JUDGMENT - DHABE H.W., J.:-This is a writ petition challenging the order of the learned Labour Court passed under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, “the Act”), granting difference of minimum wages to the respondent employee employed by the petitioner. 2. Briefly, the facts are that the respondent filed an application under section 33-C(2) of the Act on the ground that he is entitled to be paid the minimum wages fixed for the employees in shop and commercial establishments covered under entry No. 17 of Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 as also to the special allowance fixed by the Government from time to time in respect of the said establishments. The petitioner inter alia raised two questions before the Labour Court. The first was that the application under section 33-C(2) of the Act was not maintainable because there was a special enactment viz .the Minimum Wages Act which provided a remedy to the employees for recovery of the minimum wages fixed thereunder. The second question urged was that there is no notification issued under the Minimum Wages Act covering the establishment of the petitioner market committee and, therefore, the minimum wages are not applicable to the establishment of the petitioner. Really speaking what is urged is that the establishment of the petitioner is not a commercial establishment within the meaning of the said expression under entry No. 17 of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act. The learned Labour Court rejected both the contentions and directed payment of the difference in minimum wages as claimed by the respondent. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has challenged the aforesaid order of the Labour Court in this writ petition. 3. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of (M.C. Achalpur v. Shaikh Rahim and others)1, 1984 Mh.L.J. 998 the learned Counsel for the petitioner did not urge the contention that the application under section 33-C(2) of the Act is not maintainable. The second contention is, however, seriously pressed before me. It is urged that the petitioner market committee is not carrying on any business, trade or profession and is not, therefore, within the definition of the expression “commercial establishment” given in section 2(4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. The second contention is, however, seriously pressed before me. It is urged that the petitioner market committee is not carrying on any business, trade or profession and is not, therefore, within the definition of the expression “commercial establishment” given in section 2(4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. It is further urged that the petitioner market committee is constituted under the provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1964 (for short “APMC Act”) and has to perform statutory duties as provided under section 29 of the said Act. The submission is that none of the duties enumerated in section 29 of the APMC Act would show that the petitioner market committee is carrying on any business, trade or profession as those expressions are normally understood. 4. In considering the above contention on behalf of the petitioner it may be seen that the explanation to entry No. 17 of the Schedule in the Minimum Wages Act shows that the expression “shops and commercial establishments” have the meanings assigned to them respectively in the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the scope and ambit of the definition of “commercial establishment” given in section 2(4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. A careful perusal of the said definition would show that the expression “commercial establishment” means not only an establishment which itself carries on any business, trade or profession. Assuming for the sake of argument that the establishment of the petitioner does not carry on any business, trade or profession the question would be whether it carries on any work in connection with any business, trade or profession. It cannot be disputed that the traders or businessmen who carry on their activity within the market establishment carry on business or trade in the normal sense in which it is understood. If it is shown that the petitioner market committee carries on the work in connection with the said business, then by virtue of the definition of the expression “commercial establishment” given in section 2(4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 it would be a commercial establishment within the meaning of the said Act. 5. If it is shown that the petitioner market committee carries on the work in connection with the said business, then by virtue of the definition of the expression “commercial establishment” given in section 2(4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 it would be a commercial establishment within the meaning of the said Act. 5. A perusal of the duties enumerated in section 29 of the A.P.M.C. Act would show that all the activities carried on by the market committee are in relation to the marketing or allied activities carried on by the traders within the jurisdiction of the market committee. It has, therefore, to be held that the petitioner market committee is a commercial establishment within the meaning of section 2(4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. The above conclusion is further strengthened by the intrinsic evidence in the above Act itself. A perusal of item 62 of Schedule II to the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act, 1948 relating to the exemptions granted under section 4 of the said Act would show that the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committees established or deemed to be established under the APMC Act are intended to be covered by the said Act. In this view of the matter the above contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is rejected. 6. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----