Sewak Shankar v. Additional Collector, Agra — 1985 DIGILAW 196 (ALL)

ORDER B.L. Yadav, J. - Sri Sewak Shankar, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8607 of 1983 and Ram Prasad, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13618 of 1984 have come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 26-4-1983 (Annexure 2') passed by the Additional Collector, Agra, the order dated 20-7.1982 passed by the Tahsildar/Assistant Collector First Class Fatehabad, Agra (Annexure 1' in the petition of Sewak Shankar) and the order dated 19-9-1984 passed by the Additional Collector, Agra and the order dated 18-8-1983 passed by the Tahsildar/Assistant Collector First Class, Firozabad (passed in the writ petition of Ram Prasad) in the proceedings under section 122-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Tahsildar-cum- Assistant Collector. First Class has allowed applications filed by the Gaon Sabha under Section 122-B of the Act and the petitioners' before the Additional Collector, constitutional validity of the provisions of purporting to be under section 333 of the Act have been dismissed in both the cases. 2. The facts leading to these petitions are few and simple. Applications were filed by the Gaon Sabha against the petitioners for their ejectment in the proceedings under section 122-B of the Act. It was alleged that the petitioners occupied the land of the Gaon Sabha without any authority and otherwise than in accordance with law, hence notices in Z.A. Form No. 49-Ka were issued against the petitioners and it was specified that the petitioners have encroached upon the land of the Gaon Sabha and were liable to ejectment and to pay damages. 3. The petitioners in both the writ petitions filed their written statements denying any encroachment upon Gaon Sabha's land and alleging that they were not liable to ejectment or to pay any damages. It was further alleged by Sewak Shankar that the land was Khandhar and he has constructed his house after removing Khandhar therefrom and the notice was illegal as bona fide dispute of title was involved in the case and that the Tehsildar Assistant Collector First Class has no jurisdiction to try the case. The remedy for the Gaon Sabha was to file regular suit. Similar was the written statement filed by Ram Prasad. The remedy for the Gaon Sabha was to file regular suit. Similar was the written statement filed by Ram Prasad. The Tehsildar/ Assistant Collector First Class after looking into the report of the Lekhapal and other evidence adduced by the parties, allowed the applications and decreed the claims of the Gaon Sabha and imposed damages. Both the petitioners preferred revisions before the Additional Collector but those also met the same fate. Undaunted by the unsuccess both the petitioners have filed the instant writ petitions seeking for reliefs under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and have prayed for writ of certiorari quashing the impugned orders and for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to enforce the provisions of Section 122-B of the Act against them. 4. I have heard Sri Satya Prakash. the learned counsel for the petitioners as also Sri N. P. Misra, learned Chief Standing Counsel for the State of U.P., Additional Collector, Tehsildar/Assistant Collector First Class and Sri K. B. Garg on behalf of the Gaon Sahhas and the Land Management Committees at a considerable length. In these petitions the constitutional validity of the provision of Section 122-B of the Act has been challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It has been urged that under Section 122-B(4-C) of the Act it has been provided that the order of the Assistant Collector under this section shall be final subject to the provisions of sub- sections (4-E), (4-A) thereof. The order of the Collector has been provided to become final subject to the provisions of sub-section (4). Sub-section (4-E) of Section 122-B provides that any person aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Collector or the Collector in respect of any property under this section may file a suit in the Court of competent jurisdiction to establish the right claimed by him. It further provides that no such suit shall lie against an order of the Additional Collector if a revision is preferred to the Collector under sub-section (4-A). It has been urged that the remedy for the suit has been provided in case no revision has been filed before the Collector and in case the revision has been filed it has been provided that no such suit shall lie against an order of the Assistant Collector. It has been urged that the remedy for the suit has been provided in case no revision has been filed before the Collector and in case the revision has been filed it has been provided that no such suit shall lie against an order of the Assistant Collector. The provision denying the right of suit in case a revision has been filed before the Collector while the remedy of the suit is available in case no revision has been filed is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. There appears to he no nexus in enacting these provisions for the object sought to be attained by the Legislature. 