JUDGMENT : R.C. Patnaik, J. - The Petitioner in this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks annulment of the cancellation of the lease of the by-weekly vegetable market by the Notified Area. Council, Titilagarh. 2. At an auction for the lease of the by-weekly vegetable market, the Petitioner's bid was the highest, being of the amount of Rs. 65,500/.. The auction was held pursuant to notice dated February 23, 1984 as per Anneure-A/1. The terms and conditions were contained in Annexure-B/1. The crucial terms relevant for our purpose were that the bidder whose bid would be accepted would deposit 50 per cent of the bid amount before March 20, 1984. In default, the security deposit was to be forfeited and the market would be put to fresh auction. The balance 50 per cent of the bid amount was to be paid in two equal installments one by July 31, 1984 and the other by November 30, 1984. Failure to pay any of the instalment would entail cancellation of the lease and forfeiture of the amount deposited by the bidder. The agreement incorporating the prescribed terms and conditions and duly executed by the successful bidder was to be filed within 7 days from the date of acceptance of the bid. In default, the bid was to be cancelled and the market was to be put to fresh auction. 3. The Petitioner's bid being the highest was accepted by the Notified Area Council and he was called upon to deposit 50 per cent of the bid amount and execute the agreement. The Petitioner has alleged that on March 19, 1984, he purchased a non-judicial stamp paper worth Rs. 2.00 and submitted the same before the Executive Officer of the Council with an application seeking permission to deposit 25 per cent of the bid amount instead of the stipulated 50 per cent. His prayer was refused and he was called upon to deposit Rs. 32,750.00 representing 50 per cent of the bid amount and execute the agreement by March 20, 1984 without fail, vide Annexure-1. The Petitioner deposited the amount on March 28, 1984. By letter dated March 31, 1984, the Executive Officer forwarded a speciman copy of the agreement for execution of the agreement on non-judicial stamp paper and submission thereof by April 3, 1984. The Petitioner deposited the amount on March 28, 1984. By letter dated March 31, 1984, the Executive Officer forwarded a speciman copy of the agreement for execution of the agreement on non-judicial stamp paper and submission thereof by April 3, 1984. The Petitioner has alleged that though he submitted the stamp paper, the same was not handed back to him with necessary terms and conditions for his execution. But he started operating the market with effect from April 1, 1984. On July 18, 19840, he was informed that he was collecting market fee at a rate higher than that prescribed by the Notified Area Council and he had not exhibited at a conspicuous place of the market area the rate chart supplied by the Council. He was called upon to show cause. He replied denying the allegations. The Petitioner has averred that May to October was not the season for vegetable business. So, he was in financial difficulty. Hence, he requested the Executive Officer to grant him two months' time to deposit the instalment of 25 per cent of the bid amount due by July 31, 1984. He was informed by the Executive Officer on September 18, 1984, that he had already defaulted to pay the instalment due by Jury 31, 1984 and should deposit the same by September 20, 1984. The Petitioner filed an application before the Chairman as per Annexure-4 on September 20, 1984 seeking two months' time to pay the instalment which was due by July 31, 1984. On September 22, 1984, he was informed by the Executes Officer that his prayer for two months' time had been rejected by the Chairman and he was to pay the instalment amounting to Rs. 16,375.00 by September 29, 1984 without fail. The Petitioner has alleged that on September 29, 1984, he requested the Chairman to grant him two months time but he did not receive any intimation. On October 30, 1984, he came upon a mutilated order pasted on the boundary wall of his residence purporting to indicate that his lease had been cancelled by the Notified Area Council by its resolution dated October 27, 1984 for his failure to execute the agreement, deposit the instalment due and for collecting market fee at a rate higher than the prescribed rate. Next day he found opposite party No. 2 collecting fees from the market and learnt that the market had been settled with opposite party No. 2 through negotiation. 4. The Petitioner has challenged the action of the Notified Area Council cancelling his lease on various grounds: namely, the meeting did not have the quorum on the day the resolution was passed; cancellation of the lease of the market was not the subject-matter in the agenda for discussion and decision and the constellation was arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He has further averred that without following the process of auction, the Council was incompetent to settle the market with opposite party No. 2 through negotiation. 