JUDGMENT Umesh Chandra Banerjee, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order of refusal on the part of the Customs Authority to clear vinyl coated steel sheets imported by the petitioner on the strength of Open General Licence (OGL) issued by appropriate authority. 2. Two short, but interesting question arise for determination in this writ petition, viz. (a) the importability of vinyl coated steel sheets, and (b) under invoicing of the aforesaid materials. 3. Before adverting to rival contentions a brief reference to facts ought to be made for the purpose of proper appreciation of the matter. 4. The petitioner is an actual user within the meaning of the Import Policy as announced by the Government of India for the year 1984-85 and is also a holder of an additional import licence, being No-P/W/0497274/C/XX/89/C/83/Additional Dated 16.11.1983 on the strength of which importation of vinyl coated steel sheets can said to be effected by the petitioner. 5. Being a holder of an import licence the petitioner entered into a contract with one M/s. East West Corporation of Japan for supply of 220 Metric tonnes of vinyl coated steel sheets and in pursuance whereof four different consignments arrived at the post of Calcutta by four different vessels between August, 1984 and December 1984. The Assistant Collector of Customs refused to clear the goods. It is this refusal which has been challenged in this writ petition as being arbitrary and illegal. The petitioner also challenge the action of the Customs Authority as discriminatory inasmuch as the self-same Customs Authority allowed clearance of vinyl coaled steel sheets at the rate of 220 (Us) per tonne, imported by one Hindustan products of Tinsukhia. 6. As appears from records that though initially, the refusal was on the ground of under invoicing but in the counter affidavit filled by the Customs Authority, the plea of non-importability has also been raised on the ground of the material in question not being of prime quality and also being a canalized item within the meaning of the police. 7. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, appearing in support of the petitioners, contended that such a plea cannot and ought not to have been raised by a Governmental agency, whose duty is to act fairly and whose actions ought to be free from mala fides and arbitrariness. 8. Mr. 7. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, appearing in support of the petitioners, contended that such a plea cannot and ought not to have been raised by a Governmental agency, whose duty is to act fairly and whose actions ought to be free from mala fides and arbitrariness. 8. Mr. Chatterjee contended that while it is true that, normally, all items of steel to be imported under the policy, should be prime in nature but by reason of specific exception under Chapter VIII, paragraph 53 of the Policy read with Appendix 5, Part A, vinyl coated steel sheets need not be of prime quality. Mr. Chatterjee further contended that the question of vinyl coated steel sheets being termed as a canalized item and importable through canalized agencies also does not and cannot arise. Mr. Chatterjee contended that Appendix 5, Part A, Item No. 51 specifically exempts vinyl coated steel sheets and strips from being canalized item and there neither is nor can there be any dispute in regard thereto. More so by reason of specific admission on the part of the Customs Authority as contained in paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit, though subject to two conditions, viz. (a) the base material should be mild steel, and (b) the steel should be prime and both the conditions in any went been fulfilled. Mr. Chatterjee, contended that the Customs Authority acted in a manner contrary to all recognized principles of law. The materials in question were, as a matter of fact, inspected and none of the inspection report indicated that the materials in question are not prime in quality. Had it been otherwise Mr. Chatterjee contended, it would have been reflected on the inspection report itself. 9. In order to appreciate the contentions of Mr. Chatterjee it would be worthwhile to set out the relevant provisions of the policy in particular Chapter 8, paragraph 53 which reads as follows:- "All items of iron, steel and ferror alloys to be imported under the policy should be of prime quality only, except in case of items individually appearing otherwise in Appendices 3, Part-B, 4 Part B and Part C, 5 Part-A and 6. In case of any doubt whether an item of particular specification/size, etc. In case of any doubt whether an item of particular specification/size, etc. is for the purpose of manning an application covered within the description contained in any of the entries in the said Appendices or can be imported against a licence or under Open General Licence, the importer/applicant may seek clarification in advance from the Department of Steel, Udyog Bhavan, New Delhi. This would include queries as to whether material required by an Actual User (Industrial) is melting scrap or not. The terminology and definition for Iron, steel and ferro alloy items are in accordance with those appearing in the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, unless otherwise indicated in Chapter 22." 