JUDGMENT 1. ON 3rd April 1985 Chanda Jhunjhunwalla and her. minor son Rabindranath Jhunjhunwalla, the appellants before us, Moved a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before Padma Khastgir, J. 2. THE case of the writ petitioners is that by a registered Deed of Conveyance dated 14th May 1982, the vendors of the property being premises No. 3, Ashoka -Road, Calcutta, sold more or less 10 cottahs of land to the purchasers mentioned therein including the writ petitioners. Due to bonafide mistake and or inadvertence, at the time of engrossing the said Deed of Conveyance the name of the writ petitioner No., 1 Chanda Jhunjhunwala, as one of the transferees was omitted from the said Deed of Conveyance. With a view to rectify the said mistake and or omission, a duly stamped Deed of rectification was executed by and between the concerned parties including the writ petitioner No. 1 On or about 18th March 1985, the writ petitioners made and or caused to be made necessary arrangements for presenting the said Deed of Rectification for registration and it was arranged that the concerned officer of the Registrar of assurances would attend at the respective residences of the vendors at No. 3a, ashoka Road, Calcutta, on 22nd March 1985 between 5 p. m. and 7 p. m. according to the convenience, of the concerned officer and the vendors. 3. IT is alleged that on 21st March 1985, the Office of the Registrar of Assurances refused to accept the presentation on the grounds that the Deed of Rectification would attract stamp duty and registration charges on the full consideration mentioned in the principal Deed or at least l/6th of the full consideration money mentioned in the principal Deed and that the Income Tax clearance certificate of the vendors would have to be produced. It is alleged that when it was pointed out to the office of the Registrar of Assurances that the stand taken by them was not tenable in law as regards the payment of stamp duty and registration charges and the production of the Income Tax clearance certificate by the vendors, the office of the Registrar made it absolutely clear that the deed of Rectification would not be accepted for registration but would be sent to the Collector of stamps for adjudication and registration would be dependent upon the results of such adjudication. 4. 4. THE writ petitioners challenged the said action of the concerned respondents in the writ application moved on 3rd april, 1985. The main ground taken in the writ application is that the concerned respondents had no power, authority or jurisdiction to refuse the registration of the Deed of Rectification and to send the same for adjudication by the Collector of Stamps. The other ground taken in the writ application is that the deed of Rectification did not in itself purport to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or in future any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent in favour of 'the writ petitioner No. 1 or any other party, whatsoever requiring registration under the Indian Registration Act, 1908. When the said application was moved on 3rd April 1985 the Learned Judge directed the petition to be served on the respondents. Accordingly, the petition was served, and on 4th April, 1985 the learned Judge gave directions for filing of (affidavits and directed the matter to appear as an application on I5th April 1985. Affidavits were filed and the application was heard on 15th and 17th April, 1985. On 17th April, 1985, after hearing; the parties, the Learned Judge issued a Rule and passed an interim order restraining the respondents from demanding payment of stamp duty as paid on the; principal Deed, and made the Rule returnable 4 weeks from that date. 5. THIS appeal has been preferred by the writ petitioners mainly on the ground that the Learned Judge erred in not passing interim orders as prayed for in the writ petition directing the Registrar of Assurances to receive and accept the Deed of Rectification and complete the registration of the same without demanding or levying any stamp duly in excess of duty already paid on the Deed of Rectification and without collecting the registration fees in excess of the amount properly chargeable. 6. IT is contended before us that the scope of the proceedings and the questions involved are such that the Learned judge ought to have finally disposed of the writ application and should not have issued Rule Nisi. In the appeal preferred by the appellants, an application has "also been made praying, inter alia, for the interim orders which were sought for before the court of the first instance. In the appeal preferred by the appellants, an application has "also been made praying, inter alia, for the interim orders which were sought for before the court of the first instance. Whether the prayers could be allowed or not would depend on the merits of the controversy we, therefore, heard at length the submissions of the Learned Advocates appealing for the parties. 7. BEFORE we proceed to record the main submissions of the parties and express our views on the same it would be Convenient to refer to some facte which are not in dispute 8. SOMETIME prior to 14th May, 1982, the owners of the property situate at 3, ashoka Road, Calcutta, agreed to transfer 10 Cottahs 1 Chittack and 35 1/2 sq. it of vacant land to six persons including the appellants. Although the appellant no. 1 Chanda Jhunjhunwalla was one of the purchasers, her name was mistaken omitted in the Deed of Conveyance which was executed on 14th May, 1982 in implementation thereof. To rectify this mistake the vendors and all the Vendees including the appellants executed a Deed of Rectification on 18th March, 1985. The operative clause of this Deed of Rectification only added the name of Chanda Jhunjhun walla as a purchaser in the Principal deed. The Deed of Rectification was stamped on the basis that it was an agreement. 9. IT appears that all the purchasers were represented in the transactions relating to the purchase of the property by shri Ram Niranjan Jhunjhunwala (a Learned Advocate practising in this court) by virtue of a Power of Attorney dated 22nd December, 1981. The appointers mentioned in the Power of Attorney were five of the purchasers including Chanda Jhunjhunwalla. The remaining purchaser namely, Rabindra Nath jhunjhunwala (the appellant No. 2) is the minor son of said Sri Ram Niranjan jhunjhunwala and was represented by the latter at all stages of the transaction relating to sale of the concerned property as his father and natural guardian. Clauses 1 and 2 of the Power of Attorney are of importance and as such are extracted below : "1. Clauses 1 and 2 of the Power of Attorney are of importance and as such are extracted below : "1. The Appointers along with one Rabindra Nath Jhunjhunwala a minor under the age of 18 years represented by his father and natural guardian Ram Niranjan Jhunjhunwala have agreed to purchase a piece of parcel of land being a portion of the land appurtenant in relation, to the buildings and structures situate and lying at and being the demarcated eastern portion of premises No. 3, asoka Road P. S. Alipore District 24 Parganas within the municipal limits of\the town of Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as the said property) from Shri Biswas Bhusan bose and Shri Tarun Kumar Bose (hereinafter referred to as the Vendors). 2. The Appointers are desirous of appointing the persons hereinafter named as true and lawful attorneys for the purpose of (1) negotiating purchase (2) finalising negotiation for purchase (3) entering into agreement for purchase (4) completing the purchase of the said property (5) developing the said property and for various other matters connected therewith and incidental thereto and or for various other matters and or purposes herein mentioned. " 10. IT also appears from the letter dated 24th May, 1982 of M/s. Khaitan and Co. who represented the purchasers being annexure 'a' to the affidavit- in- reply filed on behalf of the appellants in the appeal being affidavit of said Ram Niranjan Jhunjhunwala affirmed by him on the 29th April, 1985 that the total amount paid on account of stamp duty on the Deed of Conveyance was rs. 2,97,079. 20 p. and on account of Registration charges was Rs, 16408. 00 p. It further appears from this letter that the total expenses incurred for completing the transaction including the amount of consideration and the amounts paid on account of stamp duty and registration charges were apportioned amongst each of the six purchasers including the appellants in equal shares. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, with his Usual fairness, did not seriously dispute the factual aspect of the case mentioned so Tar, except that according to his clients, the Deed of rectification was not presented for registration as alleged on behalf of the appellants. . 11. MR. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, with his Usual fairness, did not seriously dispute the factual aspect of the case mentioned so Tar, except that according to his clients, the Deed of rectification was not presented for registration as alleged on behalf of the appellants. . 