ORDER B.L. Yadav, J. - The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order dated 26-11-1982 passed by the District Magistrate/District Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ghazipur. 2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioner in Case No. 2209 obtained an order dated 25-6-1978 in his favour purporting to be under S. 9-A(2), U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act for the sake of brevity). It is worth mentioning that the village was denotified under S. 52 of the Act in 1980. The petitioner made an application for seeking the effect of the order dated 25-6-1978 in his favour on 2-1-1981 in the revenue record and the amaldaramad was made accordingly. The Pradhan of the village moved an application on 16-10-1981 that plot No. 146 was banjar in the khata of the Gaon Sabha and petitioner has committed a large number of illegalities and irregularities and thereby has obtained the order dated 25-6-1978, that no notice was served on the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha and that without notice to him the order has been obtained. The petitioner has filed the objection purporting to be under S. 9-A(2) of the Act on 20-4-1978 and just within two months and five days the order dated 25-6-1978 was obtained in respect of the land which was the Gaon Sabha property and publication under S. 9 of the Act has also been made much earlier, the petitioner did not file any objection purporting to be under S. 9-A(2) of the Act within a period of twenty one days (from the date of the publication), hence his objection was obviously time barred and no order for condonation of delay was passed by the Consolidation Officer. Without condoning the delay, the Consolidation Officer should not have decided the case on merits. It was also alleged in the application that even in the statements of most of the witnesses there was no certificate given by the Consolidation Officer whether the statements are recorded in the presence of the Consolidation Officer or the reader of the Court. All these things according to the averments made in the application, clearly make out a case of fraud, gross illegalities and irregularities with a view to grab the Gaon Sabha property. All these things according to the averments made in the application, clearly make out a case of fraud, gross illegalities and irregularities with a view to grab the Gaon Sabha property. It was accordingly prayed that the order of amaldarramad and the order dated 25-6-1978 passed by the Consolidation Officer may be set aside. 3. The petitioner contested the aforesaid application and alleged that after notification under S. 52 of the Act has been issued, the application filed by the Pradhan on behalf of the Gaon Sabha was not maintainable under R. 109-A, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules. 4. On the aforesaid application of the Pradhan and the objection of the petitioner, respondent directed the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) to hold an inquiry and submit a report as to whether any fraud was played in obtaining the order dated 25-6-1978. The Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) held an inquiry and submitted his report dated 6-11-1981 which was available on the record. He has mentioned in his report that Case No. 2209 under S. 9-A(2) of the Act, Bansnarain Rai v. Gaon Sabha, decided on 25-6-1978 the order has been passed in respect of plot 342 (area 1 bigha & 10 biswas, 8 dhurs) which was banjar in the name of Gaon Sabha, hence amaldaramad has been made on 2-4-81 and consequential effect has been followed in C. H. Form No. 41. He has clearly indicated that the order of the Consolidation Officer dated 25-6-1978 containing a number of irregularities and illegalities inasmuch as no benefit of S. 5, Limitation Act, was given to the petitioner, whereas his objection was clearly time barred and notice was not served personally on the Gaon Sabha and Pradhan rather it was served by affixation. A restoration application has also been filed before the Consolidation Officer which is under consideration. The Assistant Settlement Officer has, however, suggested that the order dated 25-6-1978 can be set aside or corrected by following the procedure prescribed in S. 48(3) of the Act after hearing all the parties. Against this report both parties submitted their objections. The petitioner's objection was that respondent I has no jurisdiction to set aside the order dated 25-6-1978 after notification under S. 52, of the Act has been issued. Against this report both parties submitted their objections. The petitioner's objection was that respondent I has no jurisdiction to set aside the order dated 25-6-1978 after notification under S. 52, of the Act has been issued. Respondent 1, however, after hearing both the parties by his order dated 26-4-1982 set aside the order dated 25-6-1978 and has directed the Consolidation Officer to decide the case afresh after hearing the parties and after permitting them to lead evidence in support of their respective cases. It is against this order that the present writ petition has been filed. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that after the notification under S. 52 of the Act has been issued respondent I has no jurisdiction to set aside the order dated 25-6-1978 passed by the Consolidation Officer inasmuch as once the notification under S. 52 of the Act has been issued the only power given to the consolidation authorities is under R. 109-A of the Rules framed under the Act and under that rule if an order has been passed after notification under S. 52 of the Act had been issued provided the proceedings were then pending. In that event that offer can be given effect to in the revenue papers even after the notification under S. 52 of the Act has been issued. In support of this contention he relied on Raja Ram v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1982 Rev Dec 387 : 1982 All LJ 871; Smt. Mahadei v. Joint Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, 1979 All LJ 1035 and Munshi Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1966 Rev Dec 147. 