10. Relevant extracts from Appendix 5 Part A is also set out hereunder for convenience sake at this juncture. "Appendix 5 Canalized Items Part A List of Items import of which is canalized through public sector agencies Steel Authority of India Carbon Steel Items (all grades) 48…………………………….. 49…………………………….. 50…………………………….. 51. All coated/plated including galvanized, aluminium and aluminium alloy coated and uncoated sheets/strips coils of all grades of carbon steel hot rolled or cold rolled not elsewhere mentioned but excluding plastic vinyl coated sheets/strips/coils." 11. Mr. Pranab Kumar Dutt, appearing for the respondent Customs Authority, however contended that paragraph 53 of Chapter 8 of the Import Policy ought to be read along with Clause XI of sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 244 under Chapter 22, Clause XI reads as follows:- "(xi) All items of iron and steel to be imported under the policy including REP should be of prime quality only unless specifically mentioned otherwise against any item appearing in the appendices, such as scrap or defectives and the like are permitted for import against specific entries." 12. Mr. Dutt further contended that the materials in question cannot be termed as sheets but sheet cuttings and therefore fall under Serial No.56 Appendix 5 Part A of the Import Policy and hence are canalized items. In support of his contentions, Mr. Dutt, relied upon the definition of sheet under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. 13. Item 56 of Appendix 5 Part A is set out hereunder:- "56. All seconds/second grades/defectives/cuttings circles of sheets/plates/coils/strips in any shape section/form not elsewhere stated in coated plated or uncoated condition including tin/zinc/aluminium/aluminium alloy coated plated and commodity marketed as tin free steel in the descriptions above stated." 14. 13. Item 56 of Appendix 5 Part A is set out hereunder:- "56. All seconds/second grades/defectives/cuttings circles of sheets/plates/coils/strips in any shape section/form not elsewhere stated in coated plated or uncoated condition including tin/zinc/aluminium/aluminium alloy coated plated and commodity marketed as tin free steel in the descriptions above stated." 14. I am, however, unable to accept the contentions of Mr. Dutt. Reference to Tariff Act cannot and ought not to be taken recourse to in the facts and circumstances of this case. Chapter 22 of the Import Policy related to clarification and interpretation of the policy. Chapter 22 paragraph 244(2)(i) lays down that the terminology and definition of iron and steel and ferro alloy items are to be considered in accordance with those appearing in Customs Tariff Act, 1975 except in such cases where special interpretations have been issued under the said chapter. Paragraph 244(2)(xi) lays down that all items of iron and steel to be imported under the policy including REP should be of prime quality, unless specifically mentioned otherwise against any item appearing in the appendices. By reason of specific exception under Chapter 8 read with Appendix 5, Part A, Item No.51, in my view, Chapter 22 paragraph 244 cannot have any play in the matter of importation of vinyl coated steel sheets. 15. On a true and proper interpretation of the policy, Chapter 22 has no manner of application in the facts of the case under consideration. The heading indicates the scope and applicability of the provisions thereunder and is to be regarded as giving the key to the interpretation of the clauses ranged under it. Headings are not were marginal notes, but these sections in the group to which they belong must be read in connection with them and interpreted by the light of them. See in this connection the decision of the House of Lords in the case Ingils vs. Robertson and Boxter, 1898 AC 616. 16. The view expressed above in regard to Chapter 22 (paragraph 224) cannot but be the only view possible as otherwise it would not only lead to inconsistency but an absurdity and the exemption granted under Appendix 5, Part A, Item No.51 would otherwise rendered nugatory and otiose. The heading is important and significant. 16. The view expressed above in regard to Chapter 22 (paragraph 224) cannot but be the only view possible as otherwise it would not only lead to inconsistency but an absurdity and the exemption granted under Appendix 5, Part A, Item No.51 would otherwise rendered nugatory and otiose. The heading is important and significant. Chapter 22 has been inserted by the policy marks for the purpose of clarification and interpretations, obviously for the provisions which require clarification being capable of dual meaning. Item 51 of Part A of Appendix 5 does not pose any difficulty and is incapable of having a dual meaning. In my view, the policy ought to be interpreted in a manner so as to avoid absurdity and to hold that Item 51 is to be read with Paragraph 244 under Chapter 21 would result in such absurdity. 