11. MR. S. Pal, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants, has contended that the Deed of Rectification would attract stamp duty as an agreement and not as a Conveyance because the Deed of Rectification does not have the effect of transferring any property and does not come within this definition. Mr. Pal. has relied on several decisions in support of his contention. He relied also on the relevant provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, and the instructions issued by the Government. He has further submitted that the Deed of Rectification was duly presented for registration, and the office of the Registrar of assurances clearly disclosed their stand that if the Deed of Rectification was presented it would be treated as a Conveyance. Mr. Pal has drawn our attention to the affidavit of Purushottam Balodia, affirmed on 10th April, 1985 being Annexure "d" to the said petition wherein it has been stated that the Registrar of assurances had refused to accent the deed of Rectification. Although the respondents filed ah affidavit- in- opposition before the Court of the first instance, being the affidavit of Abhinash Chakraborty, sub-Registrar, affirmed on 23rd april, 1985 the statements contained in the affidavit of Purushottam Balodia have not been dealt with. It is, therefore, contended that the statements made by Purushottam Balodia stand uncontroverted. 12. MR. T. K. Chatterjee, Learned Advocate on behalf of the respondents raised two principal objection First, the deed of Rectification is a Conveyance because there is an attempt by it to transfer half of Rabindra Nath Jhunjhunwalla's share to Chanda Jhunjhunwalla. Secondly, Rabindra Nath Jhunihunwalla being a minor cannot agree to sell his interest. The short question which arises for determination is whether a Deed of rectification which seeks to rectify a mistake by way of omission of the name of one of the six purchasers in a Deed of Conveyance attracts stamp duty as a Conveyance under the Indian Stamp Act. 13. SECTION of the India Stamp Act, 1899, specifies the instruments chargeable with stamp duties. 13. SECTION of the India Stamp Act, 1899, specifies the instruments chargeable with stamp duties. Section 4 of the said Act would apply where several instruments are used in a single transaction of sale, mortgage, or settlement. It provides as follows 4, (1) Where, in the case of any sale, mortgage or settlement, several instruments are employed for, completing the transaction, the principal instrument only shall be chargeable with the duty prescribed in Schedule I for in Schedule it A. as the case may be) for the conveyance, mortgage or settlement, and each of the other instruments shall be char geable with a duty of one rupee (if the principal instrument be chargeable with the duty prescribed in Schedule I) or with a duty of two rupees if the principal instrument be chargeable with the duty prescribed in Schedule IA. instead of the duty (if any) prescribed for such other instrument in Schedule 1 or Schedule IA, as the case may be (2) the parties. may determine for themselves which of the instruments so employed shall, for the purposes of subsection (1) be deemed to be the principal instrument; provided that - the duty chargeable on the instrument so determined shall be the highest duty which would be chargeable in respect of any of the said instruments employed. " 14. THE West Bengal Stamp Manual, revised edition 1983 published by the government of West Bengal, Finance department, Taxation, contains a note under Section 4 of the said Act to the following effect: "note - A question having arisen as to the stamp duty leviable on a deed modifying but not materially altering the conditions of an original lease, the Advocate General held and the Board agreed that the deed was an agreement and required a Rupees five stamp. Similarly a. supplementary deed purporting to rectify mistakes in a boundary in a kabuliyat previously registered should be treated as an agreement requiring a Rupees five stamp "section 2 (10) of the Stamp Act defines "conveyance" as follows: "conveyance" includes a conveyance on sale and every instrument by which property, whether moveable or immovable, is transferred inter vivos and which is not otherwise specifically provided by Schedule I (or Schedule IA as the case may be). Whether stamp duty is leviable on a Deed of Rectification would depend on whether the Deed of Rectification is an agreement or it is a Conveyance. Whether stamp duty is leviable on a Deed of Rectification would depend on whether the Deed of Rectification is an agreement or it is a Conveyance. The intention of the purchasers could be gathered from the facts stated in the Deed of Rectification., The facts which are mentioned in the Deed of Rectification have not been disputed nor can those be disputed by the respondents. If all the parties to a transaction agree that there was a mistake in expressing the agreement between them in the principal deed, in the absence of any reason to doubt the bonafide of the parties, no other reason could be imputed for execution of the Deed of Rectification. 