5. For the sake of convenience the entire statutory provisions of Section 122-B of the Act are set out below :- "122-B. Powers of the Land Management Committee and the Collector :- (1) Where any property vested under the provisions of this Act in a Gaon Sabha or a local authority is damaged or misappropriated or where any Gaon Sabha or local authority is entitled to take or retain possession of any land under the provisions of this Act and such land is occupied otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the Land Management Committee or Local Authority, as the case may be, shall inform the Assistant Collector concerned in the manner prescribed. (2) Where from the information received under sub-section (1) or otherwise, the Assistant Collector is satisfied that any property referred to in sub-section (1) has been damaged or misappropriated or any person is in occupation of any land, referred to in that sub-section, in contravention of the provisions of this Act, he shall issue notice to the persons concerned to show cause why compensation for damage, misappropriation or wrongful occupation as mentioned in such notice be not recovered from him or, as the case may be, why he should not be evicted from such land. (3) If the person to whom notice has been issued under sub-section (2) fails to show cause within the time specified in the notice or within such extended time as the Assistant Collector may allow in this behalf, or if cause shown is found to be insufficient, the Assistant Collector may direct that such person may be evicted from the land and may for that purpose, use, or cause to be used such force as may be necessary and may direct that the amount of compensation for damage, misappropriation or wrongful occupation be recovered from such person as arrears of land revenue. (4) If the Assistant Collector is of opinion that the person showing cause is not guilty of causing the damage or misappropriation or wrongful occupation referred to in the notice under sub-section (2) he shall discharge the notice. (4-A) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Collector under sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) may, within thirty days from the date of such order prefer, a revision before the Collector on the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of Section 333. (4-B) The procedure to be followed in any action taken under this section shall be such as may be prescribed. (4-C) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 333 or Section 333-A, but subject to the provisions of this section- (i) every order of the Assistant Collector under this section shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4-A) and (4-D), be final. (ii) every order of the Collector under this section shall, subject to the provisions of sub- section (4-D), be final. (4-D) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Collector or Collector in respect of any property under this Section may file suit in a Court of competent jurisdiction to establish the right claimed by him in such property. (4-E) No such suit as is referred to in sub- section (4-D) shall he against an order of Assistant Collector if a revision is preferred the Collector under sub-section (4-A). Explanation :- For the purposes of this section, the expression "Collector" means the officer appointed as Collector under the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 and includes an Additional Collector. Explanation :- For the purposes of this section, the expression "Collector" means the officer appointed as Collector under the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 and includes an Additional Collector. (4-F) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing sub-sections, where any agricultural labourer belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is in occupation of any land vested in a Gaon Sabha under Section 117 (not being land mentioned in Section 132) having occupied it from before June 30, 1975 and the land so occupied together with land, if any held by him from before the said date as bhumidhar, sirdar or asami does not exceed 1.26 hectares (3.125 acres), then no action under this section shall be taken by the Land Management Committee or the Collector against such labourer, and it shall be deemed that he has been admitted as sirdar of that land under Section 195. Explanation :- The expression 'agricultural labourer' shall have the meaning assigned to it in Section 198. (5) Rules 115-C to 115-H of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules 1952, shall be and always deemed to have been made under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 as amended by the Uttar Pradesh Land Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1961 as if this section has been in force on all material dates and shall accordingly continue in force until altered or repealed or amended in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 6. The counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State of U.P. but no counter- affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Gaon Sabha or the Land Management Committee. The statement of objects and reasons has also been filed as Annexure CA-1. Sri N. P. Misra, learned Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State Government has urged that the statement of objects and reasons does indicate that with a view to simplify the procedure for eviction of unauthorised occupants of the land of the Gaon Sabha and to obtain ejectment in a narrow span of time this has been provided that in case the remedy has been availed by a tenure-holder by filing a revision before the Collector in that event it has been laid down by the Proviso to sub-section (4-E) that he would not be entitled to avail the remedy of suit. In the ordinary course the remedy of revision itself is very lengthy. In the ordinary course the remedy of revision itself is very lengthy. It may take years and hence in case the revision is preferred before the Collector and after the conclusion of these proceedings, in case the remedy of suit is also made available to the tenure holder this could consume much time and it would take years together to get back the possession of the land after ejectment of the unlawful occupants of the land of the Gaon Sabha. The intention of the legislature was to provide a speedy remedy for ejectment of the unauthorised occupants and hence after the order of the Tehsildar/Assistant Collector First Class, the remedy of suit was made available and in case the person avails the remedy of filing a revision before the Collector, the remedy of suit was denied to him. There was no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India because the remedy of the suit was not made available to the petitioners in case they availed remedy of filing revisions before the Collector. Sri K. B. Garg also supported the arguments of Sri N. P. Misra, Chief Standing Counsel and urged that the provisions of section 122-B of the Act were not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Even though the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India are well known but at the same time it is convenient to have the same which runs as under : 14. Equality Before Law : - The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India." Similar provisions are in the America Constitution. C. Herman Pretchett in his commentary on the American Constitution. 1977 Third Edn. on page 483, Chapter 27 has explained the history of the concept of "Equal protection of the laws" and the said relevant portion is set out below : " 'Equal protection of the laws' is a phrase born with the Fourteenth Amendment, the first specific recognition of the doctrine of equality in the Constitution. The dictum of the Declaration of Independence that 'all men are created equal' which was effectively used in the anti-slavery campaign, had a somewhat different import. The dictum of the Declaration of Independence that 'all men are created equal' which was effectively used in the anti-slavery campaign, had a somewhat different import. Charles Sumner came closer to the equal protection notion with his phrase "equality before the law", which he developed in 1849 in contending before the Massachusetts Supreme Court that separate public schools for black children would he unconstitutional. Later he sought to get the principle of equal rights into the Constitution by way of the Thriteenth Amendment, his suggestion being "All persons are equal before the law, so that no person, can hold another as a slave." But it was Representative Bingham who gave final form to the idea. In December, 1865, he proposed a constitutional amendment authorising Congress' to secure to ail persons in every State of the Union equal protection in their rights, life, liberty. and property,'Within the same month Senators Willson and Trumbuli introduced the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1866, in which all inhabitants were guaranteed full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and estate'. When Bingham came to prepare his draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, "equal protection in their rights" and "equal benefit of all laws" were merged to produce "equal protection of the laws". "Substantive due process" is defined by Edward S. Corwin as the judicial doctrine that "every species of State legislation, whether dealing with procedural or substantive rights, (is) subject to the scrutiny of the (Supreme) Court when the question of its essential justice is raised". The transformation of the due process clause from a guarantee of fair procedures into an activist judicial warrant for passing judgment on the substantive policies of legislative regulations must rate as one of the Supreme Court's most significant creative efforts." "Vide Edward S. Corvin, Liberty against Government : The Rise, Flowering and Decline of a Famous Juridical Concept Baton Rough, Law Louisiana State University Press, 1948, pp. 135-136." 7. In Mugler v. Kansas, (1887) 123 U.S. 623, Justice Harlan has defined the extent of the judicial interference in such matters. The relevant observation is as under : "......not.... every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of (the public welfare) is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers of the State. 135-136." 7. In Mugler v. Kansas, (1887) 123 U.S. 623, Justice Harlan has defined the extent of the judicial interference in such matters. The relevant observation is as under : "......not.... every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of (the public welfare) is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers of the State. There are, of necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go........The Courts are not bound by mere pretences. They are at liberty - indeed, are under a solemn duty to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the Courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution." 8. In the instant case the object of the U.P. Legislature in enacting Section 122-B of the Act (sic) or as substituted by U.P. Land Laws (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1981 was to simplify the procedure for ejectment of unauthorised occupants from the land which has vested in the Gaon Sabha in view of Section 117-C and other provisions of the Act. It is with this view to simplify the time consuming procedure for ejectment of unauthorised occupants that the provision was made under sub-section (4-A) that any person aggrieved from the order of the Assistant Collector passed under sub-section (3) or sub- section (4), can file within thirty days from the date of such order a revision before the Collector on the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of section 333 of the Act. If a person has availed the remedy of revision it was provided by the proviso to sub-clause (4-F) that such person shall have no right to file the suit because the remedy ;by suit was made available to a person under sub-section (4-A). There appears to be nexus with the objects sought to be attained in adding a proviso to subsection (4-B) of Section 122-B of the Act in denying the remedy of suit to a person who has