that on 18/06/1985 or on any day thereafter till today further proceedings before the trial court have not taken place. This is so because almost all the staff members in District Court and subordinate courts of Vadodara district are on strike and therefore the normal functioning of courts is not possible. The employees are on strike on account of the agitation against roster system in the State Government services. ( 4 ) IT is also an undisputed fact that the election process as far as the election of Tarsali Gram Panchayat is concerned has started with the publication dated 5/06/1985 The nominations were to be filled in on 13/06/1985 On this very day the suit has been filed. It may be noted that the Notification declaring the programme of election was issued on 5/06/1985 It can be said that from that day onwards the process of election has started. It may be noted that the Notification declaring the programme of election was issued on 5/06/1985 It can be said that from that day onwards the process of election has started. On the date of the filing of the suit i. e. on 13/06/1985 nomination papers were to be accepted. In the case of N. P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer Namakkal reported in AIR (39) 1952 SC 64 the Supreme Court after referring to the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act 1951 and Halsburys Laws of England has stated in para 7 of the judgment:"the discussion in this passage makes it clear that the word election can be and has been appropriately used with reference to the entire process which consists of several stages and embraces many steps some of which may have an important bearing on the result of the process". It is true that the Supreme Court has laid down the aforesaid principle in the context of the provisions of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act 1951 But these very principles have got to be applied to the elections to the local authorities also. This would be clear from para 16 of the Supreme Court judgment in the aforesaid case of N. P. Ponnuswami which is reproduced hereinbelow:" (1) Having regard to the important functions which the legislatures have to perform in democratic countries it has always been recognized to be a matter of first importance that elections should be concluded as early as possible according to time-schedule and all controversial matters and ali disputes arising out of elections should be postponed till after the elections are over so that the election proceedings may not be unduly retarded or protracted. (2) In conformity with this principle the scheme of the election law in this coumtry as well as in England is that no significance should be attached to anything which does not affect the election and if any irregularities are committed while it is in progress and they belong to the category or class which under the law by which elections are governed would have the effect of vitiating the election and enable the person affected to call it in question they should be brought up before a special tribunal by means to an election petition and not be made the subject of a dispute before any court while the election is in progress". in the instant case it is an undisputed position that the term of the Panchayat had already expired. After the expiry of the term of me Panchayat it was extended by one year. Thereafter the election Notification has been issued Under the provisions of the Gujarat Panchayat Act the legislature has provided that even in the local authorities the elected representatives of the people should sit in the position of power only up to specified period. This is in con sonance within the basic democratic principles. I am crawl no one can sit in the position of power for an indefinite period. A the expiry of the specified period the person who sits in the position of power is required to seek a fresh mandate from the people. In the instant case the mandate of the people was that the elected representatives may sit in the position of power up on a specified period which cannot be extended except as provided under the Act. This period was extended for a period of on year and s reader it could no have been extended or at any rate the authorities concerned did not thinly it fit to extend the same. By declaring the programme of election she authorities concerned were acting in consonance with the basis democratic principle that one who wields power and sits in the position of power without not be permitted to hotel office beyond the specified period and he must be asked to seek fresh mandate from the people. In the ease of Chauhan Hussainbhai Alibhai v. State of Gujarat reported in 1984 0 GLH 523 I have observed as follows. In the ease of Chauhan Hussainbhai Alibhai v. State of Gujarat reported in 1984 0 GLH 523 I have observed as follows. "even if election cannot be held for technical reasons or for any other valid reasons the persons in position of power have no legitimate democratic right to continue in office. Such persons cannot be heard to say that there are illegalities in the election which is to take place or which has already commenced and direct the authorities to restrain from holding election. To uphold such contention even prima facie and allow them to continue in office would only mean that persons we have no legal or moral right to hold and set in the elective office be permitted to sit in position of power. By any standard this course will be non-democratic if not undemocratic". In view of the aforesaid basic principles applicable to ail democratic forms of government and institutions even on first principles it should be held that whenever the election process starts the courts should not come in the way and stay the election process. To do so would amount at to frustrating the mandate of the people. Such an action would not the in consonance with the basis principles of democracy. It may be noted that the institution of court has been created to maintain and uphold the democracy and no thwart or obstruct the democratic process. ( 5 ) IT may further be noted that right to vote or right; to said as a candidate for election is not a common law right but is a creature of statute on a right conferred by a special law and must be submitted to the limitations imposed by it (See Ponnuswamys case (supra) at page 64 para 13 ). If the provisions of the Gujarat Panchayats Act and other relevant provisions governing the election of Panchayat are examined from this point of view it would be clear that the right to vote and contest in the election of Panchayat has been conferred upon citizens under the provisions of the Gujarat Panchayats Act. Similarly a special machinery has been created under the provisions of the Gujarat Panchayats Act itself for challenging the legality and validity of the election. Similarly a special machinery has been created under the provisions of the Gujarat Panchayats Act itself for challenging the legality and validity of the election. Under section 24 (2) of the Panchayats Act it has also been provided that the decision of the Judge holding enquiry into the legality and validity of the election shall be conclusive. In view of the aforesaid provisions and in view of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court ion the context of election law in general and in view of the aforesaid basic principles applicable to all the democratic forms of Governments and institutions it has got to be held that by necessary implications the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded from entertaining the disputes regarding election once the election process has started. Such disputes can be raised before the Tribunal created under the Panchayats Act because the right in respect of the election is created under the statute and the remedy is also provided under the statute ( 6 ) THE trial court ought to have seen that even if prima facie strong case may appear to have been made out by the plaintiffs the suit being not maintainable it ought not to have granted the interim relief as prayed for. It should have been realised that the grant of interim relief or been ad interim relief in such cases would amount to passing the final decree. When the status two is ordered. the authorities cannot proceed