17. In that view of the matter reference to Customs Tariff Act, in my view, is not permissible in the facts of this case and as such the other contention of Mr. Dutt that the materials imported can not be described as sheets but sheet cuttings as per the definition of the word sheet under the Customs Tariff Act, ran not be sustained. The other contention of Mr. Dutt therefore also fails. Even on facts, the contention of Mr. Dutt cannot be accepted. The test reports specifically refer to each of the lots as sheet and not as sheet cuttings or strips. It is pertinent to refer to the definition given under the Policy under Chapter 22 Paragraph 244(2)(ix). The definition reads as follows:- "(ix) Plates and sheets mentioned in these schedules would mean in cut lengths only. Coils would cover the plates/sheets (as the case may be) in the coil from also." 18. In the premises I am of the view that the vinyl coated sheets are importable on the strength of the licence granted to the petitioner and can not be termed to be a canalized item. 19. Turning to the next question viz. under invoicing Mr. Dun strenuously contended that the materials in question have been grossly undervalued and the writ Court ought not to allow the removal of the materials on such gross under value. Mr. 19. Turning to the next question viz. under invoicing Mr. Dun strenuously contended that the materials in question have been grossly undervalued and the writ Court ought not to allow the removal of the materials on such gross under value. Mr. Dutt placed reliance on a quotation dated 7.11.1983 wherein coils and sheets are to be treated alike and the quotation of US 850, is a reasonable value which ought to be taken note of Mr. Dutt further contended that as against US 850, the petitioner declared the value as US 220. Referring to the case of Hindustan Products it was contended that the same was cleared on a mistaken belief as the Customs Authority had no material evidence at that juncture. 20. I am however unable to accept the contention of Mr. Dutt that the quotation depicts it fair and reasonable value of the materials in question. Firstly the materials are different and secondly it is a quotation and not an invoice. In order to arrive at a decision of under invoicing the concerned authority must act fairly and reasonably and in accordance with known principles of law. The authority must not act as a mere tax gatherer by any means. There must be some reasonable basis for such belief supported by cogent evidence and not fanciful ideas that importers are out to take advantage ever the authorities and thereby deprive the exchequer. The self same authority cleared very same articles at the rate of US 220 per M.T. in December, 1983 that evidence in any view ought not to have been ignored. Giving a go by to the evidence at hand and relying upon some thing which does not have a direct bearing on the concerned subject does not speak of a non-harrasive attitude. In this context reference may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of Mercantile Express Company Limited vs. Assistant Collector of Customs and other, AIR 1958 Cal 630 , wherein P.B. Mukherjee, J. (as he then was) observed:- "Having, expressed my view of the law and the construction of Item 63(9) and (28) of the Indian Customs Tariff, I cannot help averting to the fact that in 1953 these very similar articles were imported by Superintending Engineer, Bhakra Dam Area No.1 Nangal Township, Punjab, and they were assessed under Item 63(9) of the Tariff by the Customs Authorities themselves. The Customs now say that they are not bound by their previous decisions. Whether the doctrine of precedents applies in its full rigour to Administrative Agencies and Officer, and whether a reasonable latitude should be given to them or administrative tribunals to correct or modify their previous decisions may still remain a debatable controversy in the world of law; nevertheless I am clearly of the opinion that neither the Appraiser nor the Collector of Customs can change his mind from time to time in respect of the same articles by assessing them in the case of one importer under one section and them assessing them for another importer under different section. To allow the Customs to do so will lead to utter confusion in the very basis and principles of taxation and garave uncertainty in business and foreign trade of India. Its more serious result will be the most unfair discrimination of taxes in respect of the same goods with regard to different importers. That cannot be permitted by the Constitution which Insists on the equality of law as one of its fundamental guarantees. I am therefore inclined to hold that the Customs are bound by their own precedents in administering taxing statutes involving the very basis of taxation in respect of a particular article and not leave it to them to modify their own previous decisions but to leave it to them to apply to Courts or Parliament or Legislatures as the case may be to put the law beyond doubt. In a recent Tariff Ruling of the Department C.B.R. No. 36 (221)-Cus. III/55 dated 29.12.1955. T.R. 208/55 it has been said that Armco Nestable Steel Culverts