availed the remedy of revision. There appears to be nexus with the objects sought to be attained in adding a proviso to subsection (4-B) of Section 122-B of the Act in denying the remedy of suit to a person who has availed the remedy of revision. In case the remedy of suit was available to a person who has already filed a revision, that would have much delayed the ejectment of unauthorised occupants. The remedy of revision itself may take years and thereafter if the remedy of suit was also made available to him the ejectment of unauthorised occupants would have been prolonged beyond expectations. It is for this simple reason that the remedy of suit was denied to a person who has already availed the remedy for filing a revision before the Collector as provided under sub-section (4-A) of Section 122-B of the Act. 9. In Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum, AIR 1953 SC 91 , on page 94 (paragraph 11) it has-been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, as stated below : "..........It is well settled that a legislature which has to deal with diverse problems arising out of an infinite variety of human relations must of necessity, have the power of making special laws to attain particular objects; and for that purpose it must have large powers of selection or classification of persons and things upon which such laws are to operate. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not 'per se' amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. To attract the operation of the clause, it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary; that it does not rest on any rational basis having regard to the object which the legislature has in view." 10. To attract the operation of the clause, it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary; that it does not rest on any rational basis having regard to the object which the legislature has in view." 10. In State of U.P. v. Kaushailiya, AIR 1964 SC 416 , while interpreting Sections 13 and 20 (1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (sic) conferred uncanalised power on the Magistrate as an executive authority to decide the fate of alleged prostitute in an arbitrary manner and it was urged that the Magistrate was to act as a persona designata and not as a Court and it was further urged that under Section 20 of the said Act the inquiry was to be initiated by the Magistrate on his receiving the requisite information that a woman or a girl is prostitute, he records the substance of the information and he gives notice to the woman or girl. He sends along with a notice a copy of the record, he has to give to woman or girl an opportunity to adduce evidence on two points, namely, whether she is a prostitute or whether in the interest of general public she should be required to remove herself from the place where she is residing or she is frequenting, the Magistrate has to give his findings on the said questions and on the basis thereof he makes the appropriate order, disobedience of the order has been made punishable. The special jurisdiction was conferred on a Magistrate of comparatively high status who can safely be relied upon to discharge the onerous and delicate duties inherent in such jurisdiction. It was accordingly held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court on page 421 as follows : "Art. 14 does not prohibit reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation and that a law would not be held to infringe Article 14 of the Constitution if the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia and the said differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the said law. The difference between a woman who is a prostitute and one who is not, certainly justifies their being placed in different classes. The difference between a woman who is a prostitute and one who is not, certainly justifies their being placed in different classes. So too, there are obvious differences between a prostitute who is a public nuisance and one who is not........The differences between these two classes of prostitutes have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Section 20, in order to prevent moral decadence in a busy locality, seeks to restrict the movements of the second category of prostitutes and to deport such of them as the peculiar methods of their operation in an area may demand." It was accordingly held that Section 20 of the said Act does not infringe Article 14 of the Constitution. 11. In Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as under :- "A law applying to one person or one class of persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it. Any classification which is arbitrary and which is made without any basis is no classification and a proper classification must always rest upon some difference and must bear a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect of which it is proposed." 12. As stated earlier, Article 14 of the Constitution of India corresponds to "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America which declares that "No State shall deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws." Prof. Wills in his Constitutional Law dealing with this clause sums up the law as prevailing in the United States in regard to it in these words :- "Meaning and effect of the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws means the protection of equal laws. It forbids class legislation, but does not forbid classification which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction. It does not prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. It merely requires that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.' 'The inhibition of the amendment...... It merely requires that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.' 