further with the election. The candidates who might have prepared themselves to fill in the nomination cannot file their nomination papers and the entire election process would come to a stand-still The result would be that by granting ad interim relief the election as notified cannot be finally decreed act the stage of passing ad-interim order only. Even of the ultimate object of the plaintiff in filing such a suit. Many a time it is argued that refusal of ad interim relief would amount to dismissing the suit. It may be so but held and as a matter of fact could not be held form the year of the cannot be finally decreed at the stage of passing ad-interim order only. Many a time it is argued that refusal of ad interim relief would amount to dismissing the suit. It may be so but held and as a matter of fact could not be held form the year of the cannot be finally decreed at the stage of passing ad-interim order only. Even if them may be a strong prima facie case it can never be said that the plaintiff be granted final decree by issuing sd interim order without affording an opportunity of circumstances already the defendant. In such cases the persons to be affected and not only the election authorities but a large number of people whose democratic rights are likely to be interfered with. By the very nature of things they would not be before the court. In therefore it because the paramount duty of the court to sec that the democratic rights are not interfered with at the Instance of non be before the court. Therefore it becomes the paramount duty power. Be it noted that such suits are ordinarily filed by or at the instance of persons who are in position of lower or who are interested in seeing to it that the persons in position of power continue to be there. ( 7 ) IN the instant case the trial court by granting and interim relief stated the further steps to be taken pursuant to the Notification dated 5/06/1985 meaning thereby the intending candidates could not fill in their nomination papers the election could not be held for the dates specified in the Notification. Thus the grant of and interim relief meant the allowing of the suit itself. Assuming for a normally that the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain such suits even then the trial court ought not to have granted the ad interim relief by which the suit was being substantially allowed without giving any opportunity of being heard to the opponents. ( 8 ) IT is contended by the counsel for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that the petitioner has no locus standi to file this petition because the petitioner was not a party to the suit in the trial court and his application for being joined as party has been rejected by the trial court. The contention cannot be accepted. 1 and 2 that the petitioner has no locus standi to file this petition because the petitioner was not a party to the suit in the trial court and his application for being joined as party has been rejected by the trial court. The contention cannot be accepted. Any person who has interest in the proper function; of the local authority can move this Court under draw the attention of this Court regarding the illegal orders passed by the trial court. This Court can even exercise its suo motu powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and call for the matters and decide the same on merits (see Ahmedabad)ad Mfg. and Calico Printing Co. v. Ramtahil AIR 1979 SC 1598 para 13 ). Therefore the technical contention raised on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that the petitioner has no locus standi to file this petition has got to be rejected. ( 9 ) IT is next contended that the petitioner has alternative remedy and therefore the petition should not be entertained. This contention has also no merit. After all the bar of entertaining a matter on the ground of alternative remedy is a rule of convenience. It does not create any absolute bar of jurisdiction to be exercised by the High Court. Ordinarily as a matter of convenience the superior court would not exercise its jurisdiction when there is an alternative and efficacious remedy. But this rule of convenience cannot be set up against the courts for not exercising its power where the exercise of such power is called for. 1 ( 10 ) IN this respect reference any be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U. P. State v. Mohd. Nooh reported in AIR 1958 SC 86 . At page 94 of the judgment the Supreme Court has clearly held that in case errors irregularities or illegalities touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior court or tribunal of trust instance is so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or view which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision then the same can be dealt with by High Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held that there is no rule with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well settled provided the requisite grounds exist that certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute. The Supreme Court has further stated that this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. The aforesaid principle has again been reiteraled try the Supreme Court in the case of Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana and others (1985) 3 SCC 267 . In the instant case as a de hereinabove the trial court has prima facie acted without injurisdiction and has entertained a suit which is not maintainable. Moreover it has granted ad interim relief which is not in consonance with the basic democratic principles an cl which affects the democratic rights of innumerable citizens and yet such an order is passed without giving an opportunity of being heard to any of hem or even to the defendants who were parties any granting such ad interim relief the trial court has virtually allowed the suit. The order passed by he trial court is ex facie illegal and hence it has become necessary for this Court to exercise is powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 11 ) MOREOVER in the instant case it cannot be said that there is an alternative and efficacious remedy If the petitioner is directed to go before the learned trial court Judge and request him of hearing of Exh. 5 application than itself would take months. Further in the present day situation when the lower courts are not working due to strike by employees this may not become possible at all. Thereafter the appeal before the District Court may take pretby long the. Then revision or petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before thisnhigh Vourt would take further time. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that the petitioner has alternative and efficacious remedy. Thereafter the appeal before the District Court may take pretby long the. Then revision or petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before thisnhigh Vourt would take further time. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that the petitioner has alternative and efficacious remedy. If the petit on is rejected on this ground the respondent-plaintiff would be able to perpetuate the status quo and elections will not be held though the term of the Panchayat has expired before one Year. This would not only be unjust and improper but it would also be undermocratic. ( 12 ) COUNSEL for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 states that there were very good grounds for challenging the legality and validity of the election No tification and the even ion process itself. It is not necessary to discuss these grounds and discuss their merits or demerits because once the election process starts the civil court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain the suits and decide the same on merits. The act which confers right to vote provides for adequatel machinery to challenge the legality and validity of the election. The validity of the election can be challenged only in the manner provided under the statute and in no other manner. ( 13 ) IN above view of the matter the petition is allowed. The order passed by the trial court below application Exh. 5 dated 13/06/1985 in Regular Civil Suit No. 861 of 1985 is quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .