ORDER B.D. Agarwal, J. - These connected petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution give rise to common questions. 2. Virendra Kumar respondent was elected Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha, Barampur, district Bijnor. The petitioner Layak Ram complained in writing on July 8, 1980 to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Nazibabad, for the removal of the respondent on certain charges. The Sub- Divisional Officer issued notice to show cause to the respondent on 10-2-1981 to which the petitioner submitted his explanation dated 6-3-1981. On 26-8-1981, the Sub-Divisional Officer passed the impugned order directing the removal of the respondent from the office of Pradhan being of opinion that the conviction of the respondent for offences under Sections 147, 323/149, 452, Penal Code, involved moral turpitude and that in the public interest it was not desirable that the respondent continued to hold the office. In appeal filed by the respondent the decision was reversed by the District Magistrate on 18-3-1982. Aggrieved Layak Ram has filed Writ Petition No. 5841 of 1982 seeking the writ of certiorari to quash the order made by the District Magistrate in appeal. The operation of this order was stayed by this Court on May 18, 1982 and the interim order was confirmed on 6th May, 1983. 3. The respondent was re-elected as Pradhan in the election held on 10-4-1982. Against this election Bharat Singh petitioner filed election petition under S. 12-C, U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). He applied for stay relying upon the provisions contained in sub-s. (2), S. 95 of the Act. On June 10, 1982 the Sub- Divisional Officer granted interim stay and restrained the respondent from taking charge as Pradhan in pursuance of the re-election. The respondent filed objection. The Sub- Divisional Officer adjourned the hearing to 7-9-1982 on 24th August, 1982. In the meantime, however, on 27-8-1982 in the absence of Bharat Singh petitioner the interim stay granted on 10th June, 1982 was vacated by the Sub- Divisional Officer. The Writ Petition No. 13075 of 1982 filed by Bharat Singh is directed against this order. The operation thereof has been stayed by this Court on November 5, 1982 and as at present the charge of the office of Pradhan in the Gaon Sabha is held by the Secretary. 4. The Writ Petition No. 13075 of 1982 filed by Bharat Singh is directed against this order. The operation thereof has been stayed by this Court on November 5, 1982 and as at present the charge of the office of Pradhan in the Gaon Sabha is held by the Secretary. 4. Section 95(1)(g) of the Act empowers the State Government inter alia to remove the Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha "If he is accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude" (sub-cl. (ii)) or "his continuance as such is not desirable in public interest" (sub- cl. (iii)). In terms of S. 96-A this power has been delegated by the State Government to the Sub-Divisional Officer and an appeal against his order lies to the District Magistrate. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 95 lays down "A person removed under sub-cis. (iii) and (iv) of cl. (g) of sub-s. (1) of this section shall not be entitled to be re-elected or re-appointed to any office under this Act for a period of five years or such lesser period as the State Government may order in any case." 5. Section 5-A provides disqualifications for holding office under Gaon Sabha or Nyaya Panchayat. Cl. (h) is to the effect that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen, nominated or appointed to and for holding any office in the Gaon Sabha or Gaon Panchayat or Nyaya Panchayat if he, "has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude." 6. Upon a perusal of the order made by the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 26-8-1981 it will appear that the respondent was removed from the office of Pradhan on ground that his continuance as Pradhan is not desirable in public interest. This was founded on two counts (i) the respondent has been convicted of offence punishable under Sections 147, 323/149, 452, Penal Code, (ii) the respondent is a history sheet or and recorded as such in P. S. Kiratpur. 7. The District Magistrate in appeal reversed this on 18-3-1982 taking the view that conviction for offence under Sections 147, 323/149, 452, I.P.C., does not involve moral turpitude and that the mere opening of history sheet is not a disqualification for the office of Pradhan. 8. 7. The District Magistrate in appeal reversed this on 18-3-1982 taking the view that conviction for offence under Sections 147, 323/149, 452, I.P.C., does not involve moral turpitude and that the mere opening of history sheet is not a disqualification for the office of Pradhan. 