Judgment P. S. Mishra, J. This appeal by the plaintiff is directed against a judgment of affirmance. 2. Facts giving rive to this appeal in short are that the lands mentioned in Schedule of the plaint were ancestral Kasht lands of the plaintiff. His grand-father, Loki Sah's name stood recorded in survey records and after his death, his father Dasai Teli’s name was recorded therein. After Dasai Teli's death, the plaintiff was recorded in the Survey records. His Kashtkari on the lands mentioned in Schedule I of the plaint stood undisputed. He has been paying rent and getting rent receipt from the landlord and the State after the vesting of the tenures of the estates in the State of Bihar. Dasai Teli father of the plaintiff, filed Title suit no. 33 of 1938 impleading Ramdutta Teli and Bhagwan Teli as defendants for their eviction from the eastern portion of a house standing on plot no. 866 on the ground of default of payment of rent. The said suit was compromised on the terms that the defendants should remain in that portion till December, 1938 and vacate the same in January 1939. They vacated the said portion accordingly. The plaintiff came in possession thereafter. On 7-6-1972 the plaintiff came to know that there had been some fraud in the compromise and the petition flied on 11-7-1938 for the said purpose in Title suit no 33 of 1938 omitted to mention the correct subject matter and instead mentioned other lands. The plaintiff came to know about the said fraud when Ramdip Rai, the original defendant in the instant suit, wanted to obtain some documents in respect of the suit properties from Ramdutta and Bhagwan. Tile plaintiff, accordingly, instituted the title suit for eviction on the ground that the compromise decree was invalid and inoperative. 3. Ramdutta Teli died during the pendency of the suit and his name was expunged from the record. Bhagwan Teli contested tile suit, but he also died after the decree. During the pendency of the appeal in the court below by the plaintiff, Rupia Devi and Ramdip Rai were added as respondent since they claimed interest in the properties in dispute from Ramdutta Teli and Bhagwan Teli. Bhagwan Teli, who had contested the Suit, alleged mat his father Sheochand Sah was the full brother of Dasai Sah. There was a partition between Dasai Sah and Sheochand Sah. Bhagwan Teli, who had contested the Suit, alleged mat his father Sheochand Sah was the full brother of Dasai Sah. There was a partition between Dasai Sah and Sheochand Sah. The properties shown in the compromise petition and consequentially the compromise decree were in accordance with the allotments made in the said partition. Sheochand Sah was in exclusive possession or the said properties after partition. Dasai Sah instituted Title suit no. 33 of 1933 making false allegations but ultimately agreed and compromised the suit recognising the partition and allotments. The allegation of fraud was, accordingly, denied and contested by him. 4. My attention has been drawn in the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Arrah to a finding at the end of paragraph 10 "...I have no hesitation in holding that the compromise petition riled in the title Suit no 33 of 1938 of the court of 1st Munsif, Arrah does not contain the thumb impression of Dasai Sah, the father of the plaintiff and the finding at the end of paragraph 11 thereof from what I have stated above it is clear that the compromise petition aforesaid contains the genuine signature and L.T.I. of Dasai Sah". The former conclusion has, however, evidently been wrongly recorded, as, while considering the evidence, the learned Additional District Judge bas said that the Director of the Finger Print Bureau of the D.I.G., C.I.D. Bihar had reported that the disputed L.T.I. of Dasai Sah tallied with his admitted L.T.I. and further that- “......1 am of the opinion that the opinion of the experts of the finger print bureau of the office of the D.I.G., C.I.D. Bihar, Patna is reliable...... ..." Learned counsel for the appellant has. however, submitted that the courts below have committed error of law having come to a conclusion that the schedule attached to the compromise petition is not consistent with the recital made in the body portion of the compromise petition. His submission in this regard is resisted by learned counsel for the respondent submitting that the compromise, as it is, not invalid and is binding, as the recitals of the compromise petition do speak of the eviction from the house and the same has been carried out. His submission in this regard is resisted by learned counsel for the respondent submitting that the compromise, as it is, not invalid and is binding, as the recitals of the compromise petition do speak of the eviction from the house and the same has been carried out. He has submitted the question of title and possession with respect to the disputed lands have nothing to do with the compromise anc1 assuming that by virtue of the compromise no party can claim any title upon the suit land, the plaintiff's suit must fail on the sole ground that it bas been filed to avoid the compromise decree. 5. A compromise in terms of rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure has to satisfy, before it is recorded, that satisfaction in terms of the compromise is the same as the subject matter of the 8uit. A compromise in respect of the properties, which are not relevant or connected to the subject matter of the suit is no compromise in the eye of law. In the instant case, however, it is admitted that eviction was carried out in terms of the compromise in Title suit no. 33 of 1938. So far claim by either duty based on any mention of the properties in the schedule of the compromise petition is concerned, the same obviously is not a part of the compromise. In Bimal Kumar Goyen and other Vs. Amiya Gopal Mandal and others it has been pointed out- “............... compromise or agreement if entered into on matters relating to the suit as also on matter beyond the scope and ambit of the suit forming the consideration of the compromise, the court may pass a decree recording such compromise for agreement but the decree will in effect be in so far it relates to the suit and will be operative and executable to that extent, In respect of matters extraneous to the suit, the provision of the decree will be and amount to an agreement between the parties binding and conclusive on them to be enforced in a separate suit or proceeding, if considered necessary by any of the parties" It is obvious that in the instant case the decree in Title Suit no 33 of 1938 would be deemed to have been executed in so far as the eviction is concerned. The validity or otherwise of the compromise in respect of the matters extraneous to the subject matters of the suit has to be gone into undoubtedly for finding out whether there has been a valid agreement mentioned in the schedule of the compromise petition or not. I do not, however, propose to adjudicate in any detail this aspect of the case, but to remit for re-consideration by the court of appeal below, whether on the evidence on the record it is of the view that there was a compromise as to title and possession of the lands described in the schedule of the compromise petition or not, notwithstanding the compromise for eviction, which has already been acted upon. The law on the subject has been fully indicated in the case of Vishnu Vs. Ramchandra Hemanta Kumar Vs. Midnupur Zamindari Co. Thed ecision in these cases do suggest that even agreement extraneous to the suit, which could not be enforced in execution of the decree may form the basis of a separate suit for enforcement for a concluded and binding agreement. There is no reason for me to hold that Ii suit showing otherwise that the agreement is not binding and void cannot be maintained. The question of title with respect to the disputed land in that sense will be relevant and the court of appeal below has committed error of law in saying that the question of title and possession with respect to the disputed lands are a absolutely irrelevant for the decision of the suit. 6. In the result this appeal is allowed, the judgment and the decree are set aside and the case is remitted to the court of the learned Second Additional District judge, Arrah for a reconsideration of decision in accordance with law. On the fact and in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.