6. In Raja Ram v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (supra) the facts of the case were that after denotification under S. 52 of the Act the contesting opposite parties moved an application to give effect to the order dated 23-7-1965 whereby the father of the opposite parties 4 to 7 in that case was recognised as co-tenant of the disputed land along with the petitioners. The Consolidation Officer made a reference through his order dated 12-11-73 and the revenue court directed through its order dated 2-9-1974 for making reference considering proceedings for partition. Against this order that petition was filed before this court. The Consolidation Officer made a reference through his order dated 12-11-73 and the revenue court directed through its order dated 2-9-1974 for making reference considering proceedings for partition. Against this order that petition was filed before this court. In that case as the order was passed in favour of the opposite parties on 23-7-1965 whereas after about seven years notification under S. 52 of the Act was issued and thereafter the order dated 23-7-65 was sought to be given effect to by the opposite parties 4 to 7 of that case and this Court held that as after seven years the order dated 23-7-65 was not sought to be given effect to and the proceedings in that case in which order dated 23-7-65 was passed cannot be said to be pending when the denotification under S. 52 of the Act was issued. Hence R. 109-A of the Rules framed under the Act cannot be made applicable and as reference was sought for giving effect to the order dated 23-7-1965 after seven years after issue of notification under S. 52, hence the petition was allowed and the impugned order dated 29-10-74 was quashed and the proceedings before the Consolidation Officer were dropped. As the partition suit was already pending between the parties, it was directed that the petitioner can get a relief in the partition suit itself. This case is clearly not indistinguishable. I don't think that that case has any relevance to the facts of the present case. Rather it goes against the case of the petitioner. In the instant case also an order in favour of the petitioner was passed on 25-6-78 and the denotification under S. 52 of the Act was issued in 1981 and the petitioner sought Amaldaramad proceedings in his favour after the denotification under S. 52 of the Act when in fact no case or proceeding was pending. Hence the order dated 25-6-78 could not have been given effect to after denotification under S. 52 of the Act. Hence the petitioner cannot derive any benefit from the case of Raja Ram v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1982 All LJ 871 (supra). 7. Hence the order dated 25-6-78 could not have been given effect to after denotification under S. 52 of the Act. Hence the petitioner cannot derive any benefit from the case of Raja Ram v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1982 All LJ 871 (supra). 7. In the case of Smt. Mahadei v. Joint Director of Consolidation, 1979 All LJ 1035 (supra) the facts were that a right of prescription was prayed by the petitioner against Reference No.1510 under S. 48(3) of the Act and it was prayed that the reference need not be proceeded against and all proceedings at the instance of the opposite parties should be declared without jurisdiction. In that case denotification under S. 52(1) of the Act was issued on 15-10-1978. The petitioner in that case has claimed sirdari rights in the disputed land on the basis of Annexure 6' to the writ petition. Kanhaiyalal and others in that case made an application to the Assistant Consolidation Officer for expunging the fictitious name of the petitioner and making the entries of their names as also to take action against the person who had fictitious entry. It was alleged by Kanhaiyalal and others that the petitioner's husband used to make forgery and has obtained a fictitious entry in favour of the petitioner without there being any case. The petitioner in that case alleged that she received a notice to the effect that her name in C.H. Form 45 was fictitiously recorded without any case and her entry deserves to be expunged. The petitioner was required to file an objection and in the absence of any objection by her the matter would be referred to the Deputy Director of Consolidation for expunction of the fictitious entry on 9-2-1978. The petitioner filed her objection and alleged that she did not commit any fraud and denotification under S. 52 of the Act has taken place, hence the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter and that the petitioner had got the disputed land through a compromise and her name has been correctly entered in pursuance of the order passed in compromise. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, passed an order on 18-4-1978 to the effect that in C.H. Form No. 45 her name was fictitiously entered and the petitioner should file an objection, otherwise the matter may be referred to the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, passed an order on 18-4-1978 to the effect that in C.H. Form No. 45 her name was fictitiously entered and the petitioner should file an objection, otherwise the matter may be referred to the Deputy Director of Consolidation. In that context, it was held that R. 109-A of the Rules was not applicable to that case inasmuch as after denotification under S. 52(1) of the Act the order which was passed in favour of the petitioner before the denotification under S. 52(1) of the Act cannot be set aside after denotification. It is better to set out the relevant provisions of R. 109-A as under :- "109-A(l) Orders passed in cases covered by sub-s. (2) of S. 52 shall be given effect to by the consolidation authorities, authorised in this behalf under sub-s. (2) of S. 42. In case there be no such authority, the Assistant Collector in charge of the sub-division, the Tahsildar, the Naib Tahsildar, the Supervisor Kanungo, and the Lekhapal of the area to which the case relates shall, respectively, perform the functions and discharge the duties of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Consolidation Officer, the Assistant Consolidation Officer, the Consolidator, and the Consolidation Lekhpal respectively for the purpose of giving effect to the orders aforesaid. (2) If for the purpose of giving effect to any order referred to in sub-r. (1) it becomes necessary to reallocate affected chaks, necessary orders may be passed by the Consolidation Officer, or the Tahsildar, as the case may be, after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. (3) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Consolidation Officer, or the Tahsildar, as the case may be, may, within 15. days of the order passed under sub-r. (2), file an appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), or the Assistant Collector in charge of the sub-division; as the case may be, who shall decide the appeal after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned, which shall be final. (4) In case delivery of possession becomes necessary as a result of orders passed under sub-r. (2) or sub-r. (3), as the case may be, the provisions of Rr. 55 and 56 shall, mutatis mutandis, be followed." 8. (4) In case delivery of possession becomes necessary as a result of orders passed under sub-r. (2) or sub-r. (3), as the case may be, the provisions of Rr. 55 and 56 shall, mutatis mutandis, be followed." 8. Under the aforesaid rule the order passed in cases covered by sub-s. (2) of S. 52 of the Act shall be given effect to by the consolidation authorities authorised in this behalf under sub-s. (2) of S. 52 of the Act. It is also relevant to have S. 52(2) : "52. Close of Consolidation operations : (1) . ..................... (2) notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (1). any order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction in cases of writs filed under the provisions of the Constitution or in cases or proceedings pending under this Act on the date of issue of the notification under sub-s.(1), shall be given effect to by such authorities as may be prescribed and the consolidation operations shall, for that purpose, be deemed to have not been closed." 9. In view of the aforesaid statutory provisions it is abundantly clear that any order to seek the effect of an order, after the denotification under S. 52 of the Act, the proceedings of that case must be pending under the Act when the notification under S.52( 1) of the Act was issued, meaning thereby that when denotification under S. 52(1) of the Act was issued, if any proceeding under the Act or the Rules is pending only in that case that order can be given effect to or sought to be given effect to after the denotification under S. 52(1) of the Act closing the consolidation operations was issued. Accordingly in Smt. Mahadei v. Joint Director of Consolidation, 1979 All LI 1035 (supra) it was held that after the denotification under S. 52 of the Act has been issued the earlier order passed by the consolidation authorities in favour of the petitioner or the order directing the name of the petitioner to he entered in the revenue papers cannot be set aside or questioned. The facts of this case or the ratio does not help the petitioner and the case is clearly not indistinguishable. 10. The facts of this case or the ratio does not help the petitioner and the case is clearly not indistinguishable. 10. In Munshi Singh v. Director of Consolidation, 1966 Rev Dec 147 (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held the terms of compromise or the order passed on the basis thereof cannot be set aside by filing a review application on the basis of the allegations of fraud, the proper remedy to set aside the compromise or the compromise decree or order would be to file a civil suit. But in the instant case there was no compromise or compromise decree. Rather irregularities and illegalities were alleged to have been committed on the part of the petitioner in the report submitted by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and as the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha was not served, hence respondent I has directed that the order in favour of the petitioner seeking the effect of the order passed much prior-to-the denotification under S. 52(2) may be set aside and the case may be remanded to the Consolidation Officer for decision afresh. Hence Munshi Singh's case also does not help the petitioner. 11. On behalf of the respondents it was, however, urged that in view of the interpretation of R. 109-A (as quoted above) it is clear that even though the order dated 25-6-1978 might have been passed in favour of the petitioner, but its effect was sought in the revenue papers by amaldaramad proceedings on 6-11-1981 when the denotification under S. 52(1) of the Act was issued in the village in respect of the plots in dispute in 1980. Hence after denotification the order dated 25-6-78 was sought to be given effect to in the revenue papers and that order was passed on 6-11-1981. A bare reading of R. 109-A would clearly indicate that in order to seek the effect by the consolidation authorities after denotification under S. 52(1), the proceedings in a particular case under the Act or the Rules must have been pending at the time when the denotification under S. 52(1) of the Act was issued. But in the instant case