are assessable under Item 63(28). These Rulings are in the nature of administrative directions or guides. This departmental Ruling, however, came after the assessment in this case had been made in July, 1955 and cannot either bind or affect this assessment. These departmental instructions, guides or rulings can always be examined by Courts of law and if found wrong in law, can be overruled and set aside by the Courts. Law cannot be finally made by these departmental rulings. They are always subject to judicial decisions of Courts of law. If the law requires change in the light of such judicial decisions, it can be done only by the proper legislative authority, which in this case is Parliament. Law cannot be finally made by these departmental rulings. They are always subject to judicial decisions of Courts of law. If the law requires change in the light of such judicial decisions, it can be done only by the proper legislative authority, which in this case is Parliament. If the administration itself feels the need of changing its mind that is prima facie proof that law is dubious on the point and should be set right by legislation." 21. The same view has also been expressed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. (Pvt.) Bombay & another vs. Union of India & other, (1984) 18 ELT 172. 22. Mr. Dutt placed strong reliance on the decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of Union of India vs. Basakha Singh Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1965 Punjab 81. I am afraid that decision is of no assistance to Mr. Dutt, as the same is distinguishable on facts. In the Punjab decision it was held that no decision as such was given by the Customs Authority allowing the company to import the spare parts of 12 bore short guns on the previous occasion. 23. In that view of the matter I am of the view that the Customs Authority had no reasonable basis for withholding clearance of the vinyl coated steel sheet on the ground of under invoicing by the importer being the petitioner in this writ petition. 24. The other question which now remains to be considered, as raised by the Port Trust Authority, is whether any exemption ought to be allowed for the payment of demurrage being a part of the charges receivable by the Calcutta Port Trust in accordance with law. 25. Mr. B.C. Dutt appearing for Port Trust placed strong reliance on the Notification No. 412 dated 13.8.1979 and published in the Calcutta Gazette dated 30.8.1979 and contended that no exemption ought to be allowed by the Court in the matter of payment of demurrage. In this context reliance was placed en the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Trustees for the Port of Madras vs. Amin Chand Pyarelal, AIR 1975 SC 1935 . In my view however that decision has no relevance in the present context. In this context reliance was placed en the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Trustees for the Port of Madras vs. Amin Chand Pyarelal, AIR 1975 SC 1935 . In my view however that decision has no relevance in the present context. There is no dispute that the Port Trust has the authority to frame a scale of rates and the rates prescribed by the Notification No. 412, dated 13.8.1979 cannot be said to be illegal or void, neither any contention has been raised to that effect by Mr. Chatterjee. The issue in the present context is to consider the effect of issuance of Wharf Rent Exemption Certificate by the Customs Authority. It was strenuously contented that Certificates ought not to have been issued by the Customs Authority neither the Court has the jurisdiction to direct issuance of such a Certificate. In the facts of the case under consideration it appears that, Mrs. J. Nag, J. on 28.12.1984 directed the Customs Authority to issue necessary Wharf Rent Exemption Certificates and in pursuance of the aforesaid order the Customs Authority duly issued the rent exemption certificates. In that view of the matter discussion the questions raised may well be kept pending in an appropriate case and I refrain from making any observation in that regard. The Port Trust's contention that Certificates issued by the Customs Authority does not have a binding effect on the Port Authority does not in my view stands to reasons. The Notification itself recognizes the obligation of the Port Authority in the event of there being a Wharf Rent Exemption Certificate. The Port Authority in any event cannot sit on judgment over the decision of the Customs Authority in the matter of the grant of Wharf Rent Exemption Certificate. There exists a bounden obligation to honour the Certificates in so far as the Port Authority is concerned. 26. Before conclude, I would like to put on record my appreciation for the able assistance rendered to this Court by Sri P. Dutta, a junior Advocate of this Court. In the premises, this application succeeds. The Rules made absolute. The Port Authorities is directed to consider the rent exemption certificate and to release the materials upon payment of all necessary charges calculated on the basis of the Notification No. 412 dated 13.8.1979. There will be no order as to costs.