'The inhibition of the amendment...... was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation'. It does not take from the States the power to classify either in the adoption of police laws, or tax laws, or eminent domain laws, but permits to them the exercise of a wide scope of discretion, and nullifies what they do only when it is without any reasonable basis. Mathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required. Similarity, not identity of treatment, is enough. If any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to sustain a classification, the existence of that state of facts must be assumed. One who assails a classification must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis." "Many different classifications of persons have been upheld as constitutional. A law applying to one person or one class of persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it." (Vide page 579 Ist. Edition of "Constitutional Law" by Prof. Wills.") 13. In Louisvilla Gas and E.Co. v. Coleman, (1928) 277 U.S. 32 (37) : 72 Law Edn. 770 (773) it has been held as follows : "The equal protection clause, like the due process of law clause, is not susceptible of exact delimitation. No definite rule in respect of either, which automatically will solve the question in specific instances, can be formulated. Certain general principles have however, been established, in the light of which the cases as they arise are to be considered. In the first place, it may be said generally that the equal protection clause means that the rights of all persons must rest upon the same rule under similar circumstances, and that it applies to the exercise of all the powers of the State which can affect the individual or his property, including the power of taxation. In the first place, it may be said generally that the equal protection clause means that the rights of all persons must rest upon the same rule under similar circumstances, and that it applies to the exercise of all the powers of the State which can affect the individual or his property, including the power of taxation. It does not, however, forbid classification, and the power of the State to classify for purposes of taxation is of wide range and flexibility, provided always that the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relations to the object of the legislation so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 14. In Jagannath Prasad Sharma v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1245 , the controversy was that under the U.P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 and U.P. Police Regulations while the procedure was, in dealing with the enquiry against police officers, as promulgated under Section 7 of the Police Act neither the Tribunal Rules nor the Police Regulations provided an appeal against an order of dismissal or reduction in rank which Governor may pass whereas an order made by a police authority in an inquiry under the U.P. Police Regulations was made appealable. But the order passed by the Governor in an inquiry held under the U.P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 is not appealable. It was urged that the two different procedures against same officers were arbitrary and discriminatory and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. But under the circumstances their Lordships of the Supreme Court on page 1252 ruled as under : "The Tribunal Rules and the Police Regulations in so far as they deal with enquiries against police officers are promulgated under S. 7 of the Police Act, and neither the Tribunal Rules nor the Police Regulations provide an appeal against an order of dismissal or reduction in rank which the Governor may pass. The fact that an order made by a police authority is made appealable whereas the order passed by the Governor is not made appealable is not a ground on which the validity of the Tribunal Rules can be challenged. In either case, the final order rests with the Governor who has to decide the matter himself. The fact that an order made by a police authority is made appealable whereas the order passed by the Governor is not made appealable is not a ground on which the validity of the Tribunal Rules can be challenged. In either case, the final order rests with the Governor who has to decide the matter himself. Equal protection of the laws does not postulate equal treatment of all persons without distinction; it merely guarantees the application of the same laws alike and without discrimination to all persons similarly situated. The power of the Legislature to make a distinction between persons or transactions based on a real differentia is not taken away by the equal protection clause. Therefore by providing a right of appeal against the order of police authorities acting under the Police Regulations imposing penalties upon a member of the police force, and by providing no such right of appeal when the order passed is by the Governor, no discrimination inviting the application of Article 14 is practised." 