A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) EVEN when it is brought to the notice of the High Court that the trial court has entertained a suit which is beyond the scope of its pecuniary jurisdiction and in which an order has been passed in contravention of the accepted rules of procedure and which amounts to abuse of process of court should the High Court nor exercise its powers under Article 227 of the Consituation of India without directing the party to avail of all alternative remedy provided by way of appeal from order and/or revision ? The aforesaid question arises in the backdrop of the facts that follow. ( 2 ) THE respondent-original plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No. 101 of 1985 in the Court of Civil Judge (J. D.) Gandhidham-Kutch inter alia praying that the action of the petitioner-defendant Kandla Port Trust in discharging the tender (in respect of the sale of vessel M. V. OBA) which was opened on 30/04/1984 and inviting another tender by Public Notice dated 25/02/1985 be declared illegal and void and it be further declared that there was completed contract of sale of the vessel `m. V. OBA lying in the waters of the Kandla Port. The respondent-plaintiff also prayed that the defendant be restrained from transferring selling or disposing of the vessel in question and be directed to complete the formalities of handing over the ship/vessel to the plaintiff. ( 3 ) ON 8/02/1985 the defendant filed Caveat Application which was received by the opponent-plaintiff and also submitted in Court. The aforesaid suit was filed on 26/03/1985 and on the same day the plaintiff filed an application exhibits and prayed for interim relief. Although there was a caveat application without issuing notice and without hearing there petitionerdefendant the trial Court granted ad-interim relief and later on by its order dated 12/04/1985 confirmed the ad-interim relief granted earlier. By this order the trial court restrained the defendant from selling transferring and/or disposing of the vessel-ship M. V. OBA. ( 4 ) THE petitioner-original defendant has preferred this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and has challenged the legality and validity of the order passed by the trial court. ( 5 ) THE ship M. V. OBA was lying in the waters of Kandla Port for quite some time. ( 4 ) THE petitioner-original defendant has preferred this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and has challenged the legality and validity of the order passed by the trial court. ( 5 ) THE ship M. V. OBA was lying in the waters of Kandla Port for quite some time. The crew and other persons incharge of the vessel left the same unattended. A huge amount of Port dues was payable by the owner of the ship. Nobody cared to pay the same. Therefore under the provisions of sec. 64 of the Major Port Trust Act the Board of Trustees of the Port of Kandla (herein after referred to as the Board) seized the vehicle Some time in the year 1984. The vehicle was placed for public auction by inviting the tenders It is the case of the respondent-plaintiff that he had filled in the tender he had quoted the ice of Rs. 11. 00 lacs he had paid Rs. 3. 00 lacs as and by way deposit and his tender was accepted. Thereafter some time in the month of September 1984 the authorities of the Board communicated to the respondent-plaintiff that due to legal impediments it was not possible of hand over the ship free from encumbrances and therefore the tender was discharged. The respondent-plaintiff disputed the say of the Board and contended that in was not open for the Board to discharge the tender. Ultimately the Board issued a fresh public notice on 25/02/1985 inviting fresh tenders. The last date for filling in the tenders was 2/04/1985 Before the aforesaid date the respondent-plaintiff filed suit in the Court of Civil Judge Junior Division on 26/03/1985 and also submitted an application Exh. 5 for interim orders. It may be repeated that before the respondent-plaintiff filed the suit the petitioner-Board had filed caveat on 8/02/1985 and had also served a upon of the same on the respondent plaintiff. Still however the plaintiff did not give notice of the application for interim relief and moved the Court. The Court also did not insist that the notice be served upon the other side and without giving any opportunity of being heard no the petitioner-Board. passed ad-interim order on the same day. Still however the plaintiff did not give notice of the application for interim relief and moved the Court. The Court also did not insist that the notice be served upon the other side and without giving any opportunity of being heard no the petitioner-Board. passed ad-interim order on the same day. restraining the Board from selling transferring and/or disposing of the vessel M. V. OBA lying in the waters of Kandla Part The Board appeared in the suit filed its written statement and raised several contention The trial Court after hearing the parties confirmed the order passed by it earlier as per its order dated 12/04/1985 ( 6 ) THE counsel for the respondent-plaintiff has submitted that this Court should not exercise its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India because in the instant case the defendant has an alternative efficacious remedy and there is no case of total lack of jurisdiction with the trial Court. There is nothing extraordinary and no extraordinary situation has arisen which would call for the exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Consitution of India The Counsel for the respondent plaintiff has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Miss Maneck Custodji Surjarji v. Sarafazali Nawabali Mirza reported in AIR 1976 Supreme Court. 