JUDGMENT M.M. Gopal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree of Additional Commissioner, Varanasi Division dated August 23, 1974. The S.D.O. dismissed the suit by his order dated March 21, 1973 and Additional Commissioner allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. 2. The facts of the case that Ram Briksha (now his sons Shiv Dhari and others) brought a suit claiming the holding of Schedule A and B of the plaint on the ground that the property was the acquisition of his ancestor. There was a litigation between Gopal, Madho and himself (Ram Briksha) and in 1907 a compromise was filed whereby it was agreed that 14-14-6 area of land will go to Gopal and 2 widows Mst. Ram Sundari and Behsa Kunwari (widowed daughter-in-law of Gopal) comprising the 2/3rd of property and 1/3rd area 7-7-3 will go to Ram Briksha and Madho. In the Plaint the relief has been claimed for declaration of Bhumidhari right over the Schedule A (i.e. 14-14-6 of 2/3rd share of Gopal and others) and (of Schedule B i.e. 7-7-3, share of Ram Briksha. 3. So far as the property of group B area 7-7-3 of Ram Briksha's share (as admitted in compromise dated June 19, 1907) is concerned the defendants do not contest the right of Ram Briksha and consequently the plaintiff's right over the same has been admitted, therefore, his suit in respect of property of group B is decreed. Now remains the property in respect of land of group A (area 14-14-6). The case of the respondent plaintiff (Shiv Dhari and others) was that on the basis of the compromise deed Bihsa Kunwari had only life interest. She could not transfer the land to Vishwa Nath and others "defendants 1 to 4" and thus they cannot acquire any right. 4. The defendant-appellant Vishwanath etc. contested the case alleging that Bihsa Kunwari had full right and on the basis of sale deed they became the tenure-holder of the plots of Group A. They have also alleged that they were entitled for the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. 5. The Assistant Collector 1st class by his judgment dated March 21, 1973 dismissed the suit. The Additional Commissioner by his judgment dated August 23, 1974 allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. 5. The Assistant Collector 1st class by his judgment dated March 21, 1973 dismissed the suit. The Additional Commissioner by his judgment dated August 23, 1974 allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. During the pendency of the second appeal here the Hon'ble Board by its order dated March 23, 1978 remanded the issue of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act to the court of Additional Commissioner for decision. The Additional Commissioner recorded his finding on this issue by his order dated January 1, 1983 and held that the appellants were not entitled for the protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants (defendant) Vishwanath and others contended that the compromise dated June 19, 1907 gave absolute right to Gopal and 2 others widows over 2/3rd share and she (Behsa Kunwari) had full right to transfer the same to them. Thirdly they contended that Behsa Kunwari was never a licensee. 8. The learned counsel for the opposite party (plaintiff) has argued that according to the said compromise only life estate was created in favour of Gopal and two widows. After the death of Gopal the branch of Ram Briksha succeeded by the operation of law and the surviving widow had only right to possess the land in her life time. 9. Thus there are two important points in the present case. Firstly on the basis of compromise dated June 19, 1907 what was the nature of the rights of Gopal, Behsa Kunwari and Ram Sundari and secondly whether appellants are entitled to get the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act or not. In determining these facts in my opinion the compromise decree (deed) dated June 19, 1907 must be scrutinized. In determining these facts in my opinion the compromise decree (deed) dated June 19, 1907 must be scrutinized. The relevant Hindi translation of that compromise is as follows:- fMxzh vnkyr nhokuh equlQh eqdke cfy;k ftk cfy;k u0 bCrnkbZ 156 ejtwek rk0 3 vizSy l0 1907 xksiky nqcs cuke ek/kks nqcs o jke o`{k nqcs crtcht bl vke ds eokth 229AA vjkth uEcjh eqQflys tSy okds ekStk bczkfgekckn mijokj l0 }kck ftyk cfy;k ekyerh eq0 100 :i;k rugk dk'rdkjh eqnbZ ds gS eqnkySg 'kjhd dk'r eqnbZ ds ugha gS vkSj u mldks fuLor vjkth etdwj dksbZ gd fdlh fdLe dk gS vtj, lqygukek gkth eokth 14114 19 cdnj nks lqRl gLo uEcjh eqQlhys tSy gd o fgLlk ge eqnnbZ o eqlfEe;ku jke lqUnj dwaoj thts ;nquUnu nqcs o eqlEekr ca'kh dwaojh thts jke jru nqcs cgqxku dk;e gksdj ;g rS ik;k gS fd eokth 14114 14 cdnj nks lqYl rQlhy uEcj gktk n[ky ge eqnnbZ o cgqxku etdwfju ge eqnnbZ dk jgsxk] og okn oQkr ge xksiky nqcs fdlh Hkh cgqxku etdqfju rkfg;kr vius cgSfl;r csok fgUnw [kkunku nsk lqYl fgLlk etdwj ij dkfct o n'ky jgsxh o ckn oQkr gj nks cgqxku etdwfju ds nks lqYl fgLlk Hkh cdCtk n[ky eqnnkysge cjklru nj vkosxkA eqnnkysge mlij dkLrdkjkuk dkfctn[ksy gksaxs o feutqeyk vkjkft;kr eqrukt;k ds eokth 41123 cdnj ,d lqYl gLo uEcjh eqQflys tSy o fgLlk o dCtk n[ky eqnnkySgqe ds jgsxkA QjhdSu lqygukek vktk vius vius fgLls ds eqrkfcd yxku vkjkaft;kr eqrukt;k dk ekfyd egky dks vnk djsaxs vkSj tks :i;k tjs jsgu dk egktuku dks vnk fd;k x;k gS og gj nks Qjhd eqdnek gkt vius vius fgLlk eqUntsZ lqygukek gkt ds eqrkfcd vnk fd;k gSA 