15. In State (Delhi Admn.) v. V.C. Shukla, AIR 1980 SC 1382 , the validity of Special Courts Act, 1979, which was enacted for the trial of persons holding high public and political offices and who have committed offence during the emergency (sic). The validity of the said Act was challenged on the ground that the persons holding high public and political offices by way of trust have been put in a separate class along with those who have committed offences during the emergency. It was urged that the classification made was discriminatory and was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. But their Lordships of the Supreme Court overruled those arguments by holding that Article 14 of the Constitution lays down the following test : (1) The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons who are placed in a group from others who are left out of the group. (2) Such differentiation must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. (3) There must be a nexus between the differentiation which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act. 16. (2) Such differentiation must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. (3) There must be a nexus between the differentiation which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act. 16. Applying the aforesaid principle different clauses of the Preamble and the Act were interpreted and it was held that the classification made about the persons holding high public and political offices by way of trust have been put in a separate class along with those who have committed offences during the emergency and also bear the same characteristic as those indicated in Clause 4. In the result it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the circumstances that the Act applies to offences committed at any time by a particular set of persons possessing special characteristic does not render it unconstitutional, for, when it puts into a class a particular set of persons having special characteristics which distinguishes them from those who are left out of that class and who are to be tried under the ordinary law. The classification is eminently reasonable. It was further held that the classification made has a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely the speedy trials and the Act did not contravene Article 14 of the Constitution. 17. Applying the aforesaid principles it appears that under Section 122-B of the Act two separate classes of persons have been contemplated. One consists of those persons who want to prefer revision before the Collector as provided under sub-section (4-A) of Section 122-B of the Act and the second class of persons are those who want to prefer suit against the order of the Assistant Collector. In case that particular class of persons prefer to file revision before the Collector, they cannot avail the remedy of suit, whereas those who want to avail the remedy of suit, they should not file revision before the Collector. There is nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely, the dispossession and obtaining the land of the Gaon Sabha from the unauthorised occupants at a very early date. There is nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely, the dispossession and obtaining the land of the Gaon Sabha from the unauthorised occupants at a very early date. In case revision is permitted to be preferred and decided, it may take years together and if thereafter the remedy of suit is also available, that suit would have been fought up to the Supreme Court and that would have made a very lengthy procedure to obtain possession of the land. 18. The directive principles of State Policy as contained in Article 46 of the Constitution of India is set out below :- "46. Promotion of educational and economic interest of the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe & other weaker section.- The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interest of the weaker sections of the people and in particular of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe and shall protect them from fresh injustice and all forms of exploitation." 19. The object of taking possession of the Gaon Sabha land from the hands of unauthorised occupants without any delay, was to make allotment for members of the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, agricultural labourers and village artisans. This was the laudable object of the State as enshrined under Article 46 of the Constitution of India. 20. In Shri Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1984 SC 1151 , the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Transfer of Certain Land) Act, (Act No. II of 1979), was challenged on the ground that it was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as the provisions contained in Sections 4 and 5 of the Act purported to declare the transfer of 'granted land' made either before or after the commencement of the Act in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant, null and void and confer power and authority to take possession of such land after evicting all persons in possession thereof and to restore such land to the original grantee or his legal heirs and where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to such grantee or legal heir, the Government may grant such land to any person belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in accordance with the rules relating to grant of such land. The principal objection to the validity of the Act was taken because of the provisions in the Act seeking to nullify the transfers of granted land effected before the commencement of the Act. It was urged in that case that the power conferred on the authority to recover possession of the granted land on the basis of the provisions contained in the Act defeating the vested rights of the purchasers who have acquired such lands bona fide for consideration and have been in enjoyment and possession thereof for years is unconstitutional, unjust and invalid. It was further urged in that case that invalidation of 'transfers of land granted to persons belonging to only Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and resumption of only such granted lands are discriminatory and they infringe Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In reply to the aforesaid arguments their Lordships of the Supreme Court held at page 1156, paras 11 and 12 as follows : "....As the Statement of Objects and Reasons indicates, this prohibition on transfer of granted land has not proved to be a sufficiently strong safeguard in the matter of preserving grants in