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1985 DIGILAW 189 (PAT)

Krishan Misir v. State Of Bihar

1985-05-28

ANAND PRASAD SINHA, RAM NARESH THAKUR

body1985
Judgment Anand Prasad Sinha, J. 1. These two appeals arise out of the same judgment. They have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. All the appellants have been found guilty for an offence punishable under Section. 396 of the Indian Penal Code and each has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. 2. The prosecution case briefly stated, is that, on the 2nd June, 1978, at about sunset time, all the appellants differently armed with gun had entered into the house of the informant Dharmdeo Tiwary (P.W. 3) Lalan Tiwary (P.W. 1), who was at his house, had shouted that dacoits had arrived. At that time he was feeding his cattle inside the angan. His son Brij Bihari Tiwary was in the Janeni Kita and when he saw that the dacoits had arrived, he closed the door and climbed upon the first floor, closed the door and went inside a room. Some of the dacoits went to the first floor and having found that the door had been closed, they had climbed on the roof and from there indiscriminate firing was done with the result that Brij Bihari Tiwary was shot and killed Sumitra Devi (P. W. 2), who happened to be the wife of the informant, was inside the angan. She also claims identification. It has been specifically stated that Jagdish Tiwari was armed with a gun. 3. Necessary information to the police had been given same day at 9.45 p.m. giving rise to this case. 4. It appears that Lalan Tiwari (P.W. 1) happens to be the son of Harbansh Tiwari (P. W. 4). In addition, Lalan Tiwari was the cousin of the deceased. Lalan Tiwari (P.W. 1) and Bindeshwar Tiwari (P. W. 5) have not supported the prosecution case and they have been declared hostile. However, the fate of this case shall depend upon the question of identification and also as to whether the appellants had participated in the offence as claimed by the informant Dharmdeo Tiwari (P.W. 3) and Sumitra Devi (P.W. 2). 5. However, the fate of this case shall depend upon the question of identification and also as to whether the appellants had participated in the offence as claimed by the informant Dharmdeo Tiwari (P.W. 3) and Sumitra Devi (P.W. 2). 5. From the evidence of Sumitra Devi (P. W. 2), it appears that she was all along in the courtyard & from there she had stated all about the occurrence having taken place inside the room and also with regard to the identification We are afraid, it was not possible for Sumitra Devi (P. W. 2) to tell all about the incident having taken place inside the room in the first floor. Moreover, she has stated the time of the occurrence to be in between 4 and 5 oclock. Of course, it is not possible to tell the exact time in villages but, at least, it can be inferred that definitely it was not dark. Under the circumstance§, it does not appear acceptable when the informant (P. W. 3) had introduced a lantern burning in the angan as, a means of identification. There was no reason as to why the lantern ought to have been at that time inside the angan. Moreover, some of the miscreants were on the first floor and, therefore it would not have been possible for a witness to identify those miscreants who were on the first floor if at all the witness insists that the light was essential for such identification. It also appears that Sumitra Devi (P. W. 2) has stated that she had identified by voice and that being so, there appears to sharp contradictions between the claim of this witness for identification by voice and also naming the appellants. 6. Dharmdeo Tiwari (P.W. 3) has further stated that he got himself concealed behind some bricks which had been stocked and naturally, if he was at that position, it was not possible for the witness to identify some of the miscreants who were on the first floor and some who were on other portion of the building. 7. Another important fact worth consideration would be that appellant Jagdish Tiwari is the own brother of the informant. Further, it appears that, excepting Srikrishna Mishra and Satya Narain Mishra, all belong to the same village. 7. Another important fact worth consideration would be that appellant Jagdish Tiwari is the own brother of the informant. Further, it appears that, excepting Srikrishna Mishra and Satya Narain Mishra, all belong to the same village. Further, it appears that Rajendra Tiwari and his brother Grish Tiwari, residents of village Maheshpur, happen to be the brother in laws of Jagdish Tiwari. Therefore, al1 the appellants are known from before and if that was the situation, if that case, Lallan Tiwari (P. W. 1) ought to have also known them and in that case, it does not appear to be convincing as to whether Lalan Tiwari had shouted that dacoits had arrived without naming them even at the initial stage. 8. Moreover, the allegation that such known persons have committed the dacoity without any attempt to conceal their identity has special significance and that will have definite impact upon the prosecution case because the time alleged to be of the occurrence is about sunset or little before sunset. Therefore, there ought to have been some more independent witnesses to say about the complicity of the appellants with the crime. On the contrary, it is found that P. Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4 are inter-related and inter-connected. Further, it appears that Bindeshwar Tiwari, although he has not supported the prosecution case is the next door neighbour. In other words such a daring occurrence, practical1y in day time having been committed by several persons, ought to have attracted the attentions of the people in the neighbourhood and there should not have been any paucity of independent witnesses and, that being so, in absence of independent witnesses, strictly on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, it is difficult to accept that the appellants had committed the dacoity and murder as claimed by the prosecution. Thus, they have become entitled to benefit of doubt. 9. In the result, both the appeals are allowed and the judgment and order of conviction and sentence are hereby set aside and the appellants are acquitted of the charge. All the appellants are discharged from their bail bonds.