the order dated 25-6-78 was passed much prior-to-the denotification under S.52(1). hence no proceedings were pending at the time of the issuance of the denotification. Therefore, the order dated 6-11-1981 obtained or passed after denotification under S. 52(1) was clearly without jurisdiction. But in the instant case the order dated 25-6-78 was passed much prior-to-the denotification under S.52(1). hence no proceedings were pending at the time of the issuance of the denotification. Therefore, the order dated 6-11-1981 obtained or passed after denotification under S. 52(1) was clearly without jurisdiction. It has further been contended on behalf of the respondents that as the irregular or illegal order in favour of the petitioner without serving any notice on the Pradhan and without informing him has been passed in respect of the banjar' land which was clearly the property of the Gaon Sabha, hence substantial justice has been done and the case has correctly been remanded to the Consolidation Officer for decision afresh and the petitioner is not entitled to the writ of certiorari as prayed for by him. 12. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that as in the instant case the order dated 25-6-1978 was passed much prior to the issuance of the denotification under S. 52(1) of the Act without any proceeding under the Act or the Rules were pending, the petitioner could not have made an application after denotification and the order dated 6-11-1981 in favour of the petitioner or expunging the name of the Gaon Sabha and entering the name of the petitioner over the land in dispute was clearly without jurisdiction and the order passed by respondent is perfectly correct and valid. Much stress was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the fact that the restoration application moved on behalf of the Gaon Sabha was already pending before the Consolidation Officer, hence respondent has committed an error in setting aside the order of the Consolidation. The important circumstances of the case are that the petitioner has obtained the order without serving the Gaon Sabha, the Consolidation Officer did not condone the delay in preferring the objection by the petitioner purporting to be under S. 9-A(2) of the Act and even the statements of the witnesses were not certified whether the same were made or recorded before the Consolidation Officer. Hence respondent was perfectly justified in setting aside that order even though it may not appear to be a case of fraud. But nevertheless the maxim res ipsa loquitur is clearly applicable inasmuch as the things or proceedings speak for themselves. (See Mc. Hence respondent was perfectly justified in setting aside that order even though it may not appear to be a case of fraud. But nevertheless the maxim res ipsa loquitur is clearly applicable inasmuch as the things or proceedings speak for themselves. (See Mc. Kenzie v. Chilliwock Corpn., (1912) AC 888 and Wakelin v. L & S.W. Railway Co., (1866) 12 AC 41. 13. 'Further a writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy and it cannot be issued as a matter of course and writ cannot be issued even when the orders passed by the subordinate authorities are without jurisdiction, provided substantial justice has been done by the impugned orders. There should be substantial injustice to a party before a writ can be issued. This Court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot act as a court of appeal. (See Sangaram Singh v. Election Tribunal Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 ). 14. In A.M. Allison v. B.L. Sen, AIR 1957 SC 227 it has been observed as follows : "Proceedings by way of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution are "not as a matter of course". The High Court has the power to refuse the writ if it is satisfied that there was no failure of justice, and in appeals which are directed against the orders of the High Court in applications under Article 226, the Supreme Court can refuse to interfere unless it is satisfied that the justice of the case requires it. But where it is not so satisfied it will not interfere." 15. In Pooran Singh v. Addl. Commr. Agra Division, Agra, AIR 1957 All 276 : 1957 All LJ 193, a Division Bench of this Court has observed (at P. 278) : "... The mere fact that an order is without jurisdiction or that there is an error apparent on the face of the record is not sufficient to justify the issue of a writ. In addition to that it must be established that the order has resulted in manifest injustice. It is, therefore, open to the High Court to refuse to issue a writ if it feels that if the writ prayed for is issued it will clearly effectuate an injustice in the case." 16. Similar view has been taken in Keshkumar v. Deoria, 1981 All LJ 423 on page 425 paras 11-A and 12. 17. It is, therefore, open to the High Court to refuse to issue a writ if it feels that if the writ prayed for is issued it will clearly effectuate an injustice in the case." 16. Similar view has been taken in Keshkumar v. Deoria, 1981 All LJ 423 on page 425 paras 11-A and 12. 17. In view of the discussions made above, I am of the view that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order passed by respondent No. 1 is perfectly just and substantial justice has been done between the parties by the said order inasmuch as the case has been remanded to the Consolidation Officer where the parties would get sufficient opportunity to lead evidence in support of their respective cases and thereafter the order would be passed on merits after hearing the parties. No case for interference has been made out and the writ petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. 18. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed accordingly. However, in the peculiar circumstances of the case there shall be no orders as to costs.