5. In the return submitted by the Council, the assertion of the Petitioner that he submitted the stamp paper for execution of the agreement has been controverted. It has been averred that by letter dated March 31, 1984, the Executive Officer had sent a specimen copy of the agreement to the Petitioner for preparation of the agreement and execution thereof by him. It has been further averred that when the Petitioner failed and neglected to execute the agreement, a reminder was sent to him on April 24, 1984 (Annexure-C) asking him to execute the agreement by April 30, 1984. In reply, the Petitioner by his letter dated April 27, 1984 (Annexure-D) conveyed his willingness with some alterations and modifications. Hence, it has been contended by the Council that the Petitioner had the specimen copy and his plea in the writ application that he had not received the same was untrue. By letter dated September 18, 1984, the Petitioner was called upon to deposit the instalment of 25 percent of the bid amount due by July in, 1984 within September 20, 1984. As the Petitioner was negligent and had defaulted in executing the agreement depositing the instalment by the due date, the Council was apprehensive and refused to grant him grace of two months prayed for by him. But the Petitioner was nevertheless granted a week's time. The Petitioner, however, did not deposit the instalment. The Council then resolved authorising the Executive Officer to negotiate with the second highest bidder for settlement of the market. But the Petitioner was nevertheless granted a week's time. The Petitioner, however, did not deposit the instalment. The Council then resolved authorising the Executive Officer to negotiate with the second highest bidder for settlement of the market. The resolution has been filed as Annexure-F. The decision of the Council was sought to be intimated to the Petitioner through a peon but he avoided to accept the same. Hence, the order was affixed to the wall of the Petitioner's residence. The Council has contended that the Petitioner having violated the terms and conditions, the council took action in accordance with law. 6. Mr. L. Rath, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, urged mainly two contentions: (a) the cancellation was violative of the principle of natural justice; and (b) one of the reasons for cancellation being non-existent or baseless, the decision of the Council to cancel the lease was invalid. The other contentions, namely, lack of quorum on the date the resolution was passed or the non-inclusion of the subject-matter in the agenda though faintly touched upon, were not seriously pressed. Besides, there were no materials before us to sustain the said contentions. We, therefore, confine ourselves to the two contentions, stated above. Mr. J.K. Misra for the Council in reply submitted that a mandamus for enforcement of a right flowing from a contract, was not maintainable. Settlement of the market was governed by the terms and conditions incorporated in the auction notice. If at all the Council has broken a contract, the remedy lies in the civil court for compensation for breach of contract. The writ jurisdiction of this Court is not the appropriate forum. He further submitted that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the prevaricating stand of the Petitioner, cancellation of the lease by the Council was not arbitrary. The contract in question is not a statutory one. To the facts of the case, the principles of natural justice were not attracted. 7. The Petitioner filed affidavit of an advocate and a Stamp Vendor in support of his case that he had purchased non-judicial stamp paper and had filed the same before the Executive Officer of the Council and in the rejoinder his further stand was that on 29-9-1984 he made an application to the Chairman as per Annexure-8 for grant of two months' time, which was received by the Headclerk. A counter affidavit sworn to by the Executive Officer denying the allegation that an application was filed on 29.9.84 and the same had been received by the Headclerk was filed by the Council. An affidavit of the Headclerk was enclosed denying to have received any application from the Petitioner on September 29, 1984. 8. It has been contended by Mr. Rath for the Petitioner that the contract in question is a statutory one. Hence, an application for a mandamus is entertainable. Reliance has been placed on Section 295 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950, which reads as under: 295. Power in respect of public markets: (1) The municipal council may provide places for use as public markets, (2) Subject to such control as may be prescribed, the municipal council may in any public markets levy anyone or more of the following fees at such rates as may appear to it proper, or may farm out such fees for any period not exceeding three years at a time on such terms and subject to such conditions it may deem fit, (a) fees for the use of, or for the right to expose goods for sale in such market; (b) fees for the use of shops, pens or stands in such markets; (c) fees on vehicles, carts, carriages or pack-animals carrying or on persons bringing goods for sale in such markets; (d) fees on animals brought for sale into, or sold in such markets; and (e) licence fees on brokers, commission agents, weighmen and measurers practising their calling in such markets. (3) The municipal council may close any public market or part thereof. Sub-section (1) is an enabling provision Sub-section (2) authorises the municipal council to levy fees itself or to farm out such fees to a farmer. In our opinion, the authority conferred on the municipal council to farm out the authority to levy fees does not spell out a statutory contract. There is no provision in the Act whether regulates the relationship between the council and the farmer. No statutory terms and conditions are provided. In our opinion, therefore, the lease in favour of the Petitioner was a case of ordinary contract. 9. The question then is if a mandamus can issue for enforcement of alleged right under such a contract though a party there to is a statutory body. 10. No statutory terms and conditions are provided. In our opinion, therefore, the lease in favour of the Petitioner was a case of ordinary contract. 