( 1 ) THE plaintiff-petitioner purchased from the defendant-respondent one Lathe Machine for a sum of Rs. 17,000. 00 and odd. After delivery he did not find the lathe machine in working condition. After correspondence he filed a suit against the defendant for a decree directing him to perform his part of the contract to replace the machine in question and to pay Rs. 20,000. 00 as damages etc. The suit was contested. The evidence was being recorded and on 25-2-83 the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a compromise. They made the following statements before the Court : " Statement of Shri D. D. Chiohgur, partner of the plaintiff and Harbhajan Singh, proprietor of the defendant on S. A : We have compromised the suit. It is agreed that the plaintiff shall send the machine in question of 12 ft which was supplied by the defendant with the accessories except the parts which were found missing to the factory of Mr. Zaki Hussan at B-136, Okhla Phase I within three months and the defendant shall in place of the said machine supply two machines i. e. one of model BD-2 of 6 ft and one of the model BD-3 of 6 ft as prescribed in Ext. PT with all accessories. After the defendant gets ready the machine within 3 months from today he would send intimation in writing to the plaintiff and the plaintiffs representative shall check the machines at the factory of the defendant and after the machines are approved the defendant shall deliver the same to the plaintiff or his representative at the factory of Zaki Hussain and defendant shall be delivered back the machine in question. The plaintiff shall also intimate in writing to the defendant the date on which the machine in question reaches the factory of Mr. Zaki Hussan. The plaintiff shall bear the expenses of transporation of the machines from Bombay to factory of Zaki Hussain and also for the machines which they shall get for taking to Bombay. It is also agreed that Zaki Hussan would be the final referee for deciding whether the machines which the defendant shall manufacture are in accordance with specifications and in working order. It is also agreed that Zaki Hussan would be the final referee for deciding whether the machines which the defendant shall manufacture are in accordance with specifications and in working order. It is also agreed that in case plaintiff fails to comply with the above terms the suit shall stand dismissed with costs and in case defendant fails to comply with the above terras then the suit shall stand decreed for the sum of Rs. 20,000. 00 with proportionate costs. " ( 2 ) THE Additional District Judge passed a decree on 25-2-83 in terms of the compromise. On. 16-5-83 the plaintiff made an application under S. 148 of the Civil Procedure Code. (for short the code ) for extension of time for compliance of the obligation under the above decree. It was submitted that the plaintiff could not send machine from Bombay to Shri Zaki Hussan in terms of the compromise as there had been a strike by the workers in his factory, that the strikers had gheraoed the factory for about 2 months and they were not allowing any machine to be taken out. of the factory including the machine in question. On account of the said strike and other reasons mentioned in the application the plaintiff prayed for extension of time by two months for sending the machine to Shri Zaki Hassan for replacement in accordance with the compromise. The application was contested by the defendants. The trial Court by judgment and order dated 15th Nov. 1983 dismissed the application holding that the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time under S. 148 of the Code. ( 3 ) THE question for decision in this revision is whether the Court under S. 148 of the Code has jurisdiction to extend the time fixed under the compromise decree for the performance of an obligation under the decree. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the plaintiff submits that three months time was fixed by the Court at the instance of the parties for the delivery of machines by the plaintiff to Sh. Zaki Hussan at Delhi and therefore he submits that the Court under S. 148 of the Code has jurisdiction to extend the time. He further submits that the application for extension of time was made on 16-5-83 Le. Zaki Hussan at Delhi and therefore he submits that the Court under S. 148 of the Code has jurisdiction to extend the time. He further submits that the application for extension of time was made on 16-5-83 Le. before the expiry of the time granted by the Court and that the decree was to come in existence on 25-5-83 i. e. on the expiry of three months from the date of the compromise. ( 5 ) S. 148 of the Code reads as under : "where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. "this Section empowers the Court to extend time fixed by it even after the expiry of the period originally fixed. The power is discretionary and the Court is entitled to consider the conduct of the parties applying for the extension. This section, however, applies only where the time is fixed for doing of an act prescribed or allowed by the Code including the Rules. ( 6 ) IN the present case the parties entered into compromise whereby the plaintiff agreed that he would deliver the machine in question within three months from that date and in case he was to fail, his suit was to stand dismissed with costs. If the defendant was to , fail to comply with the terms i. e. replacement of machines by two machines within the time fixed, the plaintiffs suit was to stand decreed for Rs. 20,000. 