15. IT has been specifically mentioned in the Deed of Rectification that Ramkrishna agarwala Narain Prasad Agarwalla and Ram Niranjan Jhunjhunwalla agreed to purchase the property in question from the vendors in equal shares. Before the purchase of the said property it was agreed by and between the said Ramkrishan Agarwalla, Narain Pra-sad Agarwalla, and Ram Niranjan Jhunjhunwalla that in the purchase of the said property the said 3 persons would be represented by two persons from each of their respective families and accordingly there would be 6 purchasers in the said principal Deed. It is also stated that it was agreed by and between the said three persons that in the said principal Deed, Ramkrishan Agarwalla would be represented by Rajkumar Agarwalla and Ravindra Kumar Agarwalla, Narain prasad Agarwalla would be represented by Sm. Manju Agarwalla and Master surendra Kumar Agarwalla, and Ram niranjan Jhunjhunwalla would be represented by Master Rabindra Nath Jhunjnunwalla and Sm. Chanda Jhunjhunwalla, but through inadvertence the name of the said Chanda Jhunjhunwalla the appellant No. 1 was not mentioned in the said principal Deed as, one of the purchasers representing the branch of the said Ram Niranjan Jhunjhunwalla. Under the aforesaid circumstances it became necessary to execute the Deed of Rectification so that the said principal Deed would be rectified by including the name of the said Chanda Jhunjhunwalla as one of the purchasers of the said property. 16. IT, therefore, appears that the property in question was purchased by 3 families and each family was being represented by 2 members. From the tenor of the Deed of Rectification it appears to us that it did not intend to convey any interest (from one of the van-deeds to Sm. 16. IT, therefore, appears that the property in question was purchased by 3 families and each family was being represented by 2 members. From the tenor of the Deed of Rectification it appears to us that it did not intend to convey any interest (from one of the van-deeds to Sm. Chanda Jhunjhunwala whose name was omitted from the principal Deed) As a matter of fact the purchasers are the families of Ramknshan agarwala, Narain Prasad Agarwalla, and ram Niranjan Jhunjhunwalla, and their shares remain unchanged. By inclusion of the name of Chanda Jhunjhunwala as purchaser, the share of the family of ram Niranjan Jhunjhunwalla would neither be increased nor decreased. We are therefore, of the view that in this case there is no transfer of Rabindra Nath Jhunjhunwallas share to chanda Jhunjhunwalla, nor there is any sale of the interest of Rabindranath jhunjhunwalla, a minor, to his mother. Ram Niranjan jhunjhunwala, is being represented instead of Rabindranath jhunjhunwalla alone, by Chanda jhunjuhunwala and Rabindranath Jhunjhunwalla as originally agreed to. 17. ALL the sellers and purchasers have admitted in the Deed of Rectification that the agreement was to have the property conveyed in the name of six persons but due to inadvertence, the name of one of them, Chanda Jhunjhunwalla, was omitted. Apart from the statements contained, in the Deed of Rectification the letter of M/s. Khaitanand Co. dated 24th May 1982 being Annexure "a" to the Affidavit- in- Reply, and the Power of Attorney dated 22nd December, 1981 disclosed in the Court at the hearing on behalf of the appellants would also show that the agreement ' was to have the land conveyed to six persons including chanda Jhunjhunwalla. There is no transfer of property or any interest by the deed of Rectification. Chanda Jhunjhunwalla was a transferee, but by mistake her name was omitted from the Conveyance which gave effect to the agreement. Proportionate amount of consideration representing l6th share including l|6th share of stamp duty and registration fees have been paid and or accounted for by her at the time of the transaction. All these facts would go to establish that the Deed of Rectification was bonafide executed to rectify a mistake. 18. Proportionate amount of consideration representing l6th share including l|6th share of stamp duty and registration fees have been paid and or accounted for by her at the time of the transaction. All these facts would go to establish that the Deed of Rectification was bonafide executed to rectify a mistake. 