9. The question then is if a mandamus can issue for enforcement of alleged right under such a contract though a party there to is a statutory body. 10. A large number of authorities has been cited by the learned Counsel for the parties. It is needless to refer to all of them. In our view, the law has been clearly indicated in the case of Radhakrishna Agarwal and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others. The Supreme Court accepted the classification made by the Patna High Court of cases in which breaches of alleged obligation by the State or its agent into three types: (1) where a Petitioner makes a grievance of breach of promise on the part of the State in cases where on assurance or promise made by the State he has acted to his prejudice and predicament, but the agreement is short of a contract within the meaning of Article 299 of the Constitution; (2) where the contract entered into between the person aggrieved and the State is in exercise of a statutory power under certain Act or Rules framed thereunder and the Petitioner alleges a breach on the part of the State; and (3) where the contract entered into between the State and the person aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the terms of the contract, and the Petitioner complains about breach of such contract by the State. The first category embraces cases based on promissory contracts. The second category includes statutory contracts. In regard to the third category, the Supreme Court observed that where the State or its officers purports to operate within the contractual field, the appropriate remedy was not by way of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reference was made to the cases of Lekhraj Satramdas, Lalvani Vs. Deputy Custodian-cum-managing Officer and Others Banchhanidhi Rath Vs. The State of Orissa and Others, and Har Shankar and Others Vs. The Dy. Excise and Taxation Commr. and Others. Many of the decisions relied upon by the Petitioner have been referred to and distinguished. We, therefore, consider it needless to go over the field again especially when we have nothing better to say. The State of Orissa and Others, and Har Shankar and Others Vs. The Dy. Excise and Taxation Commr. and Others. Many of the decisions relied upon by the Petitioner have been referred to and distinguished. We, therefore, consider it needless to go over the field again especially when we have nothing better to say. As we have already held, the contract between the Petitioner and the Council is not governed or regulated by any statutory provision. No statutory provision is prescribed nor the terms and conditions regulate the same the respective rights and obligations do not flow from the statute. The general law governs the relationship. We are, therefore, of the view that this writ application invoking our extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a mandamus is not maintainable despite the fact that the person against whom it is being sought is a statutory body. 11. The next question is whether the principles of natural justice were attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case. The market was to be settled with the highest bidder through auction. The terms and conditions of the settlement were notified. The terms regarding payment of the bid amount and the time of payment were of the essence. The terms were clear that 50 per cent of the bid amount should be paid by March 20, 1984 and balance, in two installments one on July 31. 1984 and the other on November 30, 1984. In default in payment of the installments, the lease would be cancelled and the amount deposited would be forfeited. It is also an essential term that the lessee should submit an agreement incorporating the stipulated trial and conditions duly executed by him within 7 days of the acceptance of the bid. 12. Though the Petitioner participated in the auction fully aware of that terms and conditions, he sought tune to deposit the stipulated amount by the prescribed date when his request was turned down. The next stage was submission of an agreement containing the terms and conditions duly executed by him. But here again there is a controversy, the Petitioner asserting that he filed the non-judicial stamp paper, the council controverting the same. But the documents tell a different tale. The next stage was submission of an agreement containing the terms and conditions duly executed by him. But here again there is a controversy, the Petitioner asserting that he filed the non-judicial stamp paper, the council controverting the same. But the documents tell a different tale. On March 31, 1984, as per Annexure-2, the Executive Officer furnished a specimen copy of the agreement for execution of the agreement on non-judicial stamp paper and submission thereof by April 3, 1983. On April 24, 1984 (vide Annexure-C/1) the Executive Officer charged the Petitioner for collecting fees from the market without executing the agreement despite his request in his letter dated March 31, 1984 to do so by April 3, 1984. The letter dated April 27, 1984, (Annexure-D/1) is a letter from the Petitioner to the Executive Officer in reply to Annexure-C/1 He states: In reply to your letter cited above, I am herewith ready to execute an agreement of the vegetable market with the N.A.C. with some alteration and addition of the agreement supplied by you which may kindly be corrected for the facility of executant of the agreement. From Annexure-D/1 two things are obvious: (a) a specimen copy had already been supplied to the Petitioner by the Executive Officer and (b) by April 27, 1984, he had not submitted the agreement duly executed by him. The assertion of the Petitioner that non-judicial stamp paper had been handed over to the Executive Officer for drawing up the agreement is unacceptable. Had that been so, the tenor of his letter, Annexure-D/1, extracted above, would not have been what it is. Hence, his initial vacillation to enter into the contract is compounded by his non-fulfilling of another essential condition, namely, execution of the agreement. The counsel for the Council has contended that the Petitioner was deliberately taking his own time so that he could have his option to get out of the bargain. The next instalment was due by July 31, 1984. No. payment was made within the stipulated time. Hence, there was a breach on his part, the second breach in sequence. He did not seek extension before he was in default. He kept quiet till he was asked by the Council on September 18, 1984 to deposit by September 