the hands of the grantees belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and, in violation of the prohibition on transfer of the granted land, transfers of such lands on a large scale to the serious detriment of the interest of these poorer sections of the people belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes had taken place. In view of this unfortunate experience the Legislature in its wisdom and in pursuance of its declared policy of safeguarding, protecting and improving the conditions of these weaker sections of the community thought it fit to bring about this change in the legal position by providing that any such transfer except in terms of the provisions of the Act will be null and void and not merely voidable. The Legislature no doubt is perfectly competent in pursuance of the aforesaid policy to provide that such transactions will be null and void and not merely voidable....... The Legislature no doubt is perfectly competent in pursuance of the aforesaid policy to provide that such transactions will be null and void and not merely voidable....... It must be held that the Legislature for the purpose of avoiding delay and harassment of protracted litigation and in furthering its object of speedy restoration of these granted lands to the members of the weaker communities is perfectly competent to make suitable provisions for resumption of such granted lands by stipulating in the enactment that transfers of such lands in contravention of the terms of the grant or any regulation, rule or law regulating such grant will be void and providing a suitable procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice for achieving this purpose without recourse to prolonged litigation in Court in the larger interest of benefiting the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes." 21. It does appear that the dominant object of enacting Section 122-B and particularly Proviso to sub-section (4-E) of Section 122-B of the Act is to provide speedy, expeditious and effective remedy for the ejectment of unauthorised occupants of the Gaon Sabha land. The procedure contemplated by sub- section (4-E) of Section 122-B was for avoiding unusual, dilatory process and with the object of achieving the purpose of recovering possession without recourse to prolonged litigation in a regular suit. It is common knowledge that a regular suit takes long time commencing with the trial court, first appellate court, second appellate court, and the leave petition being preferred before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In pursuing revenue and civil suits several years could have elapsed before the possession could have been recovered. It is for this object that in case a person avails the remedy of preferring revision before the Collector, he has been deprived of the remedy of the suit. It was this mischief which the Legislature intended to avoid by incorporating the Proviso to sub-section (4-E) of Section 122-B of the Act. 22. Section 122-C provides that the land in possession of the Gaon Sabha has to be earmarked for Abadi sites for the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, agricultural labourer and village artisans. The land thus obtained is for the welfare of downtrodden and under-privileged section of society. Ours is a welfare State. 23. 22. Section 122-C provides that the land in possession of the Gaon Sabha has to be earmarked for Abadi sites for the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, agricultural labourer and village artisans. The land thus obtained is for the welfare of downtrodden and under-privileged section of society. Ours is a welfare State. 23. It would not be out of place to mention that there is a maxim Salus Populi est Suprema lex, which obviously means that the regard for public welfare is highest law. Individual welfare shall in case of necessity yield to that of the community and that his property, liberty and life shall, in certain circumstances, be placed in jeopardy or even sacrificed for public good. 24. In view of these discussions it is crystal clear that the Legislature in its wisdom thought it proper to lay down the procedure that in case revision was filed, the remedy of suit cannot be availed. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the provisions of sub-sections (4 A), (4-C), (4-D) and (4-E) of Section 122-B of the Act are not discriminatory nor are they violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 25. Before parting with the case I would like to emphasise an observation made in the American Constitution by C. Herman Pritch (IIIrd Edn.) Page 519, which is set out below : "Judicial intervention would be permissible only in cases where the court was able to say of its own knowledge that no state of facts could exist which would justify the legislative conclusion......... for protection against abuse by legislatures the people must resort to polls and not to Courts." 26. It was next argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the notice in U.P.Z.A. Form 49-Ka was illegal and that the petitioner has matured title to the land or in any case has acquired title by adverse possession and that the damages awarded are excessive. I have looked into the order and found that after considering the entire evidence on record, it has been held by the trial court as well as by the revisional court that the petitioner has no title over the land in dispute and that the land has vested in the Gaon Sabha under the provisions of law. The finding about the award of damages also appears to be correct. 27. The finding about the award of damages also appears to be correct. 27. In view of the discussions made hereinbefore, both the petitions lack merit and are dismissed. Under the circumstances, however, there shall be no order as to costs.