00 with costs. It is admitted that the plaintiff did not deliver the machine but made an application for extension of time on 16-5-83. The first question however is whether the Court has jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the case to extend the time. If so, whether the conduct of the plaintiff deserves grant of extension. ( 7 ) THE time for delivery of the machine by the plaintiff is not the period fixed under any provision of the Civil Procedure Code. This is the time agreed to by the parties for doing an act. There are mutual obligations upon the plaintiff and the defendant. ( 7 ) THE time for delivery of the machine by the plaintiff is not the period fixed under any provision of the Civil Procedure Code. This is the time agreed to by the parties for doing an act. There are mutual obligations upon the plaintiff and the defendant. The obligations are conditional If the plaintiff fails to perform his obligation i. e. fails to deliver the machine within three months his suit was liable to be dismissed. S. 148 of the Code is not applicable as the time was neither fixed nor prescribed under any provision of the Code. ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel submits that on 16-5-83 when the application for extension of time was made there was no decree. It is not correct to say so. The decree came into existence on 25-2-83 when the parties entered into the compromise and the Court passed the decree on the basis of that compromise. It is however correct that the decree was not executable before the expiry of three months from that date. The execution of the decree depended upon the performance of the obligations under the decree by the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff failed to perform his obligations according to the decree and therefore his suit is deemed to have been dismissed in terms of the decree after the expiry of three months from the date of the decree. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the plaintiff has referred to various judgments. I shall now deal with them. In Gobardhan Singh v. Barsati, AIR 1972 All 246 (FB) a suit was filed which was allowed to be amended later on. Consequent to amendment therewas deficiency in Court fee and this deficiency in Court fee was not made within the time allowed. The plaint was, therefore, rejected as insufficiently stamped. The plaintiff made an application for restoration and the application was allowed. The operative order of the Court was as follows : "i allow the application and restore the plaint on payment of Rs. 6. 00 as costs and payment of entire Court fee by 11-12-1960. In case of any default, the application shall stand rejected. "the Full Bench held that the case was covered by S. 148 of the Code and therefore the application for extension of time was allowed. 6. 00 as costs and payment of entire Court fee by 11-12-1960. In case of any default, the application shall stand rejected. "the Full Bench held that the case was covered by S. 148 of the Code and therefore the application for extension of time was allowed. The question for making up deficiency in Court fee is specifically provided in S. 149 of the Code and the time for payment of costs is fixed under the Code. ( 10 ) IN Budhulal Kasturchand v. Chhotelal, AIR 1977 Madh Pra 1 (FB) adjournment was allowed on payment of costs as a condition precedent before the next date of hearing. The plaintiff failed to pay the costs on the next date. The suit was dismissed. It was held that the dismissal of the suit was erroneous and illegal and the suit was restored. ( 11 ) IN Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Rahiman Sahib, AIR 1923 Mad 284 there was a decree for specific performance of a contract to sell on condition of his paying a certain amount to the defendant within a specified time. It was held that the decree was in the nature of a preliminary decree and the Court kept control over the action and had full power to make any just and necessary orders therein including in appropriate cases the extension of the time. ( 12 ) IN Maruti Vishnu Kshirsagar v. Bapu Keshav Jadhav, AIR 1970 Bom 398 which was a case for specific performance the time for deposit of the sale amount was extended in view of S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. ( 13 ) IN New Bangasree Bastralaya v. Ramanlal Phurma Karta, AIR 1976 Cal 335 the defendant was directed in a suit under 0. 37 of the Code to furnish security which was not complied with by the date fixed. After expiry of the time the defendant filed an application for extension of time and the application was allowed. This was a case where the time for doing the act was fixed under the Code. 37 of the Code to furnish security which was not complied with by the date fixed. After expiry of the time the defendant filed an application for extension of time and the application was allowed. This was a case where the time for doing the act was fixed under the Code. ( 14 ) IN Chinnamarkathian (in C. A. No. 2197 of 1969) and Chinna Gounder (in C. A. No. 2198 of 1969) and Raja Gounder (in C. A. No. 2199 of 1969) v. Ayyavoo, AIR 1982 SC 137 a conditional order for eviction on default was passed and it was held that the order was illegal and the time was extended in terms of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. ( 15 ) IN Smt. Periyakkal v. Smt. Dakshyani, AIR 1983 SC 428 the respondent had obtained a money decree against the appellant Later in execution of that decree certain property belonging to the appellant was brought to sale and the decree-holder herself purchased that property for Rs. 28,000. 