10. From the aforesaid terms it is clear that compromise had settled two things. Firstly, that Gopal, Ram Sundari and Behsa Kunwari will be the absolute owner in possession of 2/3rd share area (14-14-6) and 1/3rd share area (7-7-3) will go to Ram Briksha. Apart from this, this deed has also made it clear what will be the nature of succession in the share of Gopal and others and it is mentioned that after the death of Gopal the widows will take possession of the land and after their death the land will go as heirs to defendants Ram Briksha etc. Apart from this, this deed has also made it clear what will be the nature of succession in the share of Gopal and others and it is mentioned that after the death of Gopal the widows will take possession of the land and after their death the land will go as heirs to defendants Ram Briksha etc. This deed never contemplates that on the death of any of 3 persons (Gopal or two widows) it will go to the branch of Ram Briksha as heir, hence this cannot be presumed at any stage. 11. This inference is also supported by the latter portion of the deed that the parties will give the land revenue of their respective shares as the owner and they had also redeemed the mortgage after giving the money according to their respective shares. Moreover it has been mentioned that after the death of widows the 2/3rd share will go to Ram Briksha as heir that means that Ram Briksha as heir that means that Ram Briksha or his line had no right to inherit the property at any earlier stage. 12. Thus I hold that Behsa Kunwari was the absolute owner and she had full right to transfer the said 2/3rd share (14-14-6) to revisionist (through sale deed dated October 5, 1964) and subsequently they (Vishwanath and others) acquired the rights over the land in question. 13. So far as the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act is concerned it is, now, not relevant. Moreover, the finding of Additional Commissioner that Behsa Kunwari was a licensee is beseless. The licensee contemplates two classes of persons, here no such question arises. Gopal and others were the full owners and Behsa Kunwari was also a full owner. No lease was given in her favour by any person who had better right over her. Hence this finding of the Additional Commissioner is baseless. The later finding given by the Additional Commissioner in respect of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act is of no use, because he has given his finding on the basis that Behsa Kunwari was a licensee which, on the fact of it, is not correct. Hence, I do not accept his finding. 14. The later finding given by the Additional Commissioner in respect of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act is of no use, because he has given his finding on the basis that Behsa Kunwari was a licensee which, on the fact of it, is not correct. Hence, I do not accept his finding. 14. The learned counsel for the opposite party placed reliance on Balbhadra v. Board of Revenue 1981 A.L.J. 781 but this case is different from the present case because in the mentioned case it was an interpretation of a Will and in that Will it was specifically mentioned by the testator that the person will have no right to transfer. But in the present case as mentioned above there is no such bar in the compromise deed dated June 19, 1907 and in Balbhadra's cae there was interpretation of Section 199 of the Indian Succession Act and the specific life estate created by the Will. Hence this ruling is not applicable in the present case. 15. The alternative argument is that the widow had only a Hindu's widow estate for her life and thus she should not transfer the land to the revisionist; but this contention is not tenable because on the first hand from the said compromise deed it can never be inferred that Hindu's widow rights was created on the 2/3rd share i.e. 14-14-6. It was the absolute ownership created in favour of Gopal. Behsa Kunwari and Ram Sundari. Moreover, for the argument sake in Hindu's widow estate, the estate vests in the widow. She is not a tenant for the life but the estate vests in her completely. There is some restriction in her right to alienate the property. But after the enforcement of the Zamindari Abolition Act the old rights vanished and new rights were created. The pre-existing restrictions if any would vanish with the extinguishing other rights and would not be attracted or applicable to Sirdari rights conferred on her by the Zamindari Abolition Act (vide Jamuna v. D.D.C. 1968 R.D. 391. 16. Hence in any case she had full right to transfer the land in question and the revisionists on the basis of sale deed acquired rights on the (2/3rd share i.e. 14-14-6) land of Schedule A of the plaint. 17. I, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of Additional Commissioner dated August 23, 1974. 16. Hence in any case she had full right to transfer the land in question and the revisionists on the basis of sale deed acquired rights on the (2/3rd share i.e. 14-14-6) land of Schedule A of the plaint. 17. I, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of Additional Commissioner dated August 23, 1974. The suit of plaintiff is decreed in respect of land in Schedule B area 4.73 (7-7-3) of this plaint and the suit is dismissed in respect of land in Schedule A 9.51 (area 14-14-6) and in the circumstances of the case the parties should bear their own costs.