K. A. SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) OUT of these writ petitions, writ petitions 4364 and 4365/85 are preferred by the applicants. The other writ petitions are preferred by the objectors The parties to all these writ petitions are common. Therefore, for the purpose of convenience in the order, the ranking assigned to the parties in Writ Petition nos. 3928 and 3929/85 will be referred to. ( 2 ) RESPONDENTS 4 and 5 have filed the applications for grant of stage carriage permits on the routes-Birur to pavagada and Pavagada to Birur. After complying with the procedural requirements, the 2nd respondent has granted both the applications by the resolution dated 16-5-1984 passed in Subject No. 73 and 74/83-84. Pursuant to the grant, the secretary, R. T. A. , has assigned the timings on 28-8-1984. ( 3 ) SOME of the objectors have preferred appeals against the aforesaid grant of permits before the Karnataka state Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the 'kastat') which has allowed the appeals and has set aside the permits and has remitted the matters to the 2nd respondent with a direction to consider the same afresh in accordance with the directions contained in the order of remand. While remitting the matter, the KSTAT has also permitted respondents 4 and 5 to operate the services as per the existing timings without making that circumstances as a ground /or grant of permit to both the respondents or either of them. The petitioners in the other writ petitions other than W. Ps. 4364 and 4365/85, are aggrieved with the aforesaid direction of the KSTAT permitting respondents 4 and 5 to operate the services during the pendency of the proceedings before the 2nd respondent. Whereas respondents 4 and 5 are aggrieved with the very order of remand. Therefore, in these petitions, the main argument is advanced by respondents 4 and 5 who are petitioners in Writ Petitions 4364 and 4365 of 1985. ( 4 ) SRI C. S. Shanthamallappa, learned Counsel for a respondents 4 and 5, who are the petitioners in W. Ps. Whereas respondents 4 and 5 are aggrieved with the very order of remand. Therefore, in these petitions, the main argument is advanced by respondents 4 and 5 who are petitioners in Writ Petitions 4364 and 4365 of 1985. ( 4 ) SRI C. S. Shanthamallappa, learned Counsel for a respondents 4 and 5, who are the petitioners in W. Ps. 4364 and 4365/85, contends that the power of the appellate authority is co extensive with that of the original authority; as such even if the appellate authority is of the opinion that the material on record is not sufficient, it ought to have collected the material and decided the appeals instead of remitting the matters to the r T. A. Learned Counsel tries to receive support to this argument from the directions issued in the order of remand and submits that the remand is only for the purpose of obtaining the route-survey to be made by the Secretary, R. T. A. , which could have been done by directing the Secretary, R. T. A. to make the route survey and submit the report Alternatively, it is submitted that even if the order of remand is upheld, the permission granted by the kstat to operate two services during the pendency of the proceedings before the 2nd respondent is justified, having regard to the fact that respondent No. 5 has purchased a new vehicle and both the respondents 4 and 5 have been operating the services from 28-8-1984 itself. That if the services have to be stopped, not only respondents 4 and 5 are put to loss but the travelling public are also put to great inconvenience ; that there is no direct service from Birur to pavagada, and vice versa. It is also further submitted that the KSTAT has exercised the discretion in a particular manner while remitting the matter and that discretion is justified having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case ; therefore the same is not liable to be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution, because no objectors can be said to have been affected and even if they are affected, it will be only in respect of timings which can be directed to be adjusted so as to maintain the priority of the existing operators. ( 5 ) ON the contrary, the petitioners in the other writ petitions, who are the objectors, contend that when the KSTAT has come to the conclusion that the material on record is not sufficient to determine the need, the course adopted by the KSTAT in remitting the matters, is just and proper, and it is in conformity with the decision of this Court reported in AIR 1962 Karnataka, 32- p. Abdul Azeez, Bellary v. Mysore Revenue appellate Tribunal, Bangalore and ors. It is also further submitted that merely because the direction is given in the order of remand to collect the material in a particular manner, it does not in any way vitiate the order of remand ; that if necessary, the R T. A. may be directed to collect any further material and the petitioners and respondents be permitted to adduce such material as they find it necessary for the purpose of showing whether there exists a need or not. Regarding the permission granted by the k. S. T. A. T. to operate the services during the pendency of the proceedings before the second respondent, it is submitted that such permission is not permissible because in the absence of a finding regarding the existence of need, permitting the applicants to operate the services results in permitting them to operate without permits but also without there being no need for operating the service. In addition to this, it is contended that there is no such jurisdiction vested in the KSTAT to permit the applicants to operate pending the decision by the 2nd respondent. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in Writ petition no. 3/59, which is produced as one of the documents, in Writ Petition No. 4499/85. ( 6 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid contentions, the points that arise for consideration, are as follows : (1) Whether the order of remand passed by the KSTAT is justified ? (2) Whether the permission granted by the KSTAT to operate the services in question pending determination by the R. T. A. is permissible in law ? ( 6 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid contentions, the points that arise for consideration, are as follows : (1) Whether the order of remand passed by the KSTAT is justified ? (2) Whether the permission granted by the KSTAT to operate the services in question pending determination by the R. T. A. is permissible in law ? ( 7 ) IT is not in dispute in this case that the material that is placed on record on the question of need is all that is referred to in para 14 of the order of the KSTAT, namely- i) Route Survey report of the senior inspector of Motor Vehicles ; ii) Resolution of Parashurampura group Panchayat, dated 10 6- 1982-Subject Nos. 4 and 5 respectively ; iii) Concurrence resolution of the r. T. A. Chikkamagalur, dated 7-9-1981; and iv) Concurrence resolution of the r. T. A. Tumkur, dated 3-9-1981. This is not a case in which it is possible to hold that the KSTAT without looking into the aforesaid evidence has come to the conclusion that the material on record is insufficient to determine the question of need. On the contrary, it has considered the aforesaid material on record and has given reasons for coming to the conclusion that the aforesaid material is not at all adequate. The report of the Inspector of Motor Vehicles does not give the required information for the purpose of determining the need. The two resolutions of concurrence also do not contain the material except stating that they have no objection for granting the permission. So is the case with the resolution of the Panchayat committee. Therefore, on examination of the report of the Inspector of Motor vehicles, the KSTAT has observed as follows :"in my opinion, the said criticism of the route-survey report of the Sr. IMV appears to be well founded as he has not chosen to state whether there is flow of direct traffic between Pavagada and Birur and vice - versa and if so what is the volume of the traffic, whether the two places are having connection administratively or commercially, and whether there is need for a direct service between these two towns and if so, whether there is need for operating 2 services from the opposite directions. "on the inter-sections of the route, there are several bus services which aspect has been adverted to by the Tribunal in paragraph 15 of its order. Therefore, I am of the view that the conclusion reached by the KSTAT that the material on record is inadequate to hold that there is need for granting two permits is correct. "now the question for consideration is whether after having come to the aforesaid conclusion the KSTAT ought to have directed the R. T. A. to collect the material and place the same before it or it is right in remitting it to the R. T. A. for fresh consideration. No doubt, the power of the KSTAT is coextensive with that of the R. T. A. That does not mean that in every case the kstat must go on collecting the material. On the contrary, this court in a decision reported in AIR 1962 karnataka, page 32 (P. Abdul Azeez v mrat), has held that if the appellate authority comes to the conclusion that the material on record is inadequate to record a finding on the question of need, it is opsn to it to remit the matter. In para-12 of the judgment, it is stated thus :""a remand, in our opinion, would be justified only if there is no material at all on the basis of which the question left undecided by the original authority can properly be decided by the appellate authority or if the latter finds that the material is insufficient to enable it to come to a just decision on the question. We are equally clear in our opinion that where there is material on record and the original Authority has examined the same and come to a certain conclusion, the appellate authority can re-assess the material and come to a different conclusion, but it should not do so without examining the material on record. That is what, in our opinion, the Revenue Appellate tribunal has done in the case. (Emphasis supplied) as it is already pointed out, the KSTAT has examined every material on record and come to the conclusion that the material is not sufficient to record a finding on the question of need. That is what, in our opinion, the Revenue Appellate tribunal has done in the case. (Emphasis supplied) as it is already pointed out, the KSTAT has examined every material on record and come to the conclusion that the material is not sufficient to record a finding on the question of need. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has either acted in excess of its jurisdiction or failed to exercise the jurisdiction in remitting the matter to the r T. A. Sri C. S. Shanthamallappa, learned Counsel for the applicants, has placed reliance on a decision of this court in Writ Petitions 11275 and 11276 of 1977, decided on 24th February, 1981. It is not possible to hold that in that decision, it is laid down that the Appellate authority must collect the material wherever it finds that the material on record is insufficient. On the contrary, that is a case in which the Tribunal had remitted the matter without examining the evidence on record. Therefore, this court has observed as follows :""the observation of the Tribunal that the material on record is not sufficient to justify the need to grant variation is also not correct and cannot be accepted. The Tribunal had only a cursory view of material. Mr. Rangaswamy, counsel for the petitioner referred to me the report of the IMV and the representations of the local authorities It cannot be said that it is insufficient to come to a definite conclusion on question of need, one way or the other. "therefore, it is not possible to hold that the said decision is an authority for the preposition advanced by the learned counsel for the applicants. Learned counsel for the applicants has placed reliance on another decision of this court reported in 1964 (2) Kar Law journal, 373 (Jagadeeswara Express v The mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal and ors ). In that decision also, it has been laid down that the power of the Appellate authority is coextensive with that of the r. T. A, I have already pointed out that there is no quarrel with that preposition, but the question is whether the remand is justified. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and in the instant case it is not possible to hold that the KSTAT has. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and in the instant case it is not possible to hold that the KSTAT has. committed an illegality or irregularity in remitting the matter to the R. T. A. "no doubt, while remitting the matter to the R. T A. , the KSTAT has limited the scope of the enquiry by the r. T. A. It should not have limited the scope of enquiry. When the KSTAT has remitted the matter on the ground of inadequacy of evidence, it ought to have left it open to the R. T. A. to collect such material as is necessary to consider the question of need and also to permit the parties to adduce such material as they deem it appropriate for the purpose of establishing that there is or there is no need. Therefore, the order of the KSTAT in so far as the scope of the proceeding before the R. T. A. is concerned, requires to be modified. ""accordingly, the first point is answered as follows : The order of remand is in accordance with law. However, the directions contained therein limiting the scope of enquiry before the r. T. A. require to be modified. ( 8 ) IN Writ petition No. 3/59 decided on 1-4-1959, a division Bench of this Court under similar circumstances has held as follows :"it appears to me that there is much force in the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner in this regard. The State Transport Authority, having cancelled the permit granted to respondent-5, became functus-officio and did not possess any jurisdiction to make an order the effect of which was to keep its own order cancelling the permit granted to respondent-5 in abeyance until the Regional Transport authority finally selected the permit- holder. If, by what the State Transport Authority ceased to be operative since it was cancelled by the State transport Authority, it was not permissible for respondent-5 as provided by Sec. 42 of the Act, to run his stage carriage, since he no longer possessed a permit to do so. Under the provisions of Sec. 64 of the Act, under which the appeal was presented to the state Transport Authority, the State transport Authority could not give the impugned direction which is not in accordance with the provisions of the act, but is repugnant thereto. Under the provisions of Sec. 64 of the Act, under which the appeal was presented to the state Transport Authority, the State transport Authority could not give the impugned direction which is not in accordance with the provisions of the act, but is repugnant thereto. "the aforesaid enunciation fully covers the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners other than the grantees. However, Sri C. S. Shanthamallappa, learned Counsel for the applicants, has placed reliance on a decision reported in air 1976 (1) Supreme Court Cases, 373 (Kumaraswamy v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras and anr. ). That was a case in which, pursuant to the determination made under Sec. 47 (3) of the act, the selection was made for grant of permits. Ultimately, the 2nd respondent before the Supreme Court was granted the permit, which was set aside by the appellate Tribunal. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal and remitted the matter to the appellate Tribunal itself. As a result thereof, the grant of permit made in favour of respondent-2 remained undisturbed. However, during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate authority, it appears that the appellant no. 6 was also operating. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court observed that it was open to the appellate Tribunal to allow the appellant before the supreme Court to ply his bus on the same route. It is not possible to hold that the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court enables the applicants to sustain the permission to operate the services granted by the KSTAT during the pendency of the proceeding before the 2nd respondent. Accordingly, Point no. It is not possible to hold that the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court enables the applicants to sustain the permission to operate the services granted by the KSTAT during the pendency of the proceeding before the 2nd respondent. Accordingly, Point no. (2) is answered as follows : the Tribunal has acted illegally and without jurisdiction in permitting the applicants to operate the services during the pendency of the proceeding before the R. T. A. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons stated above, these writ petitions are allowed in the following terms :i) The order of remand made by the kstat does not call for interference ; ii) The directions contained in sub- paras (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of para-39 of the impugned order of the KSTAT, are quashed ; iii) It is open to the R. T. A to collect such material as it necessary for the purpose of deciding the applications including obtaining a fresh route-survey report from the Secretary, RTA regarding the volume of traffic on the various sectors of the route and also on the need for introducing direct services on the routes proposed by the two applicants ; iv) It is also open to the objectors and the applicants to produce such material as they deem it necessary in support of their contentions; v) As the direction given to the r. T. A. to decide the matter within three months is not possible to be complied with, the r. T. A. is directed to decide the applications within two months from the date of receipt of this order, in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order. ( 10 ) SRI Abdul Khader, learned High court Government Pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance for respondents 1 and 2 in six weeks. Communicate the order as early as possible. Sri C. S. Shanthamallappa, learned counsel for the applicants, submits that as the applicants are operating the services and as they intend to take up the matter in appeal, the operation of the order just now pronounced may be suspended for a period of three weeks. However, I am of the opinion that if the order is suspended, for a period of two weeks, it will be just and sufficient. Accordingly, the operation of the aforesaid order is suspended for a period of two weeks. However, I am of the opinion that if the order is suspended, for a period of two weeks, it will be just and sufficient. Accordingly, the operation of the aforesaid order is suspended for a period of two weeks. --- *** --- .