8. Sri R. K. Dwivedi learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed this contending, in the first place, that the view taken by the appellate authority in regard to the lack of moral turpitude is not correct. The expression moral turpitude is not defined in the Act or the Rules. This has, however come up for judicial interpretation a number of times in the context of S. 5-A(h) abovementioned. The generally accepted view is' that it implies "depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct", "anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle or good morals", "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. In Baleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector, Banaras, AIR 1959 All 71 , offence under S. 182, IPC, was held to involve moral turpitude. The view taken by B. Mukerji, J. in Shiva Nand v. The S. D. O., Chunar, 1961 Rev Dec 186 was that moral turpitude is involved in offence under S. 13, Public Gambling Act. The test propounded at p. 190 was "One has to consider as to how that act is viewed by the society or the community, as the case may he, and if the society or the community views such act as involving moral turpitude, then even though some particular individual may not consider it so will not make the act a moral one or a praiseworthy act." Conviction for offence under S. 60, U. P. Excise Act, was on the other hand found to involve no moral turpitude. A. P. Srivastava, J. on considering the authorities aforementioned commented in Mangali v. Chhakki Lal, AIR 1963 All 527 at page 528 : "With great respect, it appears to me that some of the observations made in these decisions have been too widely stated and if followed literally may make every act punishable in law an offence involving moral turpitude. A. P. Srivastava, J. on considering the authorities aforementioned commented in Mangali v. Chhakki Lal, AIR 1963 All 527 at page 528 : "With great respect, it appears to me that some of the observations made in these decisions have been too widely stated and if followed literally may make every act punishable in law an offence involving moral turpitude. That, however, could not be the intention with which those observations were made. From consideration of the dictionary meaning of the words `moral' and `turpitude' as well as the real ratio decidendi of the cases the principle which emerges appear to be that the question whether a certain offence involves moral turpitude or not will necessarily depend on the circumstances in which the offence is committed. It is not every punishable act that can be considered to be an offence involving moral turpitude. Had that been so, the qualification "involving moral turpitude" would not have been used by the Legislature and it would have disqualified every person who had been convicted of any offence. The tests which should ordinarily be applied for judging whether a certain offence does or does not involve moral turpitude appear to be, (1) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general, (2) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one and (3) whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked. down upon by the society." 9. The majority in Buddha Pitai v. Sub- Divisional Officer, Malihabad, AIR 1965 All 382 (FB) was of opinion that there was nothing inherently immoral in using a colouring matter other than that prescribed in respect.of the article in which it is used so as to constitute an offence under S. 7/16, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, involving moral turpitude rendering thereby a disqualification within the meaning of S. 5-A of the Act. It is not the gravity of the offence or the quantum of punishment which determines the question but the nature and circumstances in which it is committed. It is not the gravity of the offence or the quantum of punishment which determines the question but the nature and circumstances in which it is committed. Following this Brother K. N. Singh, J. held in Aijak Ahmad v. Niyaz Ahmed Khan, (1975) 1 All LR 476 that conviction under Sections 3 and 8, U. P. Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 does not involve moral turpitude so as to disqualify a person to hold office of Pradhan. 10. Concerning the conviction for offence under Sections 147, 323/149, 452, Penal Code, in the present case, the only material placed before the Sub-Divisional Officer was a copy of the order of this Court in Criminal Revision No. 802 of -1977 dated 18-4-1979. It shows that the incident was of 3-9-1972 (9.30 A.M.). The prosecution was against the respondent and eight others, the trial Court recorded conviction on 28-1-1977, the appeal was dismissed on 28-6-1977. In revision the conviction was maintained but the sentence both of imprisonment and fine was reduced. The judgment does not refer to facts or circumstances in which the offence was committed. Criminal trespass in the house was evidently associated with intention to cause hurt. Viewed in the light of the test propounded in his behalf, I am not inclined to the view that the conviction recorded was of offence involving moral turpitude. There is no manifest act of baseness, vileness or the, depravity in private and social duties which man owes to his fellowman, or to society in general, contrary to accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. It is not necessary however, and I refrain from expressing final opinion over this because of another aspect that is closely allied. 11. Proviso (i) to S. 95(1) of the Act lays down that "no action shall be taken under cl. (f), cl. (g) or cl. (h) except after giving to the body or person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed." 12. This is in conformity with the principles of natural justice. In Ved Singh Pradhan's case AIR 1965 All 370 which arose from an order of removal of Pradhan under section 96(1)(g)(iii), a Division Bench ruled that "the principle of natural justice imposed only this obligation upon him (Assistant Sub- Divisional Officer) that he had to give the appellant an opportunity to explain the charge". In Ved Singh Pradhan's case AIR 1965 All 370 which arose from an order of removal of Pradhan under section 96(1)(g)(iii), a Division Bench ruled that "the principle of natural justice imposed only this obligation upon him (Assistant Sub- Divisional Officer) that he had to give the appellant an opportunity to explain the charge". The principle has undeniably attained new dimensions with the advert of the decisions in Maneka Gandhi, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) and M. S. Gill, (1978) 1 SCC 405 : ( AIR 1978 SC 851 ). The proceeding that leads to the removal of the Pradhan from office is clearly quasi-judicial. The order affects adversely civil rights of the claimant. The authority has to reach his satisfaction on objective consideration of relevant grounds. There is statutory duty to afford reasonable opportunity of showing cause implying thereby the necessity to record reasons and more so because an appeal lies to the District Magistrate. But even if the enquiry be classed as administrative in character, the observance of basic norms of natural justice is inescapable A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262 : ( AIR 1970 SC 150 ). 13. The Sub-Divisional Officer in this case issued notice to show cause to the respondent on 10-2-81 (vide Annexure II to Writ Petition No. 5821 of 1982). This enumerates various cases in which the respondent had been convicted and. later acquitted but a reference to the case under Sections 147, 323/ 149, 452, Penal Code is conspicuous by its complete absence in this notice. The respondent was not called upon to submit his explanation, if any, in regard thereto. It was not, fair play in action on the part of the Sub-Divisional Officer therefore to attribute moral turpitude to the respondent on the footing of the conviction recorded under these provisions. 14. This, however, does not conclude the controversy. Another ground which prevailed with the Sub-Divisional Officer was whether as contemplated in section 95(1)(g)(iii) the continuance of the respondent as Pradhan is not desirable in public interest. The appellate authority has disposed of this issue by mere reference to a decision of this Court dismissing in limine Writ Petn. No. 2636 of 1972 (Balbir Singh v. Superintendent of Police, Bijnor) on 21-4-1972. That petition was directed against the opening of a history sheet. The appellate authority has disposed of this issue by mere reference to a decision of this Court dismissing in limine Writ Petn. No. 2636 of 1972 (Balbir Singh v. Superintendent of Police, Bijnor) on 21-4-1972. That petition was directed against the opening of a history sheet. An argument appears to have been advanced that this may constitute a disqualification within the meaning of S. 5-A. The Division Bench repelled this contention observing : "This petition is directed against the opening of history sheet by the Police against the petitioner. There are no allegations that the petitioner is being disturbed in the night of his freedom or movement is being curtailed. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that history sheet has been opened so as to render him disqualified from the office of Pradhan at the ensuing election. The disqualifications for holding the office of Pradhan of Gaon Sabha or Nyaya Panchayat are laid down in S. 5-A, U. P. Panchayat Raj Act. Opening of history sheet by Police is no disqualification for any office. There is no substance in the petitioner's contention. We accordingly dismiss the petition." 