S. S. SHARMA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against an order dated 8. 3. 1983 passed by Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Balod in Criminal Case No. 285 of 1982. ( 2 ) THE facts relevant for disposal of this revision are as under:the present applicant had filed a complaint against the non-applicants. The trial Magistrate after examination of the complainant and his witnesses issued process against the non-applicants for offences under sections 166, 413, 419, 465, 468 and 120-8 of the I. P. C. The non applicants after appearing before the Court below raised an objection about want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Codett ). The order-sheet dated 26. 5. 82 of the trial Magistrate's record indicates that both on behalf of the complainant as also on behalf of the accused copies of some orders of the courts in civil proceedings were also filed. The trial Magistrate by an order dated 4. 6. 1982, for the reasons mentioned in that order, refused to decide application of the accused at that stage inter alia holding that it shall be decided after when the facts have come on record. Aggrieved by this order, the accused persons filed a revision (Criminal Revision No. 517 of 1982) in this Court. That revision was allowed by a learned judge of this Court by order dated 5. 1. 1913 with the direction to decide the objection of want of sanction under section 197 of the Code. ( 3 ) LEARNED trial Magistrate in pursuance of the direction given by this Court in the aforesaid criminal revision, by the impugned order dated 8. 3. 83 held that sanction under Section 197 of the Code was necessary and so for all practical purposes he dismissed the complaint. ( 4 ) IN spite of notice being served on the non applicants, none of them held appeared personally or through any counsel. S P. C. had also been issued to them. Thus, only the applicants counsel was heard. ( 5 ) BEFORE proceeding any further I may mention certain decisions of their Lordship of the Supreme Court which would solve much of the controversies that may arise in the present revision. In K. Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab their Lordships have laid down that. Thus, only the applicants counsel was heard. ( 5 ) BEFORE proceeding any further I may mention certain decisions of their Lordship of the Supreme Court which would solve much of the controversies that may arise in the present revision. In K. Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab their Lordships have laid down that. We have no hesitation in saying that where a public servant commits the offence of cheating or abets another so to cheat, that offence committed by him is not one while he is acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, as such offences have no necessary connection between them and the performance of the duties of a public servant, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the commission or the offence [sin Prabhakar v. 5mar112. Their Lordships in Ronald v. State of West Beligal3 relying on Privy Council cases, as have been referred to therein, observed that The question whether sanction under section 197 v. as necessary for instituting proceedings against the appellant on charges of conspiracy and of bribery, is now concluded by the decision of the Judicial Committed NJ-I. B. Gill v. The King4, and Phanindra Chandra Neogy v. The King5, and must be answered in the negative. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the applicant contends that even for an offence of forgery no sanction under Section 197 of the Code would be necessary as by no stretch of imagination can an offence of forgery be committed by a public servant in discharge of his official duties. He referred to the decision in Bhanwar Singh and anr. v. State of Ralasthan6. According to him although in that case that question was about sanction under Section 196. A of the Code but according to him so far as the discharge of the official duties is concerned the principle would be the same. It also was in my opinion rightly, urged that in the circumstances the Court may further require to prima facie find out the main object of the criminal conspiracy and the means adopted for achieving that object. This according to him would be relevant to determine the need or other wise of the sanction for the particular alleged offence or offences. In Matajog Dubey v. BC. This according to him would be relevant to determine the need or other wise of the sanction for the particular alleged offence or offences. In Matajog Dubey v. BC. Chari,7 their Lordships have laid down that It is not always necessary that the need for sanction under 5. 197 is to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations therein contained. The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming to Light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case. See also SD. Saha v. BS. Kochar,8 ( 7 ) A perusal of the impugned order of the learned judicial Magistrate indicates that he had taken into account some or the other copy of the order of the civil proceedings between the parties while considering the question of want of sanction. As a fact, the learned judge while reminding the matter back to the Judicial Magistrate had stated that the question of sanction was to be decided on the basis of the material on record. By this be obviously meant the complain and the examination of the complaint and his witnesses. The other copies which have been referred to by the learned that Magistrate were not admitted documents though each party had filed its own copy. The main reason which seems to have prevailed on the trial Magistrate for the need of the sanction is that the alleged acts and so a sanction would be necessary. This, in my opinion, is not the correct approach and would be to broad a preposition to be accepted. The principles in this behalf have been laid down by their Lordships in many decision including these in Matojogs case (supra) and K. Sat want Singhs close (supra ). ( 8 ) THE order dated 5. 1. This, in my opinion, is not the correct approach and would be to broad a preposition to be accepted. The principles in this behalf have been laid down by their Lordships in many decision including these in Matojogs case (supra) and K. Sat want Singhs close (supra ). ( 8 ) THE order dated 5. 1. 1983 of the learned judge in Criminal Revision No. 517 of 1982 cannot be read to mean that the need or otherwise of the sanction as may be decided by the trial Magistrate would be final and conclusive so far as that court is concerned. That order clearly meant to say that the trial Magistrate had to consider and decide the question on the basis of the material on record which obviously meant exclusion of any other evidence or document unless these were admitted facts. The trial Magistrate should have, therefore, kept himself confined to the complaint and the statement of the complainant and the witnesses recorded under sections 200 and 202 of the Code. Apparently, the trial Magistrate did not apply the correct principles on which the question of want of sanction is to be determined. He also ignored the fact that for certain offences sanction under Section 197 of the Code may not at all be necessary. For these reasons the impugned order cannot be upheld. ( 9 ) CONSEQUENTLY, this revision is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. Learned trial Magistrate shall rehear the parties on the question of want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code provided the non-applicants press their objection at this stage. If on the basis of the material on record and keeping in view the principles laid down by their Lordships in the aforesaid cases and others, he finds that sanction is necessary, he may pass an order accordingly. However if he finds that at the present stage on the basis of the material on record no sanction appears to be necessary, he shall pass a speaking order accordingly and proceed with the case in accordance with law. It is made clear that even if sanction is not found necessary at this stage, this would not debar the accused from raising this objection over again at subsequent stage of the trial on the basis of the evidence and the material that may come on record during trial. Revision allowed. .