2446. In his submission if this High Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. the respondent-plaintiff will be without any remedy and therefore this Court should not exercise its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 7 ) THIS legal and technical objection may be cleared first. In the case of Miss Maneck Custodji Surjarji v. Sarafazalli Nawabali Mirza (supra) the Supreme Court has not laid down any absolute proposition that the High Court should not exercise its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India whenever there is an alternative remedy available. In that case a decree was passed by the City Civil Court and it was an admitted position that an appeal lay against that decree to the High Court itself. In that case a decree was passed by the City Civil Court and it was an admitted position that an appeal lay against that decree to the High Court itself. Instead of filing appeal the petitioner therein had moved the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the vacation Judge before whom the petition was filed did of grant interim relief pointing out that the Special Civil Application was not maintainable because adequate alternative legal remedy by way of appeal was open to the party. Therefore the matter came up for admission before another learned single judge and be admitted the same and took it for final hearing within 7 days an d disposed of the same by Judgment. It was under this situation that the Supreme Court observed as under:" It is very difficult to appreciate the reasoning behind the order made by the High Court. It is to say the least an extraordinary order which flies in the face of law and judicial procedure. The respondent had clearly a legal remedy available to him by way of an appeal against the decree of the City Civil Court and this remedy was not only adequate but more comprehensive than the one under Art. 227 of the Constitution. Even so for some inexplicable reasons the respondent house to prefer a Special Civil Application under Art. 227 of the Constitution and Vaidya J. entertained the Special Civil Application and granted relief to the respondent casting to the winds the well-settled principle that the High Court does not ordi- nary in exercise on its discretion entertain a Special Civil Application under Art. 227 of the Constitution where an adequate alternative legal remedy is available to the applicant. It is tree that this principle is not rigid and flexible and there can be extraordinary-circumstances where despite the existence of an alternative legal remedy the High Court nay interfere in favour of an applicant but this certainly not one of such extraordinary eases. It is indeed difficult to see how the learned Judge could entertain a Special Civil Application against a decree passed by a subordinate court when the procedural law allows an appeal against it and that appeal lies to the High Court itself. It is indeed difficult to see how the learned Judge could entertain a Special Civil Application against a decree passed by a subordinate court when the procedural law allows an appeal against it and that appeal lies to the High Court itself. (emphasise supplied)"it shot he clear from the aforesaid paragraph of the Judgment of the Supreme Court that in that case a decree was challenged in a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India by passing a usual remedy of ar)peal which lay to the High Court. From the Judgment of the High Court no reason whatsoever appeared he Supreme Court on the basis of which it could be said that the High Court was justified in exercising its powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. Moreover a more comprehensive remedy by way of appeal to the High Court itself was available. ( 8 ) IN the install case the aforesaid factual situation is not available. But before going to the facts of this case. it would be proper to make the leagal position clear. In the case or Rum and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana and others reported in 1985 (3) Supreme Court Cases page 267 the Supreme Court has observed as under:"the rule which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion a self-imposed restraint on the court rather than a rule of law It does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court Where the order complained against is alleged to be illegal or invalid as being contrary to law a petition at the instance of person adversely affected by it would lie to the High Court under Article 226 and such a petition cannot be rejected on the ground that all appeal lies to the higher officer or the State Government An appeal in the cases cannot be said to provide in all situations an alternative effective remedy keeping aside the nice distinction between jurisdiction and merits"the aforesaid principle though laid down in connection with the provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is equally applicable to the petitions under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 9 ) IN fact the aforesaid principle has been laid down by the Supreme Court as far back as in the year 1958 in the case of State of U. P. v. Mohammad Nooh. ( 9 ) IN fact the aforesaid principle has been laid down by the Supreme Court as far back as in the year 1958 in the case of State of U. P. v. Mohammad Nooh. Reported in AIR 1958. SC page 86 The Supreme Court made the distinction between the writ of certiorari and the writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court said There is no rule with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. Provided the requisite grounds exist certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute. In paragraph 11 of the judgment the Supreme Court has observed as under:-"there may conceived be cases and instant case is in point where the error irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure continued by an inferior court or tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obstrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp or infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision If an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in cases of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the/superior courts sense of fair play the superior Court may. we think quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogrative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the Court or tribunal of first instance even if an appeal to another inferior Court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or If course was had to it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned In the case of The Ahmedabad Mfg. and Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ramtanel Ramanand and others reported in AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1598 in paragraph 13 of the Judgment the Supreme Court has observed that as such power under Art. 227 may also be exercised suo motu". ( 10 ) THUS amplitude of power under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India is very wide. It would? Co. Ltd. v. Ramtanel Ramanand and others reported in AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1598 in paragraph 13 of the Judgment the Supreme Court has observed that as such power under Art. 227 may also be exercised suo motu". ( 10 ) THUS amplitude of power under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India is very wide. It would? depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the question whether the Court should exercise this power even when an appeal or a revision is maintainable and even at the interim stage of a proceeding pending before the lower Court will he determined mainly on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case. ( 11 ) IN the light of the aforesaid settled legal position. the facts and circumstances of this case he examined (1) The prayer in the plaint is for declaration that the discharge of first tender and inviting of tenders by public notice dated 25/02/1985 was illegal and void and it be declared that there was a completed contract. The plaintiff further prayed that the Board he restrained from transferring the vessel and he directed to complete the formalities of handing over the ship/vessel. If one reads the entire pleadings. it is very clear that though the prayer is couched in different language in essence the suit is for the specific performance of the contract. According to the plaintiff. the contract with the petitioner Board was complete. The contract was for the sale of the vessel for consideration of Rs. 11. 00 lacs. The plaintiff in substance claimed thai unilateral termination of the contract by the Board was illegal and prayed that the defendant he restrained from selling the vessel to anybody else and be directed to complete the formalities of handing over the vessel What would this mean? It would mean that the defendant-Board should fulfil the contract which according to the plaintiff was completed and was subsisting. This is nothing but the prayer for specific performance of the contract. To read these pleadings in any other manner would amount to reading the same in most unreasonable and perverse manner. The pleadings cannot be read by dissecting the words and sentences from each other. The pleadings have got to be read as a whole to ascertain its proper meanings. To read these pleadings in any other manner would amount to reading the same in most unreasonable and perverse manner. The pleadings cannot be read by dissecting the words and sentences from each other. The pleadings have got to be read as a whole to ascertain its proper meanings. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered. primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleading taken as a whole (see Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia AIR 1976 S. C. 744 paragraph 30 ). ( 12 ) IN the case of Janakiram Iyer v. Nilakantha Iyer reported in AIR 1962 S. C. P. 633 (para 19) the Supreme Court has observed that in constraining the plaint we must have regard to all the relevant allegations made in the plaint and look at the substance of the matter and of its form. Further in the case of Shanker Singh v. Rajinder Prashad reported in AIR 1973 S. C. P. 2384. the Supreme Court has said that mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court looking at. the substance of the relief asked for. In the instant case. there is no manner of doubt that the suit in sub stance is for a specific performance of the contract. the consideration for which is Rs. 11 lacs if not more. ( 13 ) EVEN so the suit is filed in the Court of Civil Judge. Junior Division which has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit upto the limit of Rs. 20 0 only. The respondent-plaintiff has put the valuation at Rs. 450. 00 and in paragraph 12 of the plaint it is slated that her the purpose of Court fees stamp the suit is for declaration and injunction and subject matter of the suit for declaration is not susceptible for monetary evaluation and therefore the suit is valued at Rs. 450. 00 and fixed Court fee stamp of Rs. 30. 00 is affixed to the plaint under sec. 6 (iv) (j) of the Bombay Court Fees Act 1959 The provisions of sec. 450. 00 and fixed Court fee stamp of Rs. 30. 00 is affixed to the plaint under sec. 6 (iv) (j) of the Bombay Court Fees Act 1959 The provisions of sec. 6 (iv) (j) of the Bombay Court Fees Act 1959 would be applicable where the declaration is sought in respect of the subject matter which is not susceptible of monetary evaluation and which is not otherwise provide d by the Act. To say that the subject matter is not susceptible of monetary evaluation would mean ignoring certain vital facts which are admitted and on the basis of which the suit itself proceeds. ( 14 ) THE plaintiff proceeds on the footing that there was a contract of Rs. 11 lacs and the dependent was bound to sell the vessel for consideration of Rs. 11 lacs and that an amount of Rs. 3. 00 lacs was paid as and by way of deposit to the defendant and the defendant had accepted the same. The plaintiffs further case is that the contract was complete. therefore the Board was bound by the contract and could not have unilaterally terminated the same and therefore cannot be permitted to sell the vessel and should ground. if one reads the entire plaint. it is very clear that the subject-matter of the suit is the contract which was arrived at between the parties in respect of the sale of vessel in question. The contract was for Rs. 11. 00 lacs as per the case of the plaintiff. Therefore. by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the subject-matter of the suit is not susceptible of monetary evaluation. By mere reproducing the words of section only adopting a clear device of astute drftmanship one cannot file a suit in a court which has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Once it is made clear that the subject-matter of the suit exceeds the limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court the trial Court. will not have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. In this case it is apparent that the Court of Civil Judge (J. D.) would not have jurisdiction to entertain this suit. Once it is made clear that the subject-matter of the suit exceeds the limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court the trial Court. will not have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. In this case it is apparent that the Court of Civil Judge (J. D.) would not have jurisdiction to entertain this suit. ( 15 ) IT is an admitted position that much prior to the filing of the suit that is on February R 1485 a caveat application was filed in the court and a by thereof was also served upon the plaintiff. Even so the plaintiff did not interim the defendant-Board and did not serve copy of plaint and application for stay before moving the Court. The Trial Court also did not think it fit to issue notice to the defendant-board before granting ex-parte order. It can very well be understood that the plaintiff may he desirous to avoid the presence of the petitioner-defendant at the time of obtaining the orders at the initial stages. But it is not understood why the Trial Court Trial also failed to perform its duty laid down under the provisions of sec. 148a of the Civil Procedure Code. The observation made by the Trial Court to the effect that the Shirastedar of the Court failed to make endorsement regarding caveat does not seem to be convincing. It that he really so it is a serious lapse. There is nothing on record to show that the trial court has taken or has even proposed to initiate any departmental actions against the Shirastedar concerned. This entire story appears to be an after thought. The Trial Court further observed that the Caveator would be required to be heard not at she time of passing an ex-parte order at the initial stage but he would be required to be heard at the time of passing the final order on application exh. 5. The reasoning adopted by the trial Court is absolutely perverse. The object of sec. 148-A of C. P. Code is to see that no ex parte order is passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the person against whom the order is to be passed. This object itself would be frustrated if the reasoning adopted by the trial Court is accepted. Moreover the entire provisions of sec. 148 would become meaningless. 148-A of C. P. Code is to see that no ex parte order is passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the person against whom the order is to be passed. This object itself would be frustrated if the reasoning adopted by the trial Court is accepted. Moreover the entire provisions of sec. 148 would become meaningless. because before making the order absolute the other side is always required to be heard. That is the mandatory provision of the Code. Then why have the provision of sec. 148-A of Civil Procedure Code on Statute Book at all ? Similar view is taken by the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of C. Seethaiah Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and others reported in A. I. R. 1983 Andhra Pradesh page 443. In the case of G. C. Siddalingappa v. G. C. Veerana reported in A. I. R. 1981 Karnataka. page 242. The High COurt of Karnataka has also token the same view. ( 16 ) THE of order passed by the Trial Court is against the principles laid don by the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunop India Ltd. and others reported in A. I. R. 1985 Supreme Courts page 330. The Trial Court ought to have taken into consideration the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case that mere finding of prima facie case would not and should not govern the grant or refusal of interim relief. There are other vital considerations such as balance of convenience irreparable loss and public interest. In the instant case the trial Court has obviously ignored the principles laid down by the Supreme Court with regard to the balance of convenience in matters of public revenue. This case though cannot be said to be directly involving revenue of a public Department. it is almost similar to that because ultimately the money belonging to the public is likely to be stuck-up. In the instant case had the Trial Court allowed the auction in take place. that would have fetched atleast Rs. 11. 00 lacs if not more to the petitioner-Board. This means that some time in the month of April 1985 the Board would have received the amount of Rs. 11. 00 lacs or more. In the instant case had the Trial Court allowed the auction in take place. that would have fetched atleast Rs. 11. 00 lacs if not more to the petitioner-Board. This means that some time in the month of April 1985 the Board would have received the amount of Rs. 11. 00 lacs or more. A public Sector Undertaking would not have been deprived of an amount of Rs. 11 00 lacs for these many months. The interest loss alone calculating at the rate of 18% of interest rate on this amount per day would be about Rs 600/ -. Moreover the ship has been left unattended by the owners of the ship and the same is required to be attended. As shown by the defendant-Board tic monthly wages of the persons engaged for keeping the watch over the ship amounts to about Rs. 10 000. 