00. The appellant filed an application for setting aside the sale. The execution Court dismissed the application but on appeal the sale was set aside. The respondent-holder filed second appeal in the High Court. At the hearing of that appeal the parties entered into a compromise whereby the judgment debtor agreed to deposit and the decree-holder agreed to receive a sum of Rs. 60,000. 00 in full and final settlement of the decree. It was further agreed that if the deposit of the aforesaid amount was made on or before 30-12-1976 the sale was to stand set aside and the second appeal of the respondent was to stand dismissed. It was also agreed that if the amount of Rs. 60,000. 00 was not deposited on or before the date fixed the second appeal was to stand allowed and the sale was to stand confirmed. The time was stated to be the essence of the contract between the parties. The judgment debtors failed to deposit the agreed amount within the stipulated time. They later filed an application under S. 148 of the Code in the High Court for extension of time for deposit of Rs. 60,000. 00 in terms of the compromise. The time was stated to be the essence of the contract between the parties. The judgment debtors failed to deposit the agreed amount within the stipulated time. They later filed an application under S. 148 of the Code in the High Court for extension of time for deposit of Rs. 60,000. 00 in terms of the compromise. The High Court dismissed the application on the ground that the Court could not extend time where the time had been stipulated by the parties themselves in the compromise arrived at between them. The Supreme Court reversed that finding. In that judgment time was not fixed under a decree but during the course of execution proceedings it was held that the time for deposit stipulated by the parties became the time allowed by the Court and this gave the Court jurisdiction to extend time in appropriate cases. It was held that the Court had jurisdiction and the matter was remanded by the Supreme Court. ( 16 ) IN Kashiram Damaji Wankhede v. Ganpat Punjaji, AIR 1957 Nag 86 a consent decree directing the defendant to deposit a certain sum in Court on or before a particular date on default the claim of the plaintiff was to stand decreed. On the fixed date the defendant filed an application for extension of time on the allegation that he was prevented from making the deposit on that date due to wrongful action of the plaintiff. The allegations made by the defendant in the affidavit tiled by him were nor controverted and therefore the Court extended the time and the deposit was actually made within the extended time and was accepted by the Court. The High Court refused to interfere with the order in revision under S. 115 of the Code. ( 17 ) IN Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 SC 882 a conditional order in appeal was made requiring the appellant to pay Court fees within three months and on payment the suit was considered to be decreed with costs and in default of payment of Court fee in time the suit was to be considered dismissed. The appellant failed to pay the Court fee within time. He applied for extension of time for payment of the Court fee. The application was dismissed by the High Court. Review application was also dismissed. The appellant failed to pay the Court fee within time. He applied for extension of time for payment of the Court fee. The application was dismissed by the High Court. Review application was also dismissed. The Supreme Court on appeal held that the time could he enlarged even though it was fixed peremptory under S. 148 of the Code and the application was filed after the expiry of the original time fixed for payment of Court fee. The Supreme Court made the following observations : "such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decree apart) are, in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. For example, it cannot be said that, if the appellant had started with the full money ordered to be paid and came well in time but was set upon and robbed by thieves the day previous, he could not ask for extension of time, or that the Court was powerless to extend it. "the Supreme Court thus held that there was ample power with the Court to extend the time initially granted by it for doing an act prescribed by the Code. The Supreme Court however impliedly excluded the applicability of Ss. 148 and 149 of the Code to the conditional decrees. ( 18 ) IN all these cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, there was no conditional decree and the time was not fixed under any decree. Further the act required to be done in all these cases was prescribed or allowed by the Civil Procedure Code. or the Rules thereunder These cases do not advance the case of the petitioner. ( 19 ) O. 20 Rule 3 of the Code reads as under: "the judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge in open Court at the time of pronouncing it and. when once signed, shall not afterwards be altered or added to, save as provided by S. 152 or on review". Under S. 152 of the Code clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees and orders can be corrected by the Court. O. 20 R. 7 of the Code provides that the decreesheet bears the date