18. WHERE two documents are employed by the parties in completing one transaction the principal Deed and the deed of Rectification ought to be read together, as parts of one and the same contract and since the principal Deed was liable to duty as Conveyance, the deed of Rectification would only attract fixed duty under section 4. This position would also be evident from the said instruction issued by the Finance Department of the Government of West Bengal as appended to Section 4 of the said Act. It is not a case where a fresh instrument, has been executed to vary the contract contained in earlier one which had been already completed. The Deed of Rectification only rectifies the error in the expression of the agreement and does net alter the agreement. Lord Denning in Fredrick Rose (London) Ltd. v. W. M. H. PIW, JUNR and Co. Ltd. reported in (1953) 2 All. E. R. 739 observed that "in order to get rectification, it is necessary to show that the parties were in complete agreement on the terms of their contract, but by an error wrote them down wrongly' 19. SIR Lawerence Jenkins, C. J. in the case of Dagdu v. bhana (1904) 28 Bom. 420 observed that "the court in administering equitable principles permit' mistakes to be proved when they are common, i. e. where the expression of the contract is contrary to the concurrent intention of all the parties. If such mistakes be' established then the Court can give relief for rectification but what is rectified is not the agreement, but the mistaken expression of it. . . . . . 20. IN Snell' s Principles of Equity, (27th Edn.) at page 610 it has been stated that "whatever rectified is not a mistake in the transaction itself but a mistake in way in which that transaction has been expressed in writing". The passage in Halsbury' s Laws of england, 4th Edn. Vol. 3, para 31 page 36, on which Mr. Pal relied also deserves to be noted. The passage in Halsbury' s Laws of england, 4th Edn. Vol. 3, para 31 page 36, on which Mr. Pal relied also deserves to be noted. According to Halsbury, the effect of rectification is that it relates back to the time when the instrument was executed and after rectification the instrument is to be. read as if it had been originally drawn in its rectified form". 21. FROM those authorities and texts it would be evident that rectification is permitted only when there is a mistake of expression in agreement. As. indicated earlier, there are sufficient materials on record to arrive at the conclusion that the parties to the transaction including the appellants had agreed to transfer the property to, inter-alia, Chanda jhunjhunwala, but her name was mistakenly omitted. Not only the Deed of rectification narrated the facts stating reasons for the execution of the Deed of Rectification but there was an antecedent agreement to transfer the property in favour of six persons which is evident from the letter dated 24th May, 1982 of M/s. Khaitan and Co, as well as from the Power of Attorney. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the respondents that by the Deed of Rectification there was on attempted transfer of any interest of Ravindra Nath jhunjhunwala to Chanda Jhunjhunwalla. 22. IF the contention of Mr, Chatterjee is accepted, then there would be transfer of interest not only by one but by all the five persons in favour of Chanda Jhunjhunwalla to make her l6th owner of the property, but none of the other persons have divested themselves of any interest by the Deed of Rectification because Chanda jhunjhunwalla was also one of the transferees in the sense that she was to be represented along with her son. If that was not the position, then, none of the vendees would have joined in the Deed of Rectification. We are, therefore, of the view that there is no transfer in favour of Chanda Jhunjhunwalla by the Deed of Rectification. The Deed of Rectification in the instant case is not a Conveyance within the meaning of Section 2 (10) of the Indian Stamp Act, l899. The stand taken by the respondents that the Deed of rectification purports to convey the interest in the property cannot be sustained. The vendees have already paid the stamp duty in full on the total consideration paid. The stand taken by the respondents that the Deed of rectification purports to convey the interest in the property cannot be sustained. The vendees have already paid the stamp duty in full on the total consideration paid. If the Deed of Rectification is treated as a Conveyance, this would empower the State to levy and recover stamp duty twice in respect of the same transaction. There cannot be double taxation for one transaction completed by two documents. On the facts and in the circumstances of this case, we have no hesitation in holding that the Deed of Rectification before us is an agreement to rectify and would attract stamp duty as an agreement. 