20, 1984. The next instalment was due by July 31, 1984. No. payment was made within the stipulated time. Hence, there was a breach on his part, the second breach in sequence. He did not seek extension before he was in default. He kept quiet till he was asked by the Council on September 18, 1984 to deposit by September 20, 1984. On September 20, 1984 he made an application to the Chairman seeking two months' time to pay the instalment which was to be deposited by July 21, 1984. On September 22, 1984, he was informed that his request for two month's time was rejected and he should make the deposit by September 29, 1984. The Petitioner has averred that he again submitted an application for time which was received by the Headclerk. The Headclerk has filed an affidavit denying to have received the same. This raises a factual controversy which, it is difficult for us, to resolve. Howsoever that may be, there can be no manner of doubt that the Petitioner has been persistently in default at almost all stages since his bid was accepted. Then comes the cancellation as per Annexure-F dated October 27, 1984 about which the Petitioner learnt on October 30, 1984. The grievance of the Petitioner is that principles of natural justice were violated by not giving him an opportunity of hearing. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances providing the Petitioner an opportunity of hearing was not called for. The Petitioner was aware of the terms and conditions, the obligation he was to discharge and the duty he was to perform. In fact, letter dated September 18, 1984 from the Council requiring him to pay the instalment which was to be paid by July 31, 1984, by September 29, 1984, was itself compliance of the principles of natural justice. For breach the Council could terminate the contract after July 31, 1984. But instead of doing so, it issued notice calling upon the Petitioner to make the deposit by September 29, 1984. The Petitioner asked for a longer time but he was granted a week's time, i.e., till September 29, 1984. If this be not compliance with the principles of natural justice, we cannot comprehend what else can be. But instead of doing so, it issued notice calling upon the Petitioner to make the deposit by September 29, 1984. The Petitioner asked for a longer time but he was granted a week's time, i.e., till September 29, 1984. If this be not compliance with the principles of natural justice, we cannot comprehend what else can be. Assuming but not accepting the assertion of the Petitioner that he filed an application on September 29, 1984, no principle mandated that he should be heard again and again on the same question. Acceptance of such a contention would make a travesty of the principles. The limitation imposed by rules of natural justice cannot operate upon powers which are governed by the terms of agreement exclusively - see Radhakrishna Agarwal and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, . Mr. Rath has cited the case of Ikop Laidakol Fishing Co-operative Society Ltd. Vs. State of Manipur and Others. This case is distinguishable on facts. The grant was pursuant to the rules and the Petitioner therein had deposited the revenue and it was found that the extension was in accordance with the ruler. Hence, it was held that if an opportunity had been given to the Petitioner there, it could have explained to the satisfaction of the authorities that the rules permitted extension of the lease. This decision is, therefore, no authority for the proposition contended for. Besides, it is a well-known principle that an application invoking the extra-ordinary jurisdiction should come with clean hands. The conduct of the Petitioner and his dubious stand on the question of submission or the agreement, disentitles him exercise of our extra-ordinary jurisdiction. 13. Though we have thought it unnecessary to consider the question whether the decision of the N.A.C. was bad on the ground that the cancellation was founded on three grounds and when one of which, as vehemently urged by the Petitioner, to be non-existent, namely, realisation of market fees at a rate higher than the prescribed one, out of courtesy to counsel we answer. The principle that where an action is founded on certain premises, it becomes vulnerable if one of the premises vanishes or is non-existent, has no universal application. Assuming that one of the reasons for the decillion is extraneous or non-existent, the decision can still be rested on the other grounds, each of which was sufficient and could justify cancellation. The principle that where an action is founded on certain premises, it becomes vulnerable if one of the premises vanishes or is non-existent, has no universal application. Assuming that one of the reasons for the decillion is extraneous or non-existent, the decision can still be rested on the other grounds, each of which was sufficient and could justify cancellation. The agreement was the foundation of the relationship and was an important condition of the settlement. For well nigh 6 months, the agreement was not executed. It was the Petitioner's primary obligation. That itself was a sufficient ground for cancellation. Failure to pay the dues within the stipulated time was also a stipulation contained in Annex-A/I. Both the grounds were not irrelevant grounds. The allegation of charging higher market fees was of lesser significance. Another minor point that has been urged is that after cancellation of the Petitioner's lease, the Council should have granted a lease through fresh auction and not by negotiation. Such a plea is not available to the Petitioner whose lease was cancelled for default. He is not fighting a public interest litigation here. 14. We are, therefore, of the view that none of the grounds urged has any substance. The writ application is, therefore, devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. S.C. Mohapatra, J. 15. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed