Judgment :- 1. By Ext. P7 the petitioner has requested the Government to issue orders directing "the Prosecutor/ Police to launch a criminal prosecution against" the 3rd respondent, who, according to him, had made speeches at the convention of his party on 25-5-1985 at Ernakulam "undermining the unity, integrity of the country and authority of the Government and the State." This petition is dated 6th June 1985. As there was no reply to Ext. P7, the petitioner has sent a reminder Ext. P8. Despite the reminder, the 1st respondent has not so far passed any order either directing the criminal prosecution or rejecting the application. In these circumstances, the petitioner has moved this Original Petition for the following reliefs: a) call for the records connected with the case; b) issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ, order or direction directing respondents 1 and 2 to take steps for launching prosecution against the 3rd respondent; c) pass such other orders as are deemed just, fair and necessary in the circumstances of the case. 2. The case of the petitioner is that the 3rd respondent by making the speech referred to above, has committed offences falling under The Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, for short the Act, and therefore liable to be prosecuted. The State failed to set in motion the machinery to prosecute the 3rd respondent and therefore being a citizen of this country, the petitioner thought, he should remind the State of its duty and this has resulted in his sending Ext. P7 petition, followed by the reminder, ext. P8. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that unless the State directs the prosecution, as demanded under Exts. P7 and P8, he has no other effective legal remedy by which he can get the rule of law enforced in this country. He therefore submits that this Court may issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to issue appropriate directions to launch a criminal prosecution against the 3rd respondent for the offences, he is alleged to have committed under the Act. The submission at the first blush, no doubt, is attractive. He therefore submits that this Court may issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to issue appropriate directions to launch a criminal prosecution against the 3rd respondent for the offences, he is alleged to have committed under the Act. The submission at the first blush, no doubt, is attractive. But going deep into the matters, I am of the view that the submission is not sustainable; for, the petitioner has other alternative and efficacious remedy as pointed out by this Court in the decision in Kallara Sukumaran and another v. Union of India, Writ Appeal No. 261 of 1985 (1985 KLT. 567). In this context, it is relevant to note the provisions contained in S.190 of the Criminal Procedure Code. S.190: "190. Congnizance of offences by Magistrates (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed." It can thus be seen that any person can set in motion the machinery provided for under the Criminal Procedure Code to prosecute a person accused of an offence by filing a petition before the Magistrate, referred to in that Section. There may be instances where a citizen cannot straightaway file a complaint. For instance, if the person accused of is a public servant, then the citizen cannot straightaway file a criminal complaint before a Magistrate unless it be, he has obtained the requisite sanction under S.197(1) of the Code. It is not the case of the petitioner that his right to move the Magistrate is fettered by S.197 of the Code. For that matter, he cannot have such a case because the 3rd respondent now, is not a public servant. It is not the case of the petitioner that his right to move the Magistrate is fettered by S.197 of the Code. For that matter, he cannot have such a case because the 3rd respondent now, is not a public servant. If that be the position, as held by the Supreme Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 684, it is unnecessary for the petitioner to obtain the sanction contemplated under S.197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because though the 3rd respondent at the time when he made the alleged speech was a public servant) now is not a public servant and therefore no sanction is necessary to take cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate. The above position notwithstanding, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that this is a fit case where this Court may issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the 1st respondent to launch a prosecution against the 3rd respondent. In support of the above contention, the learned counsel relied on a decision of the Court of Appeal reported in Regina v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Exparte Black burn (1968) 2 Q.B. 118. In the said decision it has been held thus: "In this context Mr. Worsley has addressed to the court an elaborate and learned argument in support of the bald and startling proposition that the law enforcement officers of this country owe no duty to the public to enforce the law. Carried to its logical limit, such a submission would mean that, however brazen the failure of the police to enforce the law, the public would be wholly without a remedy and would simply have to await some practical expression of the court's displeasure. In particular, it would follow that the commissioner would be under no duty to prosecute anyone for breaches of the Gaming Acts, no matter how flagrantly and persistently they were defied. Can that be right? Is our much-vaunted legal system in truth so anemic that, in the last resort, it would be powerless against those who, having been appointed to enforce it, merely cocked a snook at it? The very idea is as repugnant as it is startling, and I consider it regrettable that it was ever advanced. How ill it accords with the seventeenth-century assertion of Thomas Fuller that, "Be you never so high, the law is above you". The very idea is as repugnant as it is startling, and I consider it regrettable that it was ever advanced. How ill it accords with the seventeenth-century assertion of Thomas Fuller that, "Be you never so high, the law is above you". The applicant is right in his assertion that its effect would be to place the Police above the law. I should indeed regret to have to assent to the proposition thus advanced on behalf of the respondent, and, for the reasons already given by my Lords, I do not regard it as well founded. On the contrary, I agree with them in holding that the law enforcement officers of this country certainly owe a legal duty to the public to perform those functions which are the raison d'etre of their existence. How and by whom that duty can be enforced is another matter, and it may be that a private citizen, such as the applicant, having no special or peculiar interest in the due discharge of the duty under consideration, has himself no legal right to enforce it. But that is widely different from holding that no duty exists, enforceable either by a relator action or in some other manner which may hereafter have to be determined." 3. The above decision I am afraid, has no application to the facts of the case before me. Here, it is not the case of the petitioner that he has no remedy at all. From the discussion in the above decision what is seen is that the law, the Court of Appeal interpreted, did not contain a provision similar to S.190, Criminal Procedure Code enabling a relator to launch a private complaint. 4. The Original Petition, for the reasons stated above, is without merits. Accordingly the same is dismissed. Issue carbon copies on usual terms. Dismissed.