00 (see page 91 of the compliation) The trial Court has not at all taken into consideration these factors Moreover. as pointed out in the Caveat application keeping of the vehicle in the waters itself was causing serious traffic hazard when was likely to paralyse navigation through Kandla Creek. Thus even assuming that there was prima facie case considerations of public interest balance of convenience and irreparable loss to the Society at large should have been taken into account by the Trial Court. ( 17 ) WHENEVER a suit is instituted. a Court is required to examine the plain at least from two angles. Is the suit within limitation ? Has the Court jurisdiction to entertain the suit? Even if the point is not raised by either side it is the duty of the Court itself to examine these points. in the instant case on plain reading of the plaint it becomes clear that the subject matter of the suit was the contract in respect of the vessel. The plaintiff wanted to enforce the contract and intended that the possession of vessel be given to him. This was clearly beyond Rs. 20 0 i. e. the maximum limit of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division. It is not understood why the trial court of Civil Judge Junior Division should have attempted to usurp the jurisdiction which it did not possess. This was clearly beyond Rs. 20 0 i. e. the maximum limit of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division. It is not understood why the trial court of Civil Judge Junior Division should have attempted to usurp the jurisdiction which it did not possess. ( 18 ) THE Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Inderlal Panwarmal v. Khialdas Shewaram and others reported in A. I. R. 1971 Gujarat at page 86. On the basis of this decision it is contended that the valuation placed by the plaintiff was collect. In that case the plaintiff sought to have an agreement to sell his shop for a sum (Which the agreement wrongly stated as paid up declared void and also claimed relief of permanent injunction. Therein it was held that the provisions of sec. 6 (iv) (j) of the Act would be applicable. In the instant case there is no question of consideration of agreement to sell. According to the plaintiff himself the contract was complete the contract was for consideration of Rs. 11. 00 lacs. The plaintiffs case is that the plaintiff has paid Rs. 3. 00 lacs as and by way of deposit. If one reads the plaint as a whole there is no manner of doubt that the subjectmatter of the suit is vessel M. V. OBA in respect of which the contract of sale has been completed and according to the plaintiff the dependent could not have unilaterally terminated the same and therefore the vessel was required to he handed over to him. Hence it is very clear that the plaintiff has purposely put wrong valuation in the suit. The subject-matter of the suit is capable of monetary evaluation. The proper valuation of the subject-matter would be atleast Rs. 11 lacs if not more. Therefore the suit would be beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the trial Court. Such a suit will have to be filed in the Court of Civil Judge. Senior Division. ( 19 ) IT is contended that there is much delay in filing the petition. The petition is filed even after the prescribed period of limitation for A. O. or Revision and therefore the same should not be entertained. The contention has no merits. It is a fact of which judicial notice can be. Senior Division. ( 19 ) IT is contended that there is much delay in filing the petition. The petition is filed even after the prescribed period of limitation for A. O. or Revision and therefore the same should not be entertained. The contention has no merits. It is a fact of which judicial notice can be. and should be taken that the employees in the subordinate courts were on strike upto third week of August 85. They were on strike on account of the anti-roster agitation in the State. Therefore appeal to the District Court would not have been possible and it would have been an exercise in futility. Moreover on account of the wide spread disturbances in the State everyone coming to Ahmedabad from out stations was always afraid. So much so that the lawyers practising in the High Court decided not to attend the court matters for about a week. These circumstances would surely create apprehension in the mind of outsider and he would be show to come to Ahmedabad. Moreover in the instant case even after receiving the papers the lawyer Himself wanted further material and this circumstance caused further delay. In this view of the matter even if there is delay it is sufficiently explained. ( 20 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion. it is clear that in the instant case the respondent-plaintiff has by obtaining interim order from the Court of Civil Judge (J. D.) Gandhidham-Kutch abused the process of the Court. There is irregularity in entertaining the suit and this irregularity touches upon the jurisdiction of the Court itself. The trial Court has conducted the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the accepted rules of procedure and it certainly offends the Courts sense of fair play and justice. In such a situation it becomes an imperative duty of the High Court to exercise its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and interfere with the interim order passed by the Trial Court. If this is not done immense harm and injury will be caused to she cause of Justice which cannot be permitted to be perpetuated on the ground that the interim order passed by the trial Court could have been challenged by way of appeal and/or revision. (Rest of the judgment is not material for the reports.) (KMV) petition partly allowed .