15. The appellate authority has failed to take note of the distinction that manifestly exists between the contents of S. 5-A on the one hand and 5.95(1) on the other. For purposes of S. 5-A the desirability in general public interest is not laid down as one of the grounds. This, however, does specifically find place in S. 95(1)(g)(iii) and it certainly is wide in scope. The field that it covers is larger in its content and scope than that is contained in S. 5-A. The authority competent in this behalf is expected to apply his mind and consider whether in public interest it is desirable taking into account the antecedents to retain the person concerned in office. The office of Pradhan is of vital importance to carry out the provisions of the Act. The Pradhan, it may not be an exaggeration to say, is the pivot charged with duties of great responsibility (see R. 47, U. P. Panchayat Raj Rules, 1947). Village administration and development which the Act aims to promote may suffer if the person at the helm is not such as to inspire respect and unflinching confidence. The Pradhan, it may not be an exaggeration to say, is the pivot charged with duties of great responsibility (see R. 47, U. P. Panchayat Raj Rules, 1947). Village administration and development which the Act aims to promote may suffer if the person at the helm is not such as to inspire respect and unflinching confidence. The mere opening of history sheet may not disqualify an aspirant to the office of Pradhan under S. 5-A but whether on cumulative consideration of his preceding conduct and character one may desirably continue in office is a different issue to which the appellate authority has not adverted. I must hasten to add that by making these observations it is not intended to substitute an assessment for that of the concerned authority. The satisfaction has to be of the competent authority. What I wish to emphasise is that this has to be reached on taking relevant factors into consideration. The opening of the history sheet against the respondent it appears was a sequal to his involvement in numerous criminal cases. Sri R. H. Zaidi the learned counsel urged that he has been acquitted in these cases. The position in regard to them is as under (these are cases referred to in the notice to show cause issued to the respondent) : (1) Case under S. 395/412, Penal Code convicted and sentenced by the Court of Session on 12-9-1962 to seven years rigorous imprisonment. The conviction and sentence were set aside by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1913 of 1962 on 4-2-1964. (2) The case under S. 25 Arms Act, convicted and sentenced to 11/2 years rigorous imprisonment by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on 12-3-1964 but acquitted by this Court on 1-8-1967 in Criminal Appeal No. 2437 of 1964. (3) Case under Sections 395/397, Penal Code convicted and sentenced to nine years rigorous imprisonment by the Court of Session on 25-1-1967 but acquitted by this Court in appeal on 30-9-1979. (4) Case under S. 302, IPC convicted and sentenced for life by the Court of Session on May 27, 1975 but acquitted by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1339 of 1975 dated 21-11-1978. The appeal by the State against the acquittal is pending in the Supreme Court. 16. (4) Case under S. 302, IPC convicted and sentenced for life by the Court of Session on May 27, 1975 but acquitted by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1339 of 1975 dated 21-11-1978. The appeal by the State against the acquittal is pending in the Supreme Court. 16. In the notice to show cause vide Annexure II to the writ petition in writ petition No. 5841 of 1982 there is reference made to another case under S. 412, Penal Code, also and it is stated that this led to rigorous imprisonment for two years. In his counter- affidavit the respondent refuted, however, that there was any such case against him and in the absence of any other particulars in regard thereto furnished in the rejoinder, I take it that there was no such case. For the rest, however, there is no controversy. 17. In para 5-B of the counter-affidavit filed in Writ Petition No. 5841 of 1982 the respondent has stated inter alia that he had also filed copies of judgments of this Court. It should have been relevant for the appellate authority to look into these judgments also with a view to gather whether the respondent got a clean acquittal or as whether there is reflected a tendency or propensity to criminal activity on his part and if so the effect thereof. This too has not been done. The implications of S. 95(1)(g)(iii) cannot be claimed to have been viewed thus in correct perspective. 18. It was argued by Sri Zaidi that since the respondent was re-elected Pradhan in the election held on 10-4-1982 the Writ Petition No. 5841 of 1982 has become infructuous. I. am unable to agree. Sub-section (2) of S. 95 lays down that a person removed under sub- cl. (iii) of cl. (g) sub-s. (1) of this section "shall not be entitled to be re-elected or re-appointed to any office under this Act for a period of five years or such lesser period as the State Government may order in any case." This, therefore, places an embargo against re- election to the office of the Pradhan. If it were to be found that the Sub-Divisional Officer had under his order D/- 26-8-1981 rightly removed the respondent under S. 95(1)(g)(iii) from the office of Pradhan, this shall render him ineligible to seek re-election. If it were to be found that the Sub-Divisional Officer had under his order D/- 26-8-1981 rightly removed the respondent under S. 95(1)(g)(iii) from the office of Pradhan, this shall render him ineligible to seek re-election. Consequently, the validity of the order of removal has still to be adjudged in accordance with law. I am not impressed with the contention that because the respondent has been re-elected, the ground on which his removal was sought from the office which he earlier held have disappeared. To hold thus would amount to putting the cart before the horse. The legality of the re-election would depend on the absence of liability for removal under S. 95(1)(g)(iii) and not vice versa. 19. Taking up now the writ petition filed by Bharat Singh, there is no dispute that the petitioner therein has filed an election petition under S. 12-C of the Act directed against the re-election of the respondent to the office of Pradhan on 10-41982. In that proceeding there was an application made for interim stay by the petitioner to the effect that keeping in view sub-s. (2), S. 95 and since there had been an order of removal made against the respondent on August 26, 1982 under sub- s. (1) of S. 95, the respondent be not permitted to take over charge as the Pradhan: The Sub- Divisional Officer (Sri C. P. Misra) who took cognizance of the election petition granted interim stay vide his order dated 10th June, 1982. The order sheet vide Annexure I-C to the writ petition shows that when the case came up on 24-8-1982 it had to be adjourned since the Sub-Divisional Officer was busy in connection with the maintenance of law and order duties and the next date fixed for hearing was 7-9-1982. This date was fixed in the presence of both the parties. The case was, however, taken up on 27-8-1982 itself which was not the date fixed and in the absence of the petitioner the Sub-Divisional Officer vacated the interim stay which he had granted on 10th June, 1982. Sri Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed this on the ground firstly, that this discharge of the interim stay was unjustified since the date fixed for hearing was 27-9-1982 and the petitioner did not have notice that the case would be taken up on 27-8-1982. Sri Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed this on the ground firstly, that this discharge of the interim stay was unjustified since the date fixed for hearing was 27-9-1982 and the petitioner did not have notice that the case would be taken up on 27-8-1982. The interim stay dated 10th June, 1982 having been made on the application from the petitioner, it was incumbent that there should have been notice given to him if for some reason the Sub- Divisional Officer did not think it proper to wait until the date fixed had arrived. There is another reason also why this order cannot stand scrutiny. The basis assigned by the Sub- Divisional Officer for making this order was that the interim stay granted by this Court in Writ Petition No. 5841 of 1982 on 18th May, 1982 is of no consequence because that was in relation to.the office of Pradhan held by the respondent prior to the re-election. It appears to have been thought that since re-election had intervened the order passed in connection with the removal of the respondent from the office of Pradhan had ceased to be of any effect. This clearly overlooks the implication of sub-s. (2), S. 95 extracted above. This in essence provides for consequence ensuing as a direct result of removal made under sub- s. (1). The removal directed under S. 95(1) leads to incapacity for re-election to any office under the Act. On account of pending dispute over the issue of removal leading to the stay granted by this Court against the order of the appellate authority dated 18-3-1982, the contention is that it was improper to say that despite that stay the writ petitioner shall continue to hold charge of the office of Pradhan. 20. For the reasons set out in the above, the petitions succeed and are allowed accordingly. In Writ Petition No. 5841 of 1982 the order made by respondent 1 (the District Magistrate, Bijnor) dated 18-3-1982 (Annexure IV to the writ petition) is quashed and respondent 1 is directed to rehear and decide expeditiously on merit in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained herein the appeal directed against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Nazibabad dated 26-8-1981. In the other Writ Petition No. 13075 of 1982 respondent 1, namely, the Sub- Divisional Officer, Nazibabad, is directed to reconsider in accordance with law the question of interim stay in the election petition under S. 12-C, U. P. Panchayat Raj Act filed by the petitioner. For so long as any other order is not made by the Sub-Divisional Officer, the duties of the office of the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha, Barampur, district Bijnor shall continue to be discharged by the Secretary, Gaon Panchayat. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.