on which the judgment was pronounced. Under S. 152 of the Code clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees and orders can be corrected by the Court. O. 20 R. 7 of the Code provides that the decreesheet bears the date on which the judgment was pronounced. Reading these provisions together it is clear that the decree or judgment cannot be altered or added to except on review or under S. 152 of the Code. ( 20 ) IN Vyankatrao Laxmanji v. Shamrao Ganpatrao, AIR 1952 Nag 185 a compromise decree making the amount payable in certain instalments was passed. It was held that it was not open to the Court subsequently in the absence of the decree holder, to grant further time to the judgment-debtor to pay instalments. ( 21 ) IN Rambilas Rai (Singh) v. Ramji Rai (Singh), AIR 1960 Pat 562 a consent decree allowing payment in instalments was passed with a condition that the entire amount due was payable on single default. It was held that the consequence of the default in payment of the instalment is that the entire decree remaining unpaid became executable at once. It was held that the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time. ( 22 ) IN Bhutnath Das v. Sahadeb Chandra Panja, AIR 1962 Cal485 the decree for specific performance directed to deposit certain amount within certain time as condition and in default the suit was to stand dismissed. It was held that the Court had no power thereafter to extend the time either under S. 148 or 151 of the Code. ( 23 ) IN Bokaro and Ramgur Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 Cal 308 it has been observed that where a decree is passed on condition that if certain sum of money be put in within a specified time, the suit would stand decreed and in default thereof the suit would stand dismissed after the expiry of the time limited by the decree, the Court loses seisin over the matter and cannot extend the time. ( 24 ) IN Bethanna Nadar v. M. Srinivasan. (1962) 1 Mad LJ 418 it has been held that an essential term of the agreement embodied in the decree cannot be changed by an act of the Court on the application of one only of the parties but the consent of both parties to the original agreement would be necessary for its modification. (1962) 1 Mad LJ 418 it has been held that an essential term of the agreement embodied in the decree cannot be changed by an act of the Court on the application of one only of the parties but the consent of both parties to the original agreement would be necessary for its modification. In that case the decree in terms of compromise fixed two weeks from the date of the decree for the deposit of arrears of rent. But arrears of rent were deposited after the date specified in the decree. It was held that the Court was not entitled to amend any clause of the decree passed in pursuance of a compromise and grant extension of time. ( 25 ) IN Ram Nath v. M/s. Ram Nath Chhittar Mal, AIR AIR 1961 SC 104 the defendanttenant in terms of the compromise did not hand over possession on the date fixed by the compromise decree and it was held that the defendant-tenant was not entitled to restoration of possession under S. 15 (3) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. 1952. ( 26 ) IN M. N. Subramania Mudaliar v. Shanmugham Chettiar, AIR 1968 Mad 48 it has been held that in compromise decree where the time was of the essence of the compromise the Court has no jurisdiction to extend time. ( 27 ) IN Dr. Ram Kumar v. Mahadeo Lal, AIR 1962 Raj 54 . it has been observed that the jurisdiction of the civil Court begins from the date when the plaint is filed and it terminates on the date on which the judgment is dated and signed in open Court under 0. 20 R. 3 of the Code, and when the judgment is once signed, it shall not afterwards be altered or added to. save as provided by S. 152 or on review. It has been held that when the alteration in the period fixed for the performance of any condition does not come either under S. 152 or under any of the provisions of O. 47, extending time granted under the decree will amount to varying the decree which the Court cannot do. Further it has been observed that the Court has no inherent power to enlarge time fixed under a decree. Further it has been observed that the Court has no inherent power to enlarge time fixed under a decree. ( 28 ) IN the instant case mutual obligations were to be performed by the plaintiff and the defendant The plaintiff was required to deliver the machine in question to the defendants representative at Delhi within three months from the date of the decree and in case of his failure to do so his suit was to stand dismissed. Further obligation was imposed on the defendant to deliver new machines in lieu of the old machine within three months and on his failure to do so it was provided that a decree for Rs. 20,000. 00 would be deemed to have been passed. There are thus mutual obligations under the decree and the time of three months is the essence of the contract which is the basis of compromise decree. Although the time was granted by the Court under the decree but it was not an act prescribed or allowed by any provision of the Civil Procedure Code. or the rules made thereunder. It is held that S. 148 of the Code is not applicable and the Court under this section has no jurisdiction to extend the time fixed for the performance of an obligation under the compromise decree. ( 29 ) THE revision petition has no merit and it is dismissed with no order as to costs.