23. THE other dispute raised by Mr. Chatterjee, i.e. that the. Deed of Rectification was not presented before the office of the respondent No. 1 does not appear to be of much relevance in view of the stand taken before us by the registering authorities that the Deed of Rectification would attract stamp duty as a conveyance. In other words, if the Deed of Rectification is presented, the Registrar would refuse to register the same unless it was stamped as a conveyance. We are not inclined to accept the submission of Mr. Pal that by reason of the fact that the statements contained in the affidavit of Purushottam balodia have not been dealt with specifically in the affidavit- in- opposition affirmed by Abinash Chakraborty, the Sub-Registrar, the statements of Purushottam Balodia should be deemed to be admitted. However, the absence of specific denial casts a cloud over the bonafides of the dispute raised on behalf of the respondents. 24. BEFORE we part with this case, we have to deal with one other contention raised by Mr. Chatterjee. He submitted that at this stage we should not dispose of the entire matter including the appeal and the writ petition. Even if we are to accept the arguments of Mr Chatterjee in this behalf, we have to go into the merits of controversy before we could give or refuse any relief to the appellants. In the case of Woodford and Anr. v. Smith and Anr. Even if we are to accept the arguments of Mr Chatterjee in this behalf, we have to go into the merits of controversy before we could give or refuse any relief to the appellants. In the case of Woodford and Anr. v. Smith and Anr. reported in (1970) 1 All e. R. 1091 at 1093, Megarry J. (as His lordship then was said : "i do not think that there is anything to prevent the court in a proper case from granting on motion substantially all the relief claimed in the action. It is true that in Dodd vs. Amalgamated Marine Workers union, it was said in the Court of appeal that it was not the usual practice' or the general rule of practice' to grant on motion all the relief claimed in the action But this language is general rather than absolute, the judgments are very brief, no reasons are given, and there have been later decisions. Thus in bailey (Malta) Ltd. v. Bailey, Lord denning MR flatly said that it seemed to him that there was 'no such rule. In this, he based himself on what Sargent lj had said in A-G v. Stockton-"on-Tees Corpn. where there is what i may call a reasoned demolition of the supposed rule, the basis of which seems to have been an objection to trying the same point twice over. In the Bailey case Harman LJ deferred to the supposed rule as a theory which had in his view 'long been exploded': see also Heywood vs. BDC Properties Ltd. and Booker vs. James. I have ventured to refer to these authorities (which were not discussed before me, since there was no need) because it is time that the passage in the Supreme Court Practice 1970 which I have read received the firm touch of a revising hand. Plainly in the present case the objection which Counsel for the defendants raised but did not press is no obstacle to granting the injunction sought. In my judgment, looking at the case as a whole, there are no grounds on which the Court should refuse to grant an injunction. " 25. Plainly in the present case the objection which Counsel for the defendants raised but did not press is no obstacle to granting the injunction sought. In my judgment, looking at the case as a whole, there are no grounds on which the Court should refuse to grant an injunction. " 25. ACCORDINGLY we dispose of the entire matter including the appeal and the writ petition by the following order : the respondents are directed to receive and accept the Deed of rectification dated 18th March, 1985 which is annexure 'a' to the writ petition and register the same on commission at the respective residences of the vendors at 3a Ashoka Road, Calcutta, without demanding and or levying stamp duty in excess of the duty already paid on the deed of rectification and without collecting registration fees in excess of whatsoever amount is payable on an agreement but by collecting other charges and fees including those for commission etc. and to comply with and complete all necessary formalities for registration of the Deed of rectification and deliver back the same to the appellants after the same is duly registered. 26. THIS order virtually disposes of the appeal, and the appeal is treated as on day's list and is disposed of accordingly the undertaking will stand discharged. Filing of Paper Book is dispensed with. This order will also dispose of the writ application and the appellants would be at liberty to mention before the court of the first instance for disposal of the writ application in terms of this order. 27. THERE will be no order as to costs. All parties are directed to act on a